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Full text of "Diplomatic documents relating to the outbreak of the European war"

PRESENTED BY 
THE PUBLISHER 



Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 



DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS 

RELATING TO 

THE OUTBREAK OF THE 
EUROPEAN WAR 



EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION 

by 
JAMES BROWN SCOTT 

DIRECTOR 



PART I 



NEW YORK 

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 

AMERICAN BRANCH : 35 West 32nd Street 

LONDON, TORONTO, MELBOURNE, AND BOMBAY 

HUMPHREY MILFORD 

1916 






COPYRIGHT 1916 

BY THB 

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 
Washington, D. C. 



THE QUINN A BODEN CO. PRESS 
RAHWAY, N. J. 



INTRODUCTION 

The Bible tells us that "of making many books there is no 
end/' and it would seem that the writers on the great war of 1914 
are intent upon establishing beyond peradventure the truth of this 
pronouncement, if anyone should be bold enough to question it. In- 
deed, we are in danger of being engulfed by the multitude of books 
concerning its causes with which the world is flooded, many of 
which, it is believed, unlike the ark, will not survive the deluge ; but 
notwithstanding the many, there is one book of an authoritative na- 
ture whose chapters are the official statements laid before the world 
by each of the belligerent governments, and the present volume justi- 
fies its appearance and its claim to usefulness because it is composed 
exclusively of the appeals which each of the nations at war has made 
to public opinion. 

It is true that these many-colored books and papers have been 
more than once brought together and published, but there appears to 
have been in each case a special reason or an interested motive for so 
doing. The present publication has no purpose other than to lay be- 
fore the reader the statements which the nations have been pleased to 
make as to the reasons which drove them to war (because apparently 
none of them wanted the war and yet each of them was forced into 
it), without an attempt to analyze the reasons given by the govern- 
ments of the warring countries; to separate them into pretext or 
cause; to question their sincerity or to apportion praise or blame. 
The documents speak for themselves and the reader is left to judge. 

Now, the value of these documents is greater than the truth which 
they may contain, for they are the reasons which each nation would 
have us regard as the justification of its action, and from this stand- 
point they are a contribution to the psychology of nations. Responsi- 
ble statesmen thought that the publication of the documents would 
vindicate the propriety of their actions; otherwise the ministers of 
foreign affairs of the countries at war would not have issued them, and 
they thus furnish unimpeachable evidence of the processes of thought 
obtaining in the chancellories of Europe. The documents are further 
valuable as evidences of the fact that the actions of the nations at 
war required justification, and for the additional and even more im- 
portant fact that they are addressed not merely to their citizens or 
subjects at hom,e, but primarily to the opinion of neutral countries, 



8:47296 



iv INTBODUCTION 

which the nations seek to influence as an advocate the judge, thus 
recognizing public opinion and striving to win it to their side. 

To an American observer the issue of these documents by the dif- 
ferent belligerent countries seems to be a confession that a decent re- 
spect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare 
the causes which impel them to — war. Admitting that each nation 
honestly believed that it was forced into the war against its will, and 
that it would, if it could, gladly have maintained the peace unbroken, 
these documents appear to show, as Hamlet would say to-day, that 
something is rotten in the state of ... , and that the great need 
of the future is some kind of international organization which will 
enable nations, sincerely desirous of averting war, to settle their dis- 
putes peaceably without resorting to the sword, which they would 
prefer to have rust in the scabbard. What should be the nature, the 
visible form and shape of this international organization, requires 
the world's best thought, and it is only mentioned in passing that the 
reader may ponder these things after he has laid the volume aside. 



In view of the size of a one-volume book which would be needed to 
include all these documents, this publication is arranged in two parts, 
of which Part I contains the Introduction, a table showing the Official 
Positions of the Principal Persons mentioned in the Correspondence, 
a separate table of contents for the Austro-Hungarian, Belgian and 
French Books, but which are printed consecutively and followed by 
the documents of these three countries ; and of Part II, which contains 
a separate table of contents for the German, British, Italian, Eussian 
and Serbian books, likewise printed consecutively and likewise fol- 
lowed by the documents issued by these countries. The editor is 
responsible for the table of contents to the Austro-Hungarian Bed 
Book (No. 2), German White Book, Russian Orange Book (No. 1), 
Russian Orange Book (No. 2), Serbian Blue Book, and to the appen- 
dices to the British Blue Book (No. 1). He is also responsible for the 
translation of the table of contents to the Belgian Grey Book (No. 2). 
In order to give no just ground for criticism of expressions 
used in the summaries of the different documents in the tables of 
contents, these summaries are much briefer than they would be made 
under other circumstances. The tables of contents to the other books 
reproduced in this publication were taken from the original sources, 
with only such slight variations as were necessary for the sake of uni- 
formity. The table of Official Positions of the Principal Persons 



INTRODUCTION v 

mentioned in the Correspondence is repeated for convenience in Part 
II. The Analytical Index for the entire work is to be found at the 
close of Part II. The English system of spelling is used throughout all 
the documents, as well as in the tables of contents appertaining to them, 
inasmuch as the greater number of governments, in issuing English 
translations of their publications, used that system of spelling. 

The popular titles of the different publications of the belligerents 
have been used, as for example, the British Blue Booh, the Belgian 
Grey Boole, etc. Where more than one publication has been issued by 
a government, as in the case of Austria-Hungary, Belgium, etc., the 
books are arranged chronologically in the order as issued by the par- 
ticular government and are arbitrarily designated as (No. 1) and (No. 
2) . It is thought that this arrangement makes for ease of reference. 

The documents in the present publication are printed from the 
originals, when they are in English, and when in foreign languages, 
from the official English translations supplied by the ambassadors and 
ministers of the several countries accredited to the United States, in 
all cases where such official English translations have been made and 
issued by the respective governments. In the case of Belgium, France, 
and Serbia, the official English translations issued by the British 
Government have been used, as acceptable to those countries. 

In the present publication, the Division of International Law has 
endeavored to reproduce textually the different documents and it 
should be said, therefore, that practically the only changes made from 
the originals furnished, were in cases of clear typographical errors. 
In view of this textual reproduction, it will also be found that there is 
a variation in spelling of proper names when the same names occur in 
the documents issued by different governments, and it should be noted 
also that the same letters or documents, when printed in more than 
one book, may vary in phraseology because of different translators. 



The undersigned is deeply grateful to the foreign representatives 
of the belligerent countries for their kindness and courtesy in this 
matter and regards it as a duty, for this reason as well as for others, 
that the introduction prefixed to this volume should be free from any 
expression which may, even to the most sensitive mind, imply or seem 
to imply a criticism of one or the other of the warring nations. 

James Brown Scott, 
Director of the Division of International Law. 
Washington, D. C, February 28, 1916. 



OFFICIAL POSITIONS 
OF THE 
PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE 
CORRESPONDENCE 

Aehrenthal, Count Former Austro-Hungarian Minister for For- 
eign Affairs. 

Akidzuki, S Japanese Ambassador at Vienna. 

Albert King of Belgium. 

Alexander Crown Prince of Serbia. 

Allize^ M French Minister at Munich. 

Ambrozy, Count Austro-Hungarian Minister at Rome. 

Annoville, M. d' French Charge d'Affaires at Luxemburg. 

Apchier, M. d' French Consul-General at Budapest. 

Avarna, Duke d' Italian Ambassador at Vienna. 

Bapst, M French Minister at Copenhagen. 

Barrere, M French Ambassador at Rome. 

Baudin, M French Minister of Marine. 

Beaumont, Mr British Charge d'Affaires at Constantinople. 

Below Saleske, Herr von German Minister at Brussels. 

Benckendorff, Count Russian Ambassador at London. 

Berchtold, Count Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Af- 
fairs. 

Berthelot, M , French Political Director. 

Bertie, Sir Francis British Ambassador at Paris. 

Bethmann-Hollweg, Dr. von German Imperial Chancellor. 

Beyens, Baron Belgian Minister at Berlin. 

Bienvenu-Martin, M French Minister of Justice and Acting Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs. 

Bollati, M Italian Ambassador at Berlin. 

Bompard, M French Ambassador at Constantinople. 

Boppe, M French Minister at Belgrade. 

Boschkovitch, M Serbian Minister at London. 

Bronewsky, M Russian Charge d'Affaires at Berlin. 

Bryan, William J Secretary of State of the United States. 

Buch, Herr von German Minister at Luxemburg. 

Buchanan, Sir George British Ambassador at Petrograd. 

Bulow, Prince von Special German Ambassador at Rome. 

Bunsen, Sir Maurice de British Ambassador at Vienna. 

Burian, Baron Austro-Hungarian Privy Councilor and Cham 

berlain. 

Buisseret, Count de Belgian Minister at St. Petersburgh. 

Cambon, M. Jules M French Ambassador at Berlin. 

C ambon, M. Paul French Ambassador at London. 

Carlotti di Riparbella, Marquis . Italian Ambassador at Petrograd. 

Chevalley, M French Minister at Christiania. 

Clary, Count Austro-Hungarian Minister at Brussels. 

Crackanthorpe, Mr. . . , British Charge* d'Affaires at Belgrade. 

vii 



viii PEINCIPAL PBESONS IN THE COKKESPONDENCE 

Cuccm Boasso, M Italian Minister at Sofia. * 

Czernin, Count Austro-Hungarian Charge d'Affaires at Petro- 

grad. 

Davignon, M Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Delcasse, M French Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Demidoff, M Russian Minister at Athens. 

Doumebgue, M French Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Dudzeele, Count de Belgian Minister at Vienna. 

Dumaine, M French Ambassador at Vienna. 

Elst, Babon van deb Belgian Secretary-General to the Ministry for 

Foreign Affairs. 
Escaille, Baron de i/ Counsellor of Belgian Legation at Petrogard 

and Charge* d'Affaires. 

!Etienne, M French Minister of War. 

Etteb, M. de Counsellor of Russian Embassy at London. 

Eyschen, M. Paul President of the Government, Minister of State, 

Luxemburg. 

Fallon, Baron Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

Faramond, M. de Naval Attache* to French Embassy at Berlin. 

Farges, M French Consul-General at Basle. 

Fleuriau, M. de French Charge* d'Affaires at London. 

Flotow, Hebe von German Ambassador at Rome. 

ForGash, Count Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for 

Foreign Affairs. 

Francis Joseph Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. 

Funakoshi, Baron Japanese Charge d'Affaires at Berlin. 

George V King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 

and Ireland, etc., and Emperor of India. 

Georgevitch, M Serbian Charge* d'Affaires at Constantinople. 

Gebbabd, Mr. James W American Ambassador at Berlin. 

Giers, M. de Russian Ambassador at Constantinople. 

Giesl, Baron von Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade. 

Goschen, Sir Edward British Ambassador at Berlin. 

Graz, Mr. des British Ambassador at Belgrade. 

Gbenieb, Baron Belgian Minister at Madrid. 

Grey, Sir Edward British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 

Guillaume, Baron Belgian Minister at Paris. 

Haldane, Viscount Lord High Chancellor of England. 

Henry Prince of Prussia. 

Hoflehner, Herr Acting Consul for Austria-Hungary at Nish. 

Hohenlohe, Prince Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin, suc- 
cessor to Szogye"ny. 

Isvolsky, M Russian Ambassador at Paris. 

Jagow, Herr von German Secretary of State. 

Jehlitschka, Herr Austro-Hungarian Consul-General at Uskiib. 

Jonnart, M French Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Kazansky, M Acting Russian Consul at Prague. 

Klobukowski, M French Minister at Brussels. 

Koudacheff, Puince Russian Minister at Antwerp. Formerly Rus- 
sian Charge d'Affaires at Vienna. 
M. Kroupenski Russian Ambassador to Rome. 

Lahure, Baron French Consul at Brussels. 

Lalaing, Count de Belgian Minister at London. 



PRINCIPAL PERSONS IN THE CORRESPONDENCE ix 

Lichowsky, Prince German Ambassador at London. 

Loudon, Dr. Jkhr. J Netherland Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Macchio, Baron von Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State 

for Foreign Affairs. 

Mallet, Sir L British Ambassador at Constantinople. 

Manneville, Count de French Charge d' Affaires at Berlin. 

Mensdorff, Count Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London. 

Merey, Herr von Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Rome. 

Michailovitch, M Serbian Minister at Rome. 

Mohammed V Sultan of Turkey. 

Mayrhauser, Herr von Austro-Hungarian Consul at Valona. 

Moncheur, Baron Belgian Minister at Constantinople. 

Mollard, M. French Minister at Luxemburg. 

MorIcz de Tecso, P Austro-Hungarian Consul at Ancona. 

Muller, Baron von Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Tokio. 

Nicholas II Emperor of Russia. 

Nicholson, Sir Arthur British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 

Affairs. 
Nigra, Count Former Italian Ambassador at Vienna. 

Paleologue, M French Ambassador at Petrograd. 

Pashitch, M Serbian Prime Minister and Minister for For- 
eign Affairs. 

Patchou, Dr. Laza Serbian Acting Prime Minister and Minister 

for Foreign Affairs. 

Pellet, M French Minister at The Hague. 

Penfield, Mr. Frederick C American Ambassador at Vienna. 

Pichon, M French Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Poincare, M President of the Republic of France. 

Pourtales, Count de German Ambassador at Petrograd. 

Renkin, M Colonial Minister of Belgium. 

Rodd, Sir Rennell British Ambassador at Rome. 

Ronssin, M French Consul-General at Frankfort. 

Rumbold, Sir Horace British Charge" d' Affaires at Berlin. 

Salviati, M Russian Consul-General at Fiume. 

San Giuliano, Marquis di Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sazonoff, M Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Schebeko, M Russian Ambassador at Vienna. 

Schoen, Baron von German Ambassador at Paris. 

Serret, Lieutenant-Colonel Military Attache" to French Embassy at Berlin. 

Sevastopoulo, M Russian Charge" d' Affaires at Paris. 

Sonnino, Baron Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Spalaikovitch, Dr. M Serbian Minister at Petrograd. 

Squitti, Baron Italian Minister at Nish. 

Steen de Jehay, Count Van Den. Belgian Minister at Luxemburg. 

Storck, Ritter von Counsellor of Austro-Hungarian Legation at 

Belgrade. 

Strandtman, M. de Russian Charge" d' Affaires at Belgrade. 

Stuergck, Count President of Austrian Council of State. 

Suchomlinoff, M Russian Minister of War. 

Swerbeew, M. de Russian Ambassador at Berlin. 

Szapary, Count Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Petrograd. 

Szecsen, Count Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris. 

Szogyeny, Count de Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin. 

Thiebaut, M French Minister at Stockholm. 

Tisza, Count Hungarian Premier, Austro-Hungarian Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs. 



x PRINCIPAL PERSONS IN THE CORRESPONDENCE 

Tombeub, M Belgian Vice-Governor of the Katanga. 

Tschieschky, Heeb von German Ambassador at Vienna. 

Vesnitch, Br. Milenko. R.. Serbian Minister at Paris. 

Victor Emmanuel III King of Italy. 

Villiers, Sir Francis British Minister at Brussels. 

Viviani, M. Rene French Minister for Foreign Affairs, President 

of the Council. 

Watson, Mr. Grant Secretary of British Legation at Brussels. 

Weede, Jonkheer de Netherland Minister at Brussels. 

Welle, M. de Belgian Minister at Belgrade. 

Whitlock, Mr. Brand American Minister at Brussels. 

William II The German Emperor. 

Yovanovitch, Dr. M Serbian Charge* d' Affaires at Berlin. 

Yovanovitch, M. Yov. M Serbian Minister at Vienna. 

Ypersele, M. van de Belgian Minister at Bucharest. 

Zimmermann, Herr von German Under-Secretary of State. 



CONTENTS OF PART I 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. l) 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



Von Storck to 
Count Berchtold 



Von Storck to 
Count Berchtold 



1914 
Belgrade 
June 29 



Belgrade 
June 30 



Consul- General Uskiib 
Jehlitschka to July 1 
Count Berchtold 



Count Szecsen to 
Count Berchtold 



Acting Consul 
Hoflehner to 

Count Berchtold 

Baron von Giesl to 
Count Berchtold 



Count Berchtold to 
Baron von Giesl 



Paris 
July 4 



Nish 
July 6 



Belgrade 
July 21 



Vienna 
July 22 



Manifestations of joy in Belgrade at 
the news of the assassination of the 
heir apparent to the throne, Arch- 
duke Francis Ferdinand 

Servian police have taken no steps to 
trace the threads of the crime in 
Servia 

Joyous demonstrations at Uskiib and 
Pristina, when crime of Serajevo be- 
came known 

President of French Republic ex- 
presses conviction that Servian Gov- 
ernment would lend its assistance to 
Austria-Hungary in criminal inves- 
tigation and prosecution of possible 
accomplices in Serajevo crime. . . . 



Joyous satisfaction at Nish at crime 
of Serajevo 



Servian policy has but one aim: de 
tachment of the Austro-Hungarian 
territories inhabited by South Slavs, 
and ultimate destruction of Austria 
Hungary as a Great Power. Servian 
Press Campaign indulges in lies, 
hatred and contempt. A further 
derogation of Austria-Hungary's 
position cannot be permitted .... 



The Imperial and Royal Government's 
note to Servia 



10 
11 



12 
14 



Xll 



CONTENTS 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



Count Berchtold to 
the Imperial and 
Royal Ambassa- 
dors at Berlin, 
Rome, Paris, Lon 
don, St. Peters 
burgh, and Con- 
stantinople 

Count Berchtold to 
Count Mensdorff 



1914. 
Vienna 
July 22 



Vienna 
July 23 



10 



Count Mensdorff to 
Count Berchtold 



London 
July 24 



11 



Count Szgcsen to 
Count Berchtold 



Paris 
July 24 



12 



Count Sze*csen to 
Count Berchtold 



Paris 
July 24 



Communication of the note to Servian 
Government. Comments upon this 
note disclosing the Servian agita- 
tions and machinations against the 
Monarchy and explaining why the 
Austro-Hungarian Government had 
displayed so much forbearance in 
the face of provocative attitude .... 

Servian Government has taken no 
steps to follow up the traces of the 
Serajevo crime, which point to Bel- 
grade; but, on the contrary, has en- 
deavoured to efface them. The short 
time-limit was essential in order to 
leave no loophole for Servian sub- 
terfuges, so well known to the Im- 
perial and Royal Government for 
many years 



Communication to Sir Edward Grey 
concerning the Servian note. The 
latter's apprehension at the short 
time-limit, and fears of reaction 
upon the peace of Europe. Ex- 
planation of the standpoint of the 
Vienna Cabinet. Defence of our 
most vital interests; complete fail- 
ure of our conciliatory attitude to- 
ward Servia 



Communication to French Govern- 
ment of note to Servia and explana- 
tion of the Imperial and Royal Gov- 
ernment's standpoint: The question 
must be settled between Austria- 
Hungary and Servia alone. A check 
to the unrest caused by Servia's 
machinations for many years past 
would be to the interests of Europe 
in general. The Acting French Min 
ister of Foreign Affairs has refrained 
from palliating and defending Ser- 
via's attitude in any way 



German Ambassador is instructed to 
inform French Cabinet of his Gov- 
ernment's view that the matter of 
the Servian differences concerns only 
Austria-Hungary and Servia 



18 



21 



22 



23 



24 



CONTENTS 



xm 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



13 



14 



Count Szecsen to 
Count Berchtold 



Count Szapary to 
Count Berchtold 



1914. 

Paris 

July 24 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 24 



15 



16 



Communique* in the 
Russian Official 
Gazette 

Count Szapary to 
Count Berchtold 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 24 

St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 24 



17 



18 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Mensdorff 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Szapary 



Vienna 
July 24 

Vienna 
July 24 



German Ambassador has carried out 
his instructions. French Govern- 
ment shares German view and hopes 
differences will be settled directly 
and amicably 



Communication of note to Servia and 
comments on Austro-Hungarians 
standpoint. M. Sazonow's objections. 
In reply to his version that Austria- 
Hungary wants war, it is stated that 
Austria-Hungary is the most peace 
loving Power in the world, but is 
compelled to put an end to the men- 
ace to our Dynasty by Servian 
bombs and to our territory by Ser 
via's revolutionary machinations . . . 

Russia could not remain indifferent 
to a conflict between Austria-Hun- 
gary and Servia 



In reply to observation made by Rus 
sian Minister of Foreign Affairs that 
the controversy between Austria 
Hungary and Servia is not a matter 
to be restricted to those countries, 
and that Russia cannot remain in- 
different if Austria-Hungary should 
intend to " swallow " Servia, Ger 
man Ambassador says that Austria- 
Hungary has no such intention, but 
that she could not admit interven 
tion in her differences with Servia. . 

Action taken in Belgrade has not the 
character of formal ultimatum, but 
of a representation with time-limit. 

Russian Charge* d'Affaires has been 
informed that Austria-Hungary does 
not seek to humiliate Servia or to 
acquire territory: all she wants is 
preservation of status quo, as well 
as condemnation and suppression of 
Great-Servian agitation directed 
against the integrity of the Dual 
Monarchy 1 



24 



24 



26 



26 



27 



28 



XIV 



CONTENTS 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



19 



20 



21 



22 



23 



24 



25 



26 



Count Berchtold to 
the Imperial and 
Royal Ambassa- 
dors in Berlin, 
Rome, Paris, Lon- 
don, St. Peters- 
burgh and Con- 
stantinople 

Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macchio, 
Councilor Austro 
Hungarian Min 
istry of Foreign 
Affairs 

Count Berchtold to 
Count Szapary 

Baron von Giesl to 
Count Berchtold 

Baron von Giesl to 
Count Berchtold 

Baron von Giesl to 
Count Berchtold 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Szapary 



1914. 
Vienna 
July 25 



Lambach 
July 25 



Bad Tschl 
July 25 

Belgrade 
July 25 

Semlin 
July 25 

Semlin 
July 25 



July 12/25 

Vienna 
July 25 



Dossier relative to Great- Servian 
propaganda and its connexion with 
the Serajevo outrage 



Request presented by Russian Charge" 
d' Affaires, that time-limit for de- 
mands upon Servia be extended, can 
not be acceded to 



Communication and explanation of 
above refusal 

Administrative and military prepara 
tion in Servia 

General mobilisation ordered in 
Servia 

Rupture of diplomatic relations with 
Servia in consequence of Belgrade 
Government's unsatisfactory reply 
to Austro-Hungarian demands . . . 



Note of the Royal Servian Govern 
ment '. 



The Imperial and Royal Government's 
attitude toward Servia could not be 
influenced by the possibility of a con 
flict with Russia; fundamental con- 
siderations of Austro-Hungarian do 
mestic policy compelled Austria- 
Hungary to put an end to a situa- 
tion which amounted to a Russian 
safe conduct enabling Servia to con 
tinuously threaten the Dual Mon 
archy with impunity. The Vienna 
Cabinet hopes that Russia will not 
interfere with the Austro-Hungarian 
action in Servia, in view of the good- 
will shown heretofore by Austria- 
Hungary toward the Balkan States, 
and in consideration of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government having dis- 
claimed any intention of conquest 
or of infringement upon the sov- 
eignty of Servia 



29 



75 

75 

76 
76 

77 
77 



81 



CONTENTS 



xv 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



27 



28 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Szapary 



Count Szapary to 
Count Berchtold 



1914. 
Vienna 
July 25 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 26 



29 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Mensdorff 



Vienna 
July 26 



30 



31 



Count Berchtold to 
the Imperial and 
Royal Ambassa 
dors in Berlin, 
Rome, London 
Paris and St. 
Petersburgh 

Count Szapary to 
Count Berchtold 



Vienna 
July 26 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 27 



The demand concerning the cotfpera 
tion of Austro-Hungarian officials in 
suppressing the subversive agitation 
in Servia was due solely to practical 
considerations and was not aimed at 
an infringement upon Servia's sov- 
ereignty 



German Ambassador in St. Peters 
burgh warns Russian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs that Russian mobil 
isation measures against Germany 
would inevitably lead to war. Ger- 
man Military Attache" informs Rus- 
sian Minister of War that mobilisa- 
tion against Austria-Hungary would 
create a very threatening situation. 
Minister of War gives his word of 
honour that no order whatever has 
been issued for mobilisation 



Instructions to call Sir Edward 
Grey's attention to the fact that the 
general mobilisation of Servian army 
ordered three hours before Servian 
note in reply was presented, proves 
how little disposition there was in 
Belgrade for a peaceful settlement, 
and indicates the insincerity of the 
Servian declaration which purports 
to be conciliatory 



In view of the Servian Government's 
refusal to accept the Austro-Hun 
garian demands, the Vienna Cabinet 
is compelled to force Servia to a 
radical change in her hitherto hos 
tile attitude 



The Imperial and Royal Ambassador 
explains to Russian Minister of For- 
eign Affairs that Austria-Hungary 
was far from intending an on- 
slaught on the Balkan Peninsula, or 
even a preventive war against Rus- 
sia. The aim of our action was self- 
preservation and self-defence. Aus- 
tria-Hungary had no intention to 
menace Russian interests or to seek 
trouble with Russia. Analysis of the 
Austro-Hungarian demands upon 
Servia 



83 



84 



85 



85 



86 



XVI 



CONTENTS 



No. 




Place and 
Bate. 



Summary. 



Page. 



32 



33 



34 



35 



36 



37 



38 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Szapary 



Count Szogygny to 
Count Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
the Imperial and 
Royal Ambassa- 
dors in Berlin, 
Rome, London, 
Paris and St. 
Petersburgh 

Count Szogygny to 
Count Berchtold 



Baron Mtiller to 
Count Berchtold 



Count Berchtold to 
the Royal Servian 
Foreign Office at 
Belgrade 

Count Berchtold to 
Count Szogyeny 



1914. 
Vienna 
July 27 



Berlin 

July 27 

Vienna 
July 27 



Berlin 
July 28 



Tokio 
July 28 



Vienna 
July 28 



Vienna 
July 28 



The Imperial and Royal Government 
declares that the Dual Monarchy did 
not intend any territorial conquest, 
provided that the war remained lo- 
calised between Austria-Hungary 
and Servia 



"Military precautions" in Russia. 



Communication of the note of the 
Royal Servian Government, dated 
12th/25th July, 1914, and of the 
Austro-Hungarian Government's 
comment thereon 



The British proposal to leave the set- 
tlement of the Austro-Hungarian- 
Servian differences in the hands of 
a conference to be held in London 
has been refused by Germany on the 
ground that the latter could not 
allow her ally to be hailed before a 
European Court in its controversy 
with Servia 



Declaration of the semi-official Japan 
Times that the Japanese Govern- 
ment would remain strictly neutral 
in the event of a war 



Declaration of War on Servia. 



It has been explained to Sir Edward 
Grey that Austria-Hungary does not 
intend territorial conquest or the 
destruction of Servian independence 
but solely demands satisfaction for 
the past and guarantees for the fu- 
ture. The British suggestion of a 
conference on our controversy with 
Servia is superseded by the existing 
state of war. Concentration of 
British fleet 



87 
87 



88 



98 



99 



99 



CONTENTS 



xvii 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



39 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Mensdorff 



1914. 
Vienna 
July 28 



40 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Szapary 



Vienna 
July 28 



41 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Mensdorff 



Vienna 
July 28 



42 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Szogyeny 



Vienna 
July 28 



Instructions to explain to Sir Edward 
Grey the "Greater Servian" propa 
ganda and its relation to the crime 
of Serajevo; also to make it clear 
that Servia's reply only apparently 
meets our demands but is intended to 
deceive Europe while evading any 
guarantee for the future 



Russian Government's desire to nego 
tiate with Vienna Cabinet with a 
view of modifying several of our 
demands on Servia. This request 
had to be denied, because these de- 
mands are essential for the termina- 
tion of the Servian machinations 
against Austria-Hungary's existence. 
Servia, by issuing order for general 
mobilisation, has committed hostile 
action. Nevertheless, the Vienna 
Cabinet waited another three days. 
Servia has now begun hostilities on 
the Hungarian border. A peaceful 
adjustment of our relations with 
Servia has thus been rendered im 
possible 



The British Ambassador has explained 
to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign 
Minister Sir Edward Grey's proposal 
for a conference. Great Britain's 
offer to mediate in conflict between 
Austria-Hungary and Servia. Reply 
to the Ambassador that hostilities 
could no longer be prevented, since 
war has broken out. A compromise 
based on the Servian reply is not 
feasible, in view of the traditional 
Servian quibbles. Peace could not be 
maintained if Great Powers placed 
themselves behind Servia and guar- 
anteed the latter's impunity. Servia 
would thus be encouraged and peace 
would soon again be endangered .... 

Request to German Government to 
call Russian Cabinet's attention to 
the fact that the mobilisation of the 
military districts of Kieff, Odessa, 
Moscow and Kazan was equivalent 
to a threat to Austria-Hungary, and 
would therefore be met by the Dual 
Monarchy and Germany with the 
most extensive military counter- 
measures 



101 



101 



103 



104 



XV111 



CONTENTS 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



43 



44 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Sz5gy6ny 



Count Berchtold to 
the Imperial and 
Royal Ambassa 
dors in St. Peters 
burgh, London, 
Paris and Rome 



45 



Count Szecsen to 
Count Berchtold 



46 



Count Sz6gy6ny to 
Count Berchtold 



1914. 
Vienna 
July 28 



Vienna 
July 29 



Paris 
July 29 



Berlin 
July 29 



Germany has submitted for the con- 
sideration of the Vienna Cabinet 
Sir Edward Grey's suggestion that 
Austria-Hungary either accept the 
Servian reply as satisfactory or con- 
sider it a basis for negotiations 
among the Cabinets 



With reference to Sir Edward Grey's 
suggestions, the reasons are once 
more pointed out why the Servian 
reply is considered unsatisfactory 
and insidious. The contention that 
Austria-Hungary's action against 
Servia is directed against Russia 
and Russian interests in the Bal- 
kans, must lead to the presumption 
that the anti-Austro-Hungarian 
propaganda is not only Servian but 
of Russian origin. At the time of 
the German representations at Vi- 
enna, the whole question of the 
Servian reply had already been su- 
perseded by the opening of hostili- 
ties. The good offices of the British 
Government with Russia in the di- 
rection of the preservation of peace 
among the Great Powers would be 
gratefully acknowledged 



German Ambassador in Paris has 
been instructed to impress upon 
French Government that French 
military preparations would force 
Germany to similar action, which 
may eventually plunge both peace- 
loving nations into a dangerous mo- 
bilisation. Germany counts on 
France's support for the localisation 
of the conflict between Austria-Hun 
gary and Servia 



Germany has informed St. Peters 
burgh on July 26th, that she may 
be compelled to mobilise if Russia 
proceeds with her preparations . . . 



105 



106 



107 



108 



CONTENTS 



xix 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



47 



Count Szapary to 
Count Berehtold 



1914. 
St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 29 



48 



49 



Count Berehtold to 
Count Szogjfeny 



Vienna 
July 29 



Count Berehtold to 
Count Szapary 



Vienna 
July 30 



The Imperial and Royal Ambassador 
impressed upon M. Sazonow the fact 
that the Vienna Cabinet did not in- 
tend to violate any Russian inter- 
ests or to acquire Servian territory 
or to interfere with Servia's sov- 
ereignty; and was always willing to 
get into touch with St. Petersburgh 
with regard to Austro-Hungarian 
and Russian interests. The objec- 
tion that the Southern Army Corps, 
now mobilised against Servia, con- 
stituted a threat to Russia, could 
not be taken seriously. It was im 
perative that the dangerous race in 
warlike preparations should be 
quickly stopped. The Austro-Hun 
garian Ambassador gives grave 
warning of the impression which 
the pending extensive mobilisation 
in Russia would create in Austria 
Hungary 



Suggestion to German Government 
that the Austro-Hungarian and Ger- 
man Ambassadors in St. Petersburgh 
and Paris be instructed to declare 
that the continuation of Russian 
mobilisation would provoke counter- 
measures in Germany and Austria- 
Hungary, which would inevitably 
lead to serious consequences. Aus- 
tria-Hungary would, of course, not 
allow herself to be influenced in her 
armed action against Servia 



The Government of the Dual Mon 
archy is always ready for a friendly 
discussion with the St. Petersburgh 
Cabinet of questions bearing directly 
on Austria-Hungary's relations with 
Russia 



108 



110 



110 



XX 



CONTENTS 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



50 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Szapary 



1914. 
Vienna 
July 30 



51 



Count Berchtold to 
the Imperial and 
Royal Ambassa- 
dors in London 
and St. Peters- 
burgh 



Vienna 
July 31 



52 



53 



54 



Count Szapary to 
Count Berchtold 



Count Berchtold to 
the Imperial and 
Royal Embassies, 
Legations and 
Consulates 

Count Sz§csen to 
Count Berchtold 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 31 

Vienna 
July 31 



Paris 
July 31 



In reply to M. Sazonow's complaint 
that no exchange of views had 
taken place between Count Berch- 
told and the Russian Ambassador, 
reference has been made to the re- 
cent discussions in which extensive 
assurances were made with regard 
to the observance of Servia's terri- 
torial and sovereign rights. It has 
been pointed out to what extent Rus- 
sian diplomacy was to blame for 
Austria-Hungary's intolerable rela 
tions with Servia. Russia's mo- 
bilisation against Austria-Hungary 
compels the Dual Monarchy to ex- 
tend her own mobilisation 



Russian Cabinet has requested Brit- 
ish Government to resume its medi- 
ation between Austria-Hungary and 
Servia on condition that hostilities 
be temporarily suspended. Sir Ed- 
ward Grey has suggested the media- 
tion of France, Great Britain, 
Italy and Germany. The Vienna 
Cabinet would be glad to consider 
Sir Edward Grey's proposal, pro- 
vided that military action against 
Servia be meanwhile continued and 
that Russia shall stop her mobilisa- 
tion directed against Austria-Hun- 
gary 



General mobilisation of Russian army 
and navy 



Necessity of military action in Ga- 
licia, in view of Russian mobilisa- 
tion; the former are of a merely 
defensive character 



Declaration in Paris by German 
Government, that Germany would 
likewise mobilise, if Russian mo- 
bilisation should not be stopped 
within twelve hours. Enquiry as to 
whether France would remain neu- 
tral in event of Russo-German war. 



Ill 



112 



113 



114 



114 



CONTENTS 



xxi 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



55 



Count Szapary to 
Count Berchtold 



56 



Count Szapary to 
Count Berchtold 



57 



58 



69 



60 



61 



Count Szogyeny to 
Count Berchtold 



Count Mensdorff to 
Count Berchtold 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Szapary 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Mensdorff 



Count Szgcsen to 
Count Berchtold 



1914. 
St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 31 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
Aug. 1 



Berlin 
Aug. 2 



London 
Aug. 4 



Vienna 
Aug. 5 



Vienna 
Aug. 6 



Paris 
Aug. 8 



Russia is not satisfied even with 
formal declaration that Austria- 
Hungary would not reduce Servian 
territory nor infringe upon Servian 
sovereignty, and that she would not 
violate Russian interests in the 
Balkans or elsewhere. Russia has 
ordered general mobilisation 



Imperial and Royal Ambassador once 
more expresses Vienna Cabinet's 
willingness to negotiate with Russia 
upon the broadest basis. M. if 
zonow expresses conviction that such 
negotiations would be less promising 
if conducted in St. Petersburgh than 
on neutral ground in London .... 



Russia has not stopped war measures 
against Austria-Hungary and Ger- 
many; Russian troops have crossed 
German border. Germany, being at 
tacked, therefore considers herself 
in state of war with Russia 



Great Britain's ultimatum to Ger- 
many. Sir Edward Grey declares 
that no cause for conflict exists be- 
tween Great Britain and Austria- 
Hungary, as long as the Dual Mon- 
archy is not at war with France. 

State of war between Austria-Hun- 
gary and Russia in consequence of 
Russia's threatening attitude in 
Austro-Hungarian- Servian conflict, 
and of beginning of hostilities 
against Germany 



Austria-Hungary will on no account 
begin hostilities against Great Brit 
ain without previous formal declara- 
tion of war. Expects similar atti 
tude from Great Britain 



French Government enquires whether 
information be true, that the Army 
Corps of Innsbruck had been sent to 
French border 



114 



115 



116 



116 



117 



117 



118 



XX11 



CONTENTS 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



62 



63 



64 



65 



66 



67 



68 



69 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Sz6csen 



Count Szecsen to 
Count Berchtold 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Mensdorff 



Count Mensdorff to 
Count Berchtold 

The Japanese Am 
bassador to Count 
Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
Count Clary- 



Prince Hohenlohe 
to Count Berch- 
told 



Count Berchtold to 
Baron Miiller 



1914. 
Vienna 
Aug. 9 



Paris 
Aug. 10 



Vienna 
Aug. 11 



London 
Aug. 12 

Vienna 
Aug. 20 

Vienna 
Aug. 22 



Berlin 
Aug. 23 



Vienna 
Aug. 24 



Information that an Austro-Hun- 
garian Army Corps is participating 
in Franco-German war pronounced 
a pure invention 



French Government, having received 
information that an Austro-Hun 
garian Army Corps had been 
brought to Germany, considers this 
to be military support lent to Ger- 
many and therefore has instructed 
the French Ambassador in Vienna 
to demand his passports 



Instructions to inform British Gov 
ernment that reports to the effect 
that an Austro-Hungarian Army 
Corps had been sent to Germany 
are utterly unfounded 



France and Great Britain declare 
war upon Austria-Hungary 



Communication of Japan's ultimatum 
to Germany on August 15, 1914, . 



Instructions to inform Belgian Gov 
ernment that Austria-Hungary is 
forced to break off diplomatic rela 
tions with the Kingdom in view of 
the latter's military cooperations 
with France and Great Britain 
against Germany, and also in view 
of the inhumane treatment of Aus- 
trian and Hungarian citizens in 
Belgium ; Austria-Hungary hence 
forth considers herself in state of 
w T ar with Belgium 



German Government gives no answer 
to Japanese ultimatum and hands 
passports to Japanese Charge" d' Af- 
faires in Berlin 



In view of Japan's proceding against 
German Empire, the Commander of 
H.M.S. " Elisabeth " receives orders, 
to take part in action at Tsingtau; 
Imperial and Royal Ambassador in 
Tokio recalled 



118 



118 



119 



120 



120 



122 



122 



123 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARXAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 



No. 



10 



11 



Name. 



Count Berchtold to 
von M€rey 

Count Berchtold to 
von M6rey 



Von M6rey to 
Count Berchtold 



Count Berchtold to 
von Merey 



Count Berchtold to 
von Merey 



Count Berchtold to 
von M6rey 

Von M6rey to 
Count Berchtold 



Von Merey to 
Count Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
von Merey 



Count Berchtold to 
von Merey 

Count Berchtold to 
von M6rey 



Place and 
Date. 



1914. 
Vienna 
July 20 

Vienna 
July 20 



Rome 
July 21 



Vienna 
July 22 

Vienna 
July 22 



Vienna 
July 22 

Rome 
July 23 

Rome 
July 24 

Vienna 
July 25 



Vienna 
July 26 

Vienna 
July 26 



Summary. 



Instructions respecting the difficulty 
with Servia 



Additional instructions accompanied 
by a note in support of the Austro- 
Hungarian interpretation of the 
Triple Alliance Treaty 

Reply to the foregoing instructions 
giving statement of the interview 
with the Italian Minister for For- 
eign Affairs 

Instructions stating the terms of the 
Austro-Hungarian demands on Ser- 
via as to time-limit for compliance. 

Transmits copy of the Austro-Hun- 
garian note to the Government of 
Servia for communication to the 
Italian Government 

Further instructions respecting the 
break with Servia 

Report as to his interview with the 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
concerning Servia t 

Same subject 



Despatch concerning the interview 
with the Italian Ambassador at Vi- 
enna respecting the reservation of 
right to claim compensation under 
Article 7 of the Treaty of the Triple 
Alliance under certain conditions . . . 

Advises of the breaking off of diplo- 
matic relations with Servia 



Instructions as to interview with Ital- 
ian Minister for Foreign Affairs as 
to the purpose of the pressure on 
Servia 



Page. 



127 



128 



131 



133 



133 



140 



140 
141 



142 



142 



143 



Note. — The editor is responsible for the table of contents to the Austro-Hungarian 
Red Book (No. 2), as a table of contents was omitted from the official English transla- 
tion issued by the Austro-Hungarian Government. 

xxiii 



XXIV 



CONTENTS 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



12 



13 



14 



15 



16 



17 



18 



19 



20 



21 



22 



23 



Count Berchtold to 
von Merey 

Count Berchtold to 
von Merey 



Von Merey to 
Count Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
von M6rey 



Von Merey to 
Count Berchtold 



Von Merey to 
Count Berchtold 

Von Merey to 
Count Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
von M^rey 



Count Berchtold to 
von Merey 

His Imperial and 
Royal Apostolic 
Majesty to His 
Majesty the King 
of Italy 

Von Merey to 
Count Berchtold 



His Majesty the 
King of Italy to 
His Imperial and 
Royal Apostolic 
Majesty 



1914. 
Vienna 
July 26 

Vienna 
July 26 



Rome 
July 28 

Vienna 
July 28 



Rome 
July 29 



Rome 
July 30 

Rome 
July 31 

Vienna 
July 31 



Vienna 
Aug. 1 

Vienna 
Aug. 1 



Rome 
Aug. 1 



Rome 
Aug. 2 



Transmits telegram from Count 
Szogyeny 



Gives information with respect to the 
Lybian war and its possible use as 
a precedent by the Italian Govern 
ment 

Advises that he has carried out in 
structions 



Informs of request of German Am- 
bassador at Vienna that the Austro- 
Hungarian and Italian Governments 
reach an agreement concerning Arti- 
cle 7 of the Treaty of the Triple Al- 
liance. Advises of the submission of 
the Italian Ambassador at Vienna in 
the views of his Government.... 



Transmits the views of the Italian 
Government on the question of 
Austro-Hungarian relations with 
Servia and the attitude of Italy as 
a member of the Triple Alliance . . . 

Same subject 



Same subject 



Interview with the Italian Minister 
at Vienna concerning the interpreta- 
tion of Article 7 of the Treaty of 
the Triple Alliance . . 



Same subject 



Telegram from the Emperor of Aus- 
tria to the King of Italy concerning 
the war 



Advises of desire of Italian Govern 
ment to remain neutral in case of 
European conflict 



Telegram of the King of Italy to the 
Emperor of Austria concerning 
Italy's attitude 



144 

144 
147 



147 



149 
151 

151 



152 
153 

153 

154 
155 



CONTENTS 



XXV 



No. 



24 
25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 
35 

36 



Name. 



Count Berchtold to 
von M6rey 



Von Merey to 
Count Berchtold 



Von M6rey to 
Count Berchtold 



Von M6rey to 
Count Berchtold 

Von Merey to 
Count Berchtold 



Count Berchtold to 
von M6rey 



Count Berchtold to 
von Merey 



Count Berchtold to 
von M6rey 

Count Berchtold to 
von M6rey 



Von Me"rey to 
Count Berchtold 



Von M6rey to 
Count Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
von Merey 



Count Ambr6zy to 
Count Berchtold 



Place and 
Date. 



1914. 
Vienna 
Aug. 2 

Rome 
Aug. 2 



Rome 
Aug. 2 



Rome 
Aug. 3 

Rome 
Aug. 3 

Vienna 
Aug. 4 



Vienna 
Aug. 4 

Vienna 
Aug. 4 

Vienna 
Aug. 4 

Rome 
Aug. 5 

Rome 
Aug. 5 

Vienna 
Aug. 9 



Rome 
Aug. 11 



Summary. 



Informs of interview with Italian 
Ambassador at Vienna respecting 
the attitude of Italy 



States that he has carried out in 
structions to inform the Italian 
Government of expectation that Italy 
will fulfil her obligation of the 
Triple Alliance 



Transmits draft of proposed reply 
of Italian Government concerning 
Article 7 of the Treaty of the 
Triple Alliance 



Encloses text of Italian declaration 
of neutrality 



Reports interview with Italian Min 
ister for Foreign Affairs concerning 
attitude of Italian Government. . 

Instructs as to information con- 
veyed by Italian Ambassador to 
Vienna respecting adherence of Italy 
to agreement concerning Albania. 

Informs of interview with the Italian 
Ambassador concerning the neutral 
ity of Italy 



Advises of telegraphic communica 
tion from the Italian Chief of the 
General Staff 



Instructs that Austro-Hungarian 
Government does not contemplate a 
war against Montenegro 



Informs of attitude of Italian Gov- 
ernment and possibility of our en- 
tering war 



Question of Montenegro remaining 
neutral 



Instructs in detail of views of his 
Government respecting the interpre 
tation of Article 7 of the Triple Al 
liance Treaty 



Report of interview with Italian For 
eign Office concerning Triple Alli- 
ance 



Page. 



155 

156 

157 
159 

159 

160 

160 

162 

162 

163 
163 

163 
165 



XXVI 



CONTENTS 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



37 

38 
39 



40 



41 



42 



43 



44 



45 



46 



47 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Ambrozy 



Count Berchtold to 
Baron Maechio 

Count Berchtold to 
Baron Maechio 



Baron Maechio to 
Count Berchtold 



Count Berchtold to 
Baron Maechio 



Prince Gottfried 
zu Hohenlohe to 
Count Berchtold 



Count Berchtold to 
Prince Gottfried 
zu Hohenlohe 

Count Berchtold to 
Baron Maechio 

Baron Maechio to 
Count Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
Baron Maechio 



Baron Maechio to 
Count Berchtold 



1914. 
Vienna 
Aug. 12 



Vienna 
Aug. 16 

Vienna 
Aug. 20 



Rome 
Aug. 21 

Vienna 
Aug. 21 



Berlin 
Aug. 22 



Vienna 
Aug. 23 

Vienna 
Aug. 23 

Rome 
Aug. 25 

Vienna 
Aug. 25 



Rome 
Aug. 27 



Advises of interview with the Italian 
Ambassador concerning Italian neu 
trality and its inevitable effect on 
the Austro-Hungarian Republic . . . 

Refers to the concentration of Italian 
troops in the Province of Udine .... 

Gives views of the Italian Govern- 
ment as contained in a despatch to 
the Italian Ambassador at Vienna. 
Refers to Italian military prepara 
tions on her frontier and the reasons 
therefor; to the attitude of the Ital 
ian press; expresses the belief of the 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
that mutual distrust cannot be dis 
pelled without a positive agreement 
by both parties 



Discusses the question of Italy re 
maining neutral and explains cer 
tain military preparations 



Instructs that he is to endeavour to 
reach an understanding with the 
Italian Government and to consoli 
date the mutual relations of the two 
allies. Refers to the question of the 
cession of the Austro-Hungarian ter- 
ritory to Italy 



Refers to the neutral attitude of Italy 
and the question of the acquisition 
of territory in the Balkans by 
Austria-Hungary 



Concerns the interpretation of Arti 
cle 7 of the Treaty of the Triple 
Alliance 



Same subject 



Same subject 



Advises of interview of the German 
Ambassador of Rome with the Ital 
ian Prime Minister respecting the 
neutrality of Italy 



Same subject 



166 
167 



168 



169 



170 

171 

171 
172 

173 



173 
174 



CONTENTS 



XXVll 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



48 
49 
50 

51 

52 

53 

54 

55 

56 
57 
58 

59 
60 
61 
62 
63 



Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macehio 

Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macehio 

Prince Gottfried 
zu Hohenlohe to 
Count Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
Prince Gottfried 
zu Hohenlohe 

Prince Gottfried 
zu Hohenlohe to 
Count Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
Prince Gottfried 
zu Hohenlohe 

Baron Macehio to 
Count Berchtold 



Prince Gottfried 
zu Hohenlohe to 
Count Berchtold 

Baron Macehio to 
Count Berchtold 

Von Moricz to 
Count Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macehio 



Baron Macehio to 
Count Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macehio 

Baron Macehio to 
Count Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macehio 

Baron Macehio to 
Count Berchtold 



1914. 
Vienna 
Aug. 28 

Vienna 
Aug. 28 

Berlin 
Sept. 5 

Vienna 
Sept. 6 

Berlin 
Sept. 8 

Vienna 
Sept. 9 

Rome 
Sept. 11 

Berlin 
Sept. 12 

Rome 
Sept. 29 

Ancona 
Oct. 3 

Vienna 
Oct. 5 



Rome 
Oct. 6 

Vienna 
Oct. 7 

Rome 
Oct. 8 

Vienna 
Oct. 9 

Rome 
Oct. 10 



Interpretation of Article 7 of the 
Treaty of the Triple Alliance 

Question of the occupation by British 
and French troops of Valona .... 

Question of the occupation of the 
Island of Saseno by Italy and the 
reason therefor 

Same subject 

Same subject 

Same subject 

Refers to telegram of King of Italy 
to the Prince of Albania as to the 
welfare of that country 

Question of occupation of Saseno . . 

Refers to the question of the occupa- 
tion of Valona 

Same subject 

Alleged promise of France that Tu 
nisia should go to the Italians if 
Italy joined the allies 

Question of occupation of Valona by 
Italy 

Effect of the placing of mines in the 
Adriatic by Italian interests 

Occupation of Valona 

Same subject 

Purposes of the Entente Powers in 
respect to the Austro-Hungarian 
and Italian fleets 



174 
175 

175 
176 

177 

177 

178 
178 

179 
179 

180 

180 

181 
181 

182 
182 



XXV111 



CONTENTS 



No. 



64 
65 
66 
67 

68 
69 
70 
71 

72 

73 

74 



75 
76 

77 
78 



Name. 



Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macchio 

Baron Macchio to 
Count Berchtold 

Baron Macchio to 
Count Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Count Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macchio 

Von Mayrhauser to 
Count Berchtold 

Von Mayrhauser to 
Count Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macchio 



Von Mayrhauser to 
Count Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macchio 



Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macchio 

Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macchio 

Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macchio 

Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macchio 



Place and 
Date. 



1914. 
Vienna 
Oct. 12 

Rome 
Oct. 18 

Rome 
Oct. 19 

Vienna 
Oct. 22 



Rome 
Oct. 22 

Vienna 
Oct. 24 

Valona 
Oct. 26 

Valona 
Oct. 30 

Vienna 
Oct. 31 



Valona 
Nov. 1 

Vienna 
Dec. 12 



Vienna 
Dec. 12 

Vienna 
Dec. 13 

Vienna 
Dec. 13 

Vienna 
Dec. 21 



Summary. 



The occupation of Albania 

Condolences on the death of the Ital 
ian Minister for Foreign Affairs 

Violation of Albania's neutrality by 
Greek troops 

Italian war-ships to guard neutrality 
of Albania, as other powers who 
have guaranteed such neutrality are 
at war 

Same subject 

Same subject 

Arrival of Italian battleships at 
Valona 

Landing of Italian detachment of 
marines on Saseno . . 

Occupation of Saseno by Italian 
troops for preservation of Albania's 
neutrality 

Same subject 



Informs of visit of Italian Ambas- 
sador in respect to military inva- 
sion of Servia by Austria-Hungary. 
He claims breach of Article 7 of the 
Triple Alliance in crossing Servian 
frontier without notification to 
Italian Cabinet 

Same subject. Discussion continued. 

Same subject 

Same subject 

Same subject 



Page. 



183 

183 

184 

185 
185 

186 

187 
187 

188 
188 



188 
190 

192 

193 

194 



CONTENTS 



XXIX 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page, 



79 



80 



81 



82 



83 



84 



85 



86 



87 



88 



89 



90 



91 



92 



93 



Baron Macchio to 
Count Berchtold 

Von Mayrhauser to 
Count Berchtold 

Von Mayrhauser to 
Count Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
Count Ambrozy 



Von Mayrhauser to 
Count Berchtold 

Von Mayrhauser to 
Count Berchtold 



Von Mayrhauser to 
Count Berchtold 



Von Mayrhauser to 
Count Berchtold 



Von Mayrhauser to 
Count Berchtold 

Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macchio 



Von Mayrhauser to 
Count Berchtold 



Baron Macchio to 
Count Berchtold 



Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macchio 

Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macchio 

Von Mayrhauser to 
Count Berchtold 



1914. 

Rome 

Dec. 21 

Valona 
Dec. 25 

Valona 
Dec. 25 

Vienna 
Dec. 26 



Valona 
Dec. 26 

Valona 

Dec. 28 



Valona 
Dec. 28 



Valona 
Dec. 29 

1915. 
Valona 
Jan. 1 

Vienna 
Jan. 4 



Valona 
Jan. 5 



Rome 
Jan. 6 



Vienna 
Jan. 7 

Vienna 
Jan. 8 

Valona 
Jan. 11 



Same subject 



Firing of shots by individuals at 
Valona 



Informs of military occupation of 
Valona for protection of colonies. 

Advises of anarchy in Albania. Also 
of the landing of marines at Valona 
to quiet the Italians 



Report of firing of shots by five in- 
dividuals in streets of Valona 



Telegraphic communication of the 
sending of Italian squads to Kanina, 
Djuverina and Arta 



Informs of expected Italian interfer 
ence with civil administration at 
Valona 



Landing of the 10th Bersaglieri Regi 
ment at Valona 



Same subject 



Report of German Ambassador at 
Rome in regard to Italy's attitude 
toward the Dual Monarchy 



Advises that Albanian officials are 
still at their posts in Valona, but 
that Italian control of civil admin- 
istration has been allotted in some 
cases 



Report of discussion with Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs in re- 
gard to question of compensation . . . 

Same subject 



Same subject 



Refers to early arrival of Italian 
customs officers for organisation of 
customs service 



197 

197 
198 

198 
199 

200 

200 
200 
201 

201 

202 

203 
204 

205 
206 



XXX 



CONTENTS 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



94 

95 
96 
97 

98 

99 
100 

101 
102 

103 
104 



105 



Baron Macchio to 
Count Berchtold 



Count Berchtold to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 

Von Mayrhauser to 
Baron Burian 



Von Mayrhauser to 
Baron Burian 

Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 

Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



1915. 

Koine 

Jan. 12 



Vienna 
Jan. 12 



Vienna 
Jan. 14 



Vienna 
Jan. 19 



Vienna 
Jan. 20 



Vienna 
Jan. 29 

Valona 
Jan. 29 



Valona 
Feb. 1 

Rome 
Feb. 2 



Rome 
Feb. 4 

Vienna 
Feb. 11 



Rome 
Feb. 15 



Informs of visit to Italian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs during which he 
expressed his astonishment at the 
small concern of the Minister about 
Albania 



Transmits notes on an interview with 
the Italian Ambassador respecting 
question of compensation 



Requests that Baron Macchio be 
merely receptive during conversation 
with Italian statesmen 



Instructions to conduct discussions 
with Austria-Hungary for clearing 
relations with Germany 



Transmits notes on an interview with 
the Royal Italian Ambassador on 
the question of compensation .... 



Further instructions to Italian Am- 
bassador regarding compensation . . . 

Report that Captain of the Italian 
commissariat assumed control of 
the financial administration of Va 
lona 



Same subject 



Conversation with Italian Prime 
Minister , regarding relations be- 
tween Italy and Austria-Hungary . . 



Same subject 



Advises of interview with the Italian 
Ambassador with respect to the set- 
tlement of questions between the 
two governments, especially the 
Italian demand for compensation 
under Article 7 of the Triple Alli- 
ance. Transmits copy of personal 
memorandum handed by him to Ital- 
ian Ambassador covering the sub- 
ject 



Present session of Italian Parlia- 
ment will avoid discussion of foreign 
policies 



206 

208 

210 

210 

211 
214 

215 
216 

216 
216 



217 



224 



CONTENTS 



XXXI 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



106 



107 



108 



109 



110 



111 



112 



113 



114 



115 



116 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Prince Gottfried 
zu Hohenlohe to 
Baron Burian 



1915. 
Vienna 
Feb. 15 



Rome 
Feb. 17 



Rome 
Feb. 19 



Vienna 
Feb. 23 



Rome 
Feb. 27 



Vienna 
Mar. 1 



Vienna 
Mar. 2 



Vienna 
Mar. 4 



Rome 
Mar. 6 



Vienna 
Mar. 9 



Berlin 
Mar. 10 



Advises of the visit of the Italian 
Ambassador with instructions from 
his government to discuss mutual 
claims for compensation under Arti 
cle 7 



Effect in Rome of declarations of 
prominent journals in Vienna in op- 
position to territorial concession to 
Italy 

Discusses meeting of Italian Parlia- 
ment and speech of Premier Sa- 
landra 

Encloses notes of conversation with 
Italian Ambassador respecting inter- 
pretation of Article 7 

Refers to incorrect belief in Rome 
that no direct discussions have taken 
place with Vienna and reasons for 
this belief 

Encloses notes of discussion on ques- 
tion of compensation with Italian 
Ambassador 



Instructions with respect to public 
statement of nature of negotiations 
between Austria-Hungary and Italy. 

Encloses notes on discussion of the 
question of compensation with the 
Italian Ambassador 



States that Italian situation involves 
(1) termination of political difficul- 
ties, (2) increased anxiety about 
Turkish situation 



Advises of statement to Italian Am- 
bassador of decision of Austria- 
Hungary to accept principle of ces- 
sion of territory as a basis for dis- 
cussions in compliance with the Ital- 
ian demand respecting compensation 
question 



Advises of satisfaction of Baron 
Sonnino with the declaration of Aus- 
tria-Hungary 



224 



227 



227 



228 



231 



232 



234 



234 



236 



236 



237 



XXX11 



CONTENTS 




117 



118 



119 



120 



121 



122 



123 
124 
125 

126 
127 

128 
129 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 

Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 

Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 

Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Von Mayrhauser to 
Baron Burian 

Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 

Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



1915. 
Vienna 
Mar. 13 



Vienna 
Mar. 15 

Vienna 
Mar. 17 



Vienna 
Mar. 19 



Rome 
Mar. 19 



Vienna 
Mar. 19 



Rome 
Mar. 20 

Vienna 
Mar. 21 

Vienna 
Mar. 21 



Valona 
Mar. 22 

Vienna 
Mar. 23 



Rome 
Mar. 23 

Rome 
Mar. 24 



Summary. 



Encloses notes of conversation with 
the Italian Ambassador on the sub- 
ject of compensation 



Same subject 



Refers to compensation question and 
states that Italy's demand for a ter- 
ritorial cession has not yet been sat- 
isfied. Discusses the situation . . . 



Instructs him as to closer intercourse 
with Baron Sonnino on the subject 
of relations with Italy 



Refers to interview with Baron Son- 
nino on the compensation question 
and statement that Italian conten 
tions prompts demands 



Refers to conversation with Italian 
Ambassador in which Italian de- 
mand for immediate transfer of ter- 
ritory to be ceded was rejected, ap- 
parent misinterpretation by Baron 
Sonnino 



Same subject 



Same subject 



Same subject. Guarantees that Aus 
tria-Hungary will adhere to promise 
of cession of territory 



Italian supervision at Valona. 



Advises of further discussion with 
the Italian Ambassador concerning 
cession of territory 



Same subject 



Gives statement of views of public 
at Rome concerning status of nego- 
tiations between Austria-Hungary 
and Italy. Speaks especially of 
views for intervention in the war 
by Italy and what concessions 
would be acceptable 



Page. 



237 
240 



242 



243 



243 



244 
245 

245 

247 

247 

248 
249 



250 



CONTENTS 



xxxin 



No. 


Name. 


Place and 
Date. 


Summary. 


Page. 


130 


Baron Burian to 
Baron Macehio 


1915. 
Vienna 
Mar. 25 


Advises of his declaration to the 
Italian Ambassador of willingness 
to accept Baron Sonnino's sugges- 
tion and states that he will make 
him a specific proposal for purposes 
of initiating further negotiations . . . 


251 


131 


Baron Burian to 
Baron Macehio 


Vienna 
Mar. 28 


Same subject. States concessions 
which will be made Austria-Hungary 


252 


132 


Baron Macehio to 
Baron Burian 


Rome 
Mar. 31 


Discussion with Baron Sonnino as to 
Austria-Hungary's proposals 


253 


133 


Baron Macehio to 
Baron Burian 


Rome 
Apr. 1 


Report on Italian mobilisation and 
gives summary of situation 


254 


134 


Baron Burian to 
Baron Macehio 


Vienna 
Apr. 2 


Encloses notes on conversation with 
Italian Ambassador respecting Baron 
Sonnino's reply to Austria-Hungary's 
proposals as to basis of agreement . . 


255 


135 


Baron Macehio to 
Baron Burian 

Baron Burian to 
Baron Macehio 

Baron Macehio to 
Baron Burian 


Rome 
Apr. 2 

Vienna 
Apr. 2 

Rome 
Apr. 3 


Gives statement of state of negotia- 
tions with Italy as exposed by of- 
ficial of the Consulta 


257 


136 


States in view of unsatisfactory atti- 
tude of Baron Sonnino as to pro- 
posals, desires to obtain information 
concerning real aims of Italian Gov- 
ernment 


258 


137 


Same subject. Gives statement of 
Italian views 


258 


138 


Baron Burian to 
Baron Macehio 

Baron Macehio to 
Baron Burian 


Vienna 
Apr. 6 

Rome 
Apr. 7 


Subject of counter-proposals of Ital- 
ian Government 


260 


139 


Same subject 


261 








140 


Baron Macehio to 
Baron Burian 

Baron Burian to 
Baron Macehio 

Prince Gottfried 
zu Hohenlohe to 
Baron Burian 


Rome 
Apr. 7 

Vienna 
Apr. 11 

Berlin 
Apr. 12 


Discusses attitude of Italian Govern- 
ment 


261 


141 


Advises of submission by Italian Am- 
bassador of his Government's condi- 
tions and stipulations in form of 
eleven articles 


263 


142 


Italy's demands unacceptable 


266 


143 


Baron Macehio to 
Baron Burian 


Rome 
Apr. 14 


Gives substance of conversation of 
German Ambassador at Rome with 
Baron Sonnino 


267 



XXXIV 



CONTENTS 



No. 

144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 

150 

151 
152 
153 

154 
155 
156 
157 

158 
159 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 

Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 

Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 

Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 

Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 

Baron Burian. to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 

Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 

Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron 
Baron 

Baron 
Baron 

Baron 
Baron 

Baron 
Baron 



Burian to 
Macchio 

Macchio to 
Burian 

Macchio to 
Burian 

Burian to 
Macchio 



Baron Burian to Vienna 



1915. 
Vienna 
Apr. 16 

Vienna 
Apr. 16 

Vienna 
Apr. 17 

Rome 
Apr. 18 

Vienna 
Apr. 18 

Vienna 
Apr. 19 

Home 
Apr. 20 

Vienna 
Apr. 21 

Borne 
Apr. 22 

Vienna 
Apr. 22 

Vienna 
Apr. 22 

Rome 
Apr. 26 

Rome 
Apr. 26 

Vienna 
Apr. 27 



Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Apr. 28 

Rome 
Apr. 28 



Advises of proposed reply to Italian 
proposals 



Alleged separate peace between Aus- 
tria-Hungary and Russia 



Reply handed to Italian Ambassador, 



Report of discussion with Baron Son- 
nino of Austro-Hungarian reply. . . 

Further instrutions as to discussion 
of Austria-Hungary's reply 



Advises of interview with Italian Am- 
bassador concerning Austria-Hun- 
gary's intentions 



Reports interview with Premier Sa 
landra, discussing questions of 
Trieste, Tyrol and Albania 



Instructs as to question of Trieste.. 



Interview with Baron Sonnino as to 
receipt of Austria-Hungary's reply . . 

Advises of observations of Italian 
Government handed to him by Ital 
ian Ambassador 



Same subject 



Territory reported to be desired by 
Italy in Albania 



Advises of Garibaldi's clandestinely 
meeting the King 



Instructs to find out whether Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs would 
favour a conference with Count Go- 
luchowski 



Encloses text of Austria-Hungary's 
reply to Baron Sonnino's observa- 
tions 



Visit of Count Goluchowski to Rome . 



268 

272 
272 

273 
275 

275 

276 

278 

279 

279 
280 

281 

281 

282 

282 
286 



CONTENTS 



XXXV 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



160 

161 
162 
163 
164 

165 
166 

167 



168 



169 



170 



171 



172 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 

Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 

Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 

Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 

Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 

Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



1915. 

Rome 

Apr. 28 

Vienna 
Apr. 29 

Rome 
Apr. 30 

Rome 
May 1 

Rome 
May 1 

Vienna 
May 2 

Vienna 
May 2 



Rome 
May 2 



Rome 
May 3 



Vienna 
May 4 

Vienna 
May 4 



Rome 
May 4 

Vienna 
May 5 



Interview of Sgr. Tittoni with Baron 
Sonnino and audience with the King, 
representing France 



Visit of Count Goluchowski to Rome 



Reports on negotiations of Entente 
Powers at Rome 



Visit of Count Goluchowski to Rome . 



Interview with Baron Sonnino con- 
cerning Austria-Hungary's reply to 
Italian proposals 



Visit of Count Goluchowski to Rome 



Instructs him to vigorously maintain 
negotiations with Italian Govern- 
ment and to go into details of each 
demand. Mentions particularly the 
Albanian question 

Advises of meeting of Chamber of 
Deputies on May 12 for the purpose 
of obtaining a vote of confidence. 
Suggests authentic publication of 
what it is proposed to cede to Italy 
might create an impression sufficient 
to frustrate designs of Italian Gov- 
ernment 

States gravity of situation and that 
negotiations with Entente appear to 
be ready to be closed. Advises fur- 
ther attempts 

Replies to preceding and states con- 
cessions which might be made 

Encloses note of Italian Ambassador 
in which Italian Government de- 
clares that Treaty of Alliance is void 
and without effect 

Reports further discussion with 
Baron Sonnino on different demands 
of Italian Government 

Reply to foregoing with statement of 
furthest limits of Austro-Hun 
garian concessions 



287 
287 

288 
289 

289 
290 



291 



292 

292 
294 

294 
297 
300 



XXXVI 



CONTENTS 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



173 
174 

175 

176 

177 
178 

179 
180 
181 

182 

183 

184 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 

Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 

Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 

Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



1915. 
Rome 
May 5 

Rome 
May 6 

Rome 
May 6 



Vienna 
May 9 



Vienna 
May 10 

Rome 
May 10 



Vienna 
May 10 

Rome 
May 12 

Vienna 
May 13 

Rome 
May 13 

Vienna 
May 14 



Rome 
May 14 



Reports on gravity of situation at 
Rome 



Reports interview with Baron Son- 
nino on latest concessions offered by 
Austria-Hungary 



Advises of the probability that Coun- 
cil of Ministers will reject Austria- 
Hungary's report. Suggests that as- 
senting principle with Baron Son- 
nino's original demands appears to 
be only method of averting war .... 

Asserts good faith of Austria-Hun 
gary in its offers and that both the 
Austro-Hungarian Government and 
the German Government desire to 
inaugurate newer and closer rela 
tions with her 



Instructs that he must prevent sus- 
pension of negotiations. States ex- 
treme limits of concessions 



Encloses statement signed jointly 
with Prince Bulow stating Austria- 
Hungary's concessions and Ger- 
many's guarantee of agreement. . . . 

Replies to foregoing and instructs 
him further concerning concessions. 

Reviews situation at Rome 



Reply to foregoing. Agrees with de 
cision not to call on Italian Min- 
ister at present 



Reports meeting of Council of Min- 
isters and probability of difference 
of opinion having developed 



Further advices as to views of Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Government in reply 
to assertion of procrastination on 
the part of Austria-Hungary. . . . 



Reports Cabinet situation at Rome in 
view of resignations. Rome actu- 
ally in a state of siege and one-half 
of garrison on duty 



302 
302 

304 

304 
305 

306 

307 
308 

309 
309 

310 

311 



CONTENTS 



xxxvu 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



185 



186 



187 



188 



189 



190 



191 



192 



193 



194 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 

Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



1915. 

Rome 

May 15 



Home 
May 15 



Borne 
May 15 

Vienna 
May 16 



Rome 
May 16 



Vienna 
May 17 



Rome 
May 17 



Vienna 
May 18 



Rome 
May 18 

Rome 
May 18 



Encloses draft of proposals which 
have been approved by Prince Bulow 
for submission to new Italian Cab- 
inet 



Advises that negotiations between 
Italy and the Entente Powers are 
becoming known. Among them are 
suggestion for incursion into Aus- 
tria-Hungary of Garibaldian irregu 
lars or with regular troops. Plan 
blocked on account of dissension in 
Cabinet 



Resignation of Cabinet may not be 
accepted. King misled as to true 
feelings of the country 



Concurrence as to prompt drafting of 
eventual agreement with Italy. Ap 
prove text proposed and transmit 
comments and modifications 



Resignation of Cabinet not to be ac- 
cepted. Present foreign policy will 
be continued. Attitude of the King 
one of uncertainty 



Instructs him to cooperate with 
Prince Bulow and submit to Baron 
Sonnino draft of agreement con- 
tained in instructions of yesterday . . 

Procrastination of Baron Sonnino in 
postponing interview. Will hand 
him draft of new agreement. En- 
deavour to ascertain from his atti- 
tude if war is imminent 



Refers to Italian view to the transfer 
of proposed territories to be ceded 
and sets forth concession to be in 
corporated in agreement after Arti 
cle 13 



The Senate and Chamber of Deputies 
have been convened 



Reports interview with Baron Son 
nino in which he explained new draft 
agreement. Sonnino expressed no 
opinion 



311 



316 
317 

318 

321 

322 

322 

323 
324 

324 



XXXV111 



CONTENTS 



No. 

195 
196 

197 
198 
199 

200 

201 
202 
203 

204 
205 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 

Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 

Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



Baron Burian to 
Baron Macchio 



Baron Macchio to 
Baron Burian 



1915. 

Rome 

May 19 

Rome 
May 19 

Rome 
May 20 

Rome 
May 20 

Vienna 
May 21 



Vienna 
May 21 



Rome 
May 21 

Vienna 
May 22 

Rome 
May 23 



Vienna 
May 23 

Rome 
May 23 



Text of concessions to be inserted as 
new article communicated in writing 
to Baron Sonnino and Sgr. Salandra 

Situation at Rome. Review of garri- 
son by King and audience with 
d'Annunzio 



No reply received concerning new 
article 



Report of the day's session in the 
Chamber of Deputies 



Instructs him to call to attention of 
Baron Sonnino, the fact that the 
Italian Government owes a reply to 
last proposal 



Encloses copy of reply of Austria- 
Hungary to Italian Ambassador's 
communication concerning cancella- 
tion of Treaty of the Triple Alli- 
ance 



Attitude of public at Rome and pro- 
ceedings of Chamber of Deputies. 
Great war manifestation 



In order to avoid war, instructs him 
to make final effort with Baron 
Sonnino 



Reports that he reminded Baron Son 
nino of absence of any reply to 
later proposal. Endeavours unavail- 
ing 



Transmits copy of Italian declara- 
tion of war handed him by Italian 
Ambassador 



Advises that passports have been re 
ceived. Both Embassies depart to- 
morrow 



325 

325 
326 
326 

329 

329 
332 
333 

333 
334 
335 



CONTENTS 



XXXIX 



Appendix 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



10 
11 
12 



Count Guiccardini 
to Duke of Avarna 



Count Aehrenthal 
to Baron Ambrozy 

Von M6rey to 
Count Aehrenthal 



Count Aehrenthal 
to von M6rey 

Count Aehrenthal 
to von Merey 

Count Aehrenthal 
to Count Szogyeny 



Count Berehtold to 
von MSrey 



Count Berehtold to 
Imperial and Roy- 
al Ambassadors 
in Berlin, Con 
stantinople, Lon- 
don, Paris, Rome 
and St. Peters- 
burgh 

Count Berehtold to 
von Merey 

Count Berehtold to 
von M6rey 

Count Szogyeny to 
Count Berehtold 



1909. 

Rome 

Dec. 15 



1911. 
Vienna 
Sept. 26 

Rome 
Oct. 21 



Vienna 
Nov. 6 

Vienna 
Nov. 15 

Vienna 
Nov. 29 

1912. 
Vienna 
Mar. 1 



Vienna 
Mar. 3 



Vienna 
Apr. 6 

Vienna 
Apr. 15 

Berlin 
May 21 



Text of Article 7 of the Treaty of 
the Triple Alliance 

Instructions as to completing and 
perfecting Article 7 of the Treaty 
of the Triple Alliance. Specifies 
particularly settlement of any Bal 
kan question arising 

Discussion of effect of Italian action 
in Tripoli on Balkans 

Freedom of military operations ob- 
served by Italy outside of Turkish 
coasts in the Adriatic and Ionian 
Seas 

Annexation of Tripoli and Cyrena 
ica and its effect in the Balkans . . . 

Same subject 

Same subject 



Same subject. Question of assur- 
ances from Italy that no military 
operations will be undertaken in the 
Dardanelles or in the adjacent 
waters 



Same subject 



Same subject 
Same subject 
Same subject 



335 

336 
337 

339 

339 
340 

341 



341 
342 



342 
344 
344 



xl 



CONTENTS 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



13 



Count Berchtold to 
von Merey 



1912. 
Vienna 
May 23 



14 
15 
16 



Reports discussions with Italian Am- 
bassador of the proposed Italian 
operations in the Mediterranean. 
States Austria-Hungary's opinion 
that occupation of islands in the 
iEgean Sea is contrary to Article 7 
of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. 

Text of Article 3 of the Treaty of 
Triple Alliance 

Text of Article 1 of the Treaty of 
Triple Alliance 

Text of Article 4 of the Treaty of 
Triple Alliance 



345 
346 
346 
346 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. l) 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



Count E. de Dud- 
zeele to M. Da- 
vignon 

M. Davignon to 
Belgian Ministers 
at Paris, Berlin, 
London, Vienna, 
and St. Peters 
burgh 

M. Davignon to 
Belgian Ministers 
at The Hague, 
Rome, and Lux- 
emburg 

M. M. de Welle to 
M. Davignon 



Count Clary to M, 
Davignon 



Baron Beyens to 
M. Davignon 



Count E. de Dud- 
zeele to M. Da- 
vignon 

M. Davignon to 
Belgian Ministers 
at Berlin, Paris, 
London, Vienna, 
St. Petersburgh, 
Rome, The Hague, 
and Luxemburg 



1914. 
Vienna 
July 24 

Brussels 
July 24 



Brussels 
July 25 



Belgrade 
July 25 



Brussels 
July 26 



Berlin 
July 27 



Vienna 
July 28 

Brussels 
July 29 



Forwards text of Austro-Hungarian 
ultimatum to Servia 



Instructions for eventual presenta 
tion of a note to the respective 
Governments informing them of 
Belgian determination to remain 
neutral in the event of a European 
war 



Instructions eventually to present a 
note to the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs in same terms as that to be 
addressed to the five Powers guar- 
anteeing Belgian neutrality 



Forwards text of reply of Servian 
Government to the Austro-Hun- 
garian note 



Austro-Hungarian Government con- 
sider the Servian reply unsatisfac- 
tory and have broken off diplomatic 
relations with Servia 



British Government suggest inter- 
vention at Vienna and St. Peters- 
burgh by Great Britain, France, 
Germany, and Italy to find a basis 
of compromise. Germany alone has 
not yet replied 



Declaration of war by Austria-Hun- 
gary against Servia 



Belgian Government have placed 
army on strengthened peace footing. 
This step should not be mistaken 
for mobilisation 



349 



356 



357 



358 



362 



363 



363 



364 



xli 



xlii 



CONTENTS 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



10 



11 



12 



13 



14 



15 



16 



17 



18 



M. Davignon to 
Belgian Ministers 
at Berlin, Paris, 
and London 

M. Davignon to 
all Belgian Heads 
of Missions 

M. Davignon to 
Belgian Ministers 
at Berlin, Paris, 
and London 



M. Davignon to 
Belgian Lega- 

tions at Berlin, 
Paris, and Lon- 
don 

Count de Lalaing 
to M. Davignon 



Baron Beyens to 
M. Davignon 



M. Davignon to 
Belgian Ministers 
at Berlin, Paris, 
and London 

M. Davignon to 
Belgian Ministers 
accredited to 

Guarantor Pow 



M. Davignon to 
Belgian Legations 
at Rome, The 
Hague, and Lux- 
emburg 

M. Eyschen to M. 
Davignon 



1914. 
Brussels 
July 31 



Brussels 
July 31 

Brussels 
July 31 



Brussels 
July 31 



London 
Aug. 1 



Berlin 
Aug. 1 

Brussels 
Aug. 1 



Brussels 
Aug. 1 



Brussels 
Aug. 1 



Luxemburg 
Aug. 2 



French assurance to Belgium that no 
French troops will invade Belgium 
even if considerable forces are 
massed upon the Belgian frontiers . . 

Belgian mobilisation ordered as 
from Saturday, 1st August 



British Government have asked 
French and German Governments 
separately if each of them is pre- 
pared to respect Belgian neutrality, 
provided it is not violated by any 
other Power 



Baron van der Elst has reminded 
German Minister of the assurances 
given by Germany to Belgium re- 
garding respect of her neutrality. . . 



France accepts British suggestion 
that she should not violate Belgian 
neutrality, provided it is respected 
by Germany ( see No. 11) 

Germany refuses to answer British 
proposal to respect Belgian neu- 
trality 

France explains the conditions on 
which she will respect Belgian neu- 
trality 



To carry out the instructions con 
tained in the despatch of 24th July 
(see No. 2) 



To carry out the instructions con- 
tained in the despatch of 24th July 
(see No. 3) 



The President of the Luxemburg 
Government protests against the 
violation of the neutrality of the 
Grand Duchy guaranteed by the 
Treaty of London of 1867 



364 



365 



365 



366 



368 



368 



369 



369 



370 



370 



CONTENTS 



xliii 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



19 M. Davignon to 
the Belgian Min- 
isters accredited 
to Guarantor 
Powers 

20 Herr von Below to 
M. Davignon 

21 Interview between 
Herr von Below 
and Baron van 
der Elst 

22 M. Davignon to 
Herr von Below 



23 



24 



25 



26 



27 



28 



M. Davignon to 
Belgian Ministers 
at Paris, Lon- 
don, Vienna, Ber- 
lin, St. Peters- 
burgh, and The 
Hague 

M. Davignon to 
Belgian Ministers 
at Berlin, Paris 
London, Vienna, 
and St. Peters- 
burgh 

The King of Bel- 
gium to the King 
of England 

Count de Lalaing 
to M. Davignon 



Herr von Below to 
M. Davignon 



Sir F. Villiers to 
M. Davignon 



1914. 

Brussels 
Aug. 2 



Brussels 
Aug. 2 

Brussels 
Aug. 3 



Brussels 
Aug. 3 



Brussels 
Aug. 3 



Brussels 
Aug. 3 



Brussels 
Aug. 3 

London 
Aug. 3 

Brussels 
Aug. 4 



Brussels 
Aug. 4 



French Minister has published his 
declaration of 1st August. Belgium 
would greatly value a similar assur- 
ance from Germany 



Presentation of German ultimatum. 
Germany calls upon Belgium to al- 
low the passage of German troops . . 

Germany complains to Belgium of 
the violation of her frontiers by 
dirigibles, and a French patrol .... 



Belgian reply to German ultimatum. 
Belgium cannot fail in the duties im- 
posed upon her by the treaties of 
1839 



Informs of German action and of Bel 
gian attitude 



Belgium has informed France that for 
the moment she does not appeal to 
the guarantee of the Powers. She 
will eventually decide what must be 
done 



Belgium makes a supreme appeal to 
the British Government to safe- 
guard her neutrality 



Great Britain declares she will go to 
war if the neutrality of Belgium is 
violated (see No. 23) 



Germany will take, if necessary by 
force of arms, such steps as she 
may consider necessary for her 
safety in face of French menaces. . . 

Great Britain expects Belgium to re- 
sist to her utmost the pressure ex- 
erted by Germany to make her 
abandon her neutrality and that she 
will appeal to the guaranteeing 
Powers 



371 

371 
373 

373 
375 



375 



376 



376 



377 



377 



xliv 



CONTENTS 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



29 



30 



31 



32 



33 



34 



35 



36 



37 



38 



39 



Baron Fallon to 
M. Davignon 



M. Davignon to 
Belgian Ministers 
at London and 
Paris 

M. Davignon to 
Herr von Below 

Herr von Below to 
M. Davignon 



M. Davignon to 
Baron Grenier 



M. Davignon to 
Baron Bey ens 

Baron Beyens to 
M. Davignon 



Count de Lalaing 
to M. Davignon 

Count de Lalaing 
to M. Davignon 



M. Davignon to 
Belgian Ministers 
at Paris, London, 
and St. Peters 
burgh 



Count de Lalaing 
to M. Davignon 



1914. 

The Hague 

Aug. 4 



Brussels 
Aug. 4 



Brussels 
Aug. 4 

Brussels 
Aug. 4 

Brussels 
Aug. 4 

Brussels 
Aug. 4 

Berlin 
Aug. 4 



London 
Aug. 4 

London 
Aug. 4 



Brussels 
Aug. 4 



London 
Aug. 4 



Holland informs Belgian Government 
that she may perhaps be forced to 
establish war buoying of the Scheldt 

Violation of Belgian territory at 
Gemmenich 



Forwards passports to German Min- 
ister 

Germany leaves German interests in 
Belgium in hands of the United 
States of America 

Belgian Government request Spanish 
Government to take charge of Bel- 
gian interests in Germany 

Instructions to ask for his passports. 



Speech of Herr von Bethmann-Holl- 
weg in the Reichstag, in which the 
Chancellor admitted that Germany 
committed an injustice in disregard 
ing the protests of the Luxemburg 
and Belgian Governments 



British attitude in the European dis- 
pute 



Great Britain expects that Norway, 
Holland, and Belgium will resist 
German pressure and will preserve 
their neutrality. In that event they 
will be supported by her 



Summary of the diplomatic situation. 
No act of war having been com- 
mitted before the expiration of the 
ultimatum, the Cabinet decided on 
3rd August, at 10 o'clock, not yet 
to appeal to the guaranteeing 
Powers 



Great Britain has called upon Ger- 
many to respect Belgian neutrality 
The ultimatum expires at midnight. 



378 
379 

379 

380 

380 
381 



381 
382 

383 



384 



386 



CONTENTS 



xlv 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



40 



41 



42 



43 



44 



45 



46 



47 



48 



49 



50 



51 



1914. 
Brussels 
Aug. 4 



London 
Aug. 5 

Brussels 
Aug. 5 



Brussels 
Aug. 5 



Brussels 
Aug. 5 



Berlin 
Aug. 5 



St. Sebas- 
tian 
Aug. 5 

Paris 
Aug. 5 

Brussels 
Aug. 5 



London 
Aug. 5 

The Hague 
Aug. 5 



M. Davignon to Brussels 
Baron Grenier Aug. 5 



M. Davignon to 
British, French, 
and Russian Min 
isters at Brussels 



Count de Lalaing 
to M. Davignon 

M. Davignon to 
Belgian Ministers 
at Paris, London, 
and St. Peters- 
burgh 

M. Davignon to 
Belgian Ministers 
at Paris, London, 
and St. Peters 
burgh 

M. Davignon to 
all Heads of Bel 
gian Missions 



Baron Beyens to 
M. Davignon 



Baron Grenier to 
M. Davignon 

Baron Guillaume 
to M. Davignon 

Sir F. Villiers to 
M. Davignon 



Count de Lalaing 
to M. Davignon 



Baron Fallon to 
M. Davignon 



German troops having entered Bel- 
gium, the Belgian Government ap- 
peal to Great Britain, France, and 
Russia to cooperate, as guarantee- 
ing Powers, in the defence of Bel- 
gian territory 

Great Britain has declared war 
against Germany 

Belgium appeals to the Powers guar- 
anteeing her neutrality 



Summary of the diplomatic situation 



In virtue of Article 10 of the Fifth 
Hague Convention of 1907, Belgium, 
in forcibly repelling the infringe 
ment of her neutrality, commits no 
hostile act 



Staff of Belgian Legation in Ger- 
many will leave Berlin on 6th Au- 
gust 



Spanish Government undertake the 
protection of Belgian interests in 
Germany 



Germany declared war on France on 
3rd August at 6 p.m 



Great Britain agrees to cooperate, as 
a guaranteeing Power, in the de- 
fence of Belgian territory 



British fleet will ensure free passage 
of the Scheldt for the provisioning 
of Antwerp 



War buoying is about to be estab- 
lished (see No. 29) 



Belgian Government thank Spanish 
Government for taking charge of 
Belgian interests in Germany .... 



386 

387 
387 

388 



389 

390 

390 
390 

392 

392 
392 

393 



xlvi 



CONTENTS 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



52 



53 



54 



55 



56 



57 



58 



59 



60 



61 



62 



63 



M. Davignon to 
Belgian Ministers 
at Paris, London, 
and St. Peters- 
burgh 

M. de Weede to M, 
Davignon 



M. Davignon to 
Baron Fallon 

Baron Fallon to 
M. Davignon 



M. Davignon 
Baron Fallon 



to 



M. Davignon to 
Belgian Ministers 
at Paris and Lon 
don 



M. Davignon to 
Belgian Ministers 
at Paris and Lon- 
don 

Baron Guillaume 
to M. Davignon 



Baron Fallon to 
M. Davignon 

Baron Guillaume 
to M. Davignon 



Baron Fallon to 
M. Davignon 



1914. 
Brussels 
Aug. 5 



Brussels 
Aug. 6 

Brussels 
Aug. 6 

The Hague 
Aug. 6 

Brussels 
Aug. 7 

Brussels 
Aug. 7 



Brussels 
Aug. 7 



Paris 

Aug. 8 



The Hague 
Aug. 9 



Paris 
Aug. 9 



The Hague 
Aug. 10 



France and Russia agree to coop- 
erate with Great Britain in the de- 
fence of Belgian territory 



Communicates declaration of Nether 
lands neutrality in war between 
Belgium and Germany 

Regulation of commercial navigation 
of the Scheldt (see No. 50) 

Same subject as above 

Same subject as above 



Belgian Government anxious that 
war should not extend to Central 
Africa. Do French and British 
Governments agree to Belgian pro- 
posal to neutralise the Congo con- 
ventional basin ? 



Despatch explaining preceding tele 
gram 



France reserves her reply respecting 
Belgian proposal to neutralise 
Congo conventional basin 



M. Davignon to Brussels 
Baron Fallon Aug. 10 



Communication of a fresh German 
proposal repeating the ultimatum 
of 2nd August 



French Government are inclined to 
proclaim the neutrality of the 
Congo conventional basin (see No. 
59) 



Communicates German text (contain- 
ing an error) of the second German 
proposal and a translation of that 
document (containing another er- 
ror) 



Belgian Government have received 
the fresh German proposals and will 
reply shortly 



393 



393 

398 
399 

399 



399 
400 

401 
401 

402 

402 
404 



CONTENTS 



xlvii 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



64 
65 

66 

67 

68 

69 
70 

71 

72 

73 

74 

75 



M. Davignon to 
Baron Fallon 



M. Davignon to 
British, Russian, 
and French Min- 
isters 



M. Davignon to 
Belgian Ministers 
at London, Paris, 
and St. Peters- 
burgh 



Mr. Whitlock to 
M. Davignon 

Sir F. Villiers to 
M. Davignon 

M. Klobukowski to 
M. Davignon 

Baron Fallon to 
M. Davignon 



M. Davignon 
Baron Fallon 



to 



M. Sazonof to M, 
Davignon 

Baron Fallon to 
M. Davignon 

Baron Guillaume 
to M. Davignon 



Count de Lalaing 
to M. Davignon 



1914. 
Brussels 
Aug. 10 



Brussels 
Aug. 10 



Brussels 
Aug. 10 



Brussels 
Aug. 11 

Brussels 
Aug. 11 

Brussels 
Aug. 11 

The Hague 
Aug. 12 



Brussels 
Aug. 12 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
Aug. 13 

The Hague 
Aug. 13 

Paris 
Aug. 16 



London 
Aug. 17 



To ask German Government the 
meaning they attach to the word 
" Auseinandersetzung " 



Belgian Government communicate to 
Representatives of the guaranteeing 
Powers the text of the second Ger 
man note and of the reply which 
they propose to return 



Luxemburg authorities have asked 
Belgian Minister to leave Luxem 
burg. In the circumstances, Bel 
gian Government have not taken a 
similar step with regard to Luxem 
burg Representative at Brussels .... 

United States of America agree to 
take charge of German interests in 
Belgium 



Great Britain concurs in proposed 
Belgian reply to second German 
ultimatum ( see No. 65) 



French Government likewise entirely 
agree in proposed reply (see No. 65) 

The German text contained an error. 
The meaning is " her conflict with 
France " 



The new German proposal repeats the 
proposal contained in the ultima 
turn of 2nd August. Belgium can 
only repeat the reply she gave to 
that ultimatum 



Russian Government congratulate 
Belgian Government on their firm 
and dignified attitude (see No. 65) . 

Belgian reply to second German pro- 
posal presented on 13th August. . . . 

France no longer wishes to neutralise 
the Congo conventional basin (see 
Nos. 57 and 58) 



British Government cannot agree to 
Belgian proposal to neutralise the 
Congo conventional basin 



404 



405 



405 



407 



407 



408 



408 



408 



409 



409 



410 



410 



xlviii 



CONTENTS 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



76 

77 
78 
79 



M. Tombeur to M. 
Renkin 



Count Clary to M. 
Davignon 



M. Davignon 
Baron Fallon 



to 



M. Davignon to 
all Heads of Bel- 
gian Missions 



1914. 
Elizabeth- 

ville 
Aug. 26 

The Hague 
Aug. 28 

Antwerp 
Aug. 29 

Antwerp 
Aug. 29 



Germans attacked Belgian Congo on 
22nd August 

Austria-Hungary declares war against 
Belgium 

Belgian reply to Austro-Hungarian 
declaration of war 

Information respecting German al- 
legations against Belgium contained 
in British Parliamentary White 
Paper 



411 

411 
412 

413 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 
PART I 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



Baron Guillaume 
to M. Davignon 



Baron Beyens to 
M. Davignon 



Count Errembault 
de Dudzeele to 
M. Davignon 

Baron Beyens to 
M. Davignon 



Count Errembault 
de Dudzeele to 
M. Davignon 

Baron Beyens to 
M. Davignon 



M. de l'Escaille to 
M. Davignon 



Baron Beyens to 
M. Davignon 



Count Errembault 
de Dudzeele to 
M. Davignon 



1913. 

Paris 

Feb. 22 



1914. 
Berlin 
Apr. 2 



Vienna 
July 22 

Berlin 
July 24 



Vienna 
July 25 

Berlin 
July 25 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 26 

Berlin 
July 26 



Vienna 
July 26 



M. de Margerie asks if the new mili 
tary law is not caused by fear of 
violation of Belgian neutrality by 
France 



M. de Jagow wishes to conclude with 
France and England an agreement 
relative to the expenses of Belgian 
Congo 



Vienna seems more belligerent than 
Budapest 



The violence of the Austro-Hun- 
garian ultimatum passes all con 
jecture; it will revive the sympa- 
thies of Europe for Serbia 

The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum is 
calculated in the end to render war 
with Serbia inevitable 

Germany approves the d-marche of 
the Austro-Hungarian Government 
at Belgrade 

Russia will not permit Austria-Hun- 
gary to crush Serbia, to whom 
counsel of moderation has been sent . 

Germany and Austria-Hungary wish, 
besides annihilating Serbia, to de- 
liver a mortal blow to Russia and 
France 



War between Austria-Hungary and 
Serbia is imminent. If all the 
Powers wish peace sincerely, they 
should be able to arrive at a com- 
promise. The attitude of Austria- 
Hungary, upheld by Germany, per- 
mits of but faint hope 



419 



420 



422 



424 



425 



426 



428 



428 



431 



Note. — The editor is responsible for the translation of the table of contents to 
the Belgian Grey Book (No. 2), as a table of contents was omitted from the official 
English publication. 

xlix 



CONTENTS 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



10 



11 



12 



13 



14 



15 



16 



17 



18 



19 



20 



21 



Baron Beyens to 
M. Davignon 

M. Davignon to 
Count Errembault 
de Dudzeele 

Baron Beyens to 
M. Davignon 



M. Davignon to 
Baron Beyens 



Baron Beyens to 
M. Davignon 



Count Errembault 
de Dudzeele to 
M. Davignon 



Count Errembault 
de Dudzeele to 
M. Davignon 

Count de Buisseret 
to M. Davignon 



Baron Guillaume 
to M. Davignon 

Count Errembault 
de Dudzeele to 
M. Davignon 



Baron Beyens to 
M. Davignon 



Baron Guillaume 
to M. Davignon 



1914. 
Berlin 
July 27 

Brussels 
July 27 



Berlin 
July 28 



Brussels 
July 28 

Berlin 
July 28 



Vienna 
July 30 



Vienna 
July 30 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 31 



Paris 
July 31 

Vienna 
July 31 



Berlin 
Aug. 1 



Paris 
Aug. 2 



Opinion of M. Zimmermann upon the 
situation 



Please telegraph where mobilisation 
has taken place 



According to the Ambassador of 
Italy, the German and Austro 
Hungarian Governments are per 
suaded that Russia is unable to pre- 
vent the execution of Serbia 

Please telegraph if any measures 
have been taken in view of mobilisa- 
tion 

The warning given by Sir E. Grey to 
Prince Lichnowsky should, by dis 
sipating an illusion, have weight 
with the German Government .... 

Rupture seems imminent, but after 
a friendly interview between M, 
Sch6b6ko and Count Berchtold 
there is a basis for the renewal of 
parleys 

Same subject 



Germany refuses to exert any influ- 
ence over Austria-Hungary and the 
latter refuses discussion with Rus- 
sia. The attitude of Germany makes 
unavailing the efforts of M. Sazonow 

At Paris the situation is very un- 
settled 



The situation is very hopeless by 
reason of the mobilisation of Aus- 
tria-Hungary and the ultimatum ad- 
dressed by Germany to Russia 

The order for mobilisation has been 
given. Germany seeks to burden 
Russia with the responsibility for 
the war 



432 



434 



434 



436 



436 



438 
439 



France is alarmed at the military 
measures which Germany has taken 
against her 



440 
441 

442 

443 
444 



CONTENTS 



li 



No. 



22 



23 



24 



25 



26 



27 



28 



29 



30 



31 



32 



33 



34 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Baron Beyens to 
M. Davignon 

Count Errembault 
de Dudzeele to 
M. Davignon 

Count Errembault 
de Dudzeele to 
M. Davignon 

Baron Beyens to 
M. Davignon 



Count de Lalaing 
to M. Davignon 

Count de Lalaing 
to M. Davignon 



Baron Guillaume 
to M. Davignon 



Count de Lalaing 
to M. Davignon 



Baron Guillaume 
to M. Davignon 

Baron Guillaume 
to M. Davignon 



M. Davignon to 
Count Errembault 
de Dudzeele 

Count Errembault 
de Dudzeele to 
M. Davignon 



M. Davignon to 
the Legations at 
London, Paris 
and St. Peters 
burgh. 



1914. 
Berlin 
Aug. 2 

Vienna 
Aug. 2 

Vienna 
Aug. 2 

Berlin 
Aug. 4 

London 
Aug. 5 

London 
Aug. 5 



Paris 
Aug. 6 



London 
Aug. 7 

Paris 
Aug. 8 

Paris 
Aug. 10 

Brussels 
Aug. 12 

Vienna 
Aug. 18 



Antwerp 
Aug. 21 



There is talk in Berlin of the inva- 
sion of Luxemburg 



Count Berchtold is astonished at 
Dutch mobilisation 



General war seems inevitable. The 
attitude of England is anxiously 
watched 

Belgium can make no response to 
Germany's ultimatum except such 
as she has unhesitatingly made .... 

The support of the English expedi- 
tionary corps is not yet certain. . . . 

The splendid resistance of the Bel- 
gians will facilitate the task of the 
English Cabinet with regard to 
public opinion 

The Belgian Government asks the 
French Government to hasten the 
sending of military forces to Bel 
gium 

The heroic example of Belgium has 
decided the English people to make 
war against Germany 

M. Poineare" has conferred upon the 
town of Li6ge the Cross of the 
Legion of Honour 

Rupture in the diplomatic rela- 
tions between Austria-Hungary and 
France 

The military governor of Antwerp 
has the right to expel the subjects 
of Austria-Hungary 

The Austro-Hungarian consul at Ant- 
werp complains of having been dis- 
missed under disagreeable circum- 
stances 



England will give its diplomatic sup 
port to Belgium after the war and 
will endeavour to assure to her 
compensation for the suffering en- 
dured 



445 



446 



446 



448 



449 



450 



451 



451 



453 



454 



454 



455 



455 



lii 



CONTENTS 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



35 



36 



37 



38 



39 



40 



41 



42 



43 



44 



45 



46 



M. Davignon to 
Count Errembault 
de Dudzeele 

Prince Koudacheff 
to M, Davignon 



Count de Lalaing 
to M. Davignon 

M. Davignon to 
Prince Koudacheff 

M. Davignon to 
the Legations at 
London, Paris 
and St. Peters 
burgh 

M. Davignon to 
Baron Grenier 



Count F. van den 
Steen de Jehay to 
M. Davignon 



M. Davignon to 
all the Heads of 
Belgian Missions 
abroad 

Baron Moncheur 
to M. Davignon 



His Majesty the 
King to the Presi- 
dent of the French 
Republic 

His Majesty the 
King to His Maj- 
esty the King of 
England 

His Majesty the 
King to His Maj 
esty the Emperor 
of Russia 



1914. 
Antwerp 
Aug. 22 



Antwerp 
Aug. 27 



London 
Aug. 28 

Antwerp 
Aug. 29 

Antwerp 
Aug. 29 



Antwerp 
Aug. 30 



Antwerp 
Aug. 30 



Antwerp 
Sept. 4 



Constanti- 
nople 
Sept. 7 

Antwerp 
Sept. 13 



Antwerp 
Sept. 13 



Antwerp 
Sept. 13 



All measures have been taken to pre- 
vent any Austro-Hungarian subject 
from being molested 



Belgium may count upon the diplo- 
matic support of Russia at the end 
of the war 



English homage to the heroic resist- 
ance of the Belgian army and people 

Acknowledges receipt of communica- 
tion of August 27 (see No. 36) 

Instructions given to the Belgian 
troops of the Congo 



The Belgian Government protests 
against the accusations of the Vi 
ennese press relative to the cruelty 
to which German and Austrian sub- 
jects have been victims 

Supplementary report upon the de 
parture from Luxemburg of the 
Minister of the King to the Grand 
Ducal Court 



Note of the Antwerp court on the 
subject of anti-German manifesta 
tions which occurred on August 4 
and 5 



The Germans are doing all in their 
power to excite the Turks to war 
against the Triple Entente 



Congratulations upon the great vic- 
tory achieved by the French army . . 



Congratulations upon the superb con 
duct of the English troops in the 
battle of the Marne 



Congratulations upon the victory 
achieved by the Russian army 



456 

456 
456 
457 
458 



458 
459 

461 

464 
467 

468 
468 



CONTENTS 



liii 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



47 



48 



49 



50 



51 



52 



53 



54 



55 



The President of 
the French Re- 
public to His 
Majesty the King 

His Majesty the 
King of England 
to His Majesty 
the King 

His Majesty the 
Emperor of Rus- 
sia to His Maj- 
esty the King 

Count Errembault 
de Dudzeele to M. 
Davignon 

Baron Beyens to 
M. Davignon 



Baron Beyens to 
M. Davignon 



Baron Moncheur 
to M. Davignon 

Telegram of Mr. 
Bryan to Mr. 
Brand Whitlock 
communicated by 
the American Con- 
sulate at Ant- 
werp 



Baron Grenier 
M. Davignon 



to 



56 Baron Guillaume 
to M. Davignon 



1914. 
Bordeaux 
Sept. 14 



London 
Sept. 14 



Tsarskoy- 

Selo 
Sept. 14 



Berne 
Sept. 16 



Hove 

(Sussex) 
Sept. 21 



Hove 
(Sussex) 
Sept. 22 



Constanti- 
nople 
Sept. 22 

Brussels 
Sept. 25 



Madrid 
Sept. 30 



Bordeaux 
Oct. 11 



Appreciation of congratulations. 



The same 



The same 



Report upon the departure from 
Vienna of the Minister of the King 
at the Imperial and Royal Court. . . 

August 4th M. de Jagow acknowl- 
edged that Germany had nothing 
with which to reproach Belgium and 
that he understands the reply of the 
Belgium Government 



M. Zimmermann says that the De- 
partment of Foreign Affairs was 
powerless to prevent the invasion of 
Belgium, all power belonging to the 
military authority after mobilisa- 
tion. Return to Belgium of the 
Legation at Germany 



Turkey is an instrument of war at 
the disposal of Germany 



The German Government, on August 
22, addressed to the Ambassador of 
the United States a note relative to 
the neutralisation of the conven- 
tional free-trade zone of the Congo, 
a neutralisation which Germany is 
disposed to accept 



Protest of the Belgian Government 
against the accusation relative to 
the ill-treatment of Austro-Hun- 
garian subjects has been delivered 
to the Government of His Catholic 
Majesty (see No. 40) 



Transfer of the Belgian Government 
to Havre 



469 



469 



469 



470 



472 



475 



479 



480 



481 



481 



liv 



CONTENTS 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



57 



58 



59 



60 



61 



62 



63 



64 



66 



67 



His Majesty the 
King to the Presi- 
dent of the French 
Republic 

M. Davignon to 
Baron Grenier 



Baron Moncheur 
to M. Davignon 

Baron Moncheur 
to M. Davignon 



M. Davignon to 
Baron Moncheur 

M. Davignon to 
M. van Ypersele 
de Strihou 

Jonkheer de Weede 
to M. Davignon 



M. Davignon to all 
Heads of Belgian 
Missions abroad 

Baron Moncheur 
to M. Davignon 



Mr. Brand Whit- 
lock to M. Davi- 
gnon 



M. Davignon to 
Mr. Brand Whit- 
lock 



1914. 
Ostend 
Oct. 12 



Havre 
Oct. 21 



Constanti- 
nople 
Oct. 23 

Constanti- 
nople 
Oct. 31 

Havre 
Nov. 1 

Havre 
Nov. 6 



Havre 
Nov. 7 



Havre 

Nov. 9 



Mel in 

Nov. 16 



Brussels 
Nov. 16 



Havre 
Dec. 5 



Appreciation for the hospitality of- 
fered by France 



By attacking the Belgian port of Lu- 
kuga the German Government has 
taken against Belgium the initiative 
with regard to hostilities in Africa 
(see No. 54) 



Turkey pushes forward its prepara- 
tions for war 



The Representatives of the Powers 
of the Triple Entente leave Con- 
stantinople 

Is it not well to advise Belgians to 
go to the coast towns of Turkey ? . . . 

Transmit to your colleague at Con- 
stantinople the order to demand his 
passports 

The Minister of the Netherlands has 
taken charge of Ottoman interests in 
Belgium 

Reasons for the rupture in the diplo- 
matic relations between Belgium and 
Turkey 

Report upon the departure from 
Constantinople of the Legation of 
the King 

Transmits the German note of Au- 
gust 22 relative to the neutralisation 
of the conventional free-trade zone 
of the Congo ( see No. 54 ) 

The Belgian Government has already 
responded to the German note (see 
No. 58) 



483 



483 



484 



484 



487 



487 



488 



488 



489 



490 



491 



CONTENTS 



lv 



PART II 

X. 

Germany accuses Belgium of having concluded a Military Understanding 

with England. 



No. 


Name. 


Place and 
Date. 


Summary. 


Page. 


98 


M. Davignon to 
the Foreign Lega- 
tions of the King 

M. Davignon to 
the Foreign Lega- 
tions of the King 

M. Davignon to 
the Foreign Lega- 
tions of the King 

M. Davignon to 
the Foreign Lega- 
tions of the King 

M. Davignon to 
the Foreign Lega- 
tions of the King 

M. Davignon to 
the Foreign Lega- 
tions of the King 


1914. 
Havre 
Oct. 19 

Havre 
Dec. 4 

Havre 
Dec. 15 

1915. 
Havre 
Jan. 13 

Havre 
Feb. 13 

Havre 
Mar. 4 


Reply to the note of the Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of Oc- 
tober 13 


492 


99 


Reply to the note of the Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of No- 
vember 25 


495 


100 


Despatch of Sir E. Grey to Count de 
Lalaing of April 7, 1913, on the 
subject of the apprehension caused 
in Belgium by the rumours relative 
to a future violation of Belgian 
neutrality by England 


498 


101 
102 

103 


The Gazette de VAllemagne du Nord 
has falsified the Ducarne document. 

Sir E. Grey replies to the explana- 
tions given by M. von Bethmann- 
Hollweg on the subject of the pre- 
tended Anglo-Belgian conventions . . 

New protest of the Belgian Govern- 
ment against the affirmation that 
Belgium had, in 1906, abandoned its 
neutrality by the conclusion of a 
treaty with England 


500 
503 
507 



XL 

Austria-Hungary sent Batteries of Cannon into Belgium before the 
Declaration of War. 



No. 


Name. 


Place and 
Date. 


Summary. 


Page. 


104 


M. Davignon to 
Baron Fallon 


1914. 
Havre 
Oct. 20 


When replying to the declaration of 
war of August 28, the Government 
of the King was ignorant of the 
sending of Austrian heavy artillery 
against the forts of Namur 


511 



lvi 



CONTENTS 



No. 


Name. 


Place and 
Date. 


Summary. 


Page. 


105 


Baron Grenier to 
M. Davignon 

M. Davignon to 
Baron Grenier 


1915. 
Madrid 
Apr. 5 

Havre 
Apr. 20 


In addressing the declaration of war 
to Belgium, the Imperial and Royal 
Government was ignorant, likewise, 
that the Belgian Government had 
had pourparlers with the object of 
Belgian military cooperation with 
Great Britain and France 


512 


106 


Reply to the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment 


514 



XVI. 



No French or English Troops entered Belgium before August 5. 




116 



117 



118 



119 



M. Davignon to 
the Foreign Lega- 
tions of the King 

M. Davignon to 
M. Klobukowski 



M. Klobukowski to 
M. Davignon 

M. Davignon to 
the Foreign Lega- 
tions of the King 



Place and 
Date. 



Havre 
Jan. 28 



Havre 
Feb. 6 



Havre 
Mar. 13 

Havre 
Apr. 10 



Summary. 



Denial of the affirmation of the Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 



The French Government will doubt- 
less be able to truthfully deny the 
disembarkation of French troops at 
Erquelinnes, July 24 



Denial of the French Government. 



The plan of concentration of France 
shows that the latter had no inten- 
tion of violating Belgian neutrality . 



Page. 



517 



519 
520 



527 



THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 
WARNINGS 



No. 



Name. 



M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Jonnart 



M. jSfienne to M, 
Jonnart 



M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Stephen 
Pichon i 



Place and 
Date. 



1913. 

Berlin 

Mar. 17 



Paris 
Apr. 2 



Berlin 
May 6 



Summary. 



Transmission of reports of the mili- 
tary attache" and of the naval at- 
tache" at Berlin on the new military 
law. Efforts of the German Gov- 
ernment to represent this law as a 
reply to the French project of a 
three years' law and to foster a 
warlike spirit in the people 

Enclosure I. — Report of Lieut. 
Col. Serret. German armaments are 
intended to place France in a defi 
nitely inferior position. Anger, 
aroused in official circles by French 
precautionary measures 

Enclosure II. — Report of M. de 
Faramond. The proposed military 
law is intended to make easy a 
crushing offensive against France. 
Confidence of Germans in the su 
periority of their army. Financial 
measures intended to cover military 
expenditure 



Despatch of a German official secret 
report on the strengthening of the 

army 

Enclosure. — Text of the report. 
Retrospective survey of the succes 
sive armaments caused by the Al 
geciras Conference, the Agadir in 
cident, and the Balkan war. Neces- 
sity of making a new effort, of ac 
customing public opinion to the idea 
of war, of stirring up trouble in 
French or English colonies, and of 
considering the invasion of Belgium 
and Holland 



End of Balkan crisis. It nearly 
brought Germany to a war of ag- 
gression against France and caused 
preparations for mobilisation .... 

lvii 



Page. 



531 



540 



544 



lviii 



CONTENTS 



No. 


Name. 


Place and 
Date. 


Summary. 


Page. 


4 
5 


M. Allize* to M. 
Stephen Pichon 

Memorandum to M. 
Stephen Pichon 

M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Stephen 
Pichon 

M. Dumaine to M. 
Rene" Viviani 

M. Dumaine to M. 
Rene" Viviani 

M. de Manneville 
to M. Rene Vi- 
viani 

M. Paleologue to 
M. Rene* Viviani 

M. d'Apchier to M. 
Rene" Viviani 

M. Dumaine to M. 
Rene" Viviani 

M. Dumaine to M. 
Rene" Viviani 

Consular Report 
from Vienna 


1913. 
Munich 
July 10 

Paris 
July 30 

Berlin 
Nov. 22 

1914. 
Vienna 
June 28 

Vienna 
July 2 

Berlin 
July 4 

St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 6 

Budapest 
July 11 

Vienna 
July 15 

Vienna 
July 19 

Vienna 
July 20 


Bavarian opinion considers the new 
armaments as intended to provoke a 
war in which it sees the only possi- 
ble solution for internal difficulties. 

Prevailing ideas in German opinion; 
desire for revenge for Agadir, fear of 
revival of a strong France. Power- 
lessness of peace party. Formation, 
composition, and growing develop- 
ment of a war party, encouraged in 
its ambitions by the presumed weak- 
ness of the Triple Entente 


547 
547 


6 

7 
8 


Conversation of King of the Belgians 
with the Emperor, who has ceased 
to be pacific, gives in to the bellicose 
circle of which his son is the centre, 
and accustoms himself to the pros- 
pect of a near conflict with France . . 

News of assassination of Archduke 
Francis-Ferdinand at Serajevo 

Exploitation of that event by the 
Austrian military party 


554 
556 
557 


9 
10 


Pretended confidence of German Gov- 
ernment in a friendly arrangement 
of Austro-Servian differences 

M. Sazonof warned Austrian Ambas- 
sador that Russian Government 
could not accept assassination of 
Archduke as pretext for action on 
Servian territory 


557 

558 


11 


Forced official optimism, contrasted 
with serious military preparations 
in Hungary 


558 


12 
13 


Official Austrian newspapers advocate 
a war to the finish against Pan- 
Servism, Russia and France appear- 
ing to them incapable of intervening 

Forwards a Consular report 


559 
560 


14 


Austrian political circles appear de- 
termined on a war of aggression 
against Servia, and military circles 
consider possibility of a European 
conflict 


561 



CONTENTS 



lix 

Page. 



No. 



15 



16 



17 



18 



19 



20 



21 



Name. 



M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to the French 
Ambassadors at 
London, St. Pe- 
tersburgh, Vi- 
enna, Rome 

M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to the French 
Ambassadors at 
London, St. Pe- 
tersburgh, Vi- 
enna, Rome 

M. Dumaine to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin 



M. Paul Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to the French 
Ambassadors at 
London, Berlin, 
St. Petersburgh, 
Rome 

M. AllizS to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin 



M. Rene" Viviani to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 



Place and 
Date. 



1914. 

Berlin 

July 21 



Paris 
July 21 



Paris 
July 22 



Vienna 
July 22 



London 
July 22 



Paris 
July 23 



Munich 
July 23 



Reval 
July 24 



Summary. 



German Government, who have al- 
ready issued " preliminary mobilisa- 
tion notices," state categorically 
that they have no knowledge of 
tenour of note which Austria intends 
sending to Servia 



Germany will strongly support Aus- 
trian action, without attempting to 
act as mediator 



French Government orders French, 
Ambassador to give friendly counsel 
for moderation to Vienna 



Conciliatory attitude of Russia and 
Servia. Reassuring indications fur- 
nished to foreign diplomatists. Vio- 
lent language of German Ambas- 
sador 



Grave anxiety of Sir Edward Grey 
after a conversation with German 
Ambassador. Counsels of prudence 
and moderation given to Austro 
Hungarian Ambassador 



Forthcoming presentation of Austrian 
note to Servia. Contradictory im- 
pressions of diplomatists as to its 
contents and scope. Calming assur 
ances given by Vienna 



Pessimism of Bavarian official circles, 
particularly of President of the 
Council, who had knowledge of Aus- 
trian note to Servia 



In agreement with M. Sazonof, M. 
Viviani requests M. Bienvenu-Mar 
tin, Acting Minister for Foreign Af- 
fairs, to give instructions that from 
Paris and London counsels of mod- 
eration shall be addressed to Count 
Berchtold, the delivery of the Aus- 
trian note the evening before being 
still unknown 



562 



563 



563 



564 



565 



566 



567 



568 



lx 



CONTENTS 



No. 



23 



24 



25 



26 



27 



28 



29 



Name. 



M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to M. Rene 
Viviani 



Austrian Note 



M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to M. Rene 
Viviani 



M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to M. Thi6- 
baut 



M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to the French 
Ambassadors at 
Stockholm ( for 
the President of 
the Council ) , Bel- 
grade, London, St. 
Petersburgh, Ber- 
lin, Rome 

M. Bienvenu-Mar 
tin to the French 
Ambassadors at 
Stockholm ( for 
the President of 
the Council), Bel 
grade, London, St. 
Petersburgh, Ber 
lin, Vienna, Rome 



M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu 
Martin 



Place and 
Date. 



1914. 

Paris 

July 24 



Vienna 
July 24 



Paris 
July 24 



Paris 
July 24 



Paris 
July 24 



Paris 

July 24 



Berlin 
July 24 



Summary. 



Instructions sent in this sense to 
Vienna, where they did not arrive 
till after delivery of note to Bel- 
grade 



Text of Austrian note to Servia, com- 
municated on the morning of 24 
July by Count Sc&zsen to M. Bien- 
venu-Martin 



Analysis of note. Count Sc6zsen was 
warned, when he brought it, of the 
painful impression which must be 
produced, particularly under present 
conditions, by the extension of Aus- 
trian demands, as also by the short- 
ness of the time-limit for Servia's 
reply 



Advice given by French Government 
to Servian Government to accept 
Austria's demands so far as may be 
possible, and to propose to submit 
the question to the arbitration of 
Europe 



Information given to our Ambassa- 
dors as to bellicose inclinations of 
the Austrian military party, as to 
difficulty for Servia to accept whole 
of Austrian demands, and as to 
threatening tone of German press. 



Demarche taken by Herr von Schoen 
at the Quai d'Orsay to support, in 
the name of his Government, the 
demarche of Austria-Hungary, ap- 
proving its note, and making appar- 
ent the "incalculable consequences" 
which, by reason of the natural play 
of the alliances, would result from 
any attempt at interference by a 
third Power in the Austro- Servian 
conflict 



Austrophil and chauvinist manifesta- 
tions at Berlin; pessimism of diplo- 
matic circles 



Page. 



569 



570 



576 



578 



579 



579 



582 



CONTENTS 



lxi 



No. 



30 



31 



32 



33 



34 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



35 



36 



M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



M. Pal6ologue to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 



M. Paul Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



M. Paul Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



M. Bienvenu-Mar 
tin to the French 
Ambassadors at 
Stockholm ( for 
the President of 
the Council), Bel 
grade, St. Peters 
burgh, Berlin, Vi 
enna, Rome 

M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to the French 
Ambassadors at 
Stockholm ( for 
the President of 
the Council), and 
to London, Ber- 
lin, St. Peters- 
burgh, Vienna 



1914. 

Berlin 

July 24 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 24 



London 
July 24 



London 
July 24 



Paris 
July 24 



Berlin 
July 25 



Paris 
July 25 



Herr von Jagow states approval of 
Austrian note, but denies absolutely 
previous knowledge of contents. He 
hopes Servia will be advised by her 
friends to give in. The official press 
is equally in agreement with Austria 

Peaceable tendency of Russian Gov- 
ernment, in spite of deep impression 
made on public by presentation of 
Austrian note 



Sir E. Grey explains to M. Paul 
Cambon his plan of mediation by 
four Powers. Pessimism of Count 
Benckendorff on subject of Ger- 
many's intentions 



Semi-official intervention by Germany 
at Vienna appears to M. Paul Cam 
bon the best means of arresting the 
conflict 



Sir E. Grey wishes to propose to Ger- 
many that they should act together 
at Vienna and St. Petersburgh, in 
order that Austro-Servian conflict 
should be submitted to mediation by 
four Powers not interested in ques- 
tion. Counsel of prudence given to 
Servian Minister at Paris 



Belgian Minister at Berlin sees in 
the course crisis is taking the execu- 
tion of warlike intention premedi- 
tated by Germany 



Summary of situation. At Paris, 
Herr von Schoen comes to the Quai 
d'Orsay to deny menacing character 
of his action of previous evening. 
At London the Austrian Ambassador 
states that Austrian note is not in 
the nature of an ultimatum. Sir 
E. Grey advises prudence at Bel- 
grade and explains to German Am- 
bassador his plan of mediation by 
four Powers 



582 



584 



585 



586 



586 



587 



588 



Ixii 



CONTENTS 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



37 



38 



39 



40 



41 



42 



43 



44 



45 



M. de Fleuriau to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 



M. Pal6ologue to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 

M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to M. Du- 



M. de Fleuriau to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 

M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



M. Barr£re to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin 



M. Dumaine to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin 



1914. 
London 
July 25 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 25 

Paris 
July 25 



London 
July 25 

Berlin 
July 25 



Berlin 
July 25 



Berlin 
July 25 



Rome 
July 25 



Vienna 
July 25 



German Government refusing to in- 
tervene between Vienna and Bel 
grade, Sir E. Grey draws Prince 
Lichnowsky's attention to fact that 
this attitude will help to bring on 
a general conflict in which England 
could not remain inactive 



Conciliatory efforts of M. Sazonof ; he 
requests Vienna to extend the time- 
limit allowed Servia for her reply . . 

French Government support this re- 
quest for delay 



English Government also associate 
themselves with this request 



Herr von Jagow again states cate- 
gorically that he had no knowledge 
of Austrian note before its presenta- 
tion. He gives evasive answer to re- 
quest of English Charge" d' Affaires 
that he would intervene at Vienna 
in order to prevent a conflict and to 
prolong period of ultimatum 



Russian Charge d' Affaires also pre- 
sents this last request to Berlin. He 
insists on the urgency of a reply, 
which Herr von Jagow tries to post- 
pone 



On further pressing action by Rus- 
sian Charg6 d' Affaires, Herr von 
Jagow states that he considers 
Austro- Servian differences as a 
purely local affair, which should be 
confined to Austria and Servia, and 
which does not appear to him likely 
to lead to international difficulties . . 

Russian Ambassador at Rome re 
quests Italian Government to inter 
vene on behalf of extension of time- 
limit of ultimatum 



Austrian Government evade request 
for extension of time-limit presented 
at Vienna by Russian Charge" d J Af- 
faires 



589 

590 
591 

591 



692 



593 



593 



594 



595 



CONTENTS 



lxiii 



No. 



46 



47 



48 



49 



50 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



51 



52 



53 



54 



55 



M. Boppe to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin 

M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



M. Dumaine to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin 



Servian Note 



M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to the Presi- 
dent of the Coun- 
cil (on board the 
" La France " ) 
and to the French 
Ambassadors at 
London, St. Pe 
tersburgh, Berlin, 
Vienna, Rome 



M. Barrere to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin 



M. Barrere to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin 



M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to M. de Fleu- 
riau 



M. Paleologue to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 



M. Dumaine to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin 



1914. 
Belgrade 
July 25 

Berlin 
July 25 



Vienna 
July 25 



Belgrade 
July 25 

Paris 
July 26 



Rome 
July 26 

Rome 
July 26 

Paris 
July 26 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 26 



Vienna 
July 26 



Summary of Servian reply to Aus 
trian note 



News of departure of Austrian Min 
ister from Belgrade evokes demon 
strations of chauvinism at Berlin. 
Financiers believe there will be war 

French Ambassador at Vienna, on ac- 
count of delay of telegram sent him 
from Paris, does not receive his in- 
structions in time to associate him- 
self with action of his Russian col- 
league 



Text of Servian reply to Austro-Hun 
garian note 



Summary of situation on evening of 
25th, as resulting from Austria-Hun- 
gary's uncompromising attitude. 
Impressions made in the different 
capitals, and attempts to prevent 
aggravation of conflict which would 
result from military measures taken 
by Austro-Hungarian Government 
against Servia. Sir E. Grey still 
hopes to prevent a conflict by the 
intervention of four disinterested 
Powers 



Italy will participate in efforts to 
maintain peace, but wishes to remain 
outside conflict if it comes 



Russia still hopes for peaceful solu- 
tion; Italian opinion hostile to 
Austria 



French Government support Servia's 
request for mediation, addressed to 
English Government by Russia's 
advice 



M. Sazonof, still imbued with the 
same spirit of conciliation, proposes 
a direct conversation between Vienna 
and St. Petersburgh on modifications 
to be introduced in ultimatum to 
make it acceptable 



Russian Ambassador, on return to 
Vienna, proposes to present there 
fresh proposals for a settlement . . 



595 
596 

597 
597 



602 



604 



605 



605 



606 



606 



Ixiv 



CONTENTS 




56 



57 



58 



59 



60 



61 



M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to the Presi- 
dent of the Coun- 
cil (on board the 
" La France " ) 
and to the French 
Ambassadors at 
London, St. Pe- 
tersburgh, Berlin, 
Vienna, Rome 

Note for the Min- 
ister 



M. Chevalley to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 

M. d'Annoville to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 

M. Farges to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin 

M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to M. Jules 
Cambon and to 
the French Am- 
bassadors at Lon- 
don, St. Peters- 
burgh, Vienna, 
Rome 



Place and 
Date. 



1914. 

Paris 

July 26 



Paris 
July 26 



Christiania 
July 26 



Luxemburg 
July 26 



Basle 
July 27 

Paris 

July 27 



Summary. 



D-marche by Herr von Schoen at the 
Quai d'Orsay that France should in- 
tervene with Germany at St. Peters 
burgh only, in order to give counsels 
of peace. His refusal to reply, in 
default of instructions, to the re 
quest for mediation by four Powers 
at St. Petersburgh and Vienna . . . 



Further visit of German Ambassador 
to confirm and strengthen the pacific 
intentions of his previous d-marche. 
He refuses to give an opinion as to 
the advisability of Germany recom 
mending moderation at Vienna, and 
persists in trying to bind the French 
Government in a common action of 
"pacific solidarity" at St. Peters- 
burgh only, on whom, according to 
him, peace depends 

Order to German fleet to return to 
Germany from Norway 

First preparations for mobilisation 
at Thionville 

First preparations for mobilisation in 
Grand Duchy of Baden 

Summary of three successive d6 
marches made by Herr von Schoen. 
The situation becomes more serious 
Austria refusing both to content her 
self with Servian concessions and to 
enter into conversation on the sub- 
ject with the Powers. New English 
proposal to endeavour to find, at 
Berlin, Paris, Rome, and London, 
means of avoiding a crisis, Russia 
and Austria, the Powers directly in- 
terested, remaining apart 



Page. 



607 



609 



611 



611 



612 



612 



CONTENTS 



lxv 



No. 




62 



63 



64 



65 



66 



67 



68 



69 



70 



M. Bienvenu-Mar 
tin to the Presi- 
dent of the Coun- 
cil (on board the 
"La France") 
and to the French 
Ambassadors at 
London, St. Pe 
tersburgh, Berlin, 
Vienna 

M. de Fleuriau to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 



M. Pal6ologue to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 

M. Bompard to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin 



M. de Fleuriau to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 



M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



M. de Fleuriau to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 



M. de Fleuriau to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 



M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to M. de Fleu- 
riau 



Place and 
Date. 



1914. 

Paris 

July 27 



London 
July 27 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 27 

Constanti- 
nople 
July 27 



London 
July 27 



Berlin 
July 27 



London 
July 27 



London 
July 27 



Paris 
July 27 



Summary. 



Further demarche of Herr von Schoen 
at the Quai d'Orsay, with the object 
of compromising France in regard to 
Russia, while gaining time to facili 
tate military action by Austria in 
Servia, which Germany does nothing 
to delay 



The German and Austrian Ambas- 
sadors make it known that they are 
sure of England's neutrality, in spite 
of language used by Sir A. Mcol- 
son to Prince Lichnowsky 



Conciliatory attitude of M. Sazonof . 



It is considered at Constantinople 
that Austro- Servian dispute will re 
main localised, and that Russia will 
not intervene on behalf of Servia. 

Great Britain stops demobilisation of 
her fleet, and warns Germany that 
an Austrian invasion of Servia may 
cause European war 



Herr von Jagow gives vague pacific 
assurances, and states, in reply to 
a question, that Germany would not 
mobilise if Russia mobilised only on 
the Austrian frontier. The Secre- 
tary of State shows lively anxiety . . 

Sir E. Grey suggests that the French, 
German, and Italian Ambassadors at 
London should examine, in concert 
with him, the means of solving the 
present difficulties 



Servia has not asked for English 
mediation; the plan of mediation by 
four Powers advocated by England 
must therefore be adhered to 



French Government accepts English 
position, that a sincerely moderat- 
ing action by Germany at Vienna 
could alone bring matters to a close 



614 



616 
616 



617 



617 



618 



618 



619 



619 



lxvi 



CONTENTS 



No. 



71 



72 



73 



74 



75 



75 

(2) 



76 



77 



78 



Name. 



M. de Fleuriau to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar 
tin 

M. Barrere to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin 



M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu 
Martin 



M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu 
Martin 



M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to the French 
Ambassadors at 
London, St. Pe- 
tersburgh, Berlin, 
Vienna, Rome 

Communique* of 
the Press Bureau 



M. Rene" Viviani to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 



M. Bienvenu-Mar 
tin to M. Rene" 
Viviani 



M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to French Am- 
bassadors at Lon- 
don, Berlin, St, 
Petersburgh, Vi- 
enna, Rome 



Place and 
Date. 



1914. 
London 
July 27 

Rome 
July 27 



Berlin 
July 27 



Berlin 
July 27 



Paris 
July 27 



Vienna 
July 28 



On board 
the " La 
France " 
July 28 



Paris 
July 28 



Paris 
July 28 



Summary. 



Italian Government also accepts medi- 
ation by four Powers 



The Marquis di San Giuliano states 
that he had no previous knowledge 
of Austrian note, and adheres, with- 
out hesitation, to Sir E. Grey's pro- 
posal 



Herr von Jagow dismisses the plan 
of a conference of the Powers, while 
proclaiming his desire for a peace 
ful settlement 



He evades fresh pressure from M. 
Jules Cambon. Opportunity of re- 
newing the English suggestion in a 
different form in order to drive Ger 
many into a corner 



Count ScSzsen hands to the Quai 
d'Orsay a memorandum from his 
Government justifying the coercive 
measures against Servia which he 
states are imminent. Text of this 
memorandum 



Semi-official communique" of the Vi- 
enna Press Bureau on the subject of 
the Servian reply, which is repre- 
sented as insufficient 



Acknowledgment of receipt of com- 
munications received from M. Bien- 
venu-Martin and approval of replies 
he made both to Herr von Schoen 
and to Sir E. Grey's proposal 



Summary of the situation : Germany's 
refusal to intervene at Vienna, ob- 
jection raised by her to English pro- 
posal, postponement of Austrian 
memorandum. Dangers of the sit- 
uation ., 



Visit of Herr von Schoen to the Quai 
d'Orsay. He protests again his 
pacific sentiments, but always evades 
investigation as to practical means 
of preventing a conflict 



620 



621 



622 



622 



624 



637 



638 



639 



640 



CONTENTS 



lxvii 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



79 



80 



81 



82 



83 



84 



85 



86 



M. Bienvenu-Mar 
tin to M. Du 
maine 



M. Paul Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu 
Martin 



M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu- 
Martin 



M. Paleologue to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 

M. Dumaine to M, 
Bienvenu-Martin 



M. Barrfcre to M, 
Bienvenu-Martin 



M. Bienvenu-Mar 
tin to the French 
Ambassadors at 
St. Petersburgh, 
London, Berlin, 
Rome, Vienna, 
Const antinople, 
Belgrade 



M. Paleologue to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 



1914. 

Paris 

July 28 



London 
July 28 



Berlin 
July 28 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 28 

Vienna 
July 28 



Rome 
July 29 



Paris 
July 29 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 29 



Recommendation to M. Dumaine to 
keep in touch with his English col- 
league for the purpose of presenting 
the English proposal for mediation 
to Vienna 



German Ambassador at London in 
sists, as does Herr von Schoen at 
Paris, on the expediency of moderat- 
ing action by England at St. Peters- 
burgh alone. On the other hand, M 
Sazonof has accepted the English 
proposal of mediation, but he would 
like it to be preceded by direct con 
versa tion with Vienna, from which 
he expects good results 



Herr von Jagow continues to show 
hostility to the conference proposed 
by Sir E. Grey, and rests his dilatory 
attitude on the news of Russian ef 
forts for a direct understanding be 
tween Vienna and St. Petersburgh . . 

M. Sazonof is obliged to state that 
Austria evades his proposal for a 
direct understanding 



Austrian declaration of war on Servia 
renders useless all attempts at con- 
ciliation, according to Count Berch 
told, who thus breaks off all discus- 
sion with St. Petersburgh 



The Consulta considers that Austria's 
declaration of war should not pre- 
vent the continuance of diplomatic 
efforts for the meeting of a confer- 
ence at London 



Germany appears to renounce hope of 
Franco-English pressure on Russia 
alone, but continues to refuse to act 
at Vienna. It therefore appears in- 
dispensable that Russia should join 
definitely and at once in the English 
proposal for mediation by four 
Powers, in order that it should be 
accepted by Berlin before Austria's 
military measures should have defi- 
nitely compromised peace 



Russian Government gives complete 
adherence to this proposal 



641 



641 



643 



644 



644 



645 



646 



647 



Ixviii 



CONTENTS 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



87 



88 



89 



90 



91 



92 



93 



94 



95 



96 



M. Klobukowski to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 

M. Ronssin to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin 

M. Allize" to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin 

M. Dumaine to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin 

M. Paleologue to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar 
tin 

M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu 
Martin 



1914. 
Brussels 
July 29 



Frankfort 
July 29 

Munich 
July 29 

Vienna 
July 29 

St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 29 

Berlin 
July 29 



M. Dumaine to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin 



M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to the French 
Ambassadors at 
London, Berlin, 
St. Petersburgh, 
Home, Vienna, 
Con s tantinople, 
Belgrade 

M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin to the French 
Ambassadors at 
London, Berlin, 
St. Petersburgh, 
Rome, Vienna, 
Const antinople, 
Belgrade 

M. Barrere to M. 
Bienvenu-Martin 



Vienna 
July 29 



Paris 
July 29 



Paris 
July 29 



Borne 
July 29 



Anxiety caused at Brussels by the 
enigmatical and threatening attitude 
of Germany 

Important movements of troops noted 
round Frankfort 

Military preparations in South Ger- 
many 

Military preparations in Bohemia . . . 



Austria evades the direct conversation 
to which she was invited, and 
hastens to arm 



Herr von Jagow maintains his dila- 
tory attitude, vaguely pacific, throw- 
ing all final responsibility for the 
conflict on Russia, stating at the 
same time his hope of a direct un 
derstanding between Vienna and St. 
Petersburgh, for the success of 
which he claims to be trying to 
work 



Austria appears to have decided for 
war; she is strongly urged thereto 
by Herr von Tschirschky, German 
Ambassador. The situation grows 
worse 



Herr von Schoen called to say that 
Germany was going to consult Vi 
enna as to its intentions, that that 
would furnish a basis for discussion, 
and that military operations would 
not be actively advanced 



Russia, confronted with the disquiet- 
ing attitude of Germany and with 
the refusal of Count Berchtold to 
continue the discussions, and with 
Austria's military preparations, is 
obliged to proceed to partial mo- 
bilisation 



Marquis di San Giuliano explains the 
attitude of Germany and Austria as 
due to their erroneous conviction 
that Russia would abandon Servia . . 



648 

648 

649 
649 

650 



650 



652 



653 



653 



654 



CONTENTS 



lxix 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page f 



97 



M. Rene Viviani to 
M. Paul Cambon 



1914. 

Paris 

July 29 



98 



99 



100 



101 



102 



103 



M. Paul Cambon 
to M. Bienvenu 
Martin 



M. Boppe to M, 
Bienvenu-Martin 



M. Paleologue to 
M. Bienvenu-Mar- 
tin 



M. Rene" Viviani to 
the French Am- 
bassadors at St. 
Petersburgh and 
London 



M. Paleologue to 
M. Rene" Viviani 



M. Paleologue to 
M. Rene" Viviani 



London 
July 29 



Belgrade 
July 29 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 29 



Paris 
July 30 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 30 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 30 



Direct Austro-Russian conversations 
having been interrupted by Aus 
tria's declaration of war on Servia, 
the French and Russian Govern 
ments beg Sir E. Grey to renew at 
Berlin his proposal of intervention 
by four Powers, and to work upon 
Italy to obtain her complete coop 
eration 



Germany having been willing to ac 
cept only the principle of mediation 
by four Powers, Sir E. Grey, to 
avoid any further dilatory reply, will 
leave the German Government to 
choose whatever form of intervention 
may appear practicable to it. He 
considers the situation very grave 

Servian Government has obtained 
from Russia the assurance that that 
Power will not abandon its interest 
in the fate of Servia 



German Ambassador at St. Peters 
burgh called to state that his coun 
try would mobilise if Russia did not 
discontinue her military prepara 
tions 



Informed of this menacing step, the 
French Government declare their 
resolution to fulfil all the obliga- 
tions of the Russian alliance, while 
continuing to work for a peaceful 
solution, and requesting the Russian 
Government to act in the same way 
on their side 



Russian Government state their readi- 
ness to continue negotiations to the 
end, while remaining convinced that 
Germany will not work at Vienna in 
favour of peace 



Upon a further and less threatening 
move by the German Ambassador, 
M. Sazonof hastened to make a fresh 
proposal, intimating that Russia 
would break off her military prepa- 
rations if Austria declared herself 
ready to eliminate from her ulti- 
matum the clauses which impugned 
the sovereignty of Servia 



656 



657 



658 



658 



659 



660 



Ixx 



CONTENTS 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



104 



105 



106 



M. Dumaine to M. 
Rene Viviani 



M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Rene - Vi- 



M. Rene* Viviani to 
M. Paul Cambon 



107 



108 



109 



M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Rene* Vi- 
viani 

M. Paul Cambon 
to M. Rene* Vi 
viani 



M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Rene* Vi- 
viani 



1914. 
Vienna 
July 30 



Berlin 
July 30 

Paris 
July 30 



Berlin 
July 30 

London 
July 30 



Berlin 
July 30 



Following a very friendly interview 
between Russian Ambassador and 
Count Berchtold, a fresh attempt 
will be made at St. Peter sburgh to 
hold direct communication between 
Austria and Russia for friendly set- 
tlement of Servian affair 



German Government deny the report 
of mobilisation, but take all neces 
sary measures to hasten it , 



M. Paul Cambon is requested to 
bring to knowledge of English Gov- 
ernment all corroborative informa- 
tion proving the active and threaten- 
ing military measures taken by Ger- 
many since July 25, while France 
is keeping her covering troops at 
about ten kilometres from the fron 
tier 



Herr von Jagow states that M. Sa- 
zonof's proposal is unacceptable for 
Austria . . . . * 



German Ambassador has brought no 
answer to Sir Edward Grey's request 
that the German Government should 
themselves put forward a proposal 
for mediation by four Powers. 
Prince Lichnowsky has questioned 
English Government as to their 
military preparations. The informa- 
tion given to Sir E. Grey as to Ger- 
many's military operations has led 
him to believe, like M. Paul Cam- 
bon, that the time has come for them 
to consider together all the possi- 
bilities 



Herr von Jagow states that in order 
to gain time he will take direct ac- 
tion at Vienna by asking to know 
the Austrian conditions, thus again 
evading Sir Edward Grey's request. 
He makes recriminations against 
Russia 



661 



662 



663 



664 



665 



666 



CONTENTS 



lxxi 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



110 



111 



112 



113 



114 



115 



116 



M. Paul Cambon 
to M. Rene" Vi- 
viani 



1914. 
London 
July 31 



Sir E. Grey warns German Ambas 
sador at London that England could 
not remain neutral in a general con- 
flict in which France was implicated. 
On the other hand, he had said to M. 
Paul Cambon that the English Gov- 
ernment could not promise France 
that they would intervene. 

The autograph letter from the 
French President to the King of 
England had been handed to the 
King 



M. Mollard to M. 
Rene" Viviani 



M. Rene* Viviani to 
the French Am- 
bassadors at St 
Petersburgh, Lon- 
don, Berlin, Vi- 
enna, and Rome 



M. Paleologue to 
M. Rene* Viviani 



M. Rene* Viviani to 
the French Am- 
bassadors at Lon- 
don, St. Peters- 
burgh, Berlin, Vi- 
enna, Rome, and 
Constantinople 



M. Dumaine to M. 
Rene Viviani 

M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Rene* Vi- 
viani 



Luxemburg 
July 31 



Paris 
July 31 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 31 



Paris 
July 31 



The Luxemburg Minister of State 
notifies military preparations on 
German frontier, and requests 
France to engage to respect the neu- 
trality of the Grand Duchy, a prom- 
ise it cannot obtain from Germany . . 

French Government, in compliance 
with England's wish, request St. 
Petersburgh to modify the sugges- 
tion M. Sazonof has made to Aus- 
tria, in order to make it acceptable 
to that Power and to permit of a 
peaceful settlement of the dispute . . 

Russian Government have agreed to 
modify their formula, in spite of 
the feeling aroused by the bombard- 
ment of Belgrade and the con- 
stantly provocative action of Aus 
tria-Hungary 



Vienna 
July 31 

Berlin 
July 31 



The concurrent efforts made by Eng- 
land and Russia for the mainte- 
nance of peace have been united, 
and give hope of an understanding 
with Austria-Hungary, who appears 
more inclined thereto. Germany's 
attitude, however, gives the impres- 
sion that that Power has worked 
from the beginning for the humilia 
tion of Russia, the breaking up of 
the Triple Entente, and, if this re- 
sult could not be obtained, for war. 

General Austrian mobilisation is de- 
creed 



Germany, in her turn, decrees 
" Kriegsgef ahrzustand," and re- 
quests Russia to demobilise 



667 



669 



670 



671 



672 



672 



lxxii 



CONTENTS 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



117 



118 



119 



120 



121 



122 



123 



124 



125 



M. Rene" Viviani to 
M. Palgologue 



M. Paleologue to 
M. Rene* Viviani 



M. Klobukowski to 
M. Rene* Viviani 



M. Rene* Viviani to 
the French Am- 
bassadors at Lon 
don, St. Peters- 
burgh, Berlin, Vi- 
enna, Rome 

M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Rene* Vi 



M. Rene* Viviani to 
the French Am- 
bassadors at Lon- 
don, Berlin, and 
to French Min- 
ister at Brussels 

M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Rene Vi- 



M. Barrere to M. 
Rene* Viviani 



M. Rene* Viviani to 
the French Am- 
bassadors at Lon- 
don, St. Peters- 
burgh, Berlin, Vi- 
enna, Rome, Ma- 
drid, Constantino- 
ple 



1914. 

Paris 

July 31 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 31 

Brussels 
July 31 



Paris 
Aug. 1 



Berlin 
Aug. 1 



Paris 
Aug. 1 



Berlin 
Aug. 1 

Rome 
Aug. 1 

Paris 
Aug. 1 



In announcing to Paris the ultimatum 
addressed to Russia, Herr von 
Schoen asks the French Government 
to inform him, before 1 o'clock on 
the following afternoon, what atti- 
tude France would assume in the 
event of a Russo-German conflict . . . 

General mobilisation of Austro-Hun 
garian army entails general Russian 
mobilisation 



Belgian Government receive official 
assurance that France will respect 
Belgian neutrality 



Austrian Ambassadors at Paris and 
St. Petersburgh make two concilia 
tory moves. Unfortunately Ger 
many's attitude leaves hardly any 
hope of a peaceful settlement . . . 



Austria-Hungary announces at St. 
Petersburgh that she is willing to 
discuss the ground of her differences 
with Servia; but Germany's sum 
mons to Russia to demobilise within 
twelve hours seems to destroy the 
last hope of peace 



French Government inform English 
Government that they will respect 
Belgian neutrality 



German Government refuse a similar 
engagement 



Marquis di San Giuliano informs Ger- 
man Ambassador that Italy will pre- 
serve neutrality 



Herr von Schoen, informed of Aus- 
tria's conciliatory attitude and of 
Russia's acceptance of the English 
formula, makes no further mention 
of his departure and proclaims his 
peaceful intentions, at the same time 
stating that he has received no fur- 
ther information from his Govern- 
ment 



673 



674 



674 



675 



677 



678 



678 



679 



679 



CONTENTS 



lxxiii 



No. 



126 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



127 



128 



129 



130 



131 



132 



133 



134 



135 



136 



M. Paul Cambon 
to M. Rene* Vi- 
viani 



M. Rene* Viviani to 
M. Paul Cambon 



M. Mollard to M. 
Rene" Viviani 



M. Rene" Viviani to 
M. Mollard 

M. Jules Cambon 
to M. Rene* Vi- 
viani 

M. Eyschen to M. 
Rene* Viviani 



M. Mollard to M, 
Rene* Viviani 



Note of Herr von 
Schoen 



M. Pal<§ologue to 
M. Rene* Viviani 



M. Rene* Viviani to 
the Representa- 
tives of France 
abroad 

M. Rene Viviani 
to the French 
Ambassadors at 
London, St. Pe- 
tersburgh, Berlin, 
Vienna, Rome, 
Madrid, Constan- 
tinople 



1914. 

Paris 

Aug. 1 



Paris 
Aug. 1 



Luxemburg 
Aug. 1 



Paris 
Aug. 1 

Berlin 
Aug. 1 

Luxemburg 
Aug. 2 



Luxemburg 
Aug. 2 



Paris 
Aug. 2 



St. Peters- 
burgh 
Aug. 2 

Paris 
Aug. 2 



Paris 
Aug. 2 



Sir E. Grey states that England has 
refused the promise of neutrality for 
which Germany asked. The ob- 
servance of Belgian neutrality is of 
great importance to England, and 
Germany has not answered the ques- 
tion put to her 

French mobilisation has been ordered 
during the day, as a reply to German 
preparations 

Luxemburg Minister of State asks 
French Government for an assurance 
of neutrality similar to that re 
ceived by Belgium 

This assurance is given by French 
Government 

General mobilisation is ordered at 
Berlin 



Violation of Luxemburg neutrality by 
German troops. Protest by Minister 
of State 



Explanations furnished by German 
Government who state that measures 
taken in Luxemburg are solely pre- 
ventive and are in no sense hostile to 
the Grand Duchy 

The same explanation regarding the 
entry of German troops into the 
Grand Duchy of Luxemburg 

Germany has just declared war on 
Russia 



Communication of this news to 
French diplomatic representatives 
abroad 



French diplomatic representatives 
abroad are requested to make known 
the situation to the Governments to 
which they are accredited 



681 
681 

683 
684 
684 

684 

685 

686 
686 



687 



lxxiv 



CONTENTS 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



137 



138 



139 



140 



141 



142 



143 



144 



145 



146 



147 



M. Paul Cambon 
to M. Rene Vi 



M. Rene* Viviani to 
M. Paul Cambon 



M. Rene" Viviani to 
M. Jules Cambon 

M. Pellet to M. 
Rene* Viviani 



M. Klobukowski to 
M. Rene* Viviani 



M. Klobukowski to 
M. Rene" Viviani 



M. Paul Cambon 
to M. Rene* Vi 



M. Paul Cambon 
to M. Rene Vi- 



M. Paul Cambon 
to M. Rene* Vi- 
viani 



M. Rene* Viviani to 
M. Paul Cambon 



Herr von Schoen to 
M. Rene* Viviani 



1914. 
London 
Aug. 2 



Paris 
Aug. 2 



Paris 
Aug. 2 

The Hague 
Aug. 3 



Brussels 
Aug. 3 



Brussels 
Aug. 3 



London 
Aug. 3 

London 
Aug. 3 



London 
Aug. 3 



Paris 
Aug. 3 

Paris 
Aug. 3 



Sir E. Grey has given assurance that 
British fleet will defend French 
coasts against any German attack 
by sea. The violation of the neu 
trality of Belgium would be con 
sidered a casus belli 



The President of the Council com- 
municates to French Chamber Sir 
E. Grey's statements as to coopera- 
tion of British fleet 



Protest to Berlin against the viola- 
tions of French frontier 



German Minister at The Hague in- 
forms Netherlands Government of 
the entry of Imperial troops into 
Luxemburg and Belgium, under the 
pretext of preventive measures 



Belgian Government refuse the sum- 
mons sent to them to allow German 
troops a free passage through their 
territory 



Belgium does not think the moment 
has come to appeal to the guarantee 
of the Powers to defend her inde- 
pendence 



The statement regarding intervention 
of English fleet is binding on British 
Government 



Fruitless attempt by German Ambas- 
sador to obtain from Sir E. Grey as- 
surance that England's neutrality 
would not depend on the observance 
of Belgian neutrality 

Sir E. Grey makes statement in the 
Commons regarding intervention of 
English fleet, and reads a letter 
from King Albert asking for Eng- 
land's support 

French Government deny in London 
statement that German frontier had 
been violated by French officers 

Declaration of war handed by Ger- 
man Ambassador at Paris to Presi 
dent of the Council 



687 



689 



689 



690 



691 



691 



692 



692 



693 



693 



CONTENTS 



lxxv 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



148 



149 



150 



151 



152 



153 



154 



155 



156 



157 



158 



M. Rene* Vivian i to 
the French Repre- 
sentatives abroad 

M. Rene" Viviani to 
M. Jules Cambon 



M. Rene" Viviani to 
M. Allize" 

M. Rene" Viviani to 
the French Rep 
resentatives at 
London, St. Pe 
tersburgh, Vi- 
enna, Rome, Mad- 
rid, Berne, Con- 
stantinople, The 
Hague, Copenha 
gen, Christiania, 
Stockholm, Bu- 
charest, Athens, 
Belgrade 

M. Klobukowski to 
M. Rene* Viviani 

M. Paul Cambon 
to M. Rene" Vi- 
viani 



M. Klobukowski to 
M. Rene" Viviani 



M. Bapst to M. 
Doumergue 



M. Mollard to M. 
Doumergue 



M. Rene" Viviani 
( Circular to the 
Powers ) 

M. Raymond Poin- 
car6, President of 
the Republic 
(Message to Par- 
liament) 



1914. 

Paris 

Aug. 3 

Paris 
Aug. 3 

Paris 
Aug. 3 

Paris 
Aug. 3 



Brussels 
Aug. 4 

London 
Aug. 4 



Brussels 
Aug. 4 

Copen- 
hagen 
Aug. 6 



Paris 
Aug. 5 



Paris 
Aug. 4 

Paris 
Aug. 4 



Communication of this news to 
French diplomatic representatives 
abroad 



Instructions sent to M. Jules Cam- 
bon, at Berlin, to ask for his pass- 
ports 



French Minister at Munich instructed 
to ask for his passports 



Violation of Belgian territory by Ger- 
man troops 



Belgium's appeal to England, France, 
and Russia 



German Government will be requested 
by English Government to withdraw 
before midnight their ultimatum to 
Belgium 



German Government state at Brus- 
sels that they find themselves 
obliged to invade Belgian territory 

Enclosing a report in which M. Jules 
Cambon informs the Government of 
the circumstances of his return 
journey and of the annoyances to 
which he was subjected 



Report of M. Mollard to the Govern- 
ment on the subject of his departure 
from Luxemburg, which was insisted 
on by German military authorities . . 

Text of notification to the Powers of 
the state of war existing between 
France and Germany 



Message of President of the Republic, 
read at the sitting of Parliament on 
August 4, 1914 



694 

695 
695 
696 



696 



697 



697 



697 



703 



707 



709 



lxxvi 



CONTENTS 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



159 



160 



M. Rene" Viviani, 
President of the 
Council. (Speech 
in the Chamber) 

M. Delcasse to the 
French Ambassa- 
dors and Minis- 
ters abroad 



1914. 
Paris 
Aug. 4 



Paris 
Sept. 4 



Text of speech delivered by President 
of the Council to the Chamber of 
Deputies, August 4, 1914 



711 



Declaration of England, Russia, and 
France regarding their reciprocal un- 
dertaking not to conclude a separate 
peace, and not to put forward con- 
ditions of peace without previous 
agreement with each of the other 
Allies 



721 



APPENDICES 



APPENDIX I. 

Extracts from Blue Book [British] concerning the Attitude taken by 
England during the Pourparlers which preceded the War. 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



87 



Sir G. Buchanan to 
Sir E. Grey 



Sir E. Grey to Sir 
F. Bertie 



1914. 
St. Peters- 
burgh 
July 24 



London 
July 29 



Conversation between M. Sazonof, M. 

Paleologue, and Sir G. Buchanan 

concerning an eventual declaration 

of solidarity of England with Russia 

and France in a European crisis .... 

Information given to M. Paul Cambon 
of the view taken by English Govern- 
ment on the subject of their atti- 
tude: not to give Germany a false 
impression of possible abstention on 
the part of England, not to make 
any definite engagement from now 
on in regard to France 



722 



88 



99 



Sir E. Grey to Sir 
E. Goschen 



Sir F. Bertie to 
Sir E. Grey 



London 
July 29 



Paris 
July 30 



Account of an interview with German 
Ambassador to warn him that Eng- 
land would in no case undertake not 
to intervene if the crisis developed 
and if Germany and France were 
implicated in it 



724 



725 



Conversation with the President of 
the Republic, who considers that a 
declaration by England affirming her 
intention of supporting France, 
whose wish for peace is known, 
would arrest Germany's desire for 
war 



726 



CONTENTS 



lxxvii 



No. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



119 



148 



Sir E. Grey to Sir 
F. Bertie 



Sir E. Grey to Sir 
F. Bertie 



1914. 
London 
July 31 



London 
Aug. 2 



Statement made to French Ambas- 
sador that, in the present position 
of the crisis, the English Government 
cannot give any definite under- 
taking 



Assurance given regarding the pro- 
tection of the French coasts and fleet 
by the English fleet against any at- 
tack by German fleet by the Pas-de- 
Calais or the North Sea 



727 



729 



APPENDIX II. 

Extracts from Blue Book [British] relating to the Proposals made by 
the German Government to the English Government in order to 
obtain the Neutrality of England. 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



85 



Sir E. Goschen to 
Sir E. Grey 



1914. 
Berlin 
July 29 



101 



Sir E. Grey to Sir 
E. Goschen 



London 
July 30 



Offers made by German Chancellor to 
English Ambassador in endeavour to 
obtain English neutrality; promise 
to respect integrity of French terri 
tory, but not of her colonies; inten 
tions with regard to Holland and 
Belgium. Proposal of a general un 
derstanding of neutrality between 
Germany and England 



Refusal of German proposals, not only 
unacceptable in fact, but their ac- 
ceptance would be a stain on Eng- 
land's reputation. Uselessness of 
considering the proposal for a gen- 
eral agreement of neutrality between 
England and Germany for the future. 
England will keep her entire free- 
dom of action and continue to coop- 
erate for the maintenance of peace 
in Europe: that is the only way by 
which good relations can be main- 
tained between Germany and Eng- 
land 



730 



731 



lxxviii 



CONTENTS 



No. 


Name. 


Place and 
Date. 


Summary. 


Page. 


123 


Sir E. Grey to Sir 
E. Goschen 


1914. 
London 
Aug. 1 


Account of a conversation with Ger- 
man Ambassador regarding Belgian 
neutrality. Prince Lichnowsky 
presses for a statement by the Eng- 
lish Government of the conditions 
on which England would remain 
neutral; the reply is given that the 
English Government definitely re- 
fuse any promise to remain neutral 
and will keep their hands free 


732 



APPENDIX II (&). 

German attempts to obtain, under Pretence of a "Misunderstanding," a 
Guarantee by England of the Neutrality of France in a German- 
Russian War. (Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, August 20, 1914.) 



No. 



Name. 



Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



Prince Lichnowsky 
to Herr von Beth- 
mann-Hollweg 



His Majesty Em- 
peror William II. 
to King George V. 



Herr von Beth 
mann-Hollweg to 
Prince Lichnow- 
sky 

His Majesty King 
George V. to Em 
peror William II. 



1914. 
London 
July 31 



Berlin 
Aug. 1 



Berlin 
Aug. 1 



London 
Aug. 1 



Account of a soi-disant request by 
telephone concerning an eventual un- 
dertaking by Germany not to attack 
France if the latter would remain 
neutral in a war between Germany 
and Russia 



Telegram from the Emperor William 
to King George V. stating that he 
cannot stop his mobilisation against 
Russia and France, but will not at 
tack France in the hypothesis of 
that Power offering its neutrality 
guaranteed by the English army and 
fleet 



Telegram to Prince Lichnowsky re- 
peating Germany's undertaking. . . . 



Telegram from the King of England 
to the Emperor William, stating 
that German Ambassador is mis- 
taken and that Sir Edward Grey 
spoke to Prince Lichnowsky only of 
the means of delaying an armed con- 
flict between France and Germany 
until some definite ground of under- 
standing should have been reached 
by Austria-Hungary and Russia . . 



733 



734 



734 



735 



CONTENTS 



lxxix 



No. 


Name. 


Place and 
Date. 


Summary. 


Page. 


5 


Prince Lichnowsky 
to Herr von Beth- 
mann-Hollweg 


1914. 
London 
Aug. 2 


Notice given to Herr von Bethmann- 
Hollweg that the conversations of 
which he had given an account had 
been abandoned as " useless " 


735 



APPENDIX III. 

Extracts from Blue Book concerning England's Refusal to admit the 
German Point of View on the Question of the Violation of Belgian 
Neutrality. 



No. 


Name. 


Place and 
Date. 


Summary. 


Page. 






1914. 






153 


Sir E. Grey to Sir 


London 


Request for immediate undertaking 






E. Goschen 


Aug. 4 


by Germany that she will respect 
Belgian neutrality 


735 


155 


Sir E. Grey to Sir 


London 


Statement to Belgium that England 






F. Villiers 


Aug. 4 


is ready to unite with France and 
Russia to resist a German attack on 
Belgium and to guarantee the in- 
tegrity and independence of that 
country 


736 


157 


Herr von Jagow to 


Berlin 


Declaration communicated through 






Prince Lichnow- 


Aug. 4 


German Ambassador at London that 






sky 




in spite of the violation of Belgium, 
which is judged necessary, no terri- 
tory will be annexed. Proof of the 
sincerity of this declaration is given 
by the affirmation that the neutral- 
ity of Holland will be respected, an 
annexation of Belgian territory hav- 
ing no value without a simultaneous 
annexation of Dutch territory 


737 


159 


Sir E. Grey to Sir 
E. Goschen 


London 
Aug. 4 


England's ultimatum to Germany .... 


737 



lxxx 



CONTENTS 




160 



Sir E. Goschen to 
Sir E. Grey 



Place and 
Date. 



1914. 
London 
Aug. 8 



Summary. 



Report of English Ambassador at 
Berlin of his last conversations with 
Herr von Jagow, Herr von Beth- 
mann-Hollweg, and Herr von Zim- 
mermann. The German Chancellor 
cannot understand how, " for a word, 
neutrality" how, " for a scrap of pa- 
per," England could go to war with 
a nation to which she is related and 
which desired nothing so much as to 
be her friend. The English Ambas 
sador tries to make his interlocutor 
understand that it is a question of 
life or death for the honour of Great 
Britain to keep a solemn engage- 
ment which she has signed in de- 
fence of the neutrality of Belgium . . 



Page. 



738 



APPENDIX IV. 

Extracts from the Grey Book showing the Conditions in which Germany 
violated Belgian Neutrality. 




Place and 
Date. 



1914. 



Summary. 



Despatches Nos. 2, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 
15, 19, 20, 22, 27, 28, 30, 31, 35, 39, 
40, 41, 44, 48, 52, 60, 71 



Page. 



741 
to 

758 



APPENDIX V. 
Extracts from White Book. 




Place and 
Date. 



Summary. 



Page. 



Telegrams exchanged between the Em- 
peror of Germany, William II., and 
the Emperor of Russia, Nicholas II., 
from July 28 to August 1, 1914 



758 

to 

763 



CONTENTS 



Ixxxi 



APPENDIX VI. 

Extracts fbom Orange Book relating to Germany's Declaration op War on 

Russia. 



No. 


Name. 


Place and 
Date. 


Summary. 


Page. 


76 


Count Pourtales 

M. Sazonof 

M. Sazonof to Rus- 
sian Representa- 
tives abroad 


1914. 
St. Peters- 
burgh 
Aug. 1 

St. Peters- 
burgh 
Aug. 2 

St. Peters- 
burgh 
Aug. 2 


Note transmitted through the German 
Ambassador at St. Peter sburgh to 
the Russian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs 


763 


77 
78 


Communication from the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs sum- 
ming up the events which took place 
between July 23 and August 1, 1914. 

Circular letter from the Russian Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs to the Rep- 
resentatives of the Empire abroad . . 


764 
767 



THE 
AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK 

(NO. 1) 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. I) 1 



NOTE OF INTRODUCTION. 

Ever since the Karageorgevitch Dynasty ascended Servia 's blood- 
stained throne, surrounded by the conspirators against King Alex- 
ander, the policy of the kingdom has been directed by various means 
and with varying intensity toward a hostile propaganda and a revo- 
lutionary agitation in those territories of Austria-Hungary which are 
inhabited by Southern Slavs. This underground policy has been aimed 
at the forcible separation of these territories from the Dual Monarchy, 
when the general political situation should favour the attainment of 
the aspirations for the establishment of a Greater Servia. 

The bitter disappointment caused in Servia by the annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which drove the Servian nation to the 
brink of war, shows plainly what ambitious hopes were entertained 
by Servia and how near she thought herself to be to the goal. 

In the spring of 1909, Russia, though assuming the part of the 
protecting power, considered her armaments not sufficiently advanced 
to support Servia. Under the circumstances the Servian government 
decided to declare solemnly before Europe that it recognised the 
international situation created by the annexation as an act which 
had not affected Servia 's rights. The Servian Government further- 
more undertook to dissolve the irregular bands which had armed 
against the Dual Monarchy and to maintain good neighbourly rela- 
tions with the latter for the future. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government looked forward to the restora- 
tion of the peace and good understanding with Servia which had 
prevailed under the Obrenovitch Dynasty. It hoped to be enabled 
to promote Servia 's interests in the friendly spirit which had been 

1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book. Official English Edition, with an Introduc- 
tion. Published by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Title of publication in 
the original text: Osterreichisch-ungarisches Rotbuch, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke 
zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges 1914. Volksausgabe. Abdruck der offiziellen 
Ausgabe mit einer Einleitung. Wien 1915. Manzschc k, u, k, Eof-Verlags- und 
Universitats-Buchhandlung, I., Kohlmarkt Nr. 20, 

3 



4 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

evidenced by Austria-Hungary at the Berlin Congress, when she 
successfully advocated the recognition of the independence of the 
kingdom. These Austro-Hungarian hopes were not to be fulfilled, 
however. Far from respecting the pledge of good neighbourly rela- 
tions, the Servian Government permitted the Servian press to rouse 
unrestrained hatred against the Monarchy; it tolerated societies in 
Servia which, under the leadership of high officers, functionaries, 
teachers and judges, publicly carried on an agitation aiming to 
precipitate a revolutionary outbreak in Austro-Hungarian territories ; 
it permitted prominent officers of the Servian military and civil 
services to demoralise the public conscience to the point where 
assassination was regarded as a legitimate weapon against the ad- 
joining monarchy. This subversive agitation led to a series* of 
outrages against prominent Austrian and Hungarian officials and 
culminated in the dastardly assassination of the heir apparent, the 
Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Instead of precipitating the disin- 
tegration of Austria-Hungary which our enemies had foolishly an- 
ticipated, however, the Prince's martyrdom rallied all the peoples 
of Austria-Hungary in fervent loyalty to the defence of the Habs- 
burg Dynasty. The whole world now sees that the Monarchy rests 
upon solid foundations, and that her sons are firmly united in the 
conviction that their dignity, self-respect and vital interests made 
it imperative to check Servia 's criminal agitation. 

Convinced by experience of the duplicity of the Servian Govern- 
ment, Austria-Hungary found only one method which promised a 
satisfactory settlement. That method was to demand from Servia 
absolute guarantees that those implicated in the infamous murder 
would be punished and that the subversive agitation for a Greater 
Servia would be suppressed. 

Austria-Hungary's forbearance having been construed as an evi- 
dence of weakness, the Belgrade Government had to be made to 
realise that the Dual Monarchy was prepared to go to any lengths 
to uphold her prestige and integrity; Servia had to be taught that 
Austria-Hungary could not tolerate her policy of prevarication and 
ostensible compliance with the Austro-Hungarian demands, meant 
only to deceive the Great Powers while the Servians carried on their 
incendiary agitation. The necessity for decisive action was em- 
phasised by the recollection of a similar act of duplicity and evasion 
successfully accomplished by Servia after the solemn declaration of 
1909. Every time that the monarchy called Servia to account for 
her reprehensible campaign of disruption, the Belgrade Government 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 5 

turned to the Powers for protection and impunity. Under the cir- 
cumstances there was but one way of safeguarding the territorial 
integrity of Austria-Hungary and putting an end to the ever- 
recurring economic disturbance of the Dual Monarchy, without en- 
dangering the peace of Europe. From the very beginning the 
Imperial and Royal Government, wishing to reassure the Powers, 
declared that it did not intend to go beyond the protection of its 
legitimate interests, and that no territorial aggrandisement was 
contemplated. It was compelled, however, to insist upon a direct 
settlement between Austria-Hungary and Servia within the desig- 
nated restrictions. Russia's proposal to extend the time-limit for 
the Servian answer would have furnished the Belgrade Government 
with the opportunity for underhanded procrastination, and would 
have opened the door to the intervention of other Powers on Servia 's 
behalf. An extension of the time-limit had, therefore, to be declined. 
Though Servia 's hostility was plainly proved by the fact, that before 
giving her ambiguous reply, she had ordered a general mobilisation, 
still the Dual Monarchy did not declare war until another three 
days had elapsed. 

The British Government's suggestion that the Servian contro- 
versy be submitted to a conference of the Powers reached Vienna 
too late, as hostilities had already begun. This proposal, however, 
could by no means have safeguarded the Dual Monarchy's interests. 
Nothing less than the unconditional acceptance of Austria- Hungary's 
demands by the Belgrade Government could have guaranteed even 
tolerable neighbourly relations with Servia. On the other hand, the 
Entente Powers were guided by the wish to put aside Austria- 
Hungary's demands by means of a compromise. This method would 
have nullified the assurances required for the future correct be- 
haviour of Servia, which would thus have been encouraged to 
persist in her activities for the detachment of the southern terri- 
tories from Austria-Hungary. 

The demand that Servia punish the accomplices in the Serajevo 
murder who were on Servian soil, and live up to the obligations of a 
peaceful neighbour, was aimed solely at the protection of our dynasty 
and of the integrity of the Dual Monarchy from subversive agita- 
tions. The Austro-Hungarian Government acted as the spokesman 
of the civilised world when it asserted that it could not permit 
murder to be employed with impunity in political strife, and that 
the peace of Europe ought not to be continually menaced by Servia 's 
ambitious projects. 



6 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

The Entente Powers, dominated by selfish motives, ignored the 
laws of public morality and sided with the guilty party ; in so doing, 
they assumed a heavy responsibility. The Dual Monarchy had given 
ample proofs of its conservative policy and thoroughly peaceful dis- 
position during the crisis of the Balkan wars, when the balance of 
power in the Peninsula underwent far-reaching changes ; she, there- 
fore, deserved unrestricted confidence in the new situation. Had 
the Entente Powers accepted Austria-Hungary's assurances and 
adopted a policy of waiting, the general conflagration would have 
been averted. When the history of this war shall be written, it will 
place upon their shoulders the blame for the frightful disaster which 
their policy has brought upon the world. 

The small Servian state would never have dared to carry on its 
disruptive agitation in the territories of a great Power, had it not 
been assured of Russia's secret protection. Servia had tangible 
pledges that in the event of a clash with Austria-Hungary, the 
powerful Pan-Slavic party in Russia would bring the Czar's Gov- 
ernment to the active support of the movement for the establishment 
of a Greater Servia at the expense of the Dual Monarchy. Such a 
support was only a minor phase of the expansive policy of the Rus- 
sian Empire which, like an ever-extending glacier, had ground down 
tremendous territories and many peoples, whose religious freedom 
and languages it has suppressed. The essential and traditional 
feature of the ambitious scheme of world-domination, of which the 
Servian agitation is only an incident, is the possession of the Darda- 
nelles. Such an acquisition would make Russia predominant in the 
Near East, with exclusive political and commercial privileges. 

Since the attainment of this purpose constituted a menace to 
the vital interests of both Austria-Hungary and Germany, it was 
bound to rouse their opposition; Russia's efforts were consequently 
directed toward weakening their capacity for resistance. This was 
to be attained by disrupting the powerful combination of the two 
countries which stood in Russia's way, and by isolating Germany. 
The first move was the creation of the Balkan League, designed to 
weaken Austria-Hungary, whose foundations as a great Power were 
to be undermined by the Pan- Slav and Servian agitation in her 
border districts. As a preliminary step Turkey had to be crushed 
and driven out of Europe. By this act the power of the augmented 
Christian Balkan States was to be made available for Russia's 
struggle against the two central European Powers. 

When the Balkan League was rent asunder by the dispute over 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 7 

the distribution of the territories wrested from Turkey, the "pro- 
tecting power" of the Slavs assented to the defeat and humiliation 
of Bulgaria, who was deprived of the greater part of her recent 
conquests. New inducements were now offered for the reconstitu- 
tion of the Balkan League by the promise of territorial expansion 
at the expense of Austria-Hungary. After the defeat of Turkey, 
the Balkan Federation could be directed solely against Austria- 
Hungary and Germany. Russia and France conceived this plan, 
which was to shift Europe's balance of power. In this criminal 
game of Russian diplomacy, which threatened the peace of Europe 
and the existence of the Dual Monarchy, Servia was a trump card 
in Russia's hand, and Russia was determined not to lose this trump, 
even at the cost of a universal conflagration. 

The following series of documents show that, up to the very last, 
the Imperial and Royal Government repeatedly assured the St. 
Petersburgh Cabinet that it did not intend to violate any Russian 
interest, or to seize Servian territory, or to infringe upon Servia 's 
sovereign rights, and that it was willing to enter into negotiations 
with the Russian Government for the adjustment of Austro-Hun- 
garian and Russian interests. These solemn assurances, however, 
did not satisfy the Russian Government, which, as early as the 24th 
of July, adopted a threatening tone in a public statement on the 
issues involved. 

Though Austria-Hungary had not mobilised a single soldier 
against Russia, the latter ordered on July 29th a mobilisation of the 
military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan, which implied 
a threat against the Dual Monarchy. In spite of the repeated warn- 
ings of the Imperial and Royal Ambassador in St. Petersburgh and 
the intimation by the German Government on the 26th of July that 
preparatory military measures in Russia would compel Germany to 
take corresponding steps, and that mobilisation would mean war, 
the Russian general mobilisation order was issued on the 31st of July. 

On the 24th of July the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador met the 
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and emphatically pointed out 
the thoroughly peaceful disposition of the Dual Monarchy. He 
explained that Austria-Hungary only wished to put an end to the 
dangerous Servian policy of murderous outrages and of revolutionary 
agitation. 

The vital interests of Austria-Hungary were at stake, and she 
had to protect herself; she could not abandon her defensive policy 
even if Russia should choose to provoke a collision by taking Servia 



8 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

under her protection. The Imperial and Royal Government had no 
choice but to endeavour to put an end to an intolerable situation 
wherein Servia, in effect, would have continued its provocations 
under a Russian pledge of immunity. 

On the 30th of July the British Foreign Secretary once more 
suggested that Austria-Hungary accept the good offices of mediating 
Powers in her controversy with Servia. The Imperial and Royal 
Government, animated by a sincere desire to do its utmost to pre- 
serve the world's peace, agreed to accept this mediation. Austria- 
Hungary's honour and interests, however, demanded that this should 
not be done under the pressure of Russia's threatening measures. 
She, therefore, had to insist that Russia's order of mobilisation 
should be revoked prior to Austria-Hungary's acceptance of media- 
tion. The St. Petersburgh Cabinet responded by issuing the general 
call to the colours. 

In cooperation with Great Britain's selfish policy and France's 
craving for revanche, the Russian Government had left nothing un- 
done to place Europe under the domination of the Entente Powers 
and thus to open the way for her own bold schemes. 

Russia has resorted to most unscrupulous methods in her efforts 
to twist a rope around the Monarchy's neck. When Austria-Hungary, 
acting in self-defence, set about to sever this rQpe, Russia tried to 
tie her hands and to humiliate her. 

Threatened in their most vital interests, Austria-Hungary and 
Germany had to choose between protecting their security and sur- 
rendering to the Russian menace. They chose the way which honour 
and duty prescribed. 



No. 1. 
Von Storck to Count Berclitold. 

Belgrade, June 29, 1914. 

Still under the profound impression of the ghastly outrage of 
yesterday, I find it difficult to comment upon the bloody deed of 
Serajevo in the calm, self-possessed manner befitting the seriousness 
of the occasion. I therefore beg to be allowed to confine myself to- 
day to a mere record of some facts. 

Yesterday, the 15th/28th, the anniversary of the battle of Kos* 
sovopolje was celebrated with more than usual pomp, and the memory 
of the Servian patriot, Milosh Obilitch, who in 1389 treacherously 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 9 

assassinated the victorious Murad, was solemnised. Wherever Ser- 
vians live, Obilitch is counted a national hero. Yet, as a result of 
the propaganda fostered under the auspices of the Servian Govern- 
ment and of a press campaign carried on for many years past, we 
have been substituted for the Turks as Servia 's hereditary foes. 

In the minds of the three juvenile assassins of Serajevo (Princip, 
Gabrinovitch and the third unknown bomb-thrower) must have 
loomed up the glamour of a re-enactment of the tragedy of Kos- 
sovopolje. They have even shot and killed an innocent woman, and 
therefore may have considered that they have surpassed their model. 

For years hatred against the Dual Monarchy has been sown in 
Servia. The seed has taken and the harvest is murder. 

The news became known at about 5 p.m., and at 10 o'clock that 
night the Servian Government officially ordered the celebration of 
the Obilitch anniversary to be stopped. Unofficially, however, and 
under the cover of darkness, the festivities were kept up for some 
time. 

According to eye-witnesses people embraced each other in delight 
and jubilant remarks were heard, such as: " Serves them right! " 
"We expected it for a long time!" "That's the revenge for the 
annexation V 1 



No. 2. 
Von Storck to Count Berchtold, 

(Telegram.) Belgrade, June 30, 1914. 

I presented to-day to M. Gruitch, the Secretary General of the 
Foreign Office, the pertinent enquiry as to what steps the royal 
police had taken, or intended to take, in an effort to trace the threads 
of the outrage, which notoriously led into Servia. 

His reply was that, so far, the Servian police had not even taken 
the matter up. 



No. 3. 

Consul General JeMitscliJca to Count Berchtold. 

TJsJcub, July 1, 1914. 
On June the 15th/28th, the Vidov Dan (Corpus Christi Day), 
which this year coincided with the 525th anniversary of the battle 



10 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

of Kossovopolje fought in 1389, was for the first time officially 
celebrated at Pristina as the feast of the "Liberation of the Servian 
nation. ' ' 

For four months a special committee had been working to make 
that festival as solemn as possible and to turn it into a great national 
Serb demonstration. 

In preparation for the forthcoming festivities a propaganda had 
been extended into Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and especially into 
Hungary. Those desirous of taking part in the festivities were 
granted free passage on the Servian state railways, and the authori- 
ties promised them cheap lodging, food and other assistance. The 
agitation had been energetic and well planned. The guests were 
taken to Pristina on special trains. 

The various speeches reveled in historical reminiscences connected 
with the scene of the celebration, and invariably led up to and dwelt 
upon the customary topic of the unification of all Serbs and the 
"liberation of the oppressed brethren" across the Danube and the 
Save, including those who live in Bosnia and Dalmatia. 

During the evening hours, news of the terrible deed of Serajevo 
began to spread and the fanatic populace gave itself up to a spon- 
taneous outburst of passion, which, to judge by the numerous utter- 
ances of approval reported to me from absolutely reliable sources, 
must be described as positively inhuman. 

In view of this attitude, which was also taken up by the popula- 
tion of Uskiib, and in consideration of the fact that the news of the 
crime has been received with unconcealed satisfaction by a repre- 
sentative gathering, all attempts of the Servian press to shift from 
Servia the moral responsibility for the deed crumbled to pitiable 
nothing. 



No. 4. 

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 4, 1914. 

I conveyed to-day to M. Poincare, the Imperial and Royal Gov- 
ernment's thanks for his sympathy. 

Referring to the anti-Servian demonstrations in our country, he 
remarked that after the assassination of President Carnot all Italians 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 11 

were exposed to the most violent attacks at the hands of the popu- 
lation throughout France. 

I drew his attention to the fact that the assassination to which 
he referred had no connection whatever with any anti-French agi- 
tation in Italy, whereas it can no longer be denied that for many 
years past a campaign has been waged in Servia against the Dual 
Monarchy, availing itself of all means, legitimate and illegitimate. 

In concluding the interview M. Poincare expressed his firm con- 
viction that the Servian Government would lend us every assistance 
in the judicial investigation and prosecution of persons suspected as 
accomplices. He added: "No State could evade such a duty." 



No. 5. 
Acting Consul HofleJtner to Count Berchtold. 

NisJi, July 6, 1914. 

At Nish the news of the terrible outrage of Serajevo has caused 
a sensation in the full sense of the word. No signs of consternation 
or indignation could be seen, however. A feeling of satisfaction and 
even of joy was predominant, and was often manifested in an un- 
concealed manner. So little restraint was put on the public feeling, 
that many instances of coarse expression could be recorded. This 
chiefly applies to the so-called leading circles and educated classes, 
such as politicians, teachers, government officials, officers and stu- 
dents. The business community remained more reserved. 

All declarations made from Servian official quarters and by promi- 
nent individuals expressing indignation at the outrage and condemn- 
ing the deed, appear merely as irony to those who have had the 
opportunity to observe at close quarters the sentiments of the edu- 
cated classes during the past few days. 

Toward nine o'clock on the day of the outrage I proceeded to a 
local cafe, still ignorant of what had happened. A gentleman of 
my acquaintance informed me of the persistent rumours of the crime. 
It was revolting to witness the elation displayed by the numerous 
guests, who discussed the event with evident satisfaction. Exclama- 
tions of joy and mockery were heard, which could not have failed 
to painfully affect even those who had been hardened by the cus- 
tomary political fanaticism of the Servians. 



12 DOCUMENTS BELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 

No. 6. 
Baron von Giesl to Count BercJitold. 

Belgrade, July 21, 1914. 

Some time has passed since my return to my post after the 
unfortunate crime of June 28th, and I may now venture to give my 
estimate of the prevailing public feeling in Servia. 

Since the annexation crisis, the relations between the Dual Mon- 
archy and Servia have been strained by the jingoism and animosity 
of the latter and by an effective propaganda for the "Great Servian' ' 
cause, carried on in those parts of our country which are inhabited 
by Serbs. Servia 's successes in the Balkan wars have intensified that 
jingoism, until it now manifests itself at times in outbreaks of frantic 
passion bordering upon madness. 

I consider it superfluous to adduce proofs or instances. They 
may be obtained at any time and everywhere, in political circles as 
well as among the populace, without distinction of party. I affirm 
it as an established axiom that Servians policy has but one aim, 
namely, the detachment from the Dual Monarchy of all territories 
inhabited by Southern Slavs and the eventual destruction of that mon- 
archy as a great Power. Nobody who has spent a week in the dis- 
charge of his duties in this political atmosphere can question the 
truth of my assertion. 

The latest political events have vastly increased the existing 
hatred against the Dual Monarchy. I here refer to the crime of 
Serajevo, Hartwig's death and the electoral campaign. 

The outrage of Serajevo has evoked before the Servian people 
visions of the impending disintegration of the Habsburg Empire. 
They have been led to believe that the dismemberment of the Austro- 
Hungarian territories in question was to be expected shortly, that a 
revolution had broken out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the 
loyalty of the Slav regiments could not be relied upon. Thus the 
event introduced a certain system into the scheme of mad nationalism, 
and invested it with a semblance of justification. 

In the eyes of the Servians the hated Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
has become powerless, and is henceforth hardly worth a military 
effort. Hatred is now accompanied by contempt. Without any 
further trouble exhausted Austria-Hungary would fall helplessly 
into the lap of the Greater Servian Empire which before long would 
come into being. 



THE AUSTEO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 13 

Papers, which certainly may not be classed among the most 
radical publications, emphasise in daily articles the impotence and 
disintegration of the neighbouring monarchy, and without fear of 
punishment insult our authorities, including the august person of 
our sovereign. The press organ of the government points to the 
internal conditions in Austria-Hungary as the sole cause of the 
damnable crime. The dread of a future settling of accounts has 
vanished. For decades the Servian people have been entirely under 
the influence of the press, and the press of the ruling party deter- 
mines the national policy. The outrage of Serajevo is the horribly 
abortive product of this influence of the press. 

I shall pass over the absurd accusations raised on the occasion of 
Hartwig's death, utterances verging on madness, which the London 
Times qualified as "raging mad." Nor shall I dwell upon the men- 
dacious press campaign which endeavours to confirm the Servian 
people in their conviction that the government of Austria-Hungary 
as well as its representatives are outlawed. Terms like ' l murderers, ' ' 
"rascals" or "infamous Austrians" were some of the ornamental 
by-words applied to us. 

Hartwig's death, which meant a profound bereavement to the 
Servian political world, has been followed by a fanatic cult of the 
departed. This sentiment, however, was due not only to gratitude 
for his assistance in the past, but to a sense of apprehension as to 
the future. Every effort was made to please Eussia by a display 
of slave-like servility, in order to secure that country's good-will for 
the future. 

The third important factor is the electoral campaign. A common 
platform of hostility to the Dual Monarchy has united all parties. 
No party aspiring to the powers of government, therefore, would 
risk exposing itself to the suspicion of weakly yielding to Austria- 
Hungary. Thus the electoral campaign is waged under the watch- 
word of battle against Austria-Hungary. 

It is generally believed that, for reasons internal as well as ex- 
ternal, the Dual Monarchy is utterly powerless and incapable of any 
energetic action. Solemn warnings emanating from our competent 
sources are regarded as mere bluff. 

The leave of absence granted to the Austro-Hungarian War Min- 
ister and to the Chief of the General Staff have confirmed the 
conviction that the weakness of Austria-Hungary is now evident. 

In imposing upon your patience with this lengthy report, I am 
fully aware that I am presenting nothing new; but I consider this 



14 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

exposition essential to the inevitable conclusion that a settlement 
with Servia, involving a war not only for the preservation of Austria- 
Hungary's position as a great power, but even for her very existence, 
cannot be permanently avoided. 

If we neglect to clear up our relations with Servia, we shall lay 
ourselves open to blame for increased difficulties and disadvantages 
in a future conflict which, sooner or later, is bound to come. 

In the view of an official representative of the Austro-Hungarian 
government, who is observing events on the spot, the realisation is 
inevitable that we cannot afford to permit any further diminution of 
our prestige. 

Should we decide to make far-reaching demands, with effective 
control of their execution (and such measures alone could clean the 
Augean Stable of Greater Servian intrigues), we would have to con- 
sider all possible consequences. From the very outset we must be 
firmly resolved to persevere in our attitude. 

Half measures, demands, endless debating and finally a foul com- 
promise, would be the hardest blow to Austria-Hungary's authority in 
Servia and her standing as a Great Power. 



No. 7. 
Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesl, Belgrade. 

Vienna, July 22, 1914. 

You are directed to hand the following note to the Royal Govern- 
ment, in the course of the afternoon of Thursday, July 23rd: 

On the 31st of March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on 
instructions from the Servian Government, made the following declara- 
tion to the Imperial and Royal Government : 

"Servia recognises that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has 
not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to such 
decisions as the Powers may take with regard to article XXV. of the 
treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, 
Servia undertakes to renounce henceforth the attitude of protest and 
opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since 
last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of 
her present policy toward Austria-Hungary and to live in future 
on good neighbourly terms with the latter." 

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events 



THE AUSTEO-HUNGAEIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 15 

of the 28th. of June last, have disclosed the existence of a subversive 
movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of 
Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its 
birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as 
to make itself manifest beyond the Servian frontier in the shape of 
acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders. 

Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the 
declaration of the 31st of March, 1909, the Eoyal Servian Government 
has done nothing to repress this movement. It has tolerated the 
criminal activity of various societies and associations directed against 
the Monarchy, the licentious language of the press, the glorification of 
the authors of outrages, and the participation of officers and func- 
tionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome 
propaganda in public instruction. In short, it has permitted all 
manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred 
of the Monarchy and contempt for its institutions. 

This culpable tolerance of the Eoyal Servian Government had 
not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th of June last 
demonstrated its ominous consequences to the world. 

It is evident from the depositions and confessions of the criminal 
perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th of June, that the Serajevo 
assassination has been planned in Belgrade, that the arms and ex- 
plosives with which the murderers were provided, had been given to 
them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna 
Odbrana, and finally that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals 
and their arms was organised and carried out by the Chiefs of the 
Servian frontier service. 

The above-mentioned results of the preliminary investigation do 
not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer 
the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for 
years in the face of machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence 
propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the 
contrary, impose upon it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues 
which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy. 

To achieve this end, the Imperial and Eoyal Government finds 
itself compelled to demand from the Eoyal Servian Government a 
formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against 
the Monarchy — in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the 
ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories be- 
longing to it — and that it undertakes to suppress by every means at 
its disposal this criminal and terrorist propaganda. 



16 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 

In order to give a solemn character to this undertaking the Royal 
Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its "journal 
official/ > of the 13th (26th) July the following declaration: 

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda 
directed against Austria-Hungary, of which the final aim is to detach 
from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and 
it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal pro- 
ceedings. 

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and func- 
tionaries have participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and 
thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal 
Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st of 
March, 1909. 

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all 
idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of 
the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers 
it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole 
population of the Kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with 
the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machina- 
tions, which it will use all its efforts to prevent and suppress. ' y 

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the 
royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King, and 
published in the Official Bulletin of the army. 

The Royal Servian Government further undertakes: 

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and con- 
tempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency 
of which is directed against its territorial integrity; 

2. To dissolve immediately the society called Narodna Odbrana, 
to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same 
manner against all other societies and their branches in Servia which 
engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The 
Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the 
societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name 
and form ; 

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, 
both as regards the teaching body and the methods of instruction, 
everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda 
against Austria-Hungary ; 

4. To remove from the military service, and from the adminis- 
tration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda 
against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 17 

Austro-Hungarian Government reserves the right of communicating 
to the Royal Government; 

5. To accept the cooperation in Servia of representatives of the 
Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive 
movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy ; 

6. To take judicial proceedings against accomplices in the plot 
of the 28th of June who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the 
Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation re- 
lating thereto ; 

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voja Tanko- 
sitch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State 
employee, who have been compromised by the results of the prelimi- 
nary investigation at Serajevo; 

8. To prevent by effective measures the participation of the Ser- 
vian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the 
frontier; to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier 
service at Schabatz and Lozniea who have been guilty of having 
assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their 
passage across the frontier ; 

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explana- 
tions regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, 
both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official posi- 
tions, did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th of June to give 
utterance, in published interviews, to expressions of hostility to the 
Austro-Hungarian Government; and finally, 

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without de- 
lay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding 
heads. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government awaits the reply of the Royal 
Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th 
of July. 

A memorandum dealing with the results of the preliminary in- 
vestigation at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under 
heads 7 and 8 is attached to this note. 



(Enclosure.) 

The investigation by the court at Serajevo against Gabrilo Princip 
and accomplices in the assassination committed on June 28 of this 
year has up to now established the following facts : 



18 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

1. The plot to murder Archduke Francis Ferdinand during his 
stay in Serajevo was planned by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko Gabrino- 
vitch, a certain Milan Ciganovitch, and Trifko Grabez, with the as- 
sistance of Major Voja Tankositch. 

2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols, with their ammuni- 
tion, which were used by the criminals were obtained for them and 
handed to Princip, Gabrinovitch, and Grabez in Belgrade by a certain 
Milan Ciganovitch, and Major Voja Tankositch. 

3. The bombs are hand grenades which come from the arsenal 
of the Servian army at Kragujevac. 

4. In order to make sure of the success of the attempt, Milan 
Ciganovitch instructed Princip, Gabrinovitch and Grabez in the art 
of hurling bombs and taught Princip and Grabez how to shoot with 
Browning pistols in a forest adjoining the shooting range of Top- 
schider, in Belgrade. 

5. In order to make possible the crossing of the Bosnia-Herze- 
govina frontier by the conspirators and the smuggling in of their 
weapons, a secret transportation system was organised by Cigano- 
vitch. The entrance of the criminals with their weapons into Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was carried out with the assistance of the frontier 
Captains at Schabatz (Rade Popovitch) and at Loznica and the co- 
operation of the customs officer, Rudivoj Grbitch of Loznica, and 
several other persons. 

In presenting the above note you will add verbally that you are 
instructed to leave Belgrade with the staff of the legation at the ex- 
piration of the time-limit mentioned in the note (forty-eight hours 
after the hour and day of its presentation) in the event that within 
that period you have not received an unconditional and favourable 
response from the Royal Servian Government. 



No. 8. 

Count Berchtold to tlte Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at Berlin, 
Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburgh, and Constantinople. 

Vienna, July 22, 1914. 
The Imperial and Royal Government has found itself obliged to 
address on Thursday, the 23rd instant, through the Imperial and 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 19 

Royal Minister at Belgrade, the following note to the Royal Govern- 
ment of Servia. (See instructions to the Imperial and Royal Ministry 
at Belgrade of July 22, 1914.) 

I have the honour to request you to bring the contents of this 
note to the attention of the government to which you are accredited, 
accompanying this communication with the following comment : 

On the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government ad- 
dressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is 
reproduced above. 

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a 
policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the minds of Serb sub- 
jects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so initiating activities 
for detachment of the Austro-Hungarian territory adjoining the Ser- 
vian frontier. 

Servia became the focus of a criminal agitation. 

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups whose 
object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on 
Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count 
among their membership generals and diplomats, government officials 
and judges — in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society 
in the kingdom. 

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propa- 
ganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day 
passes without the organs of the Servian press inciting their readers 
to hatred and contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to out- 
rages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity. 

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every 
means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the 
youth in the frontier provinces. 

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of 
the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left 
such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom. Individuals 
belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to 
place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against 
Austria-Hungary. 

In the face of these activities, to which Austria-Hungary has been 
exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it in- 
cumbent on it to take the slightest step. The Servian Government 
has thus failed in the duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration 
of the 31st March, 1909, and has acted in opposition to the will of 
Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary. 



20 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face 
of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial 
disinterestedness of the Austro-Hnngarian Monarchy and the hope 
that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by 
appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By 
observing an attitude of good-will toward the political interests of 
Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the Kingdom 
would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its 
own side. In particular Austria-Hungary expected a development of 
this kind in the political ideas of Servia when, after the events of 
1912, the Imperial and Royal Government by its disinterested and 
ungrudging attitude, made so considerable an aggrandisement of Ser- 
via possible. 

The good-will which Austria-Hungary showed toward the neigh- 
bouring State had no restraining effect on the conduct of the King- 
dom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of 
which the deplorable consequences were demonstrated to the world 
on the 28th of June last, when the heir apparent to the Monarchy and 
his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched in Belgrade. 

In the face of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Gov- 
ernment has felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade 
with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary 
movement which is menacing the security and integrity of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy. 

The Imperial and Royal Government is convinced that, in tak- 
ing this step, it will find itself in full accord with the sentiments of 
all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon 
to be employed with impunity in political strife and the peace of 
Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from 
Belgrade. 

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government 
holds at the disposal of the Government to which you are accredited 
a dossier recording the Servian machinations and showing the con- 
nection between these machinations and the murder of the 28th of 
June. An identical communication has been addressed to the Im- 
perial and Royal Representatives accredited to the other signatory 
Powers. 

You are authorised to place a copy of this despatch in the hands 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 21 

No. 9. 
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 23, 1914. 

As England is the most likely of the Entente Powers to be brought 
to an unprejudiced judgment of our present move in Belgrade, I 
request your Excellency to point out among other things in the con- 
versation which you will have at the Foreign Office on the 24th 
instant, following the presentation of the circular note, that it was 
within the power of Servia to avert the serious steps she had reason 
to expect from our side, if she had spontaneously begun within her 
own territory proceedings against the Servian accomplices in the 
murderous attack of the 28th of June, and to disclose the threads of 
the plot, leading, as it has been proved, from Belgrade to Serajevo. 

Until to-day the Servian Government, in spite of much notorious 
circumstantial evidence pointing to Belgrade, not only has failed to 
do anything of that sort, but even has endeavoured to efface the ex- 
isting traces. 

According to a telegraphic report from our Legation in Belgrade, 
the Servian State employee Ciganovitch, who is compromised by the 
corroborating depositions of the assassins, was still in Belgrade on 
the day of the murder; but when his name appeared in the news- 
papers three days later, he had left the town. At the same time the 
head of the Servian Press Bureau declared Ciganovitch to be abso- 
lutely unknown in Belgrade. 

As to the short time-limit of our demands, it is based upon our 
long-standing experience with Servian proficiency in procrastination. 

We cannot allow our demands, which, as a matter of fact, do not 
contain anything unusual in the intercourse between states which 
ought to be living in peace and friendship, to become the object of 
negotiations and compromises ; and, with due regard to our economic 
interests, we cannot accept a political method which would enable 
Servia to prolong the crisis at her pleasure. 



22 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 10. 
Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) London, July 24, 1914. 

Circular note just presented to Sir Edward Grey, who perused 
it attentively. With regard to No. 5 he asked for explanations, as 
the installation of Austrian officials in Servia impressed him as 
equivalent to the termination of Servia 's independent sovereignty. I 
replied that cooperation of police officials, as in this instance, would 
not infringe upon the sovereignty of the State. 

He regretted the brevity of the time-limit, which made it im- 
possible to calm the first irritation and to induce Belgrade to give 
us a satisfactory reply. There would be time enough for an ultimatum 
should the answer prove unacceptable, he thought. 

I explicitly pointed out our position. (Necessity to proceed 
against subversive agitation which threatened parts of the Monarchy ; 
defence of our most vital interests, most complete failure of the 
conciliatory attitude we have shown up to now in our dealings with 
Servia, which has had more than three weeks' time to institute a 
spontaneous enquiry concerning complicity in the murder, and so on.) 

The Secretary of State repeated his apprehension with regard to 
the short time-limit, but he admitted that what has been said about 
the complicity in the murder of Serajevo was justified, as are some 
of our demands. 

He would be quite willing to regard the whole affair as concerning 
solely Austria-Hungary and Servia. Yet he is very " apprehensive' ' 
of the possibility that several Great Powers might be involved in 
war. Speaking of Russia, Germany and France, he remarked that 
the provisions of the Franco-Russian Alliance are probably somewhat 
similar to those of the Triplice. I explained at length our point 
of view, and I repeated with emphasis that in this case we would 
have to remain firm in order to get some guarantees, as Servian prom- 
ises hitherto never have been redeemed. I could appreciate his con- 
sidering primarily the effect of our act upon the peace of Europe, but 
indicating that, in order to understand our point of view, he ought to 
put himself in our place. 

He did not wish to enter into a further discussion of this subject, 
and said it would be necessary for him to study the note more care- 
fully. As a preliminary step he will confer with the German and 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 23 

the French Ambassadors, as he feels obliged to obtain an exchange 
of views first of all with the allies of Austria-Hungary and Russia, 
who, however, have no direct interests in Servia. 



No. 11. 

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 24, 1914. 

Have just read your instructions of the 22nd instant to the 
Minister of Justice, who is in charge of the affairs of the absent 
Foreign Secretary, and left a copy with him. M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
who was vaguely acquainted with our step in Belgrade through the 
reports in this morning's papers, seemed considerably impressed with 
my information. Without entering into a detailed discussion of the 
text, he readily admitted that recent events, and the attitude of the 
Servian Government, have made our energetic intervention appear 
intelligible. 

Demand No. 5 of our note presented in Belgrade seemed especially 
to strike the Minister, as he asked me to read it again. The Minister 
thanked me for the communication, which, he said, would be studied 
closely. I took the occasion to emphasise the point that the issue 
was one to be dealt with exclusively by Servia and ourselves, but 
that it would be to the general advantage of Europe if the unrest per- 
petuated for years by the Servian agitation against us were, at last, 
to be replaced by a clearly defined political situation. I pointed out 
that all friends of peace and order, among whom I am counting 
France in the foremost place, should earnestly advise Servia to 
change her attitude fundamentally and to meet our legitimate de- 
mands. 

The Minister conceded that it is the duty of Servia to proceed 
energetically against any accomplices of the assassins of Serajevo, 
which duty she would not be likely to evade. Emphasising the sym- 
pathy of France with Austria-Hungary, and the good relations be- 
tween the two countries, he expressed the hope that the controversy 
would be settled peacefully and in accordance with our desires. 

The Minister avoided every attempt to palliate or defend the 
attitude of Servia. 



24 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 12. 
Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 24, 1914. 

Baron Schoen, following out his instructions, will declare to-day 
that our dispute with Servia is regarded by the Berlin Cabinet as 
an affair concerning solely Austria-Hungary and Servia. 

In connexion with this information, he will make it understood 
that, should a third Power try to intervene, Germany, true to the 
obligations of her Alliance, would be found on our side. 



No. 13. 
Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 24, 1914. 

Baron Schoen has just taken the step enjoined upon him. M. 
Bienvenu-Martin told him that he could not yet give a definite reply, 
although he was prepared to say at the outset that the French 
Government shared our opinion that our controversy with Servia 
concerned only Vienna and Belgrade, and that hopes were enter- 
tained that the question would find a direct and peaceful solution. 

The Servian Minister here has been advised that his Government 
should yield on all points as much as possible, yet with the restriction : 
"As long as her rights of sovereignty were not touched.' ' 

Baron Schoen emphasised the necessity, from the European point 
of view, of eliminating, at last, the center of unceasing disturbance 
in Belgrade. 



No. 14. 

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) St. Peter sburgTt, July 24, 1914. 

The Minister of Foreign Affairs received me with the remark 
that he knew the object of my visit, and declared that he would not 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 25 

define his position at once. I began to read my instructions to him. 
He first interrupted me when the series of murderous attempts was 
mentioned. My explanation was met with the question whether it 
had been proved that all those attempts originated in Belgrade. I 
emphasised the fact that they were the outcome of Servian instiga- 
tion. In the further course of the reading he remarked that he knew 
what it all was about; that we intended to make war on Servia and 
this was to be the pretext. I replied that our attitude during the 
last few years was sufficient evidence that we neither sought nor 
needed such pretexts. The solemn declarations demanded from Servia 
did not evoke any objection from the Minister; he only repeated 
again and again that Pasitch already had expressed himself in the 
sense demanded by us, and interjected: "He will say that twenty- 
five times if you wish. ' ' I told him that no one in Austria was trying 
to infringe upon the integrity of Servia or her dynasty. M. Sazonow 
most vigorously declared himself against the dissolution of the 
1 1 Narodna Odbrana, ' y which he assured me Servia would never under- 
take. The Minister also objected to the proposed cooperation of 
Imperial and Royal officials in the suppression of the subversive 
propaganda. Servia, then, he pointed out, would no longer be mistress 
in her own house ! * i After that you will want to interfere again and 
again, and what will the life of Europe be like?" he asked. I replied: 
"It will be quieter than hitherto, if Servia shows some good- will." 

The observations with which I accompanied the reading of the 
note were listened to by the Minister rather calmly. Our belief that 
our feelings in the matter were shared by all civilised nations, he 
declared to be erroneous. With all the emphasis of which I was 
capable, I pointed out how deplorable it would be if we were to fail 
to meet with a sympathetic response in Russia in a situation imperil- 
ling all that was most sacred to us as well as to Russia, whatever the 
Minister might choose to say. He endeavoured to belittle the 
monarchical aspect of the question. 

With regard to the dossier held at the disposal of the govern- 
ments, M. Sazonow wondered why we had taken the trouble, since 
we already had issued an ultimatum. This proved conclusively, to 
his mind, that we did not desire an impartial investigation of the 
case. I replied that the results of our own enquiry were sufficient to 
justify our proceedings in an affair solely concerning Austria-Hun- 
gary and Servia, but that, having nothing to conceal, we were quite 
willing to furnish the Powers with all the information they might 
desire. 



26 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

M. Sazonow observed that, the ultimatum having been issued, he 
had no further interest in the proffered information. He presented 
the case in such a way as to make it appear that we were seeking a 
war with Servia under any circumstances. I replied that we are the 
most peace-loving Power in the world, and that all we want is to safe- 
guard our territory from foreign revolutionary intrigues and to pro- 
tect our dynasty from bombs. 

In the course of further discussion, M. Sazonow once more made 
the remark that we had certainly created a serious situation. In 
spite of the comparative calmness of the Minister's manner, his atti- 
tude was throughout one of negation and antagonism. 



No. 15. 

Communique in the Russian Official Gazette. 

St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914. 
The St. Petersburgh Telegraphic Agency reports : 
The Official Gazette publishes the following communication : 
The Imperial Government, gravely alarmed by the surprising 
events in Belgrade and by the ultimatum addressed to Servia by 
Austria-Hungary, is following attentively the development of the 
Austro-Hungarian-Servian conflict, to which Russia cannot remain 
indifferent. 



No. 16. 

Count Szdpdry to Count BercJttold. 

(Telegram.) St. PetersburgJt, July 24, 1914. 

After the Ministers had been in session for five hours, M. Sazonow 
received the German Ambassador in the course of the evening and 
had a long conference with him. 

The Minister, probably as a result of the meeting of the Cabinet, 
advanced the opinion that the controversy between Austria-Hungary 
and Servia was by no means a matter that could be confined to these 
two States, but that it involved all Europe, inasmuch as the com- 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN BED BOOK (NO. 1) 27 

promise arrived at in consequence of the Servian declaration in 1909 
had been brought about under the auspices of the whole of Europe. 

The Minister stated emphatically that he was affected in a par- 
ticularly unpleasant way by the circumstance that Austria-Hungary 
had offered to submit a dossier for examination at a time when an 
ultimatum already had been sent to Servia. Russia would demand 
an international examination of the dossier which we had placed at 
the Minister's disposal. My German colleague at once drew M. 
Sazonow 's attention to the fact that Austria-Hungary would not ac- 
cept an intervention in her differences with Servia, nor would Ger- 
many consent to a suggestion incompatible with the dignity of her 
ally as a Great Power. 

In course of the conversation the Minister stated that Russia 
could not remain indifferent to Austria-Hungary's possible intention 
to "devorer le Serbie" (absorb Servia). Count Pourtales retorted 
that he did not assume such an intention on the part of Austria- 
Hungary, and that any such purpose would be contrary to the 
Monarchy's own interests. Austria-Hungary only considered it 
necessary to inflict a fully deserved chastisement upon Servia. M. 
Sazonow expressed his doubts as to whether Austria-Hungary would 
abide by such a declaration. 

The conversation ended with an appeal by M. Sazonow that 
Germany cooperate with Russia for the maintenance of the peace. 
The German Ambassador assured the Minister that Germany had no 
desire to precipitate a war, but that she naturally would defend her 
ally's interests without reservation. 



No. 17. 

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 24, 1914. 

Re: Your yesterday's telegram. 

I request you to explain to Sir Edward Grey without delay that 
our representations of yesterday at Belgrade should not be regarded 
as a formal ultimatum, but merely as a note with a fixed time-limit. 
You will give Sir Edward Grey the strictly confidential information, 
that, for the time being, the interruption of diplomatic relations with 
Servia and the beginning of the necessary military preparations would 



28 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

be the only consequences if the time-limit should expire without 
result. We are absolutely determined to exact satisfaction of our 
legitimate demands. 

You are authorised to declare that we shall, however, be compelled 
to demand indemnification from Servia for all expenses incurred in 
such military preparations, should Servia, after the expiration of 
the stipulated time, yield only under the pressure of the aforesaid 
preparations. It must be remembered that we already have had to 
mobilise twice on account of Servia, namely, in 1908 and 1912. 



No. 18. 

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry, St PetersburgJi. 

Vienna, July 24, 1914. 

I received the Russian Charge d 'Affaires this forenoon, and ex- 
plained to him that I made a special point of informing him as early 
as possible of our step in Belgrade, and of acquainting him with our 
point of view in this matter. Prince Kudascheff thanked me for this 
mark of consideration, but did not conceal his uneasiness at our 
summary proceeding toward Servia. He pointed out that it was 
feared at St. Petersburgh that our action would involve the humilia- 
tion of Servia, an event to which Russia could not remain indifferent. 

I endeavoured to reassure the Russian Charge d' Affaires on that 
score. I explained that our object was to obtain a readjustment of 
the intolerable attitude of Servia toward the Monarchy. For this 
purpose we endeavoured to induce the Servian Government to make 
public disavowal of the existing hostile agitation against the integrity 
of Austria-Hungary, and to suppress it by administrative measures. 
We also desired an opportunity to satisfy ourselves that the measures 
adopted would be conscientiously carried out. 

I emphasised the dangers which the continuation of the Great- 
Servian propaganda involved, not only to Austria-Hungary's integ- 
rity, but also to the equilibrium and the peace of Europe. I, more- 
over, pointed out that the safety of all dynasties, and not least of 
all, the Russian, would be threatened if the conviction were to spread 
broadcast, that murder could be employed with impunity as a weapon 
in a chauvinistic agitation. 

Finally, I pointed out that we did not aspire to territorial ag- 
grandisement, but merely desired the maintenance of the status quo ; 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGARIAN BED BOOK (NO. 1) 29 

a point of view that should be understood by the Russian Government. 

Prince Kudascheff then observed that he was unfamiliar with 
the views of his Government and he did not know what attitude 
Servia would take with regard to several of the demands. 

In concluding our interview the Charge d 'Affaires undertook to 
bring to his Government's knowledge the explanations I had given 
him concerning our action, and especially promised to mention our 
assurance that we did not intend to humiliate Servia. 



No. 19. 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, 
Rome, Paris, London, St, Petersburgh and Constantinople. 

Vienna, July 25, 1914. 

I have the honour to enclose herewith for you the dossier an- 
nounced in the circular note to the Powers concerning the Pan-Servian 
propaganda and its connexions with the Serajevo plot. 

You will please communicate this dossier to the Government to 
which you are accredited: 

Memoir. 

The movement emanating from Servia which aims at the detach- 
ment of the Southern Slav parts of Austria-Hungary from the 
Monarchy to unite them with Servia, extends far back into the past. 

The propaganda on Servian soil, always the same in purpose, 
varying merely as to means and intensity, reached its climax during 
the crisis of the annexation. Divesting itself of the protecting cloak 
of secrecy, this propaganda at that juncture emerged with an open 
confession of its tendencies. Under the patronage of the Servian 
Government, it strove to attain its object by every means at its dis- 
posal. While on the one hand the entire Servian press clamoured 
for war against the Monarchy in a series of broadsides wherein the 
facts were maliciously distorted, on the other hand associations were 
formed in preparation for a struggle. There were also other means 
of propaganda. 

The Narodna Odbrana was the most important among these. 
Ostensibly organised as a private society, it was entirely dominated 



30 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

by the Belgrade Foreign Office through the officers and State func- 
tionaries on its roll of membership. Among its founders were the 
following : General Bozo Jankovitch, former State Secretaries Ljuba 
Jovanovitch, Ljuba Davidovitch and Velislav Vulovitch; Professor 
Zivojin Dacitch (Bareitch), director of the State Printing Office, and 
the then Captains, now Majors, Voja Tankositch and Milan Pribice- 
vitch. This society devoted itself to the recruiting and equipment 
of bodies of volunteers for the coming war against the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy. (See Enclosure 2.) 

As an illustration of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana, the 
deposition of Trifko Krstanovitch, a subject of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina and a witness in the Common Pleas Court at Serajevo, will 
be of interest. This man was then in Belgrade and had been hired 
by the Narodna Odbrana as a "Komitadji," together with other sub- 
jects of the Monarchy. With some hundred and forty other members 
of this band, Krstanovitch at the beginning of 1909 had been enrolled 
in a school established and managed by the Majors Voja Tankositch 
and Dusan Putnik in Cuprija (County of Jagodina) for the instruc- 
tion and equipment of armed bands of men. In it all the instructors 
were Servian officers. General Bozo Jankovitch and Captain Milan 
Pribicevitch made regular inspections of this three-months' course of 
education in irregular warfare. 

The future "Komitadjis" were there instructed in shooting, 
bomb-throwing, laying of mines, blowing up of railways, tunnels and 
bridges, and the destruction of telegraph lines. It was their task to 
apply their newly acquired knowledge in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
under the orders of their commanders. 

Through these activities of the Narodna Odbrana, which were 
carried on openly and were supported by the Servian Government, 
the guerrilla warfare against Austria-Hungary was organised. Sub- 
jects of the Monarchy were induced to commit acts of treason against 
their own country and were systematically trained to make treacher- 
ous attacks upon the defences of their country as Servian emissaries. 

This period of aggressions was terminated by the declaration of 
the Servian Government on the 31st of March, 1909, wherein the 
latter declared its willingness to abide by the new political order 
created by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and solemnly 
pledged itself to maintain friendly relations with the Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy in the future. 

This declaration seemed to mark the end of the movement against 
Austria-Hungary, the source of so much unrest, and to point a path 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EED BOOK (NO. 1) 31 

to a really friendly approach between Servia and the Dual Monarchy. 
Deprived of the assistance of the Servian Government, and checked 
by the latter as in duty bound, the hostile propaganda would have 
been reduced to a mere shadowy existence, sure to vanish. 

In such an event the kinship of Servia with the Southern Slavs 
in the Dual Monarchy by race, language and traditions, would have 
stimulated a joint work of culture which would have been of common 
value to both countries. But expectations in this direction were not 
fulfilled. 

The aspirations hostile to the Dual Monarchy remained in opera- 
tion, and, under the very eyes of the Servian Government, which has 
done nothing to suppress this movement, the propaganda against 
Austria- Hungary was intensified. Rancor against the Dual Monarchy 
was, kept at a high pitch, and by new instigations was made im- 
placable. 

In the same old way, adapted to the changed conditions and 
supplemented by new methods, the people of Servia were roused to a 
struggle of extermination against Austria-Hungary. In a systematic 
manner secret meshes were woven to and fro in the Southern Slav 
districts of the Dual Monarchy, and the citizens of the latter were 
corrupted to betray their country. 

Above all other agencies, the Servian press has not ceased to 
work in this direction. No less than 81 Servian publications had to 
be excluded from Austria-Hungary because their contents were in 
flagrant violation of the provisions of the domestic criminal code. 

There was hardly a provision enacted for the protection of the 
august person of the Sovereign, members of the dynasty and the 
integrity of the State, which was not violated by Servian newspapers. 
A few specimens of these too frequent press utterances, selected from 
an abundant crop of such matter and referring to various periods, 
are tabulated in Enclosure 1. 

"Without entering into a more minute discussion of these indi- 
cations of public opinion in Servia, it must be stated that they habit- 
ually referred to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an act 
of robbery committed against Servia and requiring remedy. This 
view is not only repeated over and over in the ultra-radical papers 
in all the degrees of filthy expression of which the Servian language 
is capable, but it finds practically open utterance in the "Samou- 
prava," a publication closely connected with the Belgrade Foreign 
Office. (See lit. C of Enclosure 1.) 

Attention must be directed likewise to the manner in which the 



32 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Servian press treated the murderous plot of Bogdan Zerajitch on 
June 15, 1910, in Serajevo against the Governor of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina, General von Varesanin. 

Zerajitch, as is known, committed suicide immediately after his 
deed, having previously reduced all his papers to ashes. Under these 
circumstances the motive of his plot could not be completely estab- 
lished. However, from a badge found on him, one might infer that 
he was a believer in Kropotkine's tenets. Investigation led to the 
conclusion that the crime rested on Anarchist foundations. 

The press of Servia, nevertheless, extolled the assassin as a Servian 
national hero and glorified his deed. And the "Politika" even voiced 
a solemn protest against the assumption that Zerajitch was an anar- 
chist, claiming him as an ' ' heroic Serb whose name every Servian will 
cherish with sorrow/ ' 

The day of the 18th of August of the same year (the birthday 
of his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty), was chosen as the 
appropriate occasion by the ' < Politika ,, for a resumption of its dis- 
cussion of the plot of Zerajitch, whose name is uttered by the people 
as something sacred, and to publish a poem extolling this murderous 
attempt (lit. A of Enclosure 1). 

Thus this crime, which had nothing to do with Servian aspira- 
tions to territories belonging to the Dual Monarchy, was utilised for 
the propagation of subversive ideas. Through the glorification of 
Zerajitch, murder was expressly commended as a model weapon in 
the struggle to realise Servian ideas, and as a deed worthy of emula- 
tion. This sanction of murder as a legitimate method in the fight 
against the Dual Monarchy recurs later in the press comments on the 
murderous attempt of Jukitch against the Royal Commissioner, M. 
von Cuvay. (See lit. .C of Enclosure 1.) 

These sheets were not only circulated in Servia, but, as will be 
shown hereafter, were also smuggled into the Monarchy through well 
organised secret channels. It is these sheets that roused the masses 
and made them fertile soil for the activities of the associations 
antagonistic to the Monarchy. 

The Narodna Odbrana became the focus of the agitation carried 
on by various organisations. The persons who had been at the head 
of this society at the time of the annexation were still its leaders. 
Now, as then, the most untiring and active organisers were the most 
violent enemies of the Dual Monarchy, to wit : General Bozo Janko- 
vitch, Zivojin Dacitch, Director of the State Printing Office, and 
the Majors Milan Pribicevitch and Voja Tankositch. In its broader 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 33 

organisation, which was under a strict hierarchical rule (see Enclosure 
2 under "Organisation"), the Narodna Odbrana soon included about 
400 committees, all of which displayed a lively activity. 

Under the same leadership as when it was founded, the Narodna 
Odbrana became the centre of an agitation to which the Sharp- 
shooters' Association, including 762 societies; the Sokolbund, with 
2,500 members; the Olympian Club, the Equestrian Society, "Knez 
Mihajlo, ' ' the Jagerbund, the Kulturliga and numerous other societies 
belonged. Owing to a constant mutual interchange, these organisa- 
tions were practically amalgamated and to-day their membership 
constitutes one body, the Narodna Odbrana. 

Thus the Narodna Odbrana extended its close-meshed net of agita- 
tion over the whole of Servia, drawing to itself everybody who proved 
susceptible to the seduction of its ideas. 

The spirit of the Narodna Odbrana is clearly disclosed by its 
official publications. 

Disguised by its articles of association as a cultural organisation, 
concerned solely with the intellectual and physical development of the 
population of Servia, as well as with its material betterment, the 
Narodna Odbrana betrays the true and only reason for its existence, 
by the publication in its organ of the following programme of re- 
organisation : Under the pretext that the Dual Monarchy is seeking 
to despoil Servia of "her freedom and language and crush her ut- 
terly," the Odbrana pledges its members to preach to the people of 
Servia, "fanatically and untiringly," the "holy truth" that the 
waging of a war of extermination against Austria-Hungary, Servians 
first and greatest enemy, is an imperative necessity ; that this war must 
be carried on "with rifles and cannon," and that the people must be 
put in readiness "in every way" for "the struggle to liberate the 
oppressed territories where 7,000,000 of our enslaved brothers are 
suffering." (See Enclosure 2.) 

The "cultural aims" of the Narodna Odbrana are completely 
dominated by this idea. They are means to the end of organising 
and educating the people for the longed-for struggle of extermination 
against the Dual Monarchy. 

The same spirit animates all the societies affiliated with the 
Narodna Odbrana. The Sokol Societies in Kragujevae (see Enclo- 
sure 3) are a case in point. 

Like the Narodna Odbrana itself, these affiliated organisations 
are under the direction of army officers, professors and state officials. 
The opening address which the president of the society, Major 



34 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Kovaeevitch, delivered in 1914, at the annual meeting, omits all men- 
tion of athletics, the main object of a Sokol Society, and deals ex- 
clusively with the ''preparations for the struggle' ' against the 
" dangerous, heartless, lustful, hateful and greedy enemy in the 
north," who is "depriving millions of Servian brothers of their free- 
dom and rights and keeping them in slavery and chains." 

In the report of the management of this society all references to 
the nominal objects of its activities are relegated to the background. 
The report only indicates the real aims of the executive committee, 
to wit : the promotion of the national evolution and the strengthening 
of the "suppressed people," to the end that they may carry out their 
programme and accomplish that "great deed" which will be achieved 
in the near future — "the liberation of the brothers across the Drina, 
who are suffering the torments of the crucified." 

Even the treasurer makes use of his financial report to sound a 
warning that it is necessary to "train falcons" which would be able 
"to bring freedom to the brothers not yet liberated." 

Like the "cultural aims" of the Narodna Odbrana, the "athletic 
sports" of the Sokols are not an end in themselves but a 
mere means to advance the same propaganda, which is carried 
on with the same idea, and even with the use of almost identical 
words. 

The Narodna Odbrana, in inciting the "people" to the struggle 
of extermination against the Dual Monarchy, appeals not only to the 
masses in both Servia, but to all Southern Slavs. To the Narodna 
Odbrana the Southern Slav territories of the Monarchy represent 
"our conquered Servian dominions." (Also see Enclosure 4.) Thus, 
the Southern Slav subjects of the Dual Monarchy are asked to par- 
ticipate in this "national work," this "sound, vital work" beyond 
the Servian frontier. The Narodna Odbrana appeals for ' ' heroes for 
this holy struggle" on the soil of the Dual Monarchy, where Oblitch, 
Sultan Murad's murderer, is pointed to as an example of national 
devotion, worthy of imitation. 

To spur on the "brothers outside of Servia" to participate in the 
"work of private initiative," the Narodna Odbrana keeps in close 
touch with the "brothers across the frontier." Nothing is said in the 
official organs of the society about the nature of this connexion, 
presumably because it belongs to that part of the "general work" 
which, for manifold reasons, is not to be disclosed. 

How extensive this branch of their activity is, however, can be 
gathered from the fact that both the Central Committee of the 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 35 

Narodna Odbrana and some of its regional committees maintain their 
departments "for Foreign Affairs. " 

This "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana and of its 
affiliations is many-sided. 

Relatively the least dangerous means of this agitation, because 
amenable to the control of the authorities, are the lecture tours which 
prominent members of the Narodna Odbrana undertake to south- 
eastern parts of the Dual Monarchy, where they address various 
societies on national and cultural subjects. On such occasions the 
opportunity is offered to the lecturer to recruit more or less openly for 
the above-mentioned societies, using words and expressions which 
carry a hidden meaning to the initiated. 

In the ranks of these emissaries the above-mentioned director of 
the Servian State Printing Office, Zivojin Dacitch, plays a prominent 
part. Zivojin Dacitch had issued a proclamation to the Servian peo- 
ple on August 9, 1909, in which he designated Austria-Hungary as 
Servians enemy and exhorted the country to prepare for the war 
against the Monarchy. He undertook many trips for purposes of 
agitation to the southeastern parts of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
archy. In one of these lectures, delivered in Karloci (1912), he 
abandoned his usual caution and advocated the "union of all Serbs 
against the common enemy. " His references to Austria-Hungary in 
this instance lacked nothing in clearness. 

More menacing were the relations which the Servian societies, 
imbued with the spirit of the Narodna Odbrana, entertained with 
organisations in the Monarchy under cover of a unity of interests 
and culture. The mutual visits of these societies, made either in a 
body or by delegates, could not be controlled by the police and 
authorities, and were utilised by Servia for the prosecution of many 
plans hostile to the Monarchy. 

Thus, for instance, a delegate of the Narodna Odbrana at the 
notorious celebration of the Prosvjeta Society in Serajevo (September, 
1912), did not hesitate to secretly enlist Bosnian members for his 
society. (See Enclosure 6.) The delegating of a representative of 
the Sokol Society at Kragujevac to this celebration was meant to 
convey this message to the "Brethren in Bosnia 7 ': "We have not 
forgotten you; the wings of the falcons of the Sumadija are still 
powerful." As to the proceedings at such meetings in Servia, it is 
more difficult to report in detail. They are not under the control of 
the Imperial and Royal authorities, which have to collect their infor- 
mation at second-hand. (See Enclosure 3.) In this connexion the 



36 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

visit of the students of Agram to Servia in April, 1912, may be re- 
called. This event took on the aspect of a strongly suggestive demon- 
stration, by reason of an official military reception and a review of 
Servian troops in honour of the students. Not without justification 
in fact did the report of the business manager of the Sokol Society at 
Kragujevac refer to this event "as the beginning and germ of a great 
deed which shall be performed in the nearest future," as "a seed 
which will put forth shoots when the soul of the people shall have 
been warmed to the task until there shall be no barriers which cannot 
be torn down." 

Only a short while ago the authorities of the Dual Monarchy 
were apprised of the fact that the Servian Sokol Societies effected a 
secret union with corresponding organisations in the Monarchy, of 
which the exact character, pending investigation, is not yet clearly 
established. Tentative results of this investigation indicate, however, 
that herein has been traced one of the channels through which the 
Servian Sokols and their friends are instilling their subversive aims 
into the minds of beguiled and misled persons in the Monarchy. 

This preliminary propaganda, affecting masses as a whole, is, 
however, entirely overshadowed by the "foreign service work" per- 
formed by the Narodna Odbrana and its friends in their man-to-man 
canvass. This is the ground where the most deplorable results of 
the movement are evidenced. Through its secret emissaries and 
trusted agents, the agitation has stirred up unthinking youths as well 
as adults. Thus, Milan Pribicevitch induced the former Honved 
officers, V.B., D.K., V.N. and V.K., the last named a lieutenant in 
the Croatian-Slavonian gendarmerie, to desert the army of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy under serious circumstances, and to flee to 
Servia. True it is that they have been disappointed in their hopes 
and some of them would gladly return to the country which they 
betrayed. 

The agitation developed by Servia in the middle schools in Croatia 
and Bosnia is unfortunately too well known to require exemplifica- 
tion. It is probably not so well known, however, that those expelled 
from Croatian and Bosnian schools for gross breaches of discipline 
are welcomed with open arms in Servia, often subsidised by the State 
and educated as enemies of the Monarchy. Servian schools with their 
anti-Austro-Hungarian text-books and maps, and the large number 
of professors and teachers belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, lend 
themselves admirably to the training of these adepts. The following 
is a notable instance of this sort : In March, 1914, several pupils of 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 37 

the training college for elementary teachers in Pakrac (Croatia) had 
to be expelled on account of a strike. They went to Servia, where 
some of them immediately obtained appointments as teachers, while 
others were admitted to a training college for teachers. Affiliating 
with people hostile to the Monarchy, one of these expelled school 
strikers publicly declared that he and his friends, on the occasion 
of the visit to Bosnia of the heir apparent, would produce convincing 
proofs that Bosnia was a Servian land. It must seem at least strange 
that the Royal Servian District Prefect and Krajna issued Servian 
passports to three of these compromised students at the time of the 
visit of Archduke Francis Ferdinand to Bosnia, in which they were 
falsely designated as Servian subjects, although he could not have 
helped being aware of their Croatian citizenship. Provided with these 
passports, the three undergraduate teachers were able to enter, un- 
recognised, the territory of the Monarchy, where eventually they were 
identified and arrested. 

These activities, however, do not exhaust the full scope of the 
" foreign " work of the Narodna Odbrana. For some time past the 
Imperial and Royal Government has had confidential information 
that military preparations were being made for the longed-for-war 
against Austria-Hungary and that Servian emissaries in the Dual 
Monarchy were under orders to destroy means of transportation and 
communication, after the manner of guerrilla fighters, and to kindle 
revolts and cause panics in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. 
(See Enclosure 7.) 

The criminal prosecution of Jovo Jaglicitch and his confederates 
in the Common Pleas Court at Serajevo in 1913 for the crime of 
espionage (see Enclosure 6) has produced evidence confirming this 
confidential information. 

As at the time of its establishment, the Narodna Odbrana still 
has on its programme the preparation of a warfare of bands, supple- 
mented by the development of a system of espionage. To-day the 
so-called "reorganised programme' ' of the Narodna Odbrana is in 
truth of broader scope, including the organisation of the so-called 
"war of extermination" against the Monarchy and the unfurling of 
the "old red flag of the Narodna Odbrana." 

Here, it will be seen, an atmosphere of hatred, promoted openly 
and secretly against the Dual Monarchy, prevailed. Coupled with it 
was an irresponsible agitation, availing itself of any means in the 
struggle against Austria-Hungary and remorselessly advocating com- 
mon murder as the most efficient weapon. It is evident that out of 



38 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

such conditions acts of terrorism would be born, even without 
the active cooperation of anti-Austro-Hungarian individuals from 
Servia. 

On June 8th, 1912, Luka Jukitch fired a shot at M. von Cuvaj, 
the Royal Commissioner, which fatally injured Councillor von 
Hervoiteh, who was seated next to him in the carriage. In his flight 
Jukitch shot down a police officer who was pursuing him, and wounded 
two others. 

The views expressed by Jukitch at the public hearing of his case, 
were in full accord with the basic ideas and plans circulated by the 
Narodna Odbrana. Although Jukitch had been brooding over his 
murderous schemes for some time, these projects really matured when 
he joined the pilgrimage of students from Agram to Belgrade on 
April 18th, 1912. During the celebrations given in honour of the visi- 
tors, Jukitch came in close touch with various persons within the 
sphere of the Narodna Odbrana and he had political discussions with 
them. A few days later Jukitch was again in Belgrade, where a 
Servian Major handed him a bomb and another sympathiser a 
Browning pistol, with which he carried out his attempt at murder. 

The bomb which was found in Agram had been, in the opinion of 
experts, manufactured for military purposes in an arsenal. 

Jukitch 's attempt was a matter of recent memory when Stefan 
Dojcitch, who came from the United States to Agram, made a 
murderous attack in Agram on August 18th, 1913, upon the Royal 
Commissioner, Baron Skerlecz — an act born of the "foreign" agita- 
tion carried on by the Narodna Odbrana and its confederates among 
the Southern Slavs in America. 

The pamphlet, "Natrag u staro ognjiste vase," published in Chi- 
cago by the Serb, T. Dimitrijevitch, contains unbridled invectives 
against His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty and an appeal to 
the Serbs of the Dual Monarchy to leave America and return to Servia 
for the impending "liberation." This publication shows a remarkable 
parallelism between the unrestrained propaganda carried on by Servia 
in America and the agitation carried on by Servia in the territories 
of the Dual Monarchy. 

Hardly a year later Agram was again the scene of a murderous 
attempt of this kind, which happily failed. On May 20th, 1914, Jacob 
Schafer attempted to kill the Banus, Baron Skerlecz, in the Agram 
theatre, which attempt was frustrated at the last moment by a police 
officer. The ensuing investigation uncovered a plot, of which the soul 
was Rudolf Hercigonja. The depositions of Hercigonja and his five 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGAEIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 39 

co-defendants made it plain that this plot also had originated in 
Servia. 

Having participated in an unsuccessful attempt to free the above- 
mentioned Jukitch, Hercigonja had fled to Servia (October, 1912) 
where he and his accomplice, Marojan Jaksitch, associated constantly 
with "Komitadjis" and members of the Narodna Odbrana. As in so 
many other instances where premature dabbling in politics had driven 
youthful minds to frenzy, the result of this corrupting intercourse 
proved disastrous. Hercigonja brought home the dogma preached 
in Belgrade, that the Southern Slav districts of Austria-Hungary 
must be detached from the Monarchy and united with the Kingdom 
of Servia. In this connexion he had acquired the notion from his 
associations in Servia that this end could be attained solely by the 
perpetration of murderous plots against persons of high rank and 
leading statesmen of the Dual Monarchy. 

Hercigonja sought to instil these ideas into the minds of his 
friends in Agram, some of whom he won over to his cause. In the 
foreground of his programme was an attempt upon the life of Arch- 
duke Francis Ferdinand, heir apparent to the throne. 

A few months previously, proceedings in connexion with a 
propaganda of high treason had been instituted against Luka Al- 
jinovitch. In the course of the investigation three witnesses had 
deposed that Aljinovitch had declared in their presence that in 1913 
he had received 100 dinars from the Narodna Odbrana and a like sum 
from a secret association of students for purposes of agitation and 
especially for an attack upon Archduke Francis Ferdinand. 

These incidents indicate how the criminal activities of the Narodna 
Odbrana and its sympathisers had lately converged upon the person 
of the Archduke and heir apparent to the throne. 

All these disclosures point to the conclusion that the Narodna 
Odbrana and the anti-Austrian circles affiliated with it in Servia, 
deemed that the time had come to translate their teachings into 
deeds. 

It is noteworthy, however, that in these activities the Narodna 
Odbrana confined itself to furnishing the impulses for deeds of vio- 
lence, and, when its seeds had sunk into fertile ground, to supplying 
the material means for their commission; but that it left the dan- 
gerous role of the "propaganda of deeds'' solely to the misled youth 
of the Dual Monarchy, who had to bear the full burden of their 
sorry "heroism." 

All the features of this method we find in the history of the 



40 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

origin of the deplorable murder plot of June 28, 1914 (see Enclosure 
8). Princip and Grabez are types of the youth whose minds had 
been poisoned in school by the teaching of the Narodna Odbrana. 

In Belgrade, associating with a circle of students nourished upon 
these ideas, Princip conceived schemes to assassinate Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand, against whom the hatred of all Servian elements antago- 
nistic to the Dual Monarchy had turned under the impetus of his 
visit to the annexed provinces. 

Princip was joined by Gabrinovitch, a member of the same circles, 
whose erratic radical-revolutionary views had developed, according 
to his own admissions, under the influence of his surroundings in 
Belgrade and through perusal of Servian papers. Thus Gabrinovitch 
also drifted into ways hostile to the Monarchy and adopted the 
theories of "the propaganda of deeds." Thanks to his antecedent 
dispositions, Grabez also quickly succumbed to the influence of these 
surroundings, which he had entered later. 

But, howsoever far the matter may have developed and howsoever 
firm the determination of the conspirators may have been to carry 
out the plot, it would never have materialised, had not other persons 
supplied the means for its accomplishment, as in the case of Jukitch. 
Princip and Gabrinovitch at their trial admitted that they had neither 
weapons nor money of their own. 

It is interesting to note the quarters where the confederates tried 
to get their weapons. Milan Pribicevitch and Zivojin Dacitch, these 
two notorious leaders of the Narodna Odbrana, were the first whom 
they thought of as helpers in their hour of need, apparently because 
in the circle of would-be-murderers and plotters it had become a 
tradition to procure murderous weapons from those representatives 
of the Narodna Odbrana. The accidental circumstance that these 
two men were not in Belgrade at the critical time frustrated this 
plan ; Princip and Gabrinovitch had no difficulty, however, in finding 
other helpers in the person of Milan Ciganovitch, a former "Komi- 
tadji" and now an official of the Central Servian State Railway in 
Belgrade, another active member of the Narodna Odbrana who had 
made his first appearance in its history as the graduate of a school 
for the training of bands in Cuprija in 1909. (See Enclosure 5.) 
Nor were they disappointed in Ciganovitch, who immediately gave 
them the required supplies. 

Ciganovitch with his friend, the Servian Major Voja Tankositch, 
likewise a leader of the Narodna Odbrana and a former director of 
the school of bands in Cuprija (see Enclosure 5), became now the 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 41 

intellectual leaders and promoters of the plot which they seemed 
to approve with an indifference characteristic of the moral qualities 
of the whole movement aimed at the Dual Monarchy. They had only 
one doubt in the beginning, and that was whether the three conspira- 
tors had firmly made up their minds to risk the deed. This hesita- 
tion, however, was soon overcome by the suggestive cooperation of 
the two Servian officials. Tankositch secured four Brownings with 
ammunition, and money for travelling expenses; six hand grenades 
from the Servian army stores supplemented this equipment, which 
in kind and origin invites comparison with the conditions in the 
Jukitch case. To make certain the success of the plot, Tankositch 
ordered that the conspirators be instructed in marksmanship, which 
task Ciganovitch assumed with a success now realised but too well. 
Special anxiety was evinced by both Tankositch and Ciganovitch in 
insuring secrecy about the plot. They supplied cyanide of potassium, 
with instructions that the perpetrators commit suicide with it after 
they should have performed their task. This precaution was to the 
sole advantage of the instigators of the deed, as the preservation of 
the secret would eliminate even the small risks which they had to 
assume in the undertaking. Certain death to the victims of its wiles, 
and complete security for themselves — such is the usual usage of the 
Narodna Odbrana. 

To render possible the carrying out of the murder scheme, bombs 
and weapons had to be smuggled into Bosnia. Ciganovitch again 
acted as the helper, minutely designating to the conspirators the 
roads which they should follow and enlisting the cooperation of the 
Servian frontier authorities to pass them into Bosnia. The manner 
of the organisation of this passage, which even Princip found 
' ' mysterious, ' ' leaves no doubt of the fact that this was a well pre- 
pared and often utilised road for the secret purposes of the Narodna 
Odbrana. 

In a matter-of-fact way which indicates long-established habit, 
the frontier captains at Schabatz and Loznica placed their entire 
staffs and administration at the disposal of the authors of the scheme. 
This mysterious means of travel, with its elaborate system of constantly 
changing guides, always ready on the spot, as if by magic, when 
they were needed, worked without a hitch. Without even inquiring 
into the object of this unusual trip of a few immature students, the 
Servian authorities, at the behest of the former "Komitadji" and 
subordinate railway employee, Ciganovitch, set the machinery of 
their offices running smoothly for the accomplishment of the task. 



42 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

There was, of course, no need of questions, as the instructions which 
they had received made it quite clear to them that another " mission " 
of the Narodna Odbrana was to be carried out. The sight of the 
arsenal of bombs and revolvers elicited merely a benevolently approv- 
ing smile from Grbitch, the customs officer on duty, which goes to 
show that on this "road" the sight of such contraband was quite 
customary. 

The Royal Servian Government has assumed a heavy load in 
allowing all this to happen. Pledged to neighbourly and friendly re- 
lations with Austria-Hungary, it has permitted its press to dis- 
seminate hatred against the Dual Monarchy. It has permitted the 
establishment, upon its soil, of organisations designed to conduct a 
revolutionary campaign against a neighbouring State, under the lead- 
ership of high military and civil officials, teachers and judges. It 
has not suppressed the activities of men holding high posts in the 
State administration, who poisoned the national conscience to an 
extent that has made common assassination appear to be a com- 
mendable weapon. 



(Enclosure 1.) 
Servian Press Comments, 

(a) On the occasion of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Maj- 
esty's 80th birthday, on August 18, 1910, the "Politika" published 
a large picture of Bogdan Zerajitch, who two months before this had 
attempted to murder Baron Varesanin, Governor of Bosnia. The 
accompanying article ran as follows : ' ' Two months ago, on June 2nd, 
on the very day of the opening of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian diet, a 
Servian youth, the student Bogdan Zerajitch, attempted to murder 
the Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Serajevo, General Marian 
Varesanin. Zerajitch fired five shots at this renegade, who had as- 
sured his career in the famous uprising in Rakovica by shedding the 
blood of his own brethren. Owing to a peculiar accident, the at- 
tempt to kill him was unsuccessful. Thereupon brave Zerajitch, with 
the sixth and last bullet, blew his brains out and instantly fell dead. 

"In Vienna they knew full well that Zerajitch had not been 
prompted to attempt this murder by reading Russian and revolu- 
tionary writings. He had done this as a noble scion of a people, 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 43 

which in this bloody manner desired to protest against foreign 
rule. For this reason they tried to hush up the whole matter as 
quickly as possible and — also against their habit — tried to avert a 
trial, which would have compromised the Austrian Government in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina even more. In Vienna, the desire was ex- 
pressed that the memory of Zerajitch be blotted out and that sig- 
nificance be denied to his murderous attempt. It is this fear of Zera- 
jitch dead and the ban placed on his name throughout Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which has exalted his memory among the people as that 
of a saint — to-day, on August 18th, perhaps more than ever. On this 
day we also light a candle on his grave and cry: 'Honour to Zera- 
jitch!' " 

Here are appended some verses which in rough translation run 
as follows: 

" Bosnia lives, death not yet has come unto her; 
In vain her body have you entombed; 
A fettered victim, she still flashes her fire. 
Time is not yet to intone her dirge. 
With devilish hands you scratched upon the grave, 
Yet will the living dead not go down to rest. 
Emperor, harkst Thou? In the flash of the gun 
Those bullets of lead how they whiz by Thy Throne ; 
Not slaves they; no, 'tis freedom divine 
Shining forth from the brave hand of the conquered. 
Why quaketh thus that terrible Golgotha ? 
In defence of Christ, Peter drew his sword. 
His hand fell, but from his blood 
A thousand more brave hands will rise; 
Yon shot was but the first messenger 
Of the Servian Easter that shall follow Golgotha's pain." 

(b) On October 8, 1910, on the anniversary of the annexation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the "Politika" and "Mali Journal,' ' the 
latter with black borders, published violent attacks upon Austria- 
Hungary. 

"Europe must take note that the Servian people still thirst for 
revenge." "The day of revenge must arrive; the feverish efforts of 
Servia to organise her army are a token of this accounting to come, 
as is the hatred of the Servian people for the neighbouring Mon- 
archy. ' ' 



44 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Such were some of the expressions used by these journals. 

On the same occasion the "Samouprava" on October 9, 1910, 
said: "Invective and excesses are not the effective expression of 
genuine patriotism. It is solely through calm and dignified work that 
the goal can be reached.' ' 

(c) On April 18, 1911, the "Politika" wrote: "With the ex- 
ception of a few cynics nobody in Servia would look with favour upon 
a visit of King Peter to Vienna or Budapest. The annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has once for all shattered even the semblance 
of friendship between Servia and Austria-Hungary. This every Ser- 
vian feels." 

(d) The "Belgradske Novine" on April 18, 1911, wrote as fol- 
lows: "Most of the men close to the Government disapprove King 
Peter's projected visit to Emperor Francis Joseph. The storm of 
indignation which stirred all Servians because of this proposed trip 
of the King, is quite natural." 

(e) The "Mali Journal" of April 19, 1911, has this to say: 
"King Peter's visit to the Sovereign of Austria-Hungary would mean 
an insult to all Servia. Through this visit Servia would lose her 
claim to Piemont's part. Servians interests can never be identified 
with Austria's interests." 

(f) On April 23, 1911, the "Politika," "Mali Journal," "Tri- 
buna," "Belgradske Novine" and "Vecernje Novosti" thus comment 
on the proposed visit of King Peter to the court of Vienna: "Be- 
tween Servia and Austria-Hungary there never can be friendship. 
King Peter's proposed visit means, therefore, 'an infamous capitula- 
tion,' 'a humiliation to Servia,' 'a solemn sanction of all the crimes 
and misdeeds committed by Austria-Hungary against Servia and the 
Servian people.' " 

(g) On April 18, 1912, the "Trgovinski Glasnik" publishes an 
editorial entitled "Austria's Collapse," which reads in part: "In 
Austria-Hungary there is ruin in every direction. What is happen- 
ing beyond the Danube and Save is no longer a German, Magyar, 
Bohemian or Croatian crisis, but a general Austrian crisis, a crisis 
of the dynasty itself. We Servians view with satisfaction such a 
course of affairs in Austria." 

(h) In an article entitled "The Frontiers of Albania" the "Bal- 
kan" attacks Austria-Hungary as follows: "If Europe is too weak 
to call a halt on Austria, Montenegro and Servia will do so by shout- 
ing to Austria : ' Stop ; you shall go no further. ' War between Aus- 
tria-Hungary and Servia is inevitable. We have dismembered the 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 45 

Turkish Empire ; we shall likewise rend Austria asunder. We have 
ended one war ; now we are facing another. ' ' 

(i) The "Vecernje Novosti," April 22, 1913, publishes a plea 
to the travelling Servian public and Servian business men to boycott 
the Danube steamship company. It says: "Nobody should travel 
on the ships of this Austrian company, nor should anybody transport 
cargo on them. Whoever does this, should be fined by a committee. 
The fines would go into the fund of the Komitadjis, which is to be 
utilised in the coming war with Austria. ' ' 

(k) The "Tribuna," May 26, 1914, on the occasion of Austria- 
Hungary's occupation of Ada Kaleh, publishes the following: "Crim- 
inal black-and-yellow Austria has again played a burglar's trick. 
She is a thief, who, if she cannot steal a whole bag of money, contents 
herself with one dinar." 

(1) On June 10, 1913, on the anniversary of the attempted 
murder of the Royal Commissioner in Agram by the student Luka 
Jukitch, Servian papers published commemorative articles. Says the 
"Pravda" in one article: "It must hurt the soul to its depths that 
not everybody has acted as our Jukitch did. We have Jukitch no 
more, but we have hatred and anger ; we have to-day ten millions of 
Jukitch. We are firmly convinced that Jukitch, through the window 
of his prison, will soon hear freedom's last gunshot." 

(m) "Mali Journal," October 7, 1913, published an editorial, 
wherein the right of existence is denied to Austria-Hungary and all 
Slavic nationalities are called upon to second the offensive war, which 
Servia planned to start soon. 

(n) The "Piemont," October 8, 1913, has this to say on the 
anniversary of the annexation: "To-day five years have elapsed 
since an Imperial decree extended the sceptre of the Habsburgs 
over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The people of Servia will feel the 
pain inflicted upon them on this date for many another decade. Hu- 
miliated and bereft, the Servian people moaned in despair. The na- 
tion made vows to wreak vengeance and to win freedom by heroic 
measures. This day has come again to rouse the slackened energies 
of the race. To-day, Servian graves dot the ancient Servian coun- 
tries; Servian cavalry is treading on the battlefields of Macedonia 
and Old-Servia. The people of Servia, having finished their task in 
the South, now turn in the opposite direction, whence the moans 
and anguish of the Servian brother come to them, and where the 
gibbet is set up. Servian soldiers, to-day, fighting these Albanians, 
stirred up in Dusan's Empire by the State which took Bosnia and 



46 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Herzegovina from us, have vowed that they will proceed in a similar 
way against the l Second Turkey/ as they have dealt by God's help 
with the Turkey of the Balkans. They take this pledge, confident 
that the day of vengeance is approaching. One Turkey has disap- 
peared. The good God of Servia will grant that the i Second Turkey* 
shall also disappear.' ' 

(o) The "Mali Journal" of November 4, 1913, publishes this: 
"Any thought of a reconciliation with Austria-Hungary is equivalent 
to treason against the people of Servia. Servia must reckon with the 
facts and forever bear in mind that Austria-Hungary is her dan- 
gerous enemy and that to fight that monarchy must be the most 
sacred duty of every Servian Government. ' ' 

(p) Thus the "Pravda" of January 14, 1914: "Our new year's 
wishes go first to our not yet liberated brothers, groaning under an 
alien yoke. Servians may well persevere ; after Kossovo came Kuma- 
novo, and our victorious march is not yet ended." 

(q) The "Novosti" of January 18, 1914, published a picture of 
the religious ceremony of the blessing of the waters in Bosnia, in 
connexion with the following text: "Servians maintain their cus- 
toms without modification even in lands which groan under foreign 
rule, until the day of freedom shall find them united in enthusiasm. ' ' 

(r) The "Zastava" in the issue of January, 1914, admits that 
"Servia incites the Austro-Hungarian Serbs to revolution." 

(s) The "Mali Journal" of March 9, 1914, has this to say: 
"Servia can never forget the rattling of Francis Ferdinand's sabre 
on the occasion of the Scutari affair. ' ' 

(t) The "Zastava," April 4, 1914, publishes this: "The 
Austrian statesmen who promote a policy of hatred, a policy of 
bureaucrats, not a far-reaching policy, are themselves bringing about 
the ruin of their state." 

(u) The "Pravda" of April 8, 1914, makes the following com- 
ment: "Austria has lost all rights to existence." 

(v) In the Easter issues (April, 1914), all Servian papers express 
hope that their "unliberated, conquered and oppressed brethren may 
soon celebrate a glad resurrection." 

(w) The "Tribuna" of April 23, 1914, says: "The Pacifists 
have discovered a new slogan: that of ' Europe's patriotism.' This 
programme can be carried out only if Austria is divided." 

(x) The "Mali Journal" of May 12, 1914, says: "What is a 
crime in private life Austria calls politics. History knows only one 
monster, and that monster is Austria." 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 47 

(Enclosure 2.) 

Extract from tJie <( Narodna Odbrana," the Official Organ of the 
Society of the Same Name, Published by the Central Committee of 
That Society, {Narodna Odbrana, izdanje stredisnog odbora Nar- 
odna Odbrane. Beograd, 1911. Nova stamparija "Davidovic," 
DecansJca ulica br. 14. Ljub. Davidovica.) 

In a brief preface to this pamphlet it is pointed out that the 
publication "does not represent a complete, exhaustive analysis of 
the total general work of the Narodna Odbrana, as for many reasons 
it neither should nor could do that." 

This publication is divided into three parts, the first of which 
consists of fourteen Chapters setting forth a sort of programme, 
while the second contains a report on the activity of the society and 
the third consists of sample rules for the organisation of similar 
societies beyond the frontiers of Servia. 

In Chapter I., entitled "Genesis and Activity of the first Narodna 
Odbrana, " it is pointed out that this society was the outcome of 
the popular movement which swept over Servia after the annexa- 
tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and had the following object: 

(1.) To arouse, encourage and strengthen national sentiment. 

(2.) To enroll and recruit volunteers. 

(3.) To form volunteer-units and prepare them for armed action. 

(4.) To collect voluntary contributions in money and supplies 
for the realisation of the task. 

(5.) To organise, equip and drill special irregular troops ("com- 
mittees") for special, independent warfare. 

(6.) To institute movements in all other ways for the defence 
of the Servian people. 

In connexion with the above, it is pointed out that on account 
of the recognition by the Great Powers of the annexation of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, a stop was put to the work of the society, whereupon 
under the by-laws the programme of the Odbrana was reorganised 
and a new work was started in order that the "old, red war-flag of 
the Narodna Odbrana might again be unfurled" if a similar situation 
should arise. 

In Chapter II., entitled "The New Narodna Odbrana of To-day," 
is the following passage : 

"Experience taught us in the days of the annexation that Servia 
was not prepared for the struggle which circumstances imposed upon 



48 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

her. The struggle which Servia has to assume is more serious and 
difficult than was thought. The annexation was merely one of the 
blows dealt to this country by the enemies of Servia. It was a blow 
preceded by many other blows, which will be followed by still others. 
In order that a new surprise attack may not find Servia in an equally 
unprepared state, it is necessary to prepare ourselves for work." 

The preparation of the people for a forward movement in all 
directions of national work in conformity with the requirements of 
modern times, is set down as the object of this "work" in which the 
mass of the people must take part. As a means to attain this end, 
a strengthening of national consciousness, athletic sport, economic 
and hygienic welfare, the raising of the level of culture, etc., are 
conspicuously enjoined upon the individual and upon the society, 
next to the state itself. 

In Chapter III., "The Three Chief Problems," it is declared that 
the annexation taught that the national consciousness in Servia was 
not so strong as it should be in a country which, with a population 
of less than three millions, constituted the hope and mainstay of 
seven millions of the subjugated Serb people. The first problem of 
the society was, therefore, to strengthen the national consciousness. 
The second problem was the promotion of physical training; the 
third was to accomplish the goal of proper valuation of these sporting 
activities. 

In the fourth chapter, "About Shooting," the value of a good 
training in marksmanship, especially for the Servian contingents, is 
emphasised, inasmuch as there the military training lasts only six 
months. These remarks conclude with the sentence: 

"A new blow like the annexation must be met by a new Servian 
people, in which every Serb, from childhood to old age, must be a 
sharpshooter. ' ' 

Chapter V., which treats of "The Relation of the Narodna Od- 
brana to the Sokol Societies," begins with a general discussion of the 
conditions for the strength of States in culture and political life. 
In this connexion the decline of Turkey is pointed out, and it is 
added : 

"The old Turks of the South are disappearing little by little, and 
only a part of our people still suffer under their rule. But new Turks 
come from the North, more terrible and more dangerous than the 
old. Stronger in culture and economically, the northern enemies at- 
tack us. They wish to deprive us of our freedom, to suppress our 
language, to crush us. The preliminary symptoms of the approach- 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 49 

ing struggle are perceptible. The Servian people face the question, 
'To be or not to be.' " 

"What Do We Desire in the Lectures?" is the heading of chapter 
VII., the gist of which is summed up in the sentences : 

"The Narodna Odbrana instituted lectures which were more or 
less lectures of agitation. The programme of our new work was de- 
veloped. At every lecture the annexation was spoken about, the old 
Narodna Odbrana and the tasks of the new. The lectures will never 
cease to be lectures of agitation, but they will always develop more 
and more into individual channels and concern themselves with every 
question of our social and national life." 

Chapter VIII., "Woman's activity in the Narodna Odbrana," IX., 
"Work with reference to details and secondary matters," and X., 
"Renaissance of the Association," while referring to the task of the 
Narodna Odbrana, deal with the preparation and intensification of 
the association's activity, and with the necessity of regenerating in- 
dividuals, the nation and the state. 

Chapter XI., "New Obilitch* and Singjelitch," says by way of 
introduction : 

"It is a mistake to assert that Kossovo is a thing of the past. We 
are in the midst of Kossovo. Our Kossovo to-day is the darkness and 
ignorance in which our people live. The other reasons for the new 
Kossovo exist on our borders at the north and west: The Germans, 
Austrians, and Swabians (Schwabas), with their encroachment upon 
our Slav and Serb South." 

The heroic deeds of Obilitch and Singjelitch are pointed out, and 
the necessity of self-sacrifice in the service of the nation, and it is 
added: "The national cause involves sacrifices, namely, in Turkey 
and Austria, where such workers are persecuted by the authorities, 
thrown into prison, and brought to the gallows. For this battle 
against darkness and ignorance, too, such heroes are needed. The 
Narodna Odbrana does not doubt that in the battle with rifles and 
cannon against the Schwabas and our other enemies our people will 
furnish a host of heroes. But the Narodna Odbrana is not satisfied 

* Milos Obilitch (also Kobilitch), Servian tradition tells, crept into the 
Turkish camp after the battle of Kossovopolie, or Kossovo, and murdered Sultan 
Murad, {cf. von Kallay, "History of the Serbs," Vol. I.). 

Stephan Singjelitch, Knez of Resara, played a part in the Servian revolt of 
1807-1810. In 1809 Singjelitch defended the redoubt of Tschagar against the 
Turks, and it is said that when he realised he was no match for the superior 
forces opposed to him numerically, he blew up his position and part of his men, 
together with many Turks, (von Kallay, "The History of the Servian Revolt"). 



50 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

with that, for it regards the present so-called peaceful relations as 
a state of war, and calls for heroes likewise for this struggle which 
we are waging in Servia and beyond the border. ' ' 

Chapter XII. is headed "The Union with the Brothers and 
Friends," and its significance is suggested by the following sen- 
tences : 

"Among the main problems of the Narodna Odbrana is that of 
maintaining the union with our near and distant brothers beyond the 
border and the rest of our friends in the world. By the word ' people' 
the Narodna Odbrana is meant our entire race, not only those in 
Servia. It hopes that the work done by it in Servia will spur the 
brothers outside of Servia to more active participation in the work 
of private initiative in order that the new upward movement to-day 
for the creation of a powerful Servian Narodna Odbrana shall proceed 
in common in all Serb territories. ' ' 

In Chapter XIII., which is headed "Two Important Problems,' ' 
occurs the following: 

"Inasmuch as we take the ground that through the annexation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina the encroachment upon our territories 
from the north has been fully revealed, the Narodna Odbrana regards 
Austria-Hungary as our greatest enemy.' ' This work (namely, to 
designate Austria to the Servian people as its greatest enemy) is 
regarded by the society as a vitally necessary task, as its funda- 
mental duty. Then the book continues : 

"As once upon a time the Turks poured in upon us from the 
south, so Austria-Hungary to-day is attacking us from the north. If 
the Narodna Odbrana preaches the necessity of a war against Austria- 
Hungary, it is preaching a holy truth of our national situation." 

The hatred arising as a result of this propaganda, it is pointed 
out, is not to be regarded as the goal, but as a natural phase of the 
work whose purpose is independence and freedom. If hereby hatred 
against Austria is engendered, it is Austria who sowed it through its 
course, a course which "makes necessary the war against Austria 
until that Monarchy is exterminated. ' ' 

The modern conception of the national idea is extolled, and it is 
remarked that in talking about "deliverance and union" too much 
work is done with phrases. The people must be told : 

"The liberation of our alienated Serb territories and their union 
with Servia is necessary for our gentlemen, our merchants, our farm- 
ers, for the most fundamental requirements of culture and trade, 
for space and for bread. Recognising this, the people will lay a hand 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 51 

to the national work with a will and great self-sacrifice. Our people 
must be told that the freedom of Bosnia is necessary for the latter, 
not only out of pity for the brothers there suffering, but also for 
the sake of trade and for an outlet to the sea." 

The "two tasks" of the Narodna Odbrana are then summed up 
in the following closing sentences: "Besides the task of explaining 
to the people the danger threatening it from Austria, the Narodna 
Odbrana has the more important task of carrying home to the people, 
with complete preservation of the holy national memories, this new 
healthy conception, so mighty in its results, of nationalism and of 
work for freedom and union." 

Chapter XIV., the concluding division, opens with an appeal to 
the Government and the people of Servia to prepare with all means 
for the conflict "which the annexation foreshadowed." 

In these passages the activities of the Narodna Odbrana are once 
more recapitulated: 

' ' Since the Narodna Odbrana works in accordance with the spirit 
of the time and in conformity with the altered circumstances, main- 
taining at the same time all connexions that were formed at the time 
of the annexation, it is the same to-day as it was then. It is to-day 
Odbrana (defence) ; it is also to-day Narodna (of the people). To- 
day, too, it rallies to its banners the citizens of Servia as it did at 
the time of the annexation. At that time the cry was for war; to- 
day the cry is for work; at that time meetings, demonstrations, 
volunteer committees, rifles, and bombs were called for ; to-day silent, 
fanatical, indefatigable work is required, and more work in the di- 
rection of the tasks and duties which we have indicated, as temporary 
preparation for the battle with rifle and cannon that will come." 

On the subject of the organisation of the Narodna Odbrana, this 
annual report of the society contains the following: 

A central Committee with its seat at Belgrade conducts all the 
minutes of the Narodna Odbrana. All other committees of the Na- 
rodna Odbrana are subordinate to this. The Central Committee is 
divided into four sections: for educational work, for physical train- 
ing, for financial collection, and for foreign affairs. 

District committees, whose headquarters are at places where there 
are political authorities, direct the affairs of the respective districts. 

Town societies are the directing organisations in the individual 
towns. 

Trusted men are to be found in those places within the country 
where there is no need of forming a committee. 



52 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Societies which " stand in closest relations with the work of the 
organisation of the Narodna Odbrana" and are supported by the lat- 
ter are : the Sharpshooters' Union, with 762 societies ; the Sokol Union, 
"Dusan Silni," with 2,500 members; the Olympic Club, the Riding 
Society, "Knez Mihaljo"; the Hunters' Union and the Culture 
League. 

All these societies are similarly organised as the Narodna Od- 
brana, utilise the quarters of the latter, namely, society houses, 
libraries, etc. ; prominent members of these societies are chairmen of 
committees of the Narodna Odbrana. 



(Enclosure 3.) 



Extract from the "Report of the Activities of the Sokol Society Dusan 
Silni in Kragujevac in the Years 1912 and 1913." (Kragujevac, 
"Buducnost" Press, Tih. Lekitch, 1914.) 

At the head of this report appears the address with which the 
President of the society, the Royal Servian Major Kovacevitch, 
greeted the annual meeting in January, 1914: 

"It is known to you that the Sokol institution, born in the battle 
against Germanism, is a purely Slavic institution, which pursues the 
aim of uniting all Slav brothers, to inspire them with enthusiasm and 
through education and force to prepare for the battle against the 
foe of Slavdom. 

"We Serbs, as a part of the great Slav community, have adopted 
the Sokol idea and joined hands in the common work for our own 
welfare and that of our brothers. 

"We Serbs, too, will live and work in the spirit of the Sokol, 
for we wish to revive the weary and exhausted, to strengthen the 
weak and anxious, to free the captives and the enchained. We have 
done this both at present and in former wars. We have delivered a 
part of our brothers from the arrogance of the enemy in the south. 
We have torn away their chains, have freed them from pain, and 
have given them freedom so that in it they may enjoy happiness, 
equality, and fraternity. ' ' 

After some words of praise of this "noble work" which realised 
a part of the great Sokol idea," Major Kovacevitch continued: 

"But, my brothers and sisters, our enemy in the north is more 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 53 

dangerous and heartless because economically and culturally he is 
stronger. 

"This enemy is insatiable in his lust; he holds millions of our 
brothers in chains and slavery. He deprived them of freedom and 
law, and subjugated them to his service. The brothers cry and beg 
for speedy help. 

"We may not abandon them to the mercy of this terrible and 
devouring foe. Rather must we hasten to their assistance, because to 
do that is our duty. Could we, in the last analysis, be happy if so 
many of our brothers live, suffer, and complain in slavery? 

"Brothers and sisters! 

"The foe is dangerous, lustful, and vicious. Let us always be 
on our guard. 

"Let us work with greater eagerness and self-sacrifice. Let us be 
faithful in our holy Sokol duty, true and persevering. 

"Let us prepare for the struggle and for the support of the just 
Sokol idea. 

"Let us unite with the numberless swarms of Sokols and let us 
always think of that truth which the Servian Sokolists have in- 
scribed on their banner: That only a healthy, strong, nationally 
conscious, and well-organised people is fit to defend itself, to give 
battle, to conquer/ ' 

To this address of the President is appended the report of the 
Executive Committee. After summarising the results achieved in the 
last wars, which hampered the society in its activities for two years, 
it points out: "The day has come on which we return to our work 
because our programme is not yet fulfilled and our task not yet 
completed. A large part of our people still endure the suffering of 
the Crucified Christ; we must still visit our brothers beyond the 
Drina; we must still seek the City of Serajevo and the heritage of 
the holy Sava; we must see to the homeland of Marina Novak, of 
Deli Radivoj, and the old Vujadin; we must cross the hills of Ro- 
manija and see why Travnik has wrapped himself in mist; some day 
that song must cease. Woe, Bosnia, thou orphan before God, hast thou 
nowhere people of thy tribe V 

After a discussion of the various undertakings of the society, em- 
phasis is laid on the fact that the society maintains relations with 
"the brother societies beyond the Save and Drina, ' ' and special em- 
phasis is laid on the sending of delegates to the celebration of the 
Prosvjeta at Serajevo. In this connexion the report says: "By 
sending these delegates to the brothers in Bosnia the committee in- 



54 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

tended to say to them: 'We have not forgotten you. The wings of 
the falcon of Sumadija are still mighty.' " 

After a detailed account of a visit of Agram students to Servia 
and the consecration of the flag of the "Society of the Sober Youth " 
the report of the Executive Committee ends with these sentences : 

"The administration knows how properly to value these phe- 
nomena — the arrival of the brother Croatians in the Sumadija and 
the convening of the 'Sober Youth' from all districts in Serbdom, and 
it will be no exaggeration to say that these events signify the be- 
ginning and germ of a great deed that will be enacted in the very 
near future. 

"They are the expression of a great, and until now silent, 
awakening of the national consciousness and strength of a down- 
trodden race, which is not permitted to arise and unite. Only a 
while longer and this germ will ripen, and when the popular soul 
expands still more there will be no restrictions that it cannot tear 
to pieces, no obstacles in its path which it will not be able to over- 
come. The work of strengthening this power, the cooperation in and 
hastening of the course of this national development, the develop- 
ment and support of this idea, was always the goal of the adminis- 
tration's actions." 

The report of the Treasurer in the first place names all those who 
liberally supported the society: the District Committee of the Na- 
rodna Odbrana in Kragujevac, especially its cavalry section, which 
frequently has come to the assistance of the Sokol Society with 
precious help; the Director of the gymnasium at Kragujevac, who 
always "showed his active paternal interest" in the Sokols; the 
Divisional Commandant of the Sumadija, who liberally supported the 
society; the President of the District Court in Kragujevac, the district 
chief, and the community leader in Kragujevac. 

After the Treasurer has memorialised the members of the society 
who had been killed in the war he concludes his report with the 
following words: 

"After such a brilliant victory over a part of our enemy the 
society's leaders hope that all of you from now on will devote your- 
selves even more fully and joyfully to the activities of the Sokol 
institution, so that in our falcon aerie you may train falcons which 
at a given time will be able to soar aloft and on their mighty 
pinions bring to all our unliberated brothers fraternity, love, and 
freedom. ' ' 

The annual report is signed by Major M. J. Kovacevitch as 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 55 

President, by the Court Secretary, D. V. Brzakovitch, as Secretary, 
and by ten members of the board, among whom are two Professors 
(Emil Lukitch and Milan Jankovitch), as well as one other officer 
(Infantry Major Michael Vasitch). 

From this annual report and from a table sent out by the Kragu- 
jevac Sokol Society to the "Srpski Sokol" in Tuzla for filling out, 
and likewise signed by Major Kovacevitch and Court Secretary 
Brzakovitch, it appears that the Sokol societies in Servia were linked 
with organisations of the same kind in the Monarchy in closer rela- 
tions than had heretofore been the case. 



(Enclosure 4.) 
The Servian Official Gazette in the Service of the Narodna Odbrana. 

The Servian official gazette, "Srpski Novine," of June 28, 1914, 
contained as a supplement an appeal to the Narodna Odbrana which 
was furnished to all subscribers to the gazette. This appeal contained 
the following passages : 

"Brothers and Sisters: Only a part of Kossovo has been avenged, 
only a part of St. Vitus Day atoned for. Throughout the lands in 
which our popular tongue is heard — the Servian, Croatian, and Sla- 
vonic — from Kikinda to Monastir, from Trieste to Carevo-Selo, ex- 
tends the significance of St. Vitus Day and of Kossovo. As many 
national souls still weep upon this territory, as many chains still 
press our brothers, as much work is still to be accomplished, as 
much must we still sacrifice. St. Vitus Day might formerly have de- 
noted a day of mourning for us, but to-day, when we have gone far 
into our new history, when back of us stand great and glorious 
national events, and still greater and more glorious ones still await us, 
to-day when we are in the midst of the creation of the great national 
State, St. Vitus Day must be for us a day of great rejoicing and 
pride for what has taken place, since it sprung from that day, and 
still more because of what is to come. Servian men and Servian 
women! Millions of our brothers, Slavonians, Croatians, and Serbs, 
outside of our borders look upon us to-day, the children of the 
kingdom, and their breasts swell with hope and joy as they look 
upon our majestic manifestations of to-day for the national cause. 

"God helps the brave! Forward all! That part of our holy 



56 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

task that has not yet been accomplished summons us, that part 
which is still to be accomplished. St. Vitus Day, 1914, in Belgrade." 



(Enclosure 5.) 
Testimony of Trifko Krstanovitch about the Narodna Odbrana. 

Trifko Krstanovitch, a journeyman baker of Zavidovitehi, was 
arrested on the night of July 6-7, 1914, because by a remark made by 
him shortly after the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand 
to the effect that this assassination was to have been expected, he 
had rendered himself suspicious of having had advance knowledge 
of the conspiracy. 

He was, therefore, brought before the district court at Serajevo. 
In the examination of the prisoner it developed that the suspicion 
against him was not justified by the remark he had made, inasmuch 
as the remark was based solely on his former knowledge of the activi- 
ties of the Narodna Odbrana and had merely been an expression 
of his opinion that in the agitation in Servia against the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy, and especially against Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand, such an act was to have been expected. The prosecution 
of Krstanovitch was, therefore, dropped for lack of evidence, and 
the prisoner was examined as a witness with a view to his knowledge 
of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana, which was considered im- 
portant for the purposes of the investigation. 

The following extract from his sworn testimony on July 19, 1914, 
is of pertinent interest : 

"In the Autumn of the year 1908 I crossed the border to Servia 
on the Mokra Gora at Visegrad, in search of employment. I went to 
Bajina Basta in the Uzice district, and as I found no employment 
there I went to Belgrade, where I arrived at the time of the announce- 
ment of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Inasmuch as I 
saw that on account of the annexation great excitement and commo- 
tion had been aroused among the populace and that I would be 
unable to find any sort of employment, I entered the Imperial and 
Royal Consulate in order to be helped home. But as I left the Con- 
sulate a gendarme grabbed me on the street and asked me where I 
came from. Thinking me to be a spy, he took me to a police station. 
Here I was questioned, and when I told them that I would like to go 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 57 

home a subaltern officer began to abuse me, asking why I wanted to 
leave Servia at this time, when they needed men more than ever 
because there might be a war with Austria. When I told him that 
I had nothing to live on, he replied that I would get all I needed if 
I would enroll with the committee. In my distress I agreed, and a 
gendarme led me into the Hotel Zelenou Vijeneu (The Green Gar- 
land) and there introduced me to Voja Tankositch, the leader of the 
committee and a Captain in the regular army. Here I received 
board and lodging, and, as I saw, others of the committee lived 
here. 

"Voja Tankositch told me it was the purpose of the committee to 
give training in bomb throwing, in the destruction of bridges, tunnels, 
telegraph and railway, lines, because things might easily lead up to a 
war between Austria and Servia. Thereupon a man led me into a 
house of smaller area adjoining the Ministry of Finance, where the 
offices of the committee were, and here in the office I met Milan 
Pribicevitch, who registered me in the committee. At this registra- 
tion Milan Pribicevitch asked me if Voja Tankositch had told me 
what my duties as a committeeman would be, and I answered 'Yes.' 
He told me that the men who had been registered must be efficient, 
strong, and ready to make sacrifices. At that time we had been regis- 
tered to the number of about seventy. We did nothing in Belgrade. 

"After about a month and a half our leader, Tankositch, in- 
formed us that the Great Powers had ordered the dissolution of our 
committee and that we must leave Belgrade and hide in some out-of- 
the-way place. They sent us to the town of Cuprija. Here we were 
trained by the officers Voja Tankositch, Dusan Putnik, Zivko 
Gvozditch, and Mitar Djinovitch, who was involved in the Montene- 
grin bomb affair and who was shot in Montenegro. We were forbidden 
to associate with the people of the place, so that nothing might be 
disclosed about our objects and our numbers. We practiced throwing 
bombs, laying mines, and destroying telephone and railroad lines, 
tunnels and bridges. Every fortnight we were visited by Milan 
Pribicevitch, Gen. Bozo Jankovitch, and the apothecary Skaritch, the 
delegate Zivko Raf ajloviteh, a certain Glisitch Milutin, an official in 
the Ministry of Finance, and these watched as we practiced and each 
time paid the expenses of our keep. Our teachers told us that as 
soon as war should be declared we committees would go forward in 
advance, behind us the volunteers, and then the regular army. 

"In Cuprija we were about 140 men. In addition to board, lodg- 
ing, and clothes, each of us received 25 para a day for tobacco. The 



58 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

course lasted about three months — that is, until March, 1909. Then 
the members of the committee told us that we were dismissed and 
that we must disperse, for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
had been recognised by the Great Powers, and our committee, there- 
fore, had no further purpose. Upon the dissolution of the committee 
Gen. Bozo Jankovitch told me that I would enter into the service of 
Bozo Milanovitch in Sabac and get 50 dinar a month. He did not tell 
me what sort of service that would be. I accepted, because I felt 
myself as a committeeman to be in duty bound to obey Gen. Janko- 
vitch, and also because I had nothing to live on. Thus in March, 
1909, I arrived at Sabac and announced myself to Bozo Milanovitch, 
a merchant in Sabac. 

"Gen. Jankovitch had told me that Bozo Milanovitch was the 
leader of the Narodna Odbrana in Sabac and that I would serve under 
him in this Narodna Odbrana. "When I gave Bozo Milanovitch the 
General's letter and he had read it, he told me that I must serve 
him faithfully and carry out instructions. My chief duty would be 
to carry his letters wherever they were addressed. In case I should 
not carry a letter to the place to which it was addressed, and in case 
any one else got in possession of this letter, my life would be in- 
volved. The very next day Bozo Milanovitch gave me a sealed letter 
which I was to carry to Cedo Lukitch, Guardian of the Treasury in 
Servian Raca. On the way toward Raca in the village of Bojatitch 
I was halted by the District Captain, who took my letter, opened it, 
and read it. In the letter Lukitch was instructed to buy three boats 
immediately, so that they might be ready in case they were needed. 
Enclosed in the letter were 100 dinar. On this occasion the Captain 
told me that strict orders had been given by the Ministry that the- 
komitadjis should do nothing on their own initiative, so that no in- 
ternational diplomatic intervention might be provoked. I returned to 
Sabac and reported to Bozo Milanovitch what had happened. Bozo 
Milanovitch turned to the District Prefect, and the latter gave orders 
that the revolver which the Captain in Bojatitch had taken from me 
should be returned to me. He also ordered the Captain to expedite 
the letter to the Cedo Lukitch to whom it was addressed. From March, 
1909, to October, 1910, I carried forty-three such letters to Servian 
Raca, fifty-five to Loznica, five to Zvornik, two to Ljubivija, and I 
know not how many to Koviljaca. I noted how many times I was in 
each place because these places were very far from Sabac. 

"I carried the letters to the Directors of the customs offices in the 
respective places, and from these I received other letters in reply, 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 59 

which I carried to Bozo Milanovitch. I remember that I also carried 
letters several times to Sepacka Ada. My assistant in carrying letters 
was a certain Vaso Eritch, a native of Srebrenica. I carried letters 
every week to Belgrade from Bozo Milanovitch and delivered them 
to Milan Pribicevitch and Bozo Jankovitch. I knew nothing of the 
contents of these letters, and no one told me anything about these. 
So far as I could see the letters which Bozo Milanovitch sent were 
not in cipher, while the letters which the Directors of the customs 
offices sent were written with peculiar signs, which I noticed when 
Bozo Milanovitch opened them. Once I brought to Bozo Milanovitch 
such a letter in cipher, I think from Zvornik, and he sent me with 
the note to Mika Atanasijevitch, Professor in Sabac, so that the latter 
might decipher it. The latter did so, as he usually did. But he forgot 
to seal the translation, so I read it. In this letter was written that 
it was reported from reliable sources that money was to be coined 
with the portrait of the Heir Apparent, and that this was an indica- 
tion that the Emperor Francis Joseph would abdicate. After about 
eight months of my service with Bozo Milanovitch, Bozo gave me a 
visiting card on which a skull had been drawn and on which was 
written that I had been appointed a trusted man (Povjerenik) of 
the Narodna Odbrana. On this occasion he told me that it was a 
matter of espionage. 

"Once I learned from the officer Dusan Opterkitch, a member 
of the Narodna Odbrana, that the Narodna Odbrana in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina had twenty-three members. Otherwise, however, I do 
not know whether the Narodna Odbrana has any organisation in 
Bosnia, or what kind of organisation it is. From time to time Milan 
Pribicevitch gave me a revolver, or sometimes money to buy a re- 
volver, so that I might give it to the revenue men on the border who 
served as komitadjis, since they had no revolvers and no money to 
buy them. As it seemed to me, Milan Pribicevitch gave them these 
as a token of honour for being komitadjis. I had no other business 
with weapons. 

"Once I was assigned by Bozo Milanovitch to accompany a man 
to a farm in Lijesnica, on the Drina, and was told that the farmer 
would give us information and show us everything necessary so that 
we two might kill Ljubo Stanaricitch, a Servian reserve officer who 
had fled to Bijeljina. The committee of the Narodna Odbrana had, it 
seems, discovered that Ljubo Stanaricitch was dangerous for the 
Servian State and had condemned him to death. 

"From Bozo Milanovitch I and that other man received instruc- 



60 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

tions to cross the Drina at a certain place and kill Ljubo Stanaricitch, 
who lives in the bank of the Drina on the Bosnian side, in the 
Bijeljiner District. I and the other man started to ford the Drina, 
but because the water was deep, and also because we saw that Ljubo 
was walking around his house with his gun on his shoulder, we 
returned to the farmer. Because I saw that we could not kill him 
with a knife, I sent my companion to Sabac to inform Bozo Milanovitch 
that it was impossible to kill Stanaricitch in the manner in which he 
desired, namely, with the knife. Thereupon I received instructions 
from Bozo Milanovitch to kill him any way. Then we decided to 
shoot him with the rifle. The man who was with me was instructed 
by Bozo to shoot at Stanaricitch and kill him, and I was to make sure 
that this was carried out. In the meantime, however, a mounted 
gendarme came, bringing instructions from the District Prefect in 
Sabac that we were to return and give up our original task. And so 
we returned to Sabac. 

"In October, 1910, I asked Bozo Milanovitch to increase my pay, 
and when he was unwilling to do that I told him that I would no 
longer remain in his service. From Sabac I went to Belgrade, where 
I met Gen. Jankovitch, who had me arrested because I had refused 
obedience. They dragged me through various prisons for about two 
months, and all because I had given notice that I would quit obeying 
commands and they were afraid I would betray their secrets. Finally 
the authorities decided to send me back to Bosnia. In Sabac a 
prisoner told me that my life was in danger. The gendarmes ac- 
companied me to Zvornik, where they turned me over to the Bosnian 
gendarmes. Thus I arrived in December, 1910, in Bosnia. 

"I know nothing definite about any Black Hand except what I 
read about that Hand in Servian newspapers. I do not remember to- 
day what was written about that Black Hand in the newspapers. 
Likewise, I know nothing about the Black List. In Servia after the 
annexation there was a general resentment and hatred against the 
person of the Austro-Hungarian Heir Apparent, for he was generally 
looked upon as a blood foe of the Serbs. ' ' 

Krstanovitch also called attention to previous statements by him, 
of which only the following are of interest as supplementing the above 
declaration : 

The committee in which Krstanovitch was enrolled through Milan 
Pribicevitch was created by the Narodna Odbrana. In the school in 
Cuprija there were twenty-two members from the Monarchy. Among 
the pupils was also Milan Ciganovitch. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 61 

In the school at Cuprija it was taught that the committee must 
be ready to go to Bosnia at the order of the Narodna Odbrana and 
there to act under instructions to be received from their superiors. 



(Enclosure 6.) 



Extract from the Documents of the District Court in Serajevo in the 
Prosecution of Jovo Jaglicitch and his Accomplices for the Crime 
of Espionage. 

In the year 1913 a system of espionage carried on by Jovo 
Jaglicitch and several accomplices in Bosnia in favour of Servia was 
discovered. The criminal prosecution, which was begun in Serajevo, 
brought out, among other things, the following facts, affording a 
glimpse into the methods of the Greater Servian propaganda and 
especially of the Narodna Odbrana. 

Jovo Jaglicitch stated that in the month of August or September, 
1912, he met for the first time the former Cattle Inspector in Foca, 
Petar Klaritch, called Pesut, who in the Autumn of 1912 fled to 
Montenegro and then became a "komitadji." 

At their first meeting Klaritch asked Jaglicitch whether he knew 
Rade Milosevitch of Kalinovik, and upon his answer that Milosevitch 
was dangerously ill in the hospital, said: "It's a pity if he dies. 
We have been talking of wonderful things. Has he not told you 
anything about it?" Upon his replying in the negative, Klaritch 
said: "I would like to tell you something important. We are Serbs 
and must do something important for Servia; come to my office." 
There then took place between them the following conversation : 

"Jovan, I will tell you something; I do not yet know you or 
whether you will betray me. I tell it to you, neverthless, and if 
you have the heart to do so betray me!" 

Upon enquiry by Jaglicitch as to what it was all about, Klaritch 
answered: "Brother, in Servia there is a society, the Narodna 
Odbrana. Many persons should join this society. There are already 
many enlisted in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the entire 
Monarchy; there are persons among them of intelligence and means, 
great heads ; and if those can do it why should not we also, that we 
may contribute something to the work?" 

Asked as to the aims the society pursued, Klaritch replied : ' ' The 



62 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

society has as its object — for example, you are in Kalinovik, you tell 
me what the news is there, how many soldiers, cannon, how much 
ammunition, different kinds of rifles, who comes and who goes, etc. 
We have a secret cipher, and correspond in it. If you are faithful 
you will receive it, too." 

Jaglicitch was afraid that Klaritch was only trying to pump him 
in order thereafter to betray him, and therefore he begged him to 
name some of the members, whereupon Klaritch deliberated for a 
while, and then mentioned to Jaglicitch a name which he whispered 
to him in strictest confidence. 

Thereupon Klaritch said to him, " Shall I give you the cipher?" 
Jaglicitch agreed. Klaritch, who knew the cipher by heart, wrote it 
out on a scrap of paper and handed it to Jaglicitch. 

Another time Klaritch told about his sojourn in Banja-Koviljaca 
(near Loznica,) where he had been trained in bomb-throwing by a 
Servian Captain, Todorovitch,* and said in reply to an enquiry by the 
accused as to why he had learned this: "If it comes to anything, as 
I have already told you, it is necessary that I should understand how 
to handle bombs, that I should train you, and you train others, so 
that powder magazines and other important structures may be blown 
up. For that purpose we shall receive bombs from Servia." 

Klaritch described the appearance of the bombs and said he 
already had enlisted people who would cut telegraph and telephone 
wires in the event of a war. 

At these meetings Jaglicitch also learned from Klaritch that it 
is one of the aims of the members of the Narodna Odbrana to induce 
Austro-Hungarian soldiers to desert their colours, to recruit volunteers 
(komitadjis,) and to organise bands, to blow up objects and depots, 
&c. Klaritch also informed him that even the cipher correspondence 
between the Servian and Bosnian members is not intrusted to the 
postal service, but is carried across the border by messengers. 

Klaritch further told Jaglicitch that on the occasion of the 
Prosvjeta celebration, (in September, 1912) a Servian Major together 
with the deputation sent to this celebration from Servia lived in the 
Hotel Europef to which Klaritch led members of the Narodna Od- 
brana whom he swore in. 

From a spy Jaglicitch learned that bombs would reach Serajevo 

* Capt. Kosta Todorovitch was then actually Frontier Commissioner and 
Director of the Servian Customs Service for the border territory from Raca to 
Ljuboija. 

f The Servian Major Mika Jankovitch appeared as a Servian delegate at 
the Prosvjeta celebration, 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 63 

or had already reached it, that these had the appearance of pieces of 
soap * and that two or three pieces would be sent to this spy also or 
that he would fetch them himself. 



(Enclosure 7.) 
From Confidential Reports About the Narodna Odbrana. 

At the head of the Narodna Odbrana are representatives of all 
political parties, so that the Progressives and the opponents of the 
conspirators might cooperate. Its real moving spirit is the present 
Major Pribicevitch. The office of Secretary is always occupied by 
an officer on furlough. 

The Narodna Odbrana seeks to develop in the Southern Slav por- 
tions of Austria-Hungary an effective propaganda in military and 
civil circles in order thus to prepare a revolution, disturb eventual 
mobilisations, precipitate panics and revolts, &c. 

The organisation has several confidential men and emissaries in 
the Monarchy who carry on a silent man-to-man propaganda. Indi- 
viduals have special missions, such as, for instance, to enlist persons 
— wherever possible railroad officials — at important bridge and junc- 
tion points for the task of carrying out instructions received at the 
proper moment, or getting them carried out. 

Communication between the members of the Narodna Odbrana 
is carried out wherever possible through personal contact. 

Chiefly young people, workingmen and railroad men are enrolled 
as members. 

* The bombs used against Archduke Francis Ferdinand in the assassination 
at Serajevo and those which were found in the year 1913 in the Save near Broko, 
originating from the Royal Servian Arsenal at Kragujevac, bear a resemblance to 
pieces of soap. 



64 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 



(Enclosure 8.) 

Some Extracts from the Documents of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
District Court in Serajevo on the Prosecution of Gavrilo Princip 
and His Accomplices for the Crime of Assassination Committed 
on June 28, 1914, Against His Imperial and Royal Highness, the 
Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria-Este, and Her Highness, 
the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg. 

I. — The Act and Its Authors. 

Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Gabrinovitch, Trifko Grabez, Vaso 
Cubrilovitch, and Cetro Popovitch confessed that in common with 
the fugitive Mehemed Mehemedbasitch they formed a conspiracy for 
the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and equipped with 
bombs and Browning pistols, lay in wait for his Highness on June 
28, 1914, on his trip through Serajevo, with a view to carrying out 
the attack they had planned. 

Nedeljko Gabrinovitch confesses to have been the first among 
the conspirators to throw a bomb against the carriage of the Arch- 
duke, but says that the bomb missed its aim and injured only those 
seated at the time of the explosion in the carriage following the auto- 
mobile of the Archduke. 

Gavrilo Princip confesses to having fired two shots from a Brown- 
ing revolver upon the Archduke's automobile, by which the Archduke 
and the Duchess of Hohenberg were mortally wounded. 

Both perpetrators admit murderous intent in the execution of 
their act. 

Full corroboration of these confessions has been furnished by 
the investigations, and it is established that the late Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand and the late Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg died 
of the consequences of the revolver shots fired upon them by Gavrilo 
Princip. 

II. — Genesis of the Conspiracy. 

The accused, agreeing in essentials, have given the following testi- 
mony before the examining Judge : 

In April, 1914, Princip during his stay in Belgrade, where he 
associated in the local coffee houses with many Servian students, 
formed the plan for an attack upon the late Archduke Francis Ferdi- 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 65 

nand. This intention lie discussed with Gabrinoviteh, then also in 
Belgrade, who already was busying himself with the same thought, 
and who expressed immediate readiness to participate in the attack. 
The plans for the murderous attempt were frequently discussed 
among the persons with whom Princip and Gabrinoviteh associated, 
since the Archduke was regarded as the most dangerous enemy of 
the Servian people. 

Princip and Gabrinoviteh at the outset proposed that the bombs 
and weapons necessary for the carrying out of the deed be obtained 
from the Servian Major, Milan Pribicevitch, or from the Narodna 
Odbrana because they themselves did not have the means to buy 
them. But inasmuch as Major Pribicevitch and the influential mem- 
ber of the society named Zivogin Daeitch were at that time away on 
travels, they decided to try to get the weapons from the former 
"komitadji," then an official of the State Railway, Milan Ciganovitch, 
whom they knew. 

Princip got in touch with Ciganovitch through an intimate ac- 
quaintance of the latter. Ciganovitch thereupon sought out Princip, 
spoke with him about the plan of attack, which he fully approved, 
and declared that he would think over the request for weapons. 
Gabrinoviteh also spoke with Ciganovitch about the weapons. 

At Easter Princip took into his confidence Trifko Grabez, who 
was also present in Belgrade at the time, and who, according to his 
own confession, likewise declared himself ready to cooperate in the 
attack. 

In the following period Princip repeatedly had conversations with 
Ciganovitch about the carrying out of the attack. 

In the meantime Ciganovitch had placed himself in communica- 
tion with the Servian Major, Voja Tankositch, an intimate friend 
of his, about the proposed attack, and Tankositch thereupon placed 
at his disposal the Browning pistols for this service. 

Grabez confesses, in corroboration of the evidence of Princip and 
of Gabrinoviteh, that on May 24, in company with Ciganovitch, he 
visited Major Tankositch in the latter 's home and at his request. 
After the introduction Tankositch said to Grabez: "Are you this 
man? Are you determined ?" Whereupon Grabez replied: "I am 
he." When Tankositch asked, "Do you know how to shoot with a 
revolver V 9 Grabez answered in the negative. Tankositch said to 
Ciganovitch: "I will give you a revolver. Go and teach them how 
to shoot." 

Thereupon Ciganovitch led Princip and Grabez to the army shoot- 



66 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Ing range at Topcider and gave them instructions in shooting with 
Browning revolvers at targets in a wood near the range. Princip 
showed himself to be the better marksman. Ciganovitch also famil- 
iarised Princip, Grabez, and Gabrinovitch with the use of bombs, 
which were later turned over to them. 

On May 27, 1914, Ciganovitch gave to Princip, Gabrinovitch, and 
Grabez, according to their joint confession, six bombs, four Brown- 
ing revolvers, and enough ammunition, as well as a glass tube con- 
taining cyanide of potassium, so that they might, after carrying out 
their act, poison themselves with the view of keeping the secret. In 
addition Ciganovitch gave them money. 

As early as Easter, Princip had instructed Danilo Illiteh about 
his plan for the attack. Upon returning to Serajevo he now begged 
Illiteh to enlist several more persons to insure the success of the at- 
tack. Thereupon Illiteh, according to his confession, enlisted for this 
Jaso Cubrilovitch, Cetro Popovitch, and Mehemed Mehemedbasitch. 

III. — Origin of the Bombs. 

Only one of the bombs was at their disposal at the time of the 
carrying out of the attack. The remaining five were later found by 
the police in Serajevo. 

These bombs, according to the opinion of experts in court, are 
Servian hand grenades, manufactured in a factory and destined for 
military use. They are identical with the twenty-one bombs which in 
the year 1913 were found in the Save at Brcko and some of which 
were still in the original package. By this it was shown with cer- 
tainty that they had come from the Servian arms depot in Kragu- 
jevac. 

It is established also that the bombs used in the assassination 
of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand originated from the arms depot 
at Kragujevac. 

Grabez of his own accord called the bombs which were handed 
over to him and his accomplices " Kragujevac bombs.'' 

IV. — Transport op the Three Assassins and the Weapons from 

Servia to Bosnia. 

The following testimony was given by Princip: 
Ciganovitch told Gabrinovitch, Grabez and Princip to take their 
journey over Sabac and Loznica to Tuzla, and there turn to Misko 



THE AUSTBO-HUNGAKIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 67 

Jovanovitch, who would take charge of the weapons. They should 
next go to Sabae, and there report to the border Captain, Major Bade 
Popovitch, for whom he gave them a note, which Princip carried. 
The three left Belgrade with their weapons on May 28. In Sabac, 
Princip delivered the note which he had received from Ciganovitch to 
Major Popovitch, who thereupon led all three to the commander's 
station (Kommando) and filled out a permit, in which it was certified 
that one of them was a revenue guard and the two others were 
his comrades. The permit also contained the name of this alleged 
revenue guard; but he had forgotten the name. At the same time 
Major Popovitch handed them a sealed letter for a border Captain 
in Loznica, whose name was Pravanovitch, Prdanovitch, or Predoje- 
vitch. 

The next night Princip, Gabrinovitch, and Grabez spent in Sabae 
and went on the next day by train to Loznica, at half fare, on the 
strength of the permit that had been filled out for them by Major 
Popovitch. At noon they arrived in Loznica and handed to the local 
border Captain Major Popovitch 's letter, in which was written: 
' f See that you receive these people and conduct them through to you 
know where." The Captain said that he would call his revenue 
guards from the border and intrust the three to the most reliable man. 
Thereupon he telephoned, and ordered the three accomplices to report 
at his office at 7 o'clock the next morning. 

On the next morning the three conspirators agreed that Gabrino- 
vitch, with the pass of Grabez, should openly take the road to Zvornik, 
but that Princip and Grabez should cross the border secretly. This 
plan was discussed with the border Captain and it was hereby agreed 
that a revenue guard from Ljesnica, named Grbitch, should take 
Princip and Grabez in his karaula and conduct them across the line. 
Gabrinovitch went on foot to Banja Koviljaca, in the direction of 
Zvornik. Princip and Grabez rode with the revenue guard, Grbitch, 
to Ljesnica, where they deposited the bombs and the revolvers in a 
hotel room. Here the revenue guard Grbitch saw these objects. 
Princip himself characterised the journey as "mysterious." 

The testimony of Grabez agreed with that of Princip on the 
essential points and he added by way of supplement that Grbitch 
laughed when he saw the bombs and revolvers and only asked whither 
in Bosnia they were going with these bombs. The revenue guard 
certainly thought Grabez and Princip had a mission. 

Grbitch and a second revenue guard brought Princip and Grabez 
in a rowboat to an island in the Drina. There Grbitch instructed 



68 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

them to wait for a peasant who would fetch them. They spent the 
night on the island in a peasant's cottage to which Grbitch had directed 
them. On the next day a peasant took them during the night, first 
through a swamp and then across the hills to the neighbourhood of 
Priboj, where he turned them over to the local teacher Cubrilovitch, 
who seemed to have been waiting for them. The latter then took 
them to Tuzla, to Misko Jovanovitch. 

Gabrinovitch testified concerning the happenings on the trip up 
to the moment in which he separated from Princip and Grabez in a 
manner that corroborated the essentials of what they had said, and 
added that Major Popovitch had told them he had come from Bel- 
grade only on the day before their arrival in Sabac. 

In Loznica, Gabrinovitch, Princip, and Grabez decided to separate, 
since it would be dangerous for them to go together. The border 
Captain in Loznica, whom they informed of this, expressed his ap- 
proval of their plan and gave Gabrinovitch a letter for the teacher, 
M. Jaklojevitch, in Mali-Zvornik. Gabrinovitch thereupon turned 
over the bombs which he had carried, the Brownings and ammunition, 
to Princip and Grabez, and in company with a revenue guard, who 
had been given to him as escort, went to Mali-Zvornik. 

There he found the teacher, Jaklojevitch, to whom he handed 
the letter of the border Captain of Loznica. The latter advised the 
Servian guard. When Gabrinovitch later reached this frontier guard 
with the teacher there was waiting there for them a man who 
brought them in a rowboat across the Drina to Greater Dvornik in 
Bosnia. 

From there Gabrinovitch went to Tuzla to Misko Jovanovitch. 

Cubrilovitch, the teacher, who undertook to guide Princip and 
Grabez at Priboj, has made a complete confession, from which the 
following important points are summarised : 

In 1911 Cubrilovitch, as a result of a Sokol excursion to Sabac, 
was made a member of the Narodna Odbrana through Bozo Fovitch, 
a member of the Board of Directors, and then made Commissioner 
of the Narodna Odbrana in Zvornik (Bosnia). On his invitation 
Misko Johanovitch was later made Commissioner of the Narodna 
Odbrana for Tuzla. 

A peasant acted as go-between in the dealings with Narodna 
Odbrana, the same peasant who brought Princip and Grabez to Cu- 
brilovitch with the news that he was bringing two armed Servian 
students with him. When he learned this he said that he knew this 
was a "message" of the Narodna Odbrana* Princip and Grabez told 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGAKIAN EED BOOK (NO. 1) 69 

him that they had bombs and revolvers for an attempt on the life of 
Archduke Francis Ferdinand. 



Supplement. 

Just before the close of this memoir, a sworn statement is pro- 
duced by the District Court in Serajevo, from which it appears that 
a subject of the monarchy some days before the 28th of June of this 
year wished to notify the Imperial and Royal Consulate in Belgrade 
that a murderous attack had been planned against Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand during his stay in Bosnia. This witness, it is said, was 
prevented from giving this information by the Belgrade police, who, 
on a trivial pretext, arrested him before he could enter the Imperial 
and Eoyal Consulate. The sworn testimony and the cross-examina- 
tion indicate that the Servian police officials had knowledge of the 
attack that was planned and only arrested this man to prevent him 
from furnishing the information. 

Inasmuch as these statements have not yet been investigated, 
no judgment can yet be given as to their ability to stand the test. 
In consideration of the importance attaching to this, the further de- 
tails of this testimony can at the present time not be divulged. 



(Enclosure 9.) 
The Servian Press on the Assassination. 

(a) The Belgrade newspaper "Balkan' ' on June 29 wrote con- 
cerning the two assassinations: 

"Nedeljko Gabrinovitch, a typesetter, was imbued with anar- 
chistic ideas and known as a restless spirit. Up to twenty days ago 
he lived in Belgrade, where he had gone after the war and found em- 
ployment in the State printing plant. Before he left he said he was 
going to Trieste, where he expected to obtain work in a new printing 
plant. Gavrilo Princip also sojourned until recently in Belgrade. 
In the course of the war he volunteered for army service, but was 
not accepted; so he left Belgrade. But he returned to Belgrade on 
Christmas of the preceding year, attended the gymnasium for a while, 
and departed from Belgrade at about the same time as Gabrinovitch, 
but by a different route. Princip was silent, nervous, a good scholar, 



70 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

and associated with several fellow-students who likewise came from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in later times with Gabrinovitch. He 
inclined toward socialist ideas, although he originally belonged to the 
Progressive youth. Princip as well as Gabrinovitch had grown up in 
Serajevo ; both had been united in inseparable friendship since their 
childhood." 

(b) It is pointed out in the "Piemont " of July 1 that the loud 
protest of the assailant Zerajitch was followed by the protest of 
Princip. The work of the latter could likewise be explained by reason 
of the Bosnian Government system. The fact that Princip carried out 
his act of vengeance on the sacred national holiday of Vidovdan (St. 
Vitus Day), the day fixed for the carrying on of manoeuvres, makes 
the desperate deed of the young martyr appear more intelligible and 
natural. 

(The paper was confiscated by the police because of this article, 
but the confiscation was annulled on the following day by the Belgrade 
court of first resort.) 

(c) The Young Radical paper, "Odjek," of July 3 says: "Arch- 
duke Francis Ferdinand was sent to Serajevo on the day of national 
enthusiasm to celebrate a brutal manifestation of power and subjec- 
tion. This brutal act was bound to evoke brutal feelings of resistance, 
of hatred, and of revenge." 

(d) The National Party organ, "Srpska Zastava," says in an 
article of July 3, headed ' i Suspicions and Threats " : " The assassina- 
tion appears even more and more the result of unhealthy conditions 
in the Monarchy. On the other hand, the savage persecution of the 
Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina excites the horror of the 
whole civilised world." 

(e) The Progressive paper, "Pravda," of July 3 writes: "The 
Vienna policy is cynical. It is exploiting the death of the unfortunate 
couple for its repulsive purposes against the Servian people." 

(f ) The "Agence des Balkans" of July 3 reports : "The crimes 
practised in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Serbs have been 
carried out under the auspices and direct incitation of the Austro- 
Hungarizin civil and military authorities." 

(g) The "Pravda" of July 4 says: "All murders and attacks 
heretofore committed in Austria have had one and the same origin. 
The oppressed peoples of the Monarchy were obliged to resort to this 
kind of protest, because no other way was open to them. In the chaos 
of a reign of terror it is natural and understandable that the era of 
murderous attacks should become popular." 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGAKIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 71 

( h) The ' ' Balkan ' ' of July 5 remarks that Austria-Hungary, ' ' be- 
cause of its persecution of the innocent, must be put under interna- 
tional control," since Austria-Hungary was less consolidated than 
Turkey. 

(i) The "Mali Journal" of July 7 says: "A scion of the Middle 
Ages was murdered in Serajevo a few days ago. He was murdered 
by a boy who felt the suffering of his enslaved fatherland to the point 
of paroxysms of emotion — the suffering which the despoilers of the 
lands of his fathers had inflicted upon it. What has official Austria - 
Hungary done thereafter? It has replied with general massacres, 
plunderings, and destruction of Serb life and property. By such 
exploits only those who are worthless distinguish themselves. The 
cowards are always great heroes when they are certain that nothing 
will happen to them. Only compare Princip and Gabrinovitch with 
these heroes, and the great difference will be noted at once. Civili- 
sation and justice in Austria-Hungary are a great, gross falsehood." 

( j ) The ' ' Tribuna ' ' of July 7 says : ' ' We are of the opinion that 
the murderous deed of Serajevo was ordered to the end that the 
extermination of the Serbs might be accomplished with one blow." 

(k) The "Piemont" of July 8 reports from Bajina Baschka that 
the Austrian authorities in Bosnia were preparing a massacre of the 
Christians. 

(1) The "Balkan" of the 8th publishes a report from Bosnia, 
under the heading "St. Bartholomew's Night in Serajevo," and ad- 
vocates a general boycott of all Austrians resident in Servia. 

(m) The "Mali Journal" of the 8th demands a boycott against 
the Danube Steamship Company. 

(n) Under the caption, "Nothing from Austria-Hungary!" the 
"Tribuna" of the 8th writes that it is best to buy no goods originating 
in Austria-Hungary, not to visit the Austrian and Hungarian baths, 
and not to call any physicians from Austria-Hungary. Private initia- 
tive, it says, could accomplish much in the direction indicated. The 
State and the authorities would not have to take action. It would 
be enough to appeal to the citizens. 

(o) It is stated in the "Stampa" of the 8th that the police at 
Serajevo were subjecting the arrested assailants to the most shame- 
less and inhuman torture in order to force confessions from them, 
to be used as the basis for an indictment of the Servian people. 

(q) Commenting upon the statement by Premier Asquith, upon 
being informed of the death of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, that 
he despaired for humanity, the "Balkan" on July 9 published a his- 



72 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

torical survey of the events of the last forty years, from which it 
concludes that the Servian people in that period were subjected to 
the terrible tortures of the Jesuit policy of Austria-Hungary. Finally 
Archduke Francis Ferdinand, like all sons of Loyola who only work 
in the blood of human beings and believe in the principle that "the 
end justifies the means/ ' was inexorably overtaken by fate and fell 
a victim to Jesuitism, even as entire Austria-Hungary will. But by 
the fall of Austria-Hungary humanity shall obtain peace and free- 
dom. "When one recapitulates all these truths, one must reach the 
conclusion that Asquith could with calm spirit have met the an- 
nouncement of the death with the words, "I no longer despair for 
humanity. ' ' 

(r) In a leading article the "Politika" of July 9 says, under the 
caption "Shameless Lie": "The manner and fashion in which the 
investigation of the Serajevo attack is being conducted point openly 
to the ends which Austria is pursuing. Since the assailants, despite 
all the torments inflicted upon them, refuse to state what is demanded 
of them, other individuals have been discovered, with difficulty, who 
declared themselves ready, under certain conditions, to confess to a 
certain complicity in the attack, but at the same time to accuse all 
those who are inconvenient for Austria. This method for the time 
being has succeeded, for the hired individuals show a willingness to 
say anything that one wants of them, and the Austrian police take 
care that these lies are at once circulated broadcast. Austria has 
no shame, and it believes that some one will be found who will 
believe such lies." 

(s) The "Stampa" of the 9th says that not everything that has 
occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet been uncovered and 
brought out to publicity. Much, it says, is being concealed. But 
truth will sooner or later come to the surface for all that. Blood- 
thirsty Austria simply wants to sate herself now with Servian blood 
and is doing it. It is reported that there are to-day about 10,000 
dead and wounded in Bosnia. 

(t) The "Politika" of July 10 hurls unmeasured insults at mem- 
bers of the Imperial House. 

(u) The "Trgovinski Glasnik" of July 10 speaks of the corrupt- 
ness and unscrupulousness of the Austro-Hungarian policy, which it 
calls "Jesuitical, ruthless, and dishonourable." It ought to convince 
the Serb people in Austria-Hungary that they do not dwell in a civi- 
lised State which guarantees life and property, but that they must ever 
be armed and ready to defend themselves against robbery by the au- 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 73 

thorities and the Government. After the latest events, the Servian 
people must no longer wait like a lamb that might be slaughtered any 
day, but like a lion ready for bloody defence. 

(v) The "Stampa" of July 10 says: "Nothing is eternal, and 
Austria-Hungary will not remain forever in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The time is not distant when the Serbs, who broke the power of the 
Turks and punished the Bulgarians, will range over the Ivan Planina 
on the Trebevitch." 

(w) Under the title "Boycott Against the Worthless," the 
"Pravda" of July 10 demands a boycott of Austro-Hungarian firms in 
Belgrade as well as of Austro-Hungarian wares, and says that it is the 
duty of the Narodna Odbrana to promote the strictest execution of 
the boycott. 

(x) The "Zvono" of July 16 declares Princip a son of Countess 
Lonyay, to whom the task was allotted to avenge the death of the 
Crown Prince Rudolf on his murderer, the Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand. 

(y) In the "Mali Journal" of July 19 occurs the following: 
"Princip was instigated to the attack by an Austro-Hungarian agent. 
In Vienna it is said that the really guilty person could be found only 
in the Austro-Hungarian Embassy at Belgrade." 

(z) The leading Young Radical paper, "Odjek," of July 20 
writes: "Austria-Hungary indicates by a hundred signs that it wishes 
to inherit the title of the Sick Man of Europe. While in Servia not a 
single Austro-Hungarian citizen was molested, villages and cities were 
plundered in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact shows afresh how 
much higher Servia stands, morally and culturally, than Austria- 
Hungary." 



(Enclosure 10.) 



The Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish on the Crime Against 
Archduke Francis Ferdinand. 

To the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has come 
from a trustworthy informant, whose name can be given if necessary, 
reliable information that the Committee of the Narodna Odbrana re- 
cently held a session at Nish, in which its Chairman, the Director of 
the Nish House of Correction, Jasa Nenadovitch, spoke of the assassi- 
nation of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and told the following : 



74 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Servia was compelled absolutely to avail herself of some means 
like the attack on Archduke Francis Ferdinand, since the latter, on 
account of his aggressive and eccentric character, was a formidable 
danger to Servia and, possibly, to other Slavic groups. Had he re- 
mained alive, he would soon have challenged Servia to war or attacked 
that country, in which case Servia, which is now so materially weak- 
ened and which has not finished organising its army, would unques- 
tionably have been hopelessly beaten. But as matters stand, Servia 
has been saved by the Serajevo murder and, moreover, one of the 
men dangerous to Servia has been removed. Servia will now have 
quiet for some years, since the new Heir Apparent will certainly 
think twice before he follows in the footsteps of his predecessor. 

The speaker was aware, he continued, that the murder of the 
Archduke would be a severe blow and a bitter sorrow to Austria- 
Hungary, and that it would cause the Serbs living there to be perse- 
cuted, but he did not think his suppositions would be so completely 
justified by events as they had been, and that the Croatians would 
rise to the requirements of the moment as they had risen. He said 
that his friends in Bosnia and Herzegovina had assured him that the 
Austro-Hungarian officials were timid and would not go too far, 
but that these friends had been deceived and that we had been 
deceived through them; that if things continued thus, revolvers and 
bombs had yet to play their real parts, and whatever the Servian God 
might ordain, things could not continue in this way. 

The statements of the speaker found complete support from those 
who heard him. 



(Enclosure 11.) 
Anti-Austro-Hungarian Paintings in the Ministry of War at Belgrade. 

Before the Reception Hall of the Servian Ministry of War there 
are on the wall four allegorical paintings, of which three are repre- 
sentations of Servian victories, while the fourth pictures the realisa- 
tion of Servia 's anti- Austrian aspirations. 

Over a landscape, part mountain (Bosnia), and part plain (South- 
ern Hungary), there is shown the "zora," or dawning of Servian 
hopes. In the foreground is an armed woman upon whose shield are 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 75 

the names of all the provinces "yet to be freed" — Bosnia, Herze- 
govina, Vojvodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, &c. 



No. 20. 

Count Berchtold to Baron Macehio, Councilor, Austro-Hungarian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Lambach, July 25, 1914. 

The Russian Charge d 'Affaires has informed me by telegraph 
that his Government has urgently instructed him to demand an ex- 
tension of the time-limit in the ultimatum to Servia. I request you 
to reply to him in my behalf, that we cannot consent to an extension 
of the time-limit. You will please add that, even after the breaking 
off of diplomatic relations, Servia will be in a position to bring about 
an amicable settlement by an unconditional acceptance of our de- 
mands. In such case, however, we would be compelled to demand 
from Servia an indemnification for all costs and damages caused to 
us by our military measures. 



No. 21. 

Count Berchtold to Count Szapdry, St. PetersburgJi. 

(Telegram.) Bad Ischl, July 25, 1914. 

For your personal information and guidance: 

The Russian Charge d 'Affaires called on Baron Macehio this fore- 
noon and requested in his Government's behalf that the time-limit 
stipulated in our note to Servia be extended. 

This request he based upon the ground that our move had taken 
the Powers by surprise and that the Russian Government would con- 
sider it a matter of due consideration on the part of the Vienna 
Cabinet toward the other Cabinets, if the latter should be given an 
opportunity to examine the merits of our communication to the 
Powers and to study the promised dossier. Baron Macehio replied 
to the Charge d' Affaires that he would advise me at once of his re- 
quest, but he could already venture to say that there is no proba- 



76 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

bility of a prolongation of the stipulated time-limit being conceded 
by ns. 

As to the explanations given by the Russian Government in sub- 
stantiation of its request, they appear to be based upon an erroneous 
conception of the premises. Our note to the Powers was by no means 
meant as an invitation to them to inform us of their views on this 
matter, but simply to convey information as a matter of international 
courtesy. Besides, we hold that our action concerns solely ourselves 
and Servia, and that this action, despite the patience and leniency 
which we have displayed for many years, had been forced upon us by 
the developments of a situation which compelled us to defend our most 
vital interests. 



No. 22. 
Baron von Oiesl to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 

The Cabinet met in council last night and this morning. Accord- 
ing to various reports the reply to our note will be handed to me 
before the expiration of the stipulated time. I hear that the court 
train is being made ready for use; that the money of the National 
Bank and of the Railroad as well as the archives of the Foreign Office 
are being removed to the interior of the country. Several of my 
colleagues are of the opinion that they must follow the Government, 
especially so the Russian legation, where packing is proceeding. 

The garrison has left town in field equipment. The ammunition 
has been removed from the fortress. There is a considerable move- 
ment of troops at the railway station. Sanitary convoys have left 
Belgrade in a southerly direction. According to the instructions 
which I have meanwhile received, we shall leave Belgrade by train 
at 6.30 o'clock if diplomatic relations are broken off. 



No. 23. 

Baron von Giesl to Count Berclttold. 

(Telegram.) Semlin, July 25, 1914. 

General mobilisation has been ordered in Servia at 3 p.m. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 77 

No. 24. 
Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Semlin, July 25, 1914. 

The reply of the Royal Servian Government to our demands of 
the 23rd instant being inadequate, I have broken off diplomatic rela- 
tions with Servia and have left Belgrade with the staff of the lega- 
tion. 

The reply was handed to me at 5.58 p.m. 



No. 25. 

Note of the Royal Servian Government, Dated July 12/25, 1914. 

The Royal Servian Government has received the communication 
of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and is 
convinced that its reply will remove any misunderstanding which may 
threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia. 

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both 
from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations 
and actions of the responsible representatives of the State — protests 
which were discontinued as a result of the declarations made by the 
Servian Government on the 18th March, 1909 — have not been renewed 
on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and 
that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the succes- 
sive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political 
and legal status created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Gov- 
ernment calls attention to the fact that in this connexion the Imperial 
and Royal Government has made no representation, except one con- 
cerning a school book, when the Imperial and Royal Government 
received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia in numerous 
instances has given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during 
the Balkan crisis, and it is due to Servia and to the sacrifice that she 
has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that the same 
has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held respon- 
sible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the 



78 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

press and the peaceable work of societies — manifestations which take 
place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and 
which as a general rule are beyond official control. The Royal Gov- 
ernment is all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time 
of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Servia 
and Austria-Hungary it showed much consideration and thus suc- 
ceeded in settling most of these questions to the mutual advantage 
of the two neighbouring countries. 

For these reasons the Royal Government has been painfully sur- 
prised at the allegations that citizens of the Kingdom of Servia 
have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at 
Serajevo ; the Royal Government had expected to be invited to collabo- 
rate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and it stood 
ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of its attitude, to take 
measures against any persons concerning whom representations might 
be made to it. 

Complying with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment, it is prepared to commit for trial any Servian subject, regard- 
less of his station or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of 
Serajevo proofs shall be produced, and more especially it undertakes 
to publish on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of 
the 13th/26th July, the following declaration : 

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda 
directed against Austria-Hungary, and in general all the tendencies 
which aim at the ultimate detachment from the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy of territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the 
fatal consequences of these criminal activities. 

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and func- 
tionaries have participated, according to the communication of the 
Imperial and Royal Government, in the above-mentioned propaganda 
and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the 
Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 
31st of March, 1909. 

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all 
idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of 
the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austro-Hungary, considers 
it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole 
population of the Kingdom, that henceforth it will proceed with the 
utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machina- 
tions, which it will use all its efforts to prevent and suppress.' ' 

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 79 

Army in an order of the day, in the name of his Majesty the King, 
by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be 
published in the next official army bulletin. 
The Royal Government further undertakes : 

1. To insert, at the first ordinary convocation of the Skuptchina, 
a provision into the press law for the most severe punishment of 
incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
archy, and for taking action against any publication the general 
tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of 
Austria-Hungary. The Government engages, at the impending re- 
vision of the Constitution, to add to Article 22 of the Constitution an 
amendment permitting that such publications be confiscated, a pro- 
ceeding at present impossible according to the clear provisions of 
Article 22 of the Constitution. 

2. The Government possesses no proof, nor does the note of the 
Imperial and Royal Government furnish it with any, that the Na- 
rodna Odbrana and other similar societies have committed up to 
the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings 
of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will 
accept the demands of the Imperial and Royal Government and will 
dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society and every other association 
which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary. 

3. The Royal Servian Government undertakes to remove without 
delay from the system of public instruction in Servia all that serves 
or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, when- 
ever the Imperial and Royal Government shall furnish it with facts 
and proofs of such a propaganda. 

4. The Royal Government also agrees to remove from the mili- 
tary and the civil service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may 
have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the territorial integ- 
rity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and it expects the Imperial 
and Royal Government to communicate to it at a later date the names 
and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the pro- 
ceedings which are to be taken against them. 

5. The Royal Government must confess that it does not clearly 
understand the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the 
Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept 
the collaboration of officials of the Imperial and Royal Government 
upon Servian territory, but it declares that it will admit such col- 
laboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with 
criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations. 



80 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAE 

6. It goes without saying that the Eoyal Government considers 
it a duty to begin an enquiry against all such persons as are, or 
eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15/28 June, and who 
may happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards 
the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or 
authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Eoyal 
Government, the Eoyal Government cannot accept such an arrange- 
ment, as it would constitute a violation of the Constitution and of 
the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases com- 
munications as to the results of the investigation in question might be 
given to the Austro-Hungarian agents. 

7. The Eoyal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the 
delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voja Tankositch. As 
regards Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation) 
by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest 
him. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government is requested to be so good 
as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the pre- 
sumptive evidence of guilt as well as the possible proofs of guilt which 
have been collected up to the present time, at the enquiry at Serajevo, 
for the purposes of the Servian enquiry. 

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the meas- 
ures which have been taken for suppressing the illicit traffic in arms 
and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that the 
Servian Government will immediately order an enquiry and will 
severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Lozniea line 
who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime 
of Serajevo to pass. 

9. The Eoyal Government will gladly furnish explanations of 
the remarks made by its officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in 
interviews after the crime, and which, according to the statement of 
the Imperial and Eoyal Government, were hostile to the Monarchy, 
as soon as the Imperial and Eoyal Government shall have communi- 
cated to it the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as 
it shall have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said 
officials, in connexion with which the Eoyal Government itself will 
take steps to collect evidence. 

10. The Eoyal Government will inform the Imperial and Eoyal 
Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the 
above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 81 

present note, as soon as each measure shall have been ordered and 
carried out. 

If the Imperial and Royal Government is not satisfied with this 
reply the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the com- 
mon interest to take precipitate action in the solution of this ques- 
tion, is ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by 
referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal 
at The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing 
up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18/31 
March, 1909. 

Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914. 



No. 26. 
Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry, St. Petersburg^. 

Vienna, July 25, 1914. 

In resolving to proceed firmly against Servia, we are fully aware 
that a conflict with Russia may result from the existing Servian 
differences. Yet, in determining our attitude toward Servia, we could 
not allow ourselves to be influenced by this possibility, because funda- 
mental considerations of our home policy have forced us to put an 
end to a situation which enables Servia, under Russia's promise of 
immunity, to threaten this empire constantly and to do so unpunished 
and unpunishable. 

In case Russia should consider that the moment for an accounting 
with the Central European Powers has come, and therefore a priori 
be resolved to make war, the following instructions would appear to 
be useless. 

Nevertheless, it is still conceivable that Russia might reconsider 
her attitude and not permit herself to be carried away by the warlike 
element, in case Servia should refuse to comply with our demands 
and we should be compelled, in consequence, to resort to force. 

The following is designed for the latter emergency and it is left 
to your discretion to make proper use of it at the right time and in 
a suitable manner in your conference with M. Sazonow and the Prime 
Minister. 

I presume that under the present circumstances you are in close 
touch with your German colleague, who has surely been instructed 



82 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

by his Government not to allow the Russian Government any room 
for doubt that Austria-Hungary would not stand alone in the event 
of a conflict with Russia. 

I have no doubt that it will not be an easy task to bring Sazonow 
to a true appreciation of our action at Belgrade, which has been 
forced upon us. 

But there is one point which cannot fail to impress the Russian 
Foreign Minister, namely, an emphatic statement by you to the effect 
that Austria-Hungary, in conformity with her established principle 
of disinterestedness, is guided by no selfish motive in the present 
crisis, although the situation has culminated in warlike action. 

The Monarchy is sated with territory and has no desire for 
Servian lands. If war with Servia be forced upon us, it will be for 
us not a war of conquest, but of self-defence and self-preservation. 

The contents of the circular note, which in itself is sufficiently 
comprehensive, may be placed in a still more convincing light by a 
study of the dossier referring to the Servian propaganda against the 
Dual Monarchy and the relation between this propaganda and the 
crime of June the 28th. 

You will therefore call the Russian Foreign Minister's special 
attention to this dossier and point out to him that there is no precedent 
of a Great Power tolerating so long and with such unexampled for- 
bearance the seditious agitations of a small neighbour. 

We had no wish to adopt a policy adverse to the free development 
of the Christian Balkan States, and therefore we have permitted 
Servia to almost double her territory since the annexation crisis of 
1908, although we knew how little Servian promises are worth. 

Since then the subversive movement fostered against the Monarchy 
in Servia has become so excessive that Austria-Hungary's vital inter- 
ests and even her dynasty are seriously menaced by Servia 's under- 
ground activities. 

We must presume that conservative and dynastic Russia will not 
only understand our energetic action against such a menace to public 
order, but will even regard it as imperative. 

On reaching this point in your conversation with M. Sazonow it 
will be necessary to state, in addition to your explanation of our 
motives and intentions, that, although we have no ambitions for 
territorial expansion and do not intend to infringe upon the integrity 
of Servia, as you already have pointed out, still we are determined to 
go to any length to ensure the acceptance of our demands. 

The course of the last 40 years, as well as the historical fact 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 83 

that our gracious Sovereign has acquired the glorious name of 
" Guardian of the Peace," attest that we have always held peace to 
be the most sacred blessing of the people, and that, in so far as it 
depended on us, we have endeavoured to maintain it. 

We would all the more regret a disturbance of the peace of 
Europe, because of our conviction that the evolution of the Balkan 
States toward national and political independence could only improve 
our relations with Russia, eliminating all possibilities of a clash of 
interests with that empire, and because in framing our own policy 
we always have been disposed to respect the important political in- 
terests of Russia. 

To tolerate the Servian machinations any longer, however, would 
undermine our national existence and our standing as a Great Power, 
and would, therefore, imperil the European balance of power — an 
equilibrium the maintenance of which, we are convinced, the peace- 
loving statesmen of Russia regard as essential to their own interests. 
Our action against Servia, whatever form it may take, is altogether 
conservative and has no object except the necessary maintenance of 
our position in Europe. 



No. 27. 

Count BercJttold to Count Szdpdry, St. PetersburgJt. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. 

As clause 5 of our demands, which concerns the cooperation of 
Austro-Hungarian officials in the suppression of the subversive agita- 
tion in Servia, has called forth M. Sazonow's particular objection, you 
are instructed to give him the strictly confidential information that 
the insertion of this clause is due to merely practical considerations 
and is not intended as an infringement on Servia 's sovereignty. The 
"collaboration" mentioned in clause 5 refers to the creation in Bel- 
grade of a secret bureau de surete which would work like the similar 
Russian institution in Paris and would cooperate with the Servian 
police and administration. 



84 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 28. 
Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) St. PetersburgJt, July 26, 1914. 

Reports concerning Russian mobilisation have caused Count Pour- 
tales to call the Russian Minister's earnest attention to the fact 
that an attempt to exert diplomatic pressure by means of mobilisa- 
tion is extremely dangerous at this juncture. In such an event the 
military considerations of the General Staff will be supreme and the 
situation will become irrevocable once "the button has been pressed" 
by the Chief of Staff in Germany. M. Sazonow gave the German Am- 
bassador his word of honour that the reports of a mobilisation were 
unfounded, that for the present not one horse had been levied, not one 
reservist called, and that merely preparatory measures were being 
taken in the military districts of Kieff and Odessa, and possibly of 
Kazan and Moscow. 

Immediately afterwards a courier delivered to the German Mili- 
tary Attache a request to call on the Minister of War. Suchomli- 
now, referring to Count Pourtales's conversation with the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs on the subject of Russian military preparations, 
stated that, as the Ambassador might possibly have misunderstood 
some details pertaining to military questions, he would be prepared 
to give the Military Attache fuller information. Major von Eggeling's 
report was summarised in the following telegram which Count Pour- 
tales sent to Berlin and placed at my disposal : 

Military Attache reports on conversation with Russian Minister 
of War: 

M. Sazonow has requested him to enlighten me concerning mili- 
tary situation. Minister of War gave me his word of honour that 
no order whatever had as yet been issued for mobilisation. For the 
present merely preparatory measures were being taken, no horse 
levied, no reservist called. In case Austria-Hungary were to cross 
Servian boundary, the military districts adjoining Austria (Kieff, 
Odessa, Moscow, Kazan) would be mobilised. Under no circumstances 
would mobilisation extend to districts of Warsaw, Vilna and St. 
Petersburgh, bordering on Germany. Peace with Germany is ear- 
nestly desired. In answer to my question as to object of mobilisation 
against Austria-Hungary, War Minister shrugged his shoulders and 
hinted at diplomatic influences. I pointed out to War Minister that 



THE AUSTBO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 85 

we should appreciate friendly disposition but consider mobilisation 
against Austria-Hungary alone as decidedly threatening. War Min- 
ister repeatedly and insistently laid stress on absolute necessity and 
desire for peace. 



No. 29. 
Count BercJitold to Count Mensdorff, London, 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

M. von Tschirschky informed me to-day under instructions that, 
according to a telegram sent from London on the 25th instant, at 
3 p.m., by Prince Lichnowsky, Sir Edward Grey had forwarded the 
latter a draft of Servia 's reply together with a personal letter ex- 
pressing the hope that, in view of the conciliatory tenor of the reply, 
the Berlin Cabinet would recommend its acceptance in Vienna. 

I consider it advisable that you should revert to this matter and 
call the Foreign Secretary's attention to the fact that, almost at 
the time when he sent his note to Prince Lichnowsky, i.e., yesterday 
at 3 p.m., Servia had already ordered a general mobilisation; this 
goes to prove that there was no inclination in Belgrade for a peaceful 
settlement. The unsatisfactory reply, which, it appears, had pre- 
viously been wired to London, was not handed to the Imperial and 
Royal Minister in Belgrade until 6 p.m., after the mobilisation order 
had been issued. 



No. 30. 

Count BercJitold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, 
Rome, London, Paris and St. PetersburgJi. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

Servia having rejected our demands, we have broken off diplo- 
matic relation with that country. 

You are instructed to call immediately on the Foreign Secretary 
or his representative and frame your statement as follows ; 

The Royal Servian Government has refused to comply with the 



86 DOCUMENTS EBLATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 

demands which we had been compelled to make upon it in order to 
permanently safeguard our most vital interests, which Servia is 
menacing. In so doing Servia has manifested her unwillingness to 
abandon her subversive tactics, which are directed at fomenting dis- 
turbances in some of our border territories with a view to their even- 
tual separation from the Dual Monarchy. To our regret, and much 
against our wish, we have been placed under the necessity of employ- 
ing the severest measures to compel Servia to modify radically her 
hitherto hostile attitude toward us. 



No. 31. 
Count Szapary to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) St. PetersburgJt, July 27, 1914. 

I have just had a long conversation with M. Sazonow. I told the 
Minister I was under the impression that the nature of our action 
had been misunderstood in Russia. We were suspected of contem- 
plating an attack upon the Balkans, and of intending to march upon 
Saloniki or possibly even upon Constantinople. Others go so far as 
to describe our action as the beginning of a preventive war against 
Russia. I declared all this to be erroneous and in a sense absurd. 
The purpose of our action is merely self-preservation and self-defence 
against a hostile propaganda threatening the integrity of the Mon- 
archy, carried on by word, writing and deed. No one in Austria- 
Hungary would think of threatening Russian interests or picking a 
quarrel with Russia. 

We were, however, resolved to reach the goal which we had in 
view, and the road which we had chosen seemed to us the most 
effective. As we had embarked upon an action of self-defence, I 
emphasised the fact that we could not allow ourselves to be diverted 
by any consequences whatsoever. 

M. Sazonow agreed with me in principle. He recognised our aim 
as a perfectly legitimate one, but expressed the opinion that the 
method we had selected for its attainment was not happy in its form. 
He had studied the note since its presentation, he observed, and would 
like to peruse it once more with me, if I had time to do so. 

I responded that I was at his disposal, but was neither authorised 
to discuss the wording of the note nor to give an interpretation of it. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 87 

His remarks, however, would be of greatest interest. The Minister 
then analysed all the points of our note and this time found that 
seven of the ten clauses were, on the whole, acceptable. He took ex- 
ception only to the two clauses dealing with the cooperation of 
Austro-Hungarian officials in Servia and to the clause concerning 
the dismissal of officers and officials to be designated by us. Those 
clauses he qualified as unacceptable in their present form. With 
reference to the two first clauses, I found myself in a position to give 
an authentic interpretation in the sense of your telegram of the 
25th instant. The third clause I qualified as a necessary demand. 
In any case events had been set in motion. The Servians had mobil- 
ised as early as yesterday, and I was ignorant of what had happened 
since. 



No. 32. 

Count Berchtold to Count Szapdry, St. Petersburgh. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. 

I authorise you to tell M. Sazonow that Austria-Hungary has no 
intention whatever to make any territorial conquests, as long as the 
war remains localised between Austria-Hungary and Servia. 



No. 33. 
Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 27, 1914. 

M. Sazonow declared to the German Ambassador that he could 
' * guarantee that no mobilisation had been effected by Russia. Certain 
essential military precautions had been taken, however.' ' 

German Military Attache in St. Petersburgh reports that "the 
Russian Minister of War had given him his word of honour that not 
one man or horse had been mobilised; yet certain military precau- 
tions had, of course, been taken"; precautions which, however, are 
"fairly extensive," in the personal opinion of the Military Attache, 
expressed in his report. 



88 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 



No. 34. 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, 
Rome, London, Paris and St. Petersburgh. 

Vienna, July 27, 1914. 
You will receive herewith the text of the note which was handed 
to the Imperial and Royal Minister in Servia on July the 25th by the 
Royal Servian Government, and our comments thereon. 



(Enclosure.) 

Note of the Royal Servian Government to the Imperial and Royal 
Austro-IIungarian Government, Dated 12/25th July, 1914, and 
Comments Thereon. 



Servian Reply to Austrian 
Government. 

The Royal Servian Government 
has received the communication 
of the Imperial and Royal Gov- 
ernment of the 10th instant, and 
is convinced that its reply will 
remove any misunderstanding 
which may threaten to impair the 
good neighbourly relations be- 
tween the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy and the Kingdom of 
Servia. 

Conscious of the fact that the 
protests which were made both 
from the tribune of the national 
Skuptchina and in the declara- 
tions and actions of the responsi- 
ble representatives of the State — 
protests which were discontinued 
as a result of the declarations 
made by the Servian Government 



Comments of the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government. 



The Royal Servian Government 
confines itself to the statement 
that no endeavour has been made 
by either the Servian Government 
or its officers to modify the status 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina since 
the declaration of the 18th of 
March, 1909. 

Thereby it deliberately evades 



THE AUSTEO-HTJNGAEIAN EED BOOK (NO. 1) 



89 



on the 18th March, 1909— have 
not been renewed on any occasion 
as regards the great neighbouring 
Monarchy, and that no attempt 
has been made since that time, 
either by the successive Eoyal 
Governments or by their organs, 
to change the political and legal 
status created in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Eoyal Govern- 
ment calls attention to the fact 
that in this connexion the Im- 
perial and Eoyal Government has 
made no representation, except 
one concerning a school book, 
when the Imperial and Eoyal Gov- 
ernment received an entirely sat- 
isfactory explanation. Servia in 
numerous instances has given 
proofs of her pacific and moderate 
policy during the Balkan crisis, 
and it is due to Servia and to the 
sacrifice that she has made in the 
exclusive interest of European 
peace that the same has been 
preserved. 

The Eoyal Government cannot 
be held responsible for manifes- 
tations of a private character, 
such as articles in the press and 
the peaceable work of societies — 
manifestations which take place 
in nearly all countries in the ordi- 
nary course of events, and which 
as a general rule are beyond 
official control. The Eoyal Gov- 
ernment is all the less responsible, 
in view of the fact that at the 
time of the solution of a series 
of questions which arose between 
Servia and Austria-Hungary it 



the basic point in our representa- 
tions, as we have not asserted 
that the Servian Government or 
its officers have officially under- 
taken anything to that end. 

Our grievance, however, is that 
the Servian Government has 
omitted to suppress the agitation 
directed against the territorial 
integrity of the Dual Monarchy, 
notwithstanding the obligations it 
entered into under the terms of 
the above-mentioned note. 

The Servian Government, there- 
fore, was in duty bound to a 
radical change in the trend of its 
policy and to establish good 
neighbourly relations with Aus- 
tria-Hungary ; and not merely to 
refrain from official attempts to 
dispute the status of Bosnia as 
an integral part of the Dual 
Monarchy. 



The contention of the Eoyal 
Servian Government that utter- 
ances of the press and the activi- 
ties of associations have a private 
character and are beyond the 
control of the State, is plainly 
at variance with the institutions 
of modern States, even of those 
which have the most liberal regu- 
lations in this respect; these 
regulations, designed to safe- 
guard public polity and right, 
impose State supervision upon 
both press and associations. 
Moreover, the Servian institu- 



90 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 



showed much consideration and 
thus succeeded in settling most of 
these questions to the mutual ad- 
vantage of the two neighbouring 
countries. 



For these reasons the Royal 
Government has been painfully 
surprised at the allegations that 
citizens of the Kingdom of Servia 
have participated in the prepara- 
tions for the crime committed at 
Serajevo; the Royal Government 
had expected to be invited to col- 
laborate in an investigation of all 
that concerns this crime, and it 
stood ready, in order to prove the 
entire correctness of its attitude, 
to take measures against any 
persons concerning whom repre- 
sentations might be made to 
it. 

Complying with the desire of 
the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment, it is prepared to commit for 
trial any Servian subject, regard- 
less of his station or rank, of 
whose complicity in the crime of 
Serajevo proofs shall be pro- 
duced, and more especially it 
undertakes to publish on the first 
page of the " Journal Officiel/' 
on the date of the 13th/26th July, 
the following declaration: 

' * The Royal Government of Ser- 
via condemns every propaganda 
directed against Austria-Hun- 
gary, and in general all the 
tendencies which aim at the ulti- 



tions themselves provide for such 
supervision. The charge against 
the Servian Government is that 
it completely failed to supervise 
the Servian press and associa- 
tions, although it well knew that 
both were engaged in a campaign 
against the Monarchy. 

This assertion is incorrect. The 
Servian Government had been 
fully informed of the suspicion 
raised against certain designated 
persons, and therefore was not 
only in a position spontaneously 
to institute an investigation, but 
was even bound to do so by its 
own laws. It has done nothing 
at all in this respect. 



Our demand read as follows : 
"The Royal Government of 
Servia condemns the propaganda 
directed against Austria-Hungary 



THE AUSTEO-HUNGAEIAN EED BOOK (NO. 1) 91 



mate detachment from the Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Monarchy of ter- 
ritories belonging to it, and it 
sincerely deplores the fatal con- 
sequences of these criminal ac- 
tivities. 

"The Eoyal Government re- 
grets that Servian officers and 
functionaries have participated, 
according to the communication 
of the Imperial and Eoyal Gov- 
ernment, in the above-mentioned 
propaganda and thus compro- 
mised the good neighbourly rela- 
tions to which the Eoyal Govern- 
ment was solemnly pledged by its 
declaration of the 31st of March, 
1909. 

1 ' The Eoyal Government, which 
disapproves and repudiates all 
idea of interfering or attempting 
to interfere with the destinies of 
the inhabitants of any part what- 
soever of Austria-Hungary, con- 
siders it its duty formally to warn 
officers and functionaries, and 
the whole population of the King- 
dom, that henceforth it will pro- 
ceed with the utmost vigour 
against persons who may be 
guilty of such machinations, 
which it will use all its efforts to 
prevent and suppress.' ' 

This declaration will be brought 
to the knowledge of the Eoyal 
Army in an order of the day, in 
the name of his Majesty the King, 
by his Eoyal Highness the Crown 
Prince Alexander, and will be 
published in the next official army 
bulletin. 



The alteration made by the 
Eoyal Servian Government in the 
declaration demanded by us im- 
plies either that such a propa- 
ganda against Austria-Hungary 
does not exist, or that its exist- 
ence is not within the knowledge 
of the Eoyal Government. This 
formula is insincere and equivo- 
cal ; it is intended to furnish the 
Servian Government with a loop- 
hole for future emergencies. The 
Servian Government might, in 
future, interpret this declaration 
as neither a disavowal of the ex- 
isting propaganda, nor an admis- 
sion of its hostility to the Mon- 
archy; it might, furthermore, 
base thereon the claim that it is 
not bound to suppress any future 
propaganda similar to the pres- 
ent one. 

The wording of our demand 
was : * ' The Eoyal Government re- 
grets that Servian officers and 
functionaries have participated 
in . . . " By the additional 
phrase, "according to the com- 
munication from the Imperial 
and Eoyal Government, ' ' the 
Eoyal Servian Government seeks, 
as indicated above, to keep a 
free hand for the future. 



92 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 



The Royal Government further 
undertakes : 

1. To insert, at the first ordi- 
nary convocation of the Skupt- 
china, a provision into the press 
law for the most severe punish- 
ment of incitement to hatred and 
contempt of the Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy, and for taking 
action against any publication the 
general tendency of which is di- 
rected against the territorial in- 
tegrity of Austria-Hungary. 

The Government engages, at 
the impending revision of the 
Constitution, to add to Article 22 
of the Constitution an amendment 
permitting that such publications 
be confiscated, a proceeding at 
present impossible according to 
the clear provisions of Article 22 
of the Constitution. 



We had demanded: 

1. The suppression of "any 
publication which incites to hat- 
red and contempt of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy, and the 
general tendency of which is di- 
rected against its territorial in- 
tegrity.' ' 

We thus wished to establish 
Servia 's obligation to provide for 
the prevention of such press at- 
tacks in the future; we wished, 
therefore, to secure definite re- 
sults in the present instance. 

Servia, instead, offers to decree 
certain laws intended to serve as 
means to that purpose, to wit: 

(a) A law providing individual 
punishment of above-mentioned 
press utterances hostile to the 
Dual Monarchy. This is all the 
more immaterial to us, as it is a 
notorious fact that individual 
prosecution of press offences is 
very rarely possible, and as, fur- 
thermore, the lax application of 
such a law would leave unpun- 
ished even the few cases that 
might be prosecuted. This pro- 
posal, therefore, in no way meets 
our demand, as it gives no guar- 
antee whatever for the results de- 
sired by us. 

(b) An addition to Article 22 
of the constitution, permitting 
confiscation, as referred to in the 
Servian note. This proposal like- 
wise must fail to satisfy us. The 
existence of such a law in Servia 
is of no avail to us, whereas only 
a pledge by the Government to 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 93 



2. The Government possesses 
no proof, nor does the note of the 
Imperial and Royal Government 
furnish it with any, that the Na- 
rodna Odbrana and other simi- 
lar societies have committed up to 
the present any criminal act of 
this nature through the proceed- 
ings of any of their members. 
Nevertheless, the Royal Govern- 
ment will accept the demands of 
the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment and will dissolve the Na- 
rodna Odbrana Society and every 
other association which may be 
directing its efforts against Aus- 
tria-Hungary. 



apply it would be useful. This, 
however, has not been promised 
to us. 

These proposals are, therefore, 
quite unsatisfactory, all the more 
so because they are also evasive, 
as they do not state the time 
within which these laws shall be 
decreed. Besides, no provision is 
made for the event of a rejection 
of the bills by the Skuptchina — 
not to mention a possible resig- 
nation of the Cabinet — in which 
case matters would remain un- 
changed. 

The propaganda against the 
Monarchy conducted by the Na- 
rodna Odbrana and its affiliated 
associations permeates the entire 
public life of Servia ; the Servian 
Government's declaration that it 
knows nothing about this propa- 
ganda, is, therefore, an absolutely 
inadmissible act of evasion. Set- 
ting this contention aside, our de- 
mand is not wholly met, as we 
have also demanded: 

The confiscation of the means 
of propaganda of these societies. 

The prevention of the reorgani- 
sation of the dissolved societies 
under other names and in other 
guise. 

These two points the Belgrade 
Government ignores, thus elimi- 
nating even the guarantee which 
the preceding half -promise would 
imply that the proposed dissolu- 
tion would put an end, once for 
all, to the activities of the socie- 
ties hostile to the Dual Monarchy, 



94 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 



3. The Royal Servian Govern- 
ment undertakes to remove with- 
out delay from the system of 
public instruction in Servia all 
that serves or could serve to 
foment propaganda against Aus- 
tria-Hungary, whenever the Im- 
perial and Royal Government 
shall furnish it with facts and 
proofs of such a propaganda. 



4. The Royal Government also 
agrees to remove from the mili- 
tary and the civil service all such 
persons as the judicial enquiry 
may have proved to be guilty of 
acts directed against the terri- 
torial integrity of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy, and it ex- 
pects the Imperial and Royal 
Government to communicate to it 
at a later day the names and the 
acts of these officers and officials 



and especially of the Narodna 
Odbrana. 

In this case, be it noted, more- 
over, the Servian Government 
first demands proof that a propa- 
ganda against the Monarchy is 
being carried on in Servia 's pub- 
lic instruction ; this, too, when the 
Servian Government must know 
that the books in use in Servian 
schools contain much objection- 
able matter, and that a large 
number of the Servian teachers 
are connected with the Narodna 
Odbrana and its affiliated asso- 
ciations. 

The Servian Government has 
again in this instance failed to 
comply with our demand in the 
way indicated by us, inasmuch 
as the phrase, "with regard to 
both the teaching-staff and the 
means of instruction," has been 
omitted in the Servian note. In 
this eliminated phrase are clearly 
pointed out the mediums where- 
by the propaganda against the 
Dual Monarchy is being con- 
ducted in the Servian schools. 

If the dismissal of the military 
officers and civil officials referred 
to from the Government service 
should be conditional upon their 
guilt being first confirmed by 
means of a trial, the Servian Gov- 
ernment restricts its acceptance 
of our demand to cases where 
persons are charged with having 
committed a crime punishable 
under the provision of the penal 
code. Since we, however, de- 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGAKIAN BED BOOK (NO. 1) 95 



for the purposes of the proceed- 
ings which are to be taken against 
them. 



5. The Eoyal Government must 
confess that it does not clearly 
understand the meaning or the 
scope of the demand made by the 
Imperial and Royal Government 
that Servia shall undertake to ac- 
cept the collaboration of officials 
of the Imperial and Eoyal Gov- 
ernment upon Servian territory, 
but it declares that it will admit 
such collaboration as agrees with 
the principle of international law, 
with criminal procedure, and with 
good neighbourly relations. 

6. It goes without saying that 
the Royal Government considers 
it a duty to begin an enquiry 
against all such persons as are, 
or possibly may be, implicated 
in the plot of the 15/28 June, and 
who may happen to be within the 
territory of the kingdom. As re- 
gards the participation in this en- 
quiry of Austro-Hungarian agents 
or authorities appointed for this 
purpose by the Imperial and 
Royal Government, the Royal 
Government cannot accept such 
an arrangement, as it would con- 
stitute a violation of the Consti- 
tution and of the law of criminal 
procedure; nevertheless, in con- 



manded the removal of officers 
and officials who carry on a propa- 
ganda hostile to the Monarchy, 
our demand is palpably not com- 
plied with in this respect, for the 
reason that in Servia the propa- 
ganda of which we complain does 
not constitute an offence punish- 
able by law. 

International law and the penal 
code governing criminal proceed- 
ings have nothing whatever to do 
with this question ; this is purely 
a problem of national polity to be 
settled by a special mutual ar- 
rangement. Servia 's reservation 
is, therefore, unintelligible and, 
on account of its vague and unde- 
fined form, is likely to give rise 
to insurmountable difficulties in 
the attainment of a final settle- 
ment. 

Our demand was perfectly clear 
and could not be misunderstood. 
We demanded: 

1. The institution of a legal in- 
vestigation against those who par- 
ticipated in the plot. 

2. The cooperation of Austro- 
Hungarian officials in the enquiry 
(recherches, in contradistinction 
to enquete judiciaire). 

We did not contemplate the 
participation of Austro-Hunga- 
rian officials in the Servian legal 
proceedings; these officials were 
only to cooperate in the prelimi- 
nary police investigation, which 
was to seek out and collect the 
data for the judicial enquiry. 



96 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 



crete cases communications as to 
the results of the investigation in 
question might be given to the 
Austro-Hungarian agents. 



7. The Royal Government pro- 
ceeded on the very evening of the 
delivery of the note, to arrest 
Commandant Voja Tankositch. 

As regards Milan Ciganoviteh, 
who is a subject of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy and who 
up to the 15th June was employed 
(on probation) by the directorate 
of railways, it has not yet been 
possible to find out his where- 
abouts. Notices for his appre- 
hension have been published in 
the press. 

The Austro-Hungarian Govero- 



If the Servian Government has 
misunderstood us, it has done so 
intentionally, since it must be 
familiar with the difference be- 
tween an enquete judiciaire (a 
judicial enquiry) and simple re- 
citer ches (a preliminary police in- 
vestigation). 

Since the Servian Government 
wishes to evade every form of 
control in connexion with the 
proposed investigation which, if 
correctly conducted, would ad- 
duce results highly undesirable 
for that Government; and since 
it is unable to decline on plausi- 
ble grounds the cooperation of 
our officials in the police prelimi- 
naries, — a police intervention for 
which there are a great number 
of precedents — it has adopted a 
contention designed to furnish an 
apparent justification of its re- 
fusal to comply with our demand 
and to make our demand appear 
impossible of acceptance. 

This reply is equivocal. 

Our investigations have shown 
that Ciganoviteh took a leave of 
absence three days after the 
assassination, when it became 
known that he had partici- 
pated in the plot ; and that under 
orders from the Belgrade Police 
Department he proceeded to Ri- 
bari. It is, therefore, untrue that 
Ciganoviteh had retired from the 
Government's service as early as 
the 15/28th of June. In addition, 
it should be stated that the Chief 
of the Belgrade Police, who him- 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 97 



ment is requested to be so good as 
to supply as soon as possible, in 
the customary form, the presump- 
tive evidence of guilt as well as 
the possible proofs of guilt which 
have been collected up to the pres- 
ent time, at the enquiry at Sera- 
jevo, for the purposes of the Ser- 
vian enquiry. 

8. The Servian Government will 
reinforce and extend the meas- 
ures which have been taken for 
suppressing the illicit traffic in 
arms and explosives across the 
frontier. 

It goes without saying that 
the Servian Government will im- 
mediately order an enquiry and 
will severely punish the frontier 
officials on the Schabatz-Loznica 
line who have failed in their duty 
and allowed the authors of the 
crime of Serajevo to pass. 

9. The Royal Government will 
gladly furnish explanations of 
the remarks made by its officials, 
whether in Servia or abroad, in 
interviews after the crime, and 
which, according to the statement 
of the Imperial and Royal Gov- 
ernment, were hostile to the Mon- 
archy, as soon as the Imperial and 
Royal Government shall have 
communicated to it the passages in 
question in these remarks, and as 
soon as it shall have shown that 
the remarks were actually made 
by the said officials, in connexion 
with which the Royal Government 
itself will take steps to collect 
evidence. 



self had caused Ciganovitch's de- 
parture and knew his where- 
abouts, stated in an interview 
that no person of the name of 
Milan Ciganovitch existed in 
Belgrade. 



The interviews here referred to 
must be well known to the Ser- 
vian Government. The request 
that the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment furnish details concern- 
ing these interviews, and the fact 
that the Servian Government re- 
serves the exclusive right to con- 
duct the formal investigation in 
this matter, prove that on this 
point, as on others, Servia has no 
serious intention to accede to our 
demands. 



98 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

10. The Royal Government will 
inform the Imperial and Royal 
Government of the execution of 
the measures comprised under the 
above heads, in so far as this has 
not already been done by the pres- 
ent note, as soon as each measure 
shall have been ordered and car- 
ried out. 

If the Imperial and Royal Gov- 
ernment is not satisfied with this 
reply the Servian Government, 
considering that it is not to the 
common interest to take precipi- 
tate action in the solution of this 
question, is ready, as always, to 
accept a pacific understanding, 
either by referring this question 
to the decision of the Interna- 
tional Tribunal at The Hague, or 
to the Great Powers which took 
part in the drawing up of the 
declaration made by the Servian 
Government on the 18/31 March, 
1909. 

Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914. 



No. 35. 

Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 28, 1914. 

Great Britain's proposal for a conference in London, in which 
Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France should take part, has been 
rejected by Germany on the ground that Germany could not bring 
her ally before a European tribunal for adjudication of Austria- 
Hungary's differences with Servia. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN BED BOOK (NO. 1) 99 

No. 36. 
Baron Mutter to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Tokio, July 28, 1914. 

To-day's semi-official " Japan Times" concludes an editorial by 
saying that Japan is on the best of terms with the three Great Powers 
concerned, namely, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia, and had 
no interest whatever in Servia. 

In the event of war the Imperial Government would naturally 
remain strictly neutral. 



No. 37. 
Count Berchtold to the Royal Servian Foreign Office, Belgrade. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

The Royal Servian Government having failed to give a satis- 
factory reply to the note which was handed to it by the Austro- 
Hungarian Minister in Belgrade on July 23, 1914, the Imperial and 
Royal Government is compelled to protect its own rights and in- 
terests, by a recourse to armed force. 

Austria-Hungary, therefore, considers herself from now on to 
be in state of war with Servia. 



No. 38. 
Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny, Berlin. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

For your information and for transmission to the Secretary of 
State. 

I have received from Count Mensdorff the following telegram, 
dated the 27th inst. : 

"I had occasion to-day to explain fully to Sir Edward Grey, that 
our action does not mean aggression but self-defence and self-preser- 



100 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

vation, and that we do not contemplate conquest of Servian territory 
or destruction of Servian independence. "We desire to obtain satisfac- 
tion for the past and guarantees for the future. 

"In so doing I made use of certain points in your instructions to 
Count Szapary. Sir Edward Grey said he felt very much disap- 
pointed at the fact that we dealt with the Servian reply as if it were 
a downright refusal. 

"He had expected that this reply would furnish a basis upon 
which the four other Governments would be able to elaborate a 
satisfactory arrangement. 

"This had been his idea when he suggested a conference. The 
conference would meet on the assumption that Austria-Hungary as 
well as Russia would refrain from all military operations while the 
other Powers endeavoured to find a satisfactory solution. (To-day's 
declaration by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons enlarges 
upon the project of the conference.) 

"When he made the suggestion that we should refrain from 
military operations against Servia, I expressed the fear that it might 
possibly be too late. 

"The Secretary of State was of the opinion that we were taking 
a great risk if we were bound, under all circumstances, to make war 
on Servia, on the assumption that Russia would remain inactive. 
Should we be able to persuade Russia to refrain from action, he 
would have no more to say ; if not, the possibilities and dangers were 
incalculable. 

"As a symptom of the feeling of uneasiness prevalent in England, 
he pointed out that the Great British fleet which had been concen- 
trated in Portsmouth after the manoeuvres and was to have been 
dispersed to-day, would remain there for the time being. 'We would 
not have called out any reserves,' he observed, 'but since they are 
gathered, we cannot send them home at this moment. ' 

"The object of his suggestion of a conference is to avert a collision 
among the Great Powers, if possible, and presumably to isolate the 
conflict. Should Russia mobilise and Germany take action, the proj- 
ect of a conference would automatically fall through. 

"It seems to me superfluous to point out to you that Grey's 
project of a conference has been superseded by the course of events 
inasmuch as it concerns our conflict with Servia, in view of the 
existing state of war." 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 101 

No. 39. 
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

We attach great importance to Sir Edward Grey's impartial 
appreciation of our action in Servia in general, and of our rejection 
of the Servian note in particular. I therefore request you to explain 
in detail to the Secretary of State the dossier which has been des- 
patched to you by post, and to emphasise the salient points in it. 
In the same sense you will discuss with Sir Edward Grey the critical 
comments on the Servian note (copy of the note together with our 
comments was despatched to you by yesterday's past) and make 
clear to him that Servia has only apparently met our demands with 
the object of deceiving Europe, without giving any guarantee as to 
the future. 

In view of the fact that the Servian Government was fully aware 
that the unconditional acceptance of our demands alone could satisfy 
us, the Servian tactics are easily fathomed. Servia has accepted, 
with various reservations, several of our demands in order to deceive 
public opinion in Europe, confident that she never would be called 
upon to carry out her promises. In your conversation with Sir 
Edward Grey, you will lay particular stress upon the circumstance 
that the general mobilisation of the Servian army was ordered for 
July the 25th, 3 o'clock p.m., while the reply to our note was handed 
in shortly before the expiration of the stipulated time, a few minutes 
before 6 o'clock. 

We had previously made no military preparations, but were forced 
to make them by the Servian mobilisation. 



No. 40. 
Count Berchtold to Count Szapdry, St. Petersburg^,. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

For your information and guidance: 

The Imperial Russian Ambassador called on me to-day to inform 
me of his return from Russia after a short leave of absence, and at 



102 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

the same time to comply with telegraphic instructions received from 
M. Sazonow. The latter had informed him of having had a long 
and friendly conversation with you (re your telegram of the 27th 
inst.) in the course of which you had, with great readiness, analysed 
the different points of Servians response. M. Sazonow held the opinion 
that Servia had met our demands to a great extent, but that he con- 
sidered several of these demands to be unacceptable, a view which he 
already had communicated to you. Under the circumstances the 
Servian response appeared to him to furnish the basis for an 
understanding, to which the Russian Government would willingly 
lend a hand. M. Sazonow therefore wished to propose that the ex- 
change of views be continued with you and that I should instruct you 
to that effect. 

I replied that I could not agree to such a proposal. Nobody in 
Austria-Hungary would understand or approve such a discussion of 
a note which we already had found unsatisfactory. Such a discus- 
sion appears all the more impossible since public opinion is already 
deeply and generally excited, as the Ambassador must be well aware. 
Moreover, we have declared war on Servia to-day. 

The Ambassador's arguments were chiefly to the effect that we 
would not stamp out the admitted ill-feeling in Servia by force of 
arms, but that on the contrary we would inflame it still further. In 
reply I shed some light upon our actual relation with Servia, which 
made it inevitable that we should, however reluctantly and without 
any underhand design, exert the necessary pressure to make it clear 
to our restless neighbour that we are irrevocably resolved no longer 
to permit a movement tolerated by the Servian Government and 
directed against the existence of the Dual Monarchy. Moreover, 
Servia's attitude after the receipt of our note was not such as would 
make possible a peaceful settlement, because Servia, before presenting 
her unsatisfactory reply, had ordered a general mobilisation, and by 
so doing had committed a hostile act against us. Nevertheless, we 
had waited three more days. 

Yesterday Servia inaugurated hostilities against us on the Hun- 
garian border. Thus we are compelled to abandon our forbearing 
attitude toward Servia. It has now been made impossible for us to 
bring about a complete and peaceful adjustment of relations with 
Servia, and we are forced to meet the Servian provocations in the 
only manner compatible with the dignity of the Dual Monarchy under 
the circumstances. 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 103 

No. 41. 
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

The British Ambassador called on me this morning and, accord- 
ing to instructions, explained Sir Edward Grey's attitude on our 
controversy with Servia, as follows : 

The British Government has followed with great interest the 
course of the crisis up to date, and wishes to assure us of its sympathy 
with the stand we have taken and of its thorough understanding of 
our grievances against Servia. 

Although Great Britain has no special concern about our difficulty 
with Servia as such, the London Cabinet could not ignore the con- 
flict, inasmuch as it involves the possibility of extending into widening 
eddies and thereby endangering the peace of Europe. 

Only on this ground was Sir Edward Grey prompted to invite the 
Governments of the countries not directly interested in this conflict 
(Germany, Italy and France) to examine all the possibilities by a 
continuous exchange of views and to consider methods of as speedy 
a settlement as possible. The Secretary of State considers it expe- 
dient that, following the precedent of the London Conference during 
the last Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of the aforesaid States in 
London should keep in continuous touch with him. 

Sir Edward Grey already has received responses in which the 
above-mentioned Governments expressed their cordial assent to his 
suggestion. For the present the Secretary of State would desire, if 
possible, to prevent at the eleventh hour the outbreak of hostilities 
between Austria-Hungary and Servia. Should this, however, not be 
possible, he was anxious to avoid a bloody collision, possibly by induc- 
ing Servia to withdraw her troops without giving battle. Servia 's 
reply to us seems to offer the basis for an understanding, in the 
opinion of Sir Edward Grey. England, he intimated, was willing to 
use her influence in this direction, subject to our desire. 

I thanked the Ambassador for Sir Edward Grey's communication, 
and replied that I fully appreciated the views of the Secretary of 
State. His point of view, however, necessarily differs from mine, 
since Great Britain has no direct interest in our dispute with Servia, 
and because the Secretary of State could hardly be thoroughly cogni- 
sant of the seriousness and importance of the pending questions for 



104 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

the Dual Monarchy. Sir Edward Grey's suggestions concerning the 
possibility of preventing an outbreak of hostilities are somewhat 
belated, since, as early as yesterday, the Servians had opened fire on 
our frontier-guards, and also because we declared war upon Servia 
to-day. Referring to the idea of an exchange of views on the basis 
of the Servian response, I have to decline the suggestion. We had 
demanded an unqualified acceptance. Servia had endeavoured to 
extricate herself from an embarrassing situation by means of quibbles. 
With such tactics we were only too familiar. 

I added that Sir Maurice de Bunsen's personal experience surely 
placed him in a position to appreciate fully our standpoint and to 
explain it accurately to Sir Edward Grey. 

Inasmuch as Sir Edward Grey is desirous to serve the cause of 
European peace, he certainly will meet with no opposition from us. 
But he should realise that the peace of Europe would not be preserved 
if Great Powers stood behind Servia and assured her of impunity. 
Suppose, even, that we agreed to attempt such a compromise, Servia 
as a result would only be encouraged to persevere in her old tactics — 
a situation which would once more endanger peace in a very short 
time. 

The British Ambassador assured me that he perfectly understood 
our standpoint ; but, on the other hand, he regretted that, under the 
circumstances, there was no chance of attaining the British Govern- 
ment's desire to bring about a peaceful compromise. He hoped to be 
allowed to remain in touch with me, particularly on account of the 
grave danger of a European conflagration. 

I replied that I was always at the Ambassador's disposal, and 
with this the interview terminated. 



No. 42. 
Count BercJitold to Count Szogyeny, Berlin. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I request you to call at once on the Imperial Chancellor or on 
the Secretary of State and to convey to him the following in my 
behalf: 

According to corroborative news from St. Petersburgh, Kieff, 
Warsaw, Moscow and Odessa, Russia is making extensive military 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 105 

preparations. M. Sazonow, however, as well as the Russian Minister 
of War, have given their word of honour that a mobilisation had not 
yet been ordered. The latter Minister, however, has advised the Ger- 
man Military Attache that the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, 
Moscow and Kazan, which adjoin Austria-Hungary, would be mo- 
bilised if our troops crossed the Servian border. 

Under these circumstances I would urgently request the Berlin 
Cabinet to consider whether Russia's attention should not be called, 
in a friendly manner, to the fact that the mobilisation of the above- 
mentioned districts would be equivalent to a threat to Austro-Hun- 
gary, and that should it actually occur it would have to be met by 
Austria-Hungary and her ally, the German Empire, with the most 
comprehensive military counter-measures. 

In order to facilitate the possible adoption of a more conciliatory 
attitude by Russia, we think it advisable that such a move should 
be initiated by Germany, alone, although we would, of course, be pre- 
pared to join in the action. 

Plain language would seem to me to be the most effective meas- 
ure at this moment, in order to bring home to Russia the lengths to 
which her menacing attitude may lead. 



No. 43. 
Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny, Berlin. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

The Imperial German Ambassador has advised me that Sir Ed- 
ward Grey has approached the German Government with a request 
that it use its influence with the Imperial and Royal Government to 
the effect that the latter either consider the reply from Belgrade satis- 
factory or else accept it as a basis for discussions between the Cabinets. 

Herr von Tschirschky was instructed to submit the British pro- 
posal to the Vienna Cabinet for its consideration. 



106 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 



No. 44. 

Count Berchtold to tJie Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in St. Peters- 
burgh, London, Paris and Rome. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. 

For your information : 

I have conveyed to the Imperial German Ambassador to-day, the 
following memorandum in reply to a communication by him : 

(Memoir.) 

The Austro-Hungarian Government has noted with profound 
thanks the communication which the Imperial German Ambassador 
transmitted to it on the 28th instant, by request of the British Cabi- 
net, to the effect that the Imperial German Government use its in- 
fluence with the Vienna Cabinet in an effort to induce the latter, either 
to approve the response from Belgrade or else to accept it as a basis 
for discussions. 

Referring to the communication made by the British Secretary 
of State to Prince Lichnowsky, the Imperial and Royal Government 
wishes to point out, in the first place, that Servia 's reply by no means 
conveys an assent to all our demands with one sole exception, as Sir 
Edward Grey seems to assume, but on the contrary, contains reserva- 
tions in almost every clause, so that the value of the concessions is 
essentially reduced. The clause which has been entirely rejected 
covers the very points which would have afforded us some guarantee 
for the realisation of our object. 

The Imperial and Royal Government cannot conceal its surprise 
at the assumption that its action against Servia was aimed at Russia 
and Russian influence in the Balkans, a supposition which would imply 
that the propaganda against the Dual Monarchy is not only Servian 
but also of Russian origin. 

Hitherto we have presumed that official Russian circles had no 
connexion with the agitation against the Dual Monarchy, and our 
present action is directed solely against Servia, while our sentiments 
toward Russia are perfectly friendly, as we can assure Sir Edward 
Grey. 

At the same time the Austro-Hungarian Government must point 
out that, to its sincere regret, it no longer is in a position to meet the 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 107 

Servian reply in the spirit of the British suggestions, since at the time 
when the German request was presented here, a state of war already 
existed between the Dual Monarchy and Servia, and thus the Servian 
reply had been superseded by events. 

The Imperial and Royal Government wishes to call attention to 
the fact that the Royal Servian Government has proceeded to the 
mobilisation of the Servian forces before it replied to our note, and 
subsequently has allowed three days to elapse without showing any 
disposition to modify its point of view, whereupon we have declared 
war. 

Should the British Cabinet be prepared to exert its influence 
upon the Russian Government for the maintenance of peace among 
the Great Powers, and for a localisation of the war which has been 
forced upon us by the Servian agitation of many years' standing, 
such efforts would meet with the Imperial and Royal Government's 
appreciation. 



No. 45. 
Count Sztcsen to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 29, 1914. 

France undoubtedly is making military preparations as announced 
by the newspapers, though the latter may possibly be exaggerating. 
According to strictly confidential information, Baron Schoen has been 
instructed to touch upon the topic of these military preparations with 
M. Viviani to-day, and to point out that, under the circumstances, 
Germany might be compelled to adopt similar measures, which, of 
course, could not be concealed and which would cause great excite- 
ment when they should become known to the public. 

Thus both countries, though only desirous of peace, might be 
driven to at least a partial mobilisation, which would be dangerous. 

Moreover Baron Schoen, acting on instructions, will also declare 
that Germany anxiously desires that the conflict between us and 
Servia shall remain localised, and that Germany counts on the sup- 
port of France on this point. 



108 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 46. 
Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. 

As early as Sunday the German Government declared at St. 
Petersburg!! that a mobilisation by Russia would be followed by a 
mobilisation by Germany. 

Thereupon the Russian Government replied in the sense of my 
telegram of the 27th instant. Another telegram was sent to St. 
Petersburgh to-day, to the effect that Germany may be compelled to 
mobilise if Russia carries on her mobilisation any further. 



No. 47. 
Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914. 

On information received from the German Ambassador that M. 
Sazonow appeared greatly disturbed by your apparent unwillingness 
to continue discussions with Russia and by the Austro-Hungarian 
order of mobilisation, which appears to him to exceed the necessary 
scope and therefore is believed to be directed against Russia, I called 
upon the Minister in an attempt to clear up misconceptions which 
seemed to exist. 

The Minister asserted that Austria-Hungary had refused point- 
blank to discuss matters any further. In accordance with your tele- 
gram of the 28th instant, I explained that, in view of recent events, 
you certainly had refused to discuss any further the wording of the 
notes and our conflict with Servia in general; that, on the other 
hand, I have to state that I was in a position to open a much wider 
field for discussion by declaring that we do not wish to interfere with 
any Russian interests and that we do not intend to take any Servian 
territory; provided, always, that the conflict be localised between 
Austria-Hungary and Servia; that, moreover, we did not intend to 
violate Servia ? s sovereignty. I expressed my firm conviction that 
you would always be willing to keep in touch with St. Petersburgh 
with regard to Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 109 

M. Sazonow replied that he felt reassured on the territorial ques- 
tion, but that he must adhere to his former view that the enforcement 
of our demand would place Servia in a condition of vassalage ; that 
such an event would affect the equilibrium of the Balkans and thereby 
would infringe upon Eussian interests. He then reverted to the dis- 
cussion of the note, to Sir Edward Grey's action, etc., and again 
suggested that he recognised our legitimate interests and wished to 
satisfy them fully, but that this should be done in a manner acceptable 
to Servia. I rejoined that these were not Russian but Servian inter- 
ests, whereupon Sazonow retorted that in this case Russian interests 
were identical with Servian interests. In order to find an issue from 
this vicious circle, I passed to another topic. 

I observed that it had been brought to my notice that some ap- 
prehension was felt in Russia, because we had mobilised eight army 
corps for action against Servia. M. Sazonow stated that not he but 
the Chief of the General Staff had expressed uneasiness, and that he 
himself knew nothing about it. I endeavoured to convince M. Sazonow 
that any unbiased person could be easily convinced that our southern 
army corps could not be a menace to Russia. 

I pointed out to the Minister that it might be well to inform his 
Imperial Majesty, the Czar, of the true situation, the more so, because 
it is urgently necessary for the preservation of the peace that an 
immediate stop be put to this race in military preparations, which 
appeared imminent as the result of this information. M. Sazonow 
said in a significant manner — and his observation shed an illuminat- 
ing light upon the situation — that he would inform the Chief of the 
General Staff, as that officer conferred with His Majesty every day. 

The Minister also said that an Ukase was being signed to-day, 
ordering a somewhat extensive mobilisation. He could, however, 
declare in an absolutely official way that these forces were not in- 
tended for a sudden attack upon us, but would be kept under arms 
in case Russia's interests in the Balkans should be menaced. An 
explanatory note, he said, would confirm this assurance that it was 
only a question of a precautionary measure, which Czar Nicholas had 
deemed justifiable on the ground that we not only have the advantage 
of a quicker mobilisation, but also have the benefit of so long a start. 
I emphatically drew Sazonow 's attention to the impression which 
such measures are bound to create in Austria-Hungary. I expressed 
my doubts as to whether the explanatory note would be able to soften 
that impression, whereupon Sazonow reiterated his assurance that 
this measure is absolutely inoffensive ( !). 



110 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 48. 
Count Berchtold to Count Szbgyeny, Berlin. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. 

Herr von Tschirschky has just told me that the Russian Ambas- 
sador has informed him that his Government had communicated to 
him the fact that the Military Districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and 
Kazan would be mobilised. Russia considers her honour as a Great 
Power to have been offended, and therefore she has been obliged to 
take adequate measures. The Russian mobilisation is being confirmed 
by our generals commanding the Army Corps in Galicia, and, ac- 
cording to our Military Attache, was not denied by M. Sazonow in 
his conference with the German Ambassador. 

You are instructed to convey the above information to the Ger- 
man Government without delay and to point out emphatically that 
for military reasons our general mobilisation will have to be ordered 
at once, unless the Russian mobilisation is stopped immediately. 

As a last attempt to avert a European war, I consider it desirable 
that our Envoy and the German Representative in St. Petersburgh, 
and if necessary also in Paris, be instructed at once to explain in an 
amicable way to the respective Governments that the continuation 
of the Russian mobilisation would provoke counter-measures in Ger- 
many and Austria-Hungary, which necessarily would lead to the most 
serious consequences. You will add, that it is self-evident that we 
cannot allow any interference with our armed action in Servia. 

The Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in St. Petersburgh and Paris 
are being simultaneously instructed to make the above declaration as 
soon as their German colleagues receive the same instructions. 



No. 49. 

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry, St. Petersburgh. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. 

In reply to your telegram of July 29th, I am still ready, as 
before, to allow you to explain to M. Sazonow the individual points 
in our note to Servia, which has since been superseded by events. In 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 111 

this connexion I would also make a point of discussing in a frank 
and friendly manner the questions which directly concern our rela- 
tions with Russia, in accordance with the suggestion transmitted to 
me by M. Schebeko. From such a discussion, it is to be hoped, may 
result the elimination of the unfortunate misconception in this par- 
ticular matter, as well as the peaceful development of our good 
relations with Russia. 



No. 50. 
Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry, St. Petersburgh. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. 

For your information and guidance : 

I have explained to M. Schebeko to-day, that it had been reported 
to me that M. Sazonow was painfully impressed by my flat rejection 
of his suggestion of a conference between you and himself, and also 
because no exchange of views had taken place between myself and 
M. Schebeko. 

With regard to the first proposal, I had already instructed you 
by telegraph to give M. Sazonow any explanation he might require 
concerning our note, although recent events have superseded that 
note. Such an explanation, however, could be confined to only be- 
lated elucidation, as we had intended never to abate any point in the 
note. I also stated that I had authorised you to make our relations 
with Russia the subject of an amicable exchange of views with M. 
Sazonow. The complaint that there had been no conference between 
myself and Schebeko must be based on a misunderstanding, as we — 
Schebeko and I — had discussed the pending questions only two days 
ago. The Ambassador confirmed this and said that he had sent a full 
report of our interview to M. Sazonow. 

M. Schebeko then explained why our action against Servia had 
caused such anxiety in St. Petersburgh. He asserted that we, as a 
Great Power, were taking action against the small Servian State, 
without conveying any knowledge of our intention at St. Petersburgh, 
as to whether we would infringe upon its sovereignty, overthrow it, 
or even crush it out of existence. Being connected with Servia by 
historic and other ties, Russia could not remain indifferent to Servia 's 
fate. Every attempt has been made in St. Petersburgh to impress 



112 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 

upon Belgrade the necessity of complying with our demands. This, 
however, at a time when it could not have been known what demands 
we would formulate. 

But even now, after the demands have been made, every influence 
would be exerted, I was assured, to obtain all possible concessions to 
our wishes. I begged the Ambassador to remember that we had re- 
peatedly stated that we were not following a policy of conquest in 
Servia, that we did not intend to infringe upon her sovereignty, but 
that we merely desired to attain a solution which would afford us a 
guarantee against further agitations on the part of Servia. In en- 
larging upon the subject of our intolerable relations with Servia, I 
plainly gave Schebeko to understand to what extent Russian diplo- 
macy was responsible for this state of things, though surely against 
the inclination of the leading men in Russia. 

In the course of our conversation I referred to the Russian mobili- 
sation, which had meanwhile been brought to my knowledge. Since 
the mobilisation is restricted to the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, 
Moscow and Kazan, it bears the character of a hostile demonstration 
against the Dual Monarchy. The cause of this measure is unknown 
to me, since there is no matter in dispute between us and Russia. 
Austria-Hungary has mobilised her troops solely against Servia, and 
not one man against Russia. The very fact that the 1st, Xth, and 
Xlth army corps have not been mobilised, bears out my statement. 
Since Russia is obviously mobilising against us, we are compelled to 
extend our own mobilisation ; I, however, wish to point out expressly, 
that this measure should not be considered as a hostile act against 
Russia, but simply as a response to the Russian mobilisation. 

I asked M. Schebeko to report the above to his Government, which 
he undertook to do. 



No. 51. 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in London 
and St. Petersburgh. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 31, 1914. 

I am telegraphing to Berlin as follows: 

Herr von Tschirschky, acting on instructions, informed me yes- 
terday of a conversation between Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lich- 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 113 

nowsky, in the course of which the Secretary of State made the 
following declaration to the German Ambassador: 

Sazonow has made known to the British Government that, since 
Austria-Hungary has declared war on Servia, he was no longer in a 
position to treat directly with Austria-Hungary, and therefore re- 
quested Great Britain to resume her mediation. As a condition of 
this mediation, however, the Russian Government stipulates the sus- 
pension of hostilities in the meanwhile. 

Commenting upon this Russian suggestion, Sir Edward Grey told 
Prince Lichnowsky that Great Britain was considering a plan of 
mediation a quatre, and held such mediation to be urgent and essen- 
tial for the avoidance of a general war. 

You are instructed to thank the Secretary of State warmly for 
the communication made by Herr von Tschirsehky and to express 
our readiness to consider Sir Edward Grey's proposition to mediate 
between us and Servia despite the changes brought about in the 
situation by Russia's mobilisation. 

Our acceptance, however, is subject to the condition that our 
military action against Servia shall nevertheless proceed and that 
the British Cabinet shall induce the Russian Government to stop the 
mobilisation directed against us. It is understood that in this case 
we would at once cancel our defensive military counter-measures in 
Galicia, which had been forced upon us by Russia's mobilisation. 



No. 52. 

Count Szapary to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July 31, 1914. 

Early this morning an order was issued for the general mobilisa- 
tion of the entire army and navy. 



114 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 



No. 53. 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Embassies, Legations 

and Consulates. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 31, 1914. 

For your information and for use at the respeetive Governments : 

In response to Russian Government's order for mobilisation at 
our frontier we are forced to take similar measures in Galieia. 

These measures are of a purely defensive character and are solely 
due to the pressure of the Russian preparations, which we greatly 
regret, as we have no aggressive intentions whatever against Russia, 
and desire the continuation of the same friendly relations as here- 
tofore. 

Negotiations dealing with the situation are proceeding between 
the Cabinets at Vienna and at St. Petersburgh, and we still hope that 
they may lead to a general understanding. 



No. 54. 
Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Paris, July 31, 1914. 

The German Ambassador, on instructions from his Government, 
has made a declaration here to the effect, that, if the Russian general 
mobilisation shall not be stopped within twelve hours, Germany also 
will mobilise. At the same time Baron Sehoen enquired whether 
France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war. 
He requested an answer to this question within eighteen hours. The 
time-limit expires to-morrow, Saturday, at 1 o'clock p.m. 



No. 55. 
Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July 31, 1914. 

Received your telegram of the 30th inst. My telegram of the 
29th inst. will have acquainted you with the fact that I had resumed 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 115 

the exchange of views with M. Sazonow without waiting for instruc- 
tions and practically on the basis now suggested by you, without 
succeeding, however, in bringing the conflicting viewpoints nearer to 
an agreement. 

Meanwhile the conversations between the German Ambassador 
and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs have made it clear that 
Russia would not be content even with a formal declaration by 
Austria-Hungary that she would not reduce Servian territory, nor 
infringe upon her sovereignty, nor violate any Russian interest in the 
Balkans, or elsewhere. Moreover, Russia has, since then, ordered a 
general mobilisation. 



No. 56. 
Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) St. Peter sburgJt, August 1, 1914. 

On my visit to M. Sazonow to-day, I declared that I had received 
certain instructions, but that I was not aware of the situation created 
in Vienna by the Russian general mobilisation. 

Therefore, in carrying out the instructions which had been des- 
patched to me before that event, I could not take into account the 
newly created situation. I said that the two points of your instruc- 
tions dealt with the misunderstanding arising out of our refusal to 
discuss matters any further with Russia. As I had said even before I 
was authorised to do so, this conception is erroneous. I pointed out 
that you were not only willing to enter into negotiations with Russia 
on a most comprehensive basis, but even to discuss the wording of 
our note, inasmuch as it was only a question of interpretation. 

I emphasised the point that your instructions once more bear out 
your good intentions ; that I was still ignorant of the effect produced 
in Vienna by the Russian general mobilisation and that I could but 
hope that events might not yet have carried us too far. In any case 
I considered it my duty at the present momentous juncture to fur- 
nish another proof of the good-will of the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment. 

M. Sazonow, in reply, expressed his satisfaction at this evidence 
of our good intentions, but observed that for obvious reasons the 
neutral ground of London would promise better success for the pro- 



116 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

posed negotiations than St. Petersburgh. I replied that you desired 
to be in direct touch with St. Petersburgh, and that I was conse- 
quently unable to give an opinion on the suggestion, but would not 
fail to convey it to you. 



No. 57. 
Count Szogyeny to Count Berclitold. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, August 2, 1914. 

The Secretary of State has just advised me that no reply to the 
German enquiry has arrived from Russia. 

Russian troops have crossed the German border near Schwiddin 
(southeast of Bialla). Russia has, therefore, attacked Germany. 
Germany consequently considers herself to be in state of war with 
Russia. 

The Russian Ambassador was handed his passports this forenoon ; 
he probably will leave to-day. 



No. 58. 
Count Mensdorff to Count Berclitold. 

(Telegram.) London, August 4, 1914. 

I have just seen Sir Edward Grey. The British Government has 
addressed an ultimatum to Germany on the subject of Belgium. He 
expects reply at midnight. 

Sir Edward Grey holds that, meanwhile, there was no reason for 
a similar communication to the Imperial and Royal Government, and 
no cause for a conflict with us, as long as we are not at war with 
France. He hoped we would not open hostilities without a previous 
formal declaration of war. He will not recall Sir M. de Bunsen. 

Should we enter into a state of war with France, Great Britain, 
as an ally of France, would find it difficult to cooperate with the 
latter in the Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGAEIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 117 

No. 59. 
Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry, St. PetersburgJi. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 5, 1914. 

You are instructed to hand the following note to the Russian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs: 

"By order of his Government, the undersigned Ambassador of 
Austria- Hungary has the honour to notify His Excellency, the Rus- 
sian Minister of Foreign Affairs, as follows: 

"In view of the threatening attitude assumed by Russia in the 
conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Servia, and in 
view of the fact that, in consequence of this conflict, and according 
to a communication of the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has considered it 
necessary to open hostilities against Germany; furthermore, in view 
of the fact that the latter consequently has entered into a state of war 
with the former Power, Austri ar Hungary considers herself equally 
in a state of war with Russia." 

After having presented this note, you will ask for the return of 
your passports and take your departure without delay accompanied 
by the entire staff of the Embassy, with the sole exception of those 
officials who may have to remain. 

Simultaneously passports are being handed to M. Schebeko. 



No. 60. 
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 6, 1914. 

Received your telegram of the 6th inst. 

You are instructed to assure Sir Edward Grey, that we shall 
under no circumstances begin hostilities against Great Britain with- 
out previous formal declaration of war, but that we also expect Great 
Britain to act on the same principle. 



118 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 61. 

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Paris, August 8, 1914. 

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has sent for me and has informed 
me that the Innsbruck army corps has been despatched to the French 
frontier, according to positive information received by him. M. Dou- 
mergue urgently desires to know whether this information is correct, 
and in the event of the affirmative to know the Imperial and Royal 
Government's intentions. France being at war with Germany, such 
a movement of troops to the French border is, in his opinion, incom- 
patible with the state of peace existing between Austria-Hungary and 
France. M. Dumaine is instructed to make a similar representation 
to you. 



No. 62. 
Count Berchtold to Count Szecsen, Paris, 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 9, 1914. 

Re your telegram of the 8th inst. 

On information received from General Staff I authorise you to 
declare to the French Government that news of participation of our 
troops in the Franco-German war is a pure invention. I have made 
an identical declaration to M. Dumaine. 



No. 63. 
Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Paris, August 10, 1914. 

Received telegram of 9th August. 

Immediately communicated contents to M. Doumergue. The 
Minister, having received a similar telegraphic report from M. Du- 
maine concerning his conversation with you, is satisfied that our 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 119 

troops are not on the French frontier, but says that he has positive 
information that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been trans- 
ported to Germany, thus enabling the latter to withdraw her own 
troops from the German territories now occupied by our forces. In 
the Minister's view this facilitates the military operations of the 
Germans. 

I have repeatedly called the Minister's attention to the wording 
of your reply; he recognises that there could be no question of an 
active participation of our troops in the Franco-German war, but in- 
sists that the presence of our troops on German territory is undeni- 
able and represents military support to Germany. Under these cir- 
cumstances he has instructed the French Ambassador in Vienna to 
ask immediately for his passports and to leave Vienna with the entire 
staff of the Embassy, to-day. 

The Minister told me that, under the circumstances, my presence 
here could be of no avail, but owing to public excitement, might even 
give rise to unpleasant incidents which he would like to avoid. He 
offered to have a special train ready to-night for my conveyance out 
of France. I replied that it would be impossible for me to obtain 
instructions from you by to-night, but in view of the recall of M. 
Dumaine, I begged him to have my passports handed to me. 



No. 64. 
Count BercJttold to Count Mensdorff, London. 

Vienna, August 11, 1914. 

The French Government has instructed its Ambassador here to 
ask for his passports on the ground that an Austro-Hungarian army 
corps has been sent to Germany, thereby enabling the German mili- 
tary authorities to withdraw their troops from the German territories 
now occupied by our forces. 

This move by our General Staff is considered to constitute mili- 
tary support to Germany. 

You are instructed to assure the British Government that this 
French assertion, according to authentic information, is unfounded. 



120 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 65. 
Count Mensdorff to Count BercJitold. 

(Telegram.) London, August 12, 1914. 

I have just received from Sir Edward Grey the following com- 
munication : 

"By request of the French Government, which no longer is able 
to communicate directly with your Government, I wish to inform you 
of the following: 

"After having declared war on Servia and having thus initiated 
hostilities in Europe, the Austro-Hungarian Government has, with- 
out any provocation on the part of the Government of the French 
Republic, entered into a state of war with France. 

1st : " After Germany had declared war successively upon Russia 
and France, the Austro-Hungarian Government has intervened in 
this conflict by declaring war on Russia, which was already in alliance 
with France. 

2nd: "According to manifold and reliable information Austria 
has sent troops to the German border under circumstances which 
constitute a direct menace to France. 

"In view of these facts the French Government considers itself 
compelled to declare to the Austro-Hungarian Government that it 
will take all measures necessary to meet the actions and menaces of 
the latter." 

Sir Edward Grey added: "A rupture with France having thus 
been brought about, the Government of His Britannic Majesty is 
obliged to proclaim a state of war between Great Britain and Austria- 
Hungary, to begin at midnight." 



No. 66. 

The Japanese Ambassador to Count BercJitold. 

Monsieur le Comte : Vienna, August 20, 1914. 

No doubt you already have been informed by Baron Miiller of 
the nature of the communication made to the German Government 
by my Government on the 15th inst. ; but, for your personal infor- 
mation, I beg to enclose herewith a copy of a telegram received from 
Tokio on the subject, although I have no instruction to do so. 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGAKIAN EED BOOK (NO. 1) 121 



(Enclosure.) 

The Japanese Government, taking into serious consideration the 
present situation, and as the result of full communication with the 
British Government for the purpose of consolidating and maintaining 
the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, which forms one of 
the objects of the Anglo- Japanese alliance, have come to the decision 
of taking the necessary measures therefor in common with Great 
Britain; but before taking such measures, the Japanese Government 
thought it proper to once approach the German Government with 
a friendly advice which was communicated to them to the following 
effect on the 15th of August, 1914: 

1. All German vessels of war to be immediately withdrawn from 
the waters in the neighbourhood of Japan and China. The vessels 
which cannot be so withdrawn, to be disarmed. 

2. The German Government to deliver, unconditionally and with- 
out compensation, to the Japanese authorities, the entire leased terri- 
tory of Kiau-Chau before the 16th of September, 1914, for the purpose 
of returning it to China. 

The Japanese Government has declared to the German Govern- 
ment that unless their reply of unconditional acceptance of the above 
advice should be received before noon of Sunday, the 23rd instant, 
the Japanese Government shall take such action as they deem neces- 
sary. 

It is sincerely hoped that the above advice, with such ample allow- 
ance of time for reply, may be accepted by the German Government ; 
but should, unfortunately, the German Government not accept the 
advice of the Japanese Government, the latter will be obliged to take 
the necessary measures in order to accomplish their object. 

The reason that led the Imperial Government to assume the 
present attitude is, already mentioned, none other than to safeguard 
the common interests of Japan and Great Britain mentioned in the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance by consolidating the foundation of perma- 
nent peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, and the Japanese Gov- 
ernment have no intention whatever of embarking on a policy of 
territorial expansion or any other design of self-interest. Conse- 
quently, the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to respect, 
with the utmost care, the interests of third Powers in Eastern Asia 
and not in the least to injure them. 



122 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 67. 
Count Berchtold to Count Clary, Brussels. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 22, 1914. 

I request you to inform the Royal Belgian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs without delay, as follows: 

By order of my Government I have the honour to notify you, as 
follows : 

In view of the fact that Belgium, having refused to accept the 
propositions addressed to her on several occasions by Germany, is 
now in military cooperation with France and Great Britain, both of 
which have declared war on Austria-Hungary; and in view of the 
recently established fact that Austrian and Hungarian subjects resi- 
dent in Belgium have, under the eyes of the Royal authorities, been 
treated in a manner contrary to the most primitive laws of humanity, 
and inadmissible even toward subjects of a hostile State, Austria- 
Hungary is necessarily compelled to break off diplomatic relations 
and considers herself from now on in a state of war with Belgium. 

I leave the country with the staff of the Legation and place the 
subjects of my country under the protection of the Minister of the 
United States of America in Belgium. 

The Imperial and Royal Government has handed his passports to 
Count Errembault de Dudzeele. 



No. 68. 
Prince HoTienloJie to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, August 23, 1914. 

The Japanese Minister here has been informed by the Foreign. 
Office that the German Imperial Government had no intention to reply 
to the Japanese ultimatum. The German Government has instructed 
its Ambassador in Tokio to leave Japan upon the expiration of the 
time-limit fixed by Japan for noon to-day. Simultaneously the 
Japanese Charge d 'Affaires is to be handed his passports. 

At noon the Charge d'Aff aires received his passports; he will 
leave Berlin to-morrow morning with the staff of the Embassy. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1) 123 

No. 69. 
Count BercJitold to Baron Miiller, Tokio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 24, 1914. 

The Commander of H. M. S. " Elisabeth' ' has been instructed to 
participate in the action at Tsingtau. 

In view of Japan's action against our ally, the German Empire, 
I request you to ask for your passports, notify Consulates and leave 
Japan for America together with our colony and the staffs of Em- 
bassy and Consulates. You will place our subjects and interests under 
the protection of the American Ambassador. Passports will be handed 
to Japanese Ambassador here. 



THE 
AUSTRO-HIWGABIAN RED BOOK 

(NO. 2) 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 1 



No. 1. 
Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 20, 1914. 

On the occasion of your meeting with the Marchese di San Giu- 
liano, which presumably will take place to-morrow, you will express 
yourself in this sense : 

So far you had not received any precise information as to the 
results of the trial of Serajevo, nor with regard to the steps we 
propose to take in this matter at Belgrade. Nevertheless, I had 
acquainted you with the fact that the evidence established up to 
date, as well as the constant subversive Servian agitations carried 
on for many years past, are likely to compel us to assume a serious 
attitude in Belgrade. You are authorised to bring this to the 
knowledge of the Marchese di San Giuliano, and to add that we 
consider it decidedly within the range of possibilities that a peace- 
able issue may be reached in our undertakings in Belgrade. We 
are convinced that in clearing up our relations with Servia, we 
can rely on Italy's loyalty in fulfilment of the terms of our alliance. 

Summing up correctly the international situation, the Marchese 
di San Giuliano has frequently remarked to you, and had also ex- 
pressed to me at Abbazia, the view that Italy needs a strong Austria- 
Hungary. The clearing up of our delicate relations with Servia 
seems an absolute necessity for the preservation of the present position 
of the Monarchy and of the power of resistance of the Triple Alliance, 
which is the foundation of the peace and the equilibrium of Europe. 
At the present moment it is also to Italy's interest to side with us 

1 Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Diplo- 
matic Documents Concerning the Relations of Austria-Hungary with Italy 
from July 20, 1914, to May 23, 1915. Published by the Austro-Hungarian 
Government. Title of publication in the original text: KXJ.K. Ministerium des 
Aussern. Diplomatische Aktenstucke betreffend die Beziehungen Osterreich- 
ungarns zu Italien in der zeit vom 20. Juli 1914 bis 23. Mai 1915. Wien: 
Druck der K.K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1915. 

127 



128 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

openly. It would therefore be of great importance, that the Minister 
should make timely efforts to inspire Italian public opinion in a sense 
favourable to our alliance in order that it may manifest itself accord- 
ingly, as soon as our demands on Servia shall be made. 

In the course of a possible discussion of the subject you may, 
meanwhile without authorisation, express your own firm conviction, 
that, should all peaceful means fail, the Vienna Cabinet would not 
think of inaugurating a war of conquest or of acquiring any Servian 
territory. At the same time you may also deny the malicious in- 
vention of the Temps, that we intend an attack on the Lovcen. We 
would be greatly obliged to the Italian Government if it were to use 
its influence at Cetinje in an effort to persuade Montenegro to remain 
quiescent during our conversations with Belgrade. Montenegro cer- 
tainly is at variance with the attitude of the Belgrade Government 
and, moreover, has had its own painful experiences with bombs im- 
ported from Servia. 

I have expressed myself in the above sense in my conversation 
with the Italian Ambassador. 



No. 2. 

Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, July 20, 1914. 

We must consider the possibility that the Royal Italian Govern- 
ment, in case of warlike complications between us and Servia, will 
endeavour to interpret Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty * 
in a way which would conform neither with the sense nor with the 
wording of it, and that it will claim compensation. The enclosed 
note will serve for your guidance in opposing such a possible Italian 
interpretation of the above mentioned article which the Marchese di 
San Giuliano may bring forward. 

* See Enclosure I. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 129 

(Enclosure 1.) 
(Note.) 

In possibly resorting to the necessity of declaring war against 
Servia, Austria-Hungary by no means intends any territorial con- 
quest. The Monarchy aims solely at the attainment of the object as 
set forth in her note to the Belgrade Government, namely, freedom 
from a disturbance of her normal and peaceful development by a 
subversive agitation fostered by the neighbouring kingdom. 

Even though the Dual Monarchy does not aim at territorial ex- 
pansion by a war with Servia, the nature of the war would necessarily 
transfer the basis of operations to Servian soil. It must also be 
understood that a provisional occupation of Servian territory would 
be maintained until the required guarantees are given and until 
the payment of the expenses which Austria-Hungary will have in- 
curred for the mobilisation and for conducting the war in consequence 
of Servians original refusal. This applies also in the event of Servia 
deciding to yield, whether during the mobilisation or after the be- 
ginning of hostilities. 

It would mean a complete misunderstanding of the spirit of the 
Triple Alliance agreement, if Article VII were to be interpreted in 
such a way as to make a temporary occupation of territory belong- 
ing to a neighbouring Balkan State at war with Austria-Hungary 
conditional upon a previous agreement with Italy based on com- 
pensations. 

As far as the wording of the treaty is concerned, Article VII 
may give rise to misinterpretation: in dealing with a possible neces- 
sity for a modification of the status quo by Austria-Hungary or Italy, 
occurs the phrase "dans les regions des Balcans," which may suggest 
an interpretation in the sense that the provisions of the above-men- 
tioned article should apply as much to the Balkan possessions of 
Turkey as to the territories of other Balkan States, no special dis- 
tinction being made between the two. 

The wording of our agreements shows how unjustified such an 
interpretation of Article VII would be. 

Following the words "dans les regions des Balcans," the same 
Article VII says: "des cotes et lies ottomanes dans la mer Egee" 
(the Ottoman coast and islands in the Adriatic and JEgean Seas). 
This specific mention of Turkish territory implicitly excludes the 



130 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

coasts and islands of other States from the provisions of that article, 
and must be accepted as proof that the words "dans les regions des 
Balcans" also refer solely to Turkish possessions. Otherwise, a surely 
unintended differentiation would arise, according to which, for in- 
stance, the provisions of Article VII would have no bearing on 
Montenegrin or Greek coastal territories or islands, but would apply 
to parts of the interior. 

The particular clause of the same article which deals with a 
possible compensation, also shows the correctness of the view that 
Article VII refers solely to territories of the Turkish dominion. 
There can be no doubt that in the event of either of the contracting 
powers occupying any Turkish territory, the other would be at liberty 
to participate in the war, and thus have the opportunity to occupy 
temporarily or permanently a previously defined territory by way of 
compensation. It seems out of the question to apply this maxim in 
connexion with a war between the Dual Monarchy and a Balkan 
state which has no coastal territory as long as no other Balkan 
state, which possesses its own coast, joins Austria-Hungary's ad- 
versary and thus places Italy in a position to occupy a compensatory 
territory by way of the sea. 

The wording of the "Arrangement special concemant le Sandjak 
de Novibazar" of 1909, also clearly points to the meaning of the 
words "les regions des Balcans" in Article VII of the Triple Alliance 
agreement. This "arrangement," which was made expressly for 
the purpose of defining and completing the much discussed Article 
VII, says that the provisions of the said article shall have equal 
bearing on the Sandjak of Novibazar as on the other parts of Turkey. 
If, therefore, the next sentence in the "arrangement/' which begins 
with "Si done," once more speaks of the "maintien du statu quo dans 
les Balcans" (maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans) it can 
be understood only in one way, namely, that in this instance, as 
throughout the entire agreement, the words "les Balcans" refer only 
to the Turkish possessions in the Balkans. 

As to the spirit of the treaty, it should suffice to consider the 
words of the introduction to the agreement on the "bienfaits que leur 
garantit, au point de vue politique, aussi bien qu'au point de vue 
monarchique et social, le maintien de la Triple Alliance" (the bene- 
fits which the maintenance of the Triple Alliance guarantees from 
political as well as from a monarchical and social point of view) 
to make it clear that the Dual Monarchy cannot anticipate an inter- 
pretation of the agreement on the part of Italy which would hamper 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGAKIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 131 

our action against Servia; especially so, as the object of that action 
is to obtain guarantees against the continuation of a propaganda 
which endangers the very existence of the Monarchy. 

Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that in the spirit of Article 
VII the maintenance of the status quo existing at that time, was said 
to be desirable, in order to prevent any territorial changes which 
might be of disadvantage to either Austria-Hungary or Italy. Since 
that time such changes have taken place in a manner decidedly un- 
favourable to the interests of the Dual Monarchy. Servia 's aggran- 
disement at the expense of Turkey has accentuated the Great-Servian 
Utopia to such an extent that the peaceful development of our terri- 
tories is seriously menaced and Austria-Hungary may be compelled 
even to resort to force of arms to defend her possessions. An inter- 
vention on the part of the Dual Monarchy for the purpose of chang- 
ing the status quo of the present Turkish possessions or of the terri- 
tories which at the time of the treaty had been part of the Turkish 
dominion, undoubtedly would necessitate a previous understanding 
with Italy; on the other hand, it is evident that Austria-Hungary 
must have a free hand to protect her interests in connexion with 
changes of the status quo which have been affected without her in- 
tervention. 



No. 3. 
Von Merey to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Rome, July 21, 1914. 

With reference to your telegram of the 20th instant. 

Interview with the Marchese di San Giuliano took place this 
afternoon. 

The Minister seemed very apprehensive of our proposed step 
at Belgrade. I dwelt upon the first part of the above-mentioned 
telegram in the sense indicated. In the course of the ensuing thor- 
ough discussion, I also found occasion to use the last paragraph. 

In regard to the clearing up of our relations with Servia, the 
Minister, as on many previous occasions, explained in detailed argu- 
ments that we could remedy them only by adopting a conciliatory 
attitude but not by means of force and the humiliation of a neigh- 
bouring State. For a State of mixed nationalities like Austria- 



132 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Hungary he considers such a policy to be the only practicable one, 
and pointed out that it had proved successful in dealing with the 
Germans and the Poles. I declared that this argument, so often 
discussed between us, was merely hypothetical and that it was, more- 
over, erroneous. In reality things are different. I drew his attention 
to all that we have done for Servia since the Treaty of Berlin, to our 
conciliatory attitude during the Balkan war and to the Pan-Servian 
offensive, which was becoming more and more violent. 

The Minister then continued by saying that Italy desired a strong 
Austria-Hungary, but such as it is, without territorial expansion. 
My declaration that we do not aspire to any territorial aggrandise- 
ment met with the Minister's approval, and the one concerning the 
Lovcen was received with evident satisfaction. 

The Marchese di San Giuliano then expressed his decided inten- 
tion to assist us as long as our demands were justifiable. Should 
this not be the case, he would be opposed by the sentiment of the 
entire country, which, undoubtedly liberal, remembers its own revolu- 
tionary origin and sympathises with nationalistic movements, no 
matter in what part of the world. He pointed out that his position 
would be materially stronger if our measures at Belgrade were prin- 
cipally, if not entirely, based upon the outrage at Serajevo, and to 
a lesser degree on other agitations. I argued against all these limita- 
tions, which I described as wrong in theory and in practice an indica- 
tion of insufficient friendship and assistance. 

In respect of the press, the Minister promised to use his influence 
under the aforesaid reservations, but he thought he would be 
unable to act until the contents of our note became known in Bel- 
grade. 

As to Montenegro, he promised to send instructions in the sense 
described by us this very day. He has already advised Belgrade to 
be conciliatory. 

Finally, the Minister remarked that his confidence in our modera- 
tion toward Servia was chiefly based on the wisdom of our Sovereign. 
"While agreeing with him on this point, I replied that for this very 
reason he could rest assured that our steps in Belgrade will be care- 
fully thought out and that whatever form they might take, they 
would be limited to absolutely necessary action. 

On the whole, the conversation gave me the impression of many 
friendly phrases with as many mental reservations; furthermore, 
that the Minister evidently does not yet believe that events will lead 
to war, but rather expects Servia to yield. He probably bases his 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN BED BOOK (NO. 2) 133 

calculations on an intensive diplomatic intervention in Vienna and 
Belgrade on the part of the Powers. 



No. 4. 
Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 22, 1914. 

I request you to inform the Marchese di San Giuliano in strict 
confidence and in pursuance of the information you have given him 
previously, that our decisive step in Belgrade has now been fixed for 
Thursday noon, 23rd inst. As to the contents of the note which 
Baron von Giesl will hand to the Servian Government, you will 
say that it contains demands dealing with the suppression of the 
agitation which endangers our territories. "We are compelled to make 
these demands as a result of the facts so far disclosed by the Serajevo 
investigation, and because we realise that we must put an end to 
the subversive agitation which has been carried on for many years 
in our southern provinces and which emanates from Belgrade. 

We have given the Servian Government a time-limit of forty- 
eight hours for the acceptance of our demands, as we cannot expose 
ourselves to the usual Servian delays. The signatory Powers will 
be notified on Friday, 24th inst., and on that day you will also be 
placed in a position to acquaint the Italian Government officially of 
our steps in Belgrade. 

Your proceeding of to-day is limited to Berlin and Rome, in 
special consideration of our alliance. 

I request you, if possible, to acquaint the Marchese di San 
Giuliano personally — and only if this be impossible, his representa- 
tive — with the contents of this telegram. 



No. 5. 

Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 22, 1914. 

(Translation from the French.) 
The Austro-Hungarian Government has found itself obliged to 
address on Thursday, the 23rd instant, through the Austro-Hun- 



134 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

garian Minister at Belgrade, the following note to the Royal Govern- 
ment of Servia. (See Enclosure.) 

I have the honour to request you to bring the contents of this 
note to the attention of the government to which you are accredited, 
accompanying this communication with the following comment: 

On the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government 
addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text 
is reproduced above. 

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a 
policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the minds of Serb sub- 
jects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so initiating activities 
for the detachment of the Austro-Hungarian territory adjoining the 
Servian frontier. 

Servia became the focus of a criminal agitation. 

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups whose 
object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on 
Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among 
their membership generals and diplomats, government officials and 
judges — in short, men at the top of the official and unofficial society 
in the kingdom. 

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propa- 
ganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day 
passes without the organs of the Servian press inciting their readers 
to hatred and contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to out- 
rages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity. 

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every 
means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the 
youth in the frontier provinces. 

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence 
of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which 
has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom. 
Individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia 
have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propa- 
ganda against Austria-Hungary. 

In the face of these activities, to which Austria-Hungary has 
been exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it 
incumbent upon it to take the slightest step. The Servian Govern- 
ment has thus failed in the duty imposed upon it by the solemn 
declaration of the 31st of March, 1909, and has acted in opposition 
to the will of Europe and the pledges given to Austria-Hungary. 

The patience of the Austro-Hungarian Government, in the face 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 135 

of the provocative attitude of Servia, was inspired by the territorial 
disinterestedness of the Dual Monarchy and by the hope that the 
Servian Government, in spite of everything, would come to an appre- 
ciation of Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observ- 
ing an attitude of good-will toward the political interests of Servia, 
the Austro-Hungarian Government hoped that the Kingdom would 
finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. 
In particular Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind 
in the political ideas of Servia when, after the events of 1912, the 
Austro-Hungarian Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging 
attitude, made so considerable an aggrandisement of Servia possible. 

The good-will which Austria-Hungary showed toward the neigh- 
bouring State had no restraining effect on the conduct of the King- 
dom, which continued to tolerate upon its territory a propaganda 
of which the deplorable consequences were demonstrated to the 
world on the 28th of June last, when the Heir Apparent to the 
Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched 
in Belgrade. 

In the face of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment has felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade 
with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the in- 
cendiary movement which is menacing the security and integrity of 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government is convinced that, in taking 
this step, it will find itself in full accord with the sentiments of all 
civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon to 
be employed with impunity in political strife and the peace of 
Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from 
Belgrade. 

In support of the above the Austro-Hungarian Government holds 
at the disposal of the Government to which you are accredited a 
dossier recording the Servian machinations and showing the con- 
nection between these machinations and the murder of the 28th of 
June. An identical communication has been addressed to the Austro- 
Hungarian Representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers. 

You are authorised to place a copy of this despatch in the hands 
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 



136 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 



(Enclosure.) 

On the 31st of March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on 
instructions from the Servian Government, made the following 
declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government: 

"Servia recognises that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has 
not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to such 
decisions as the Powers may take with regard to the annexation 
since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direc- 
tion of her present policy toward Austria-Hungary, and to live in 
future on good neighbourly terms with the latter.' ' 

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events 
of the 28th of June, have disclosed the existence of a subversive 
movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of 
Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement which had 
its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far 
as to make itself manifest beyond the Servian frontier in the shape 
of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders. 

Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in 
the declarations of the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Servian Gov- 
ernment has done nothing to repress this movement. It has tolerated 
the criminal activity of various societies and associations directed 
against the Monarchy, the licentious language of the press, the 
glorification of the authors of outrages, and the participation of 
officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted 
an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction. In short, it has 
permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian popu- 
lation to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt for its institutions. 

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not 
ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th of June last demon- 
strated its ominous consequences to the world. 

It is evident from the depositions and confessions of the criminal 
perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th of June, that the Serajevo 
assassination had been planned in Belgrade, that the arms and ex- 
plosives with which the murderers were provided, had been given to 
them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna 
Odbrana, and finally that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals 
and their arms was organised and carried out by the Chiefs of the 
Servian frontier service. 

The above-mentioned results of the preliminary investigation do 



THE AUSTEO-HUNGAEIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 137 

not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer 
the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for 
years in the face of machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence 
propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the 
contrary, impose upon it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues 
which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy. 

To achieve this end, the Austro-Hungarian Government finds 
itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a 
formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against 
the Monarchy — in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the 
ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories 
belonging to it — and that it undertakes to suppress by every means 
at its disposal this criminal and terrorist propaganda. 

In order to give a solemn character to this undertaking, the 
Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its 
"Official Journal " of the 26th of June (13th of July) the following 
declaration : 

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda 
directed against Austria-Hungary, of which the final aim is to detach 
from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, 
and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal 
proceedings. 

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and func- 
tionaries have participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and 
thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal 
Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st of 
March, 1909. 

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all 
idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the 
inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it 
its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole 
population of the Kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with 
the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machi- 
nations, which it will use all its efforts to prevent and suppress/' 

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the 
royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King, and 
published in the Official Bulletin of the army. 

The Royal Servian Government further undertakes : 

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and con- 
tempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency 
of which is directed against its territorial integrity ; 



138 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

2. To dissolve immediately the society called Narodna Odbrana, 
to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same 
manner against all other societies and their branches in Servia which 
engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 
The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent 
the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under any other 
name or form ; 

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, 
both as regards the teaching body and the methods of instruction 
everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda 
against Austria-Hungary ; 

4. To remove from the military service, and from the administra- 
tion in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda 
against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, whose names and deeds the 
Austro-Hungarian Government reserves the right of communicating 
to the Royal Government; 

5. To accept the cooperation in^ Servia of representatives of 
the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the sub- 
versive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the 
Monarchy ; 

6. To take judicial proceedings against accomplices in the plot 
of the 28th of June who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the 
Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation 
relating thereto; 

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voja 
Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian 
State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the 
preliminary investigation at Serajevo ; 

8. To prevent by effective measures the participation of the 
Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives 
across the frontier; to dismiss and punish severely the officials of 
the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica who have been guilty 
of having assisted the perpetrators of the crime of Serajevo by 
facilitating their passage across the frontier; 

9. To furnish the Austro-Hungarian Government with explana- 
tions regarding the unjustifiable utterance of high Servian officials, 
both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official posi- 
tions, did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th of June to give 
utterance, in published interviews, to expressions of hostility to the 
Austro-Hungarian Government; and finally, 

10. To notify the Austro-Hungarian Government without delay 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 139 

of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding 
heads. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government awaits the reply of the Royal 
Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 
25th of July. 

A memorandum dealing with the results of the preliminary in- 
vestigation at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under 
heads 7 and 8 is attached to this note. 



(Memorandum.) 



The investigation by the court at Serajevo against Gabrilo Princip 
and his accomplices in the assassination committed on June 28th of 
this year has up to now established the following facts : 

1. The plot to murder Archduke Francis Ferdinand during his 
stay in Serajevo was planned by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko Gabrino- 
vitch, a certain Milan Ciganovitch and Trifko Grabez, with the 
assistance of Major Voja Tankositch. 

2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols, with their ammuni- 
tion, which were used by the criminals, were obtained for them and 
handed to Princip, Gabrinovitch, and Grabez in Belgrade by a cer- 
tain Milan Ciganovitch, and Major Voja Tankositch. 

3. The bombs are hand grenades which came from the arsenal 
of the Servian army at Kragujevac. 

4. In order to make sure of the success of the attempt, Milan 
Ciganovitch instructed Princip, Gabrinovitch and Grabez in the art 
of hurling bombs and taught Princip and Grabez how to shoot with 
Browning pistols in a forest adjoining the shooting range of Topt- 
schider, in Belgrade. 

5. In order to make possible the crossing of the Bosnia-Herzego- 
vina frontier by Princip, Gabrinovitch and Grabez, and the smug- 
gling in of their weapons, a secret transportation system was organised 
by Ciganovitch. The entrance of the criminals with their weapons 
into Bosnia and Herzegovina was carried out with the assistance of 
the frontier Captains at Schabatz (Rade Popovitch) and at Loznica, 
and the cooperation of the customs officer, Rudivoj Groitch or Loznica, 
and several other persons. 



140 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 6. 

Count Berchtold to von Aferey. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, July 22, 1914. 

When carrying out the instructions despatched herewith, further 
verbal comments will hardly be necessary, as you have advised the 
Marchese di San Giuliano in your previous interview of what he had 
to expect. However, it may seem opportune to you to draw his 
special attention to the fact that the Narodna Odbrana, which counts 
among its members all the Servians committed in connexion with the 
plot of June 28, 1914, constitutes a fighting organisation, which is 
scattered all over Servia. Its activities, according to the programme 
which we hold in its authentic form, are now solely and purely 
directed against the Dual Monarchy, since Turkey has vanished from 
the sphere of its aggressions. 



No. 7. 
Von Merey to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Borne, July 23, 1914. 

To-day, at 4.45 p.m., I carried out your telegraphic instructions 
of yesterday in an interview with the Marchese di San Giuliano at 
Fiuggi. The latter expressed his inability to give an opinion with- 
out being acquainted with the demands made at Belgrade by the 
Austro-Hungarian Government, and without having discussed the 
matter with the Prime Minister. The latter will proceed to-morrow 
to Fiuggi, where events will be discussed between him, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and the German Ambassador, who is there at 
present. 

In terms which he distinctly qualified as both official and private, 
the Marchese di San Giuliano expressed his misgiving concerning 
Italian public opinion. Nevertheless, he at once wrote a letter to 
Secretary General de Martino, with the professed instruction to in- 
spire the press with moderation when the news of the delivery of our 
ultimatum shall reach Rome. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 141 

No. 8. 
Von Merey to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Rome, July 24, 1914. 

Owing to absence of Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Under- 
Secretary of State, our note to the Servian Government was de- 
livered to the Secretary General this forenoon. 

In commencing the reading, the latter remarked that it was very 
clever to begin the note by citing the Servian note of 1909. In 
further perusal of the note he said, while laying stress on the personal 
character of his utterance, that it appeared to him that, in consider- 
ing ourselves endangered by the agitation carried on in Servian terri- 
tory we were treating Servia almost as a Great Power. This gave 
me the occasion to utilise the information received from you concern- 
ing the aims of the Narodna Odbrana and the wide scope of its 
activities. 

As to the publication which we demand from Servia, he remarked 
that the Servian Government could and should accept this unim- 
portant item. 

Clause 4 he thought the Servian Government would find it diffi- 
cult to accept. 

The reading of the note concerning the result of the Serajevo in- 
vestigation seemed to surprise him considerably. 

In concluding the reading he remarked that we apparently had 
reached a turning point in history. De Martino agreed with my con- 
tention that he could not fail to admit the purely defensive char- 
acter of our action and said: " Certainement je n'aurais jamais cru 
que Von puisse constat er et prouver la culpabilite d'officiers et de fonc- 
tionnaires series dans le drame de Seraievo" ("I certainly never 
would have believed that the culpability of Servian army-officers and 
functionaries in the drama of Serajevo could be ascertained and 
proved"). 

Finally he promised to send a copy of the note to the Marchese di 
San Giuliano without delay. 



142 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 9. 
Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. 

The Italian Ambassador eame here to-day and announced with 
regard to the conflict between the Monarchy and Servia, that the 
Royal Italian Government, in case this conflict should reach the stage 
of war and lead to the occupation of Servian soil, even provisionally, 
would reserve the right to claim compensation under Article VII of 
the treaty of the Triple Alliance. He also stated that the Royal 
Italian Government was, moreover, of the opinion that, according 
to the above-mentioned article of the alliance, we should come to an 
understanding with Italy regarding the possible occupation of Servian 
territory. 

Beyond this, he continued, the Royal Italian Government in the 
event of war between Austria-Hungary and Servia, intended to main- 
tain a friendly attitude in accordance with its obligations under the 
terms of its alliance. 



No. 10. 
Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

Since Servia has refused to comply with our demands, we have 
broken off diplomatic relations with that country. 

You will at once call on the Minister of Foreign Affairs or on 
his representative and make, in effect, the following declaration : 

The Royal Servian Government has refused to comply with the 
demands which we have been compelled to make for the permanent 
safety of our most vital interests. In so doing it has manifested its 
unwillingness to abandon its subversive aspirations, which aim at 
the constant disturbance of some of our territories upon the border 
and at their ultimate separation from the Dual Monarchy. 

To our regret, and much against our will, we are therefore placed 
under the necessity of forcing Servia by the most drastic means to 
alter radically her hitherto hostile attitude. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. ?,) 143 

No. 11. 
Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

In carrying out the instructions contained in to-day's telegram 
you will also point out to the Marehese di San Giuliano or to his 
representative, that the Royal Italian Government is well aware 
that we are far from entertaining any aggressive purpose and that 
it is an act of self-defence if, after many years of tolerance, we at 
last decide to put a stop to the Great-Servian machinations by force 
of arms, if need be. I must assume that no attempt will be made in 
Rome to deny that we have shown the utmost patience with Servia 
during many years, in the face of the most serious provocations, al- 
though the Great-Servian propaganda was conducted with increas- 
ing boldness and inevitably aroused our grave apprehension. The 
results of the investigation prove plainly that Belgrade has not 
refrained even from the most violent means for the attainment of its 
goal, and therefore we have come to the conclusion that it is high 
time to use every available pressure to exact guarantees for the dis- 
continuance of the present intolerable conditions on our southeastern 
border. All peaceful means to induce Servia to alter her attitude 
having been exhausted, a resort to arms may be expected. 

A short time ago Italy deemed it necessary to make war for 
the preservation of her economic interests and for her position in 
the Mediterranean. In the friendly spirit of our alliance we wel- 
comed the successes of her arms and readily recognised the subse- 
quent extension of the Italian sphere of power. 

Finally, you will point out that the Duke of Avarna has officially 
declared that Italy, in the event of war between us and Servia, 
would remember her obligations toward the alliance and that we 
greatly appreciate this friendly act as being in accord with the terms 
of our alliance. 



144 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 12. 
Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

Yesterday's telegram from Count Szogeny: 

"Secretary of State told me to-day that my Italian colleague 
seemed surprised you had not earlier informed his government, as an 
allied power, of our steps in Belgrade. 

"Von Jagow replied that Germany had not been informed by 
us any earlier, which he (von Jagow) considered a perfectly correct 
procedure because present conflict must be regarded as a matter 
between Austria-Hungary and Servia. 

"He would also telegraph this to the Imperial German Am- 
bassador in Rome for his guidance and instruct him to point out to 
Marehese di San Giuliano, if occasion should arise, that Italy had not 
previously informed her allies of her 48-hour ultimatum to Turkey. " 



No. 13. 

Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

By instructions dated the 20th inst. you have been informed 
of the arguments to use if Italy should attempt to interpose obstacles 
to our action against Servia on the ground of an arbitrary interpreta- 
tion of Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty. 

You are also aware that it does not seem to me desirable to 
create ill-feeling between Rome and Vienna by discussions which offer 
little hope of a satisfactory result. 

On the other hand, we must be prepared for an insistent attitude 
on the part of the Italian Government, and, in view of the tone 
adopted by some Italian papers, it seems not impossible that the 
Marehese di San Giuliano will endeavour to present our attitude dur- 
ing the Lybian war as obstructive to Italian activities. He might also 
misuse for his purposes our reference to Article VII on that occasion. 

The question whether the territories of the Balkan States come 
under the provisions of Article VII or not has no bearing upon the 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 145 

question whether the application of Article VII would have been 
justified in respect of the islands under Italian occupation in the 
iEgean Sea. 

My chief object, however, at the present moment is to refute 
emphatically a possible reproach by Italy that we have acted in a 
manner contrary to the friendly spirit of our alliance. 

For this purpose it seems advisable to recall briefly to your 
memory our attitude during the Lybian war. 

On September 26, 1911,* the Duke of Avarna, on instructions 
from his government, declared that Italy would confine her activities 
to the Mediterranean and that she would do nothing adverse to the 
policy which she had hitherto followed, namely, the maintenance of 
the status quo in the Balkans. Nevertheless, a month later, the 
Marchese di San Giuliano took up a position which he expressed as 
follows: "Nous nous sommes tou jours reserves la liberie des opera- 
tions militaires en dehors des cotes ottomanes de VAdriatique et la 
mer Jonienne." "We have always reserved to ourselves a free hand 
to conduct military operations beyond the Turkish coasts on the 
Adriatic and on the Ionian Sea.")t 

Thereupon Count Aehrenthal confined himself to pointing out 
the dangers of reaction on the Balkans in the event of Italy carrying 
her military activities upon the coasts of the iEgean Sea and re- 
marked that even a temporary occupation of the islands in the 
iEgean Sea would be contrary to the provisions of Article VII.J 

At the same time Count Aehrenthal emphasised Austria-Hun- 
gary's long-standing friendship. 

Our further reserve in the matter of the extension of Italy's 
activities was subsequently § explained by the consideration that 
Austria-Hungary, by giving her consent, would have shared the re- 
sponsibility which Italy would have to assume if she wished to act 
contrary to her declarations at the beginning of the war or dis- 
regarded her obligations to the alliance. 

Count Aehrenthal's utterance || to the German Ambassador (at 
the end of November, 1911) plainly shows our friendly attitude and 
our endeavours to avoid any discussions which might disturb the 
relations among the Allies at a time when Italy was at war. On 
that occasion it was pointed out to von Tschirschky that we would 
endeavour to avoid dealing with the question concerning the exten- 

* See Appendix No. 3. § See Appendix No. 6. 

f See Appendix No. 4. || See Appendix No. 7. 

$ See Appendix No. 5. 



146 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

sion of Italian activities upon the Asiatic coast without, however, hav- 
ing any intention of causing thereby any difficulties to the Italian 
Government ; we did not wish even to arouse her apprehension of such 
a possibility. 

Further proof of our friendship was given when at the end of 
February, 1912, Great Britain advanced the proposal * that a promise 
be obtained from Italy that she would refrain from any action against 
the Dardanelles. In compliance with Marchese di San Giuliano's 
wish, we rejected this proposal, and it was because of our opposition 
that the British project was dropped. The Dual Monarchy did 
more; she published denials in London and Constantinople of the 
circulated rumours that Italy had made promises to her concerning 
the Dardanelles.! 

On April 6, 1912, von Tschirschky reverted once more to Italy's 
intention to extend her sphere of activity. It was then pointed out 
to him that we could not alter our attitude of unwillingness to 
assume a part of Italy's responsibility. At the same time he was 
given to understand that Italy could rest assured of our tacit passivity 
in the event of a proposed temporary action in territories which 
would not be likely to affect the Balkans. It would, however, be 
better to avoid $ going into the details of specific operations. 

In order to assure the allied governments of our good-will, we 
declared in our conversations § with the Duke of Avarna on April 
the 13th and 15th, 1912, our willingness to make an exception of 
the islands of Rhodos and Karpathos, on the southern outlet of the 
iEgean Sea and geographically pertaining to the Mediterranean, as 
well as of the ledge of rocks, called Stampalia (Astropalia), off the 
Cyelades; that we would not object to their occupation. We only 
demanded that guarantees be given us by Italy that the proposed 
occupation of these islands would be temporary. 

Count Szogyeny reported, || under date of May 21, 1912, that 
von Kiderlen-Waechter had gratefully acknowledged our conciliatory 
attitude in the matter of the Italian action in the Archipelago. 

In the course of a conversation fl which took place on the follow- 
ing day in connexion with the occupation of Kos, which had been 
accomplished meanwhile, and of several other neighbouring islands 
by Italy, the Duke of Avarna reproached us for our " protest' ' 
against further occupations of islands. This reproach was naturally 

* See Appendix No. 8. § See Appendix No. 11. 

f See Appendix No. 9. || See Appendix No. 12. 

J See Appendix No. 10. fl See Appendix No. 13. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 147 

refuted and it was stated that there was no question of a "protest"; 
we had simply specified our legitimate claims based upon the wording 
of Article VII. Meanwhile, in order not to make Italy's problem 
more difficult, we had no intention of availing ourselves of our rights. 
It is clearly shown that we have specified in express terms our rights 
in accordance with the agreement, but have done nothing to impede 
Italy's activities. In order not to involve ourselves in the responsi- 
bility, we have refused our positive consent to measures which might 
be expected to create a reaction in the Balkans. Otherwise, we were 
content with having warned Italy against threatening reactions. Sub- 
sequent events have shown that those warnings were justified. All 
this will prove that we always have been mindful of our obligations 
to our allies and have shown our good- will as far as possible; we 
evaded useless discussions which might have disturbed the friendly 
relations between Vienna and Rome. 

The above is exclusively for your personal information and you 
will avail yourself of the most suitable arguments therein contained, 
only in the event that the Marchese di San Giuliano should charge 
the Monarchy with having acted in an unfriendly manner during 
the Lybian war. 



No. 14. 

Ton Merey to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Rome, July 28, 1914. 

Have carried out your telegraphic instructions of the 26th inst., 
Minister of Foreign Affairs having meanwhile returned to Rome. 
Have added that you reserve the right to discuss the question of 
compensation at the opportune moment. 

The Marchese di San Giuliano promised his reply for to-morrow. 



No. 15. 

Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

On instruction from his government, the Imperial German Am- 
bassador has requested me, if possible, to come to an agreement with 



148 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Italy concerning the interpretation of Article VII of the Triple 
Alliance treaty. Italy considers our procedure against Servia as an 
aggression against Russia, and therefore holds that she is not com- 
pelled to join us in the struggle which may result therefrom, in view 
of the defensive character of the Triple Alliance. 

Furthermore, Bollari, in Berlin, as well as the Marchese di San 
Giuliano and Salandra in Rome, have declared that Italy could as- 
sume a friendly attitude only if we accepted the Italian interpreta- 
tion of Article VII of the Triple Alliance agreement. 

Von Tschirschky was at the same time instructed to inform me 
that the German Government construed Article VII in the same 
sense as the Italian Government. 

The Duke of Avarna called on me to-day and in behalf of his 
government made a statement analogous to that of my telegram of 
the 26th instant, to wit: Should the threatening conflict lead to war 
and concurrently to an even temporary occupation of Servian terri- 
tory, the Italian Government, in accordance with Article VII of the 
treaty of the Triple Alliance, would reserve its right to claim com- 
pensation, with regard to which an agreement should be reached in 
advance. Furthermore, he declared that in case of war between 
Austria-Hungary and Servia, the Italian Government would main- 
tain a friendly attitude, such as might be expected from a faithful 
and dutiful ally. 

I replied to the Italian Ambassador that the disagreement with 
Servia concerns only ourselves and Servia; that, besides, we contem- 
plated no territorial conquests, and that an occupation of Servian ter- 
ritory was therefore not intended. 

The Duke of Avarna having suggested that it would impress the 
Powers very favourably if we were to make a formal statement to 
this effect, I replied that we could not do so, as it was impossible to 
assume that, in the course of the war, a situation would not arise 
which would compel us to occupy Servian territory, even against our 
will. Such a contingency, however, was not to be expected in the 
normal course of events. 

I request you to communicate to the Marchese di San Giuliano 
the statement made by the Duke of Avarna and my reply thereto. 
Furthermore, with reference to the claims of compensation based 
upon Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, you will make 
the following declaration : 

As already stated to the Italian Ambassador, territorial acquisi- 
tions are in no way contemplated by us. Should we, nevertheless, be 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 149 

compelled to decide upon an occupation which could not be con- 
sidered as merely provisional, we should be prepared to enter upon 
an exchange of views with Italy concerning an eventual compensation. 
On the other hand, we fully expect Italy not only not to impede her 
ally's action in the pursuance of her aims, but to maintain steadfastly 
the friendly attitude of an ally, in accordance with her promise. 



No. 16. 
Von Merey to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Borne, July 29, 1914. 

The reply of the Italian Government which, as mentioned at the 
end of my telegram of the 28th instant, had been promised to me, has 
been handed to me by the chief of the Foreign Minister's cabinet; 
though it is in writing, I was requested to consider it as a verbal 
note. 

The text of the reply reads: 

(Translation from the French.) 

" Animated by the most friendly feelings for Austria-Hungary, 
the Italian Government has exerted itself and will continue to do so 
in an effort to induce Servia to accede to the demands made by the 
Austro-Hungarian Government in its note of July 23, 1914. The 
Italian Government has repeatedly counselled Servia to pursue a 
policy of correct and good neighbourly relations with Austria- 
Hungary. 

"The Italian Government recalls with satisfaction Austria-Hun- 
gary's friendly attitude toward Italy during the last phase of the 
Italo-Turkish war. 

"The object of that war was a far-distant province, which could 
not affect the interests of Austria-Hungary. The scene of the present 
conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia is in territories close 
to Italy ; our vital interests might, therefore, become involved in the 
outcome of events. 

"The provisions of Article VII present, in our mind, one of the 
main points upon which the Triple Alliance rests, and which have 
even been conducive to the strength of the Alliance. They apply to 
the whole of the Balkan peninsula; they were supplemented by the 



150 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

agreement of 1909 concerning the Sandjak of Novibazar, which in its 
turn was confirmed when the Triple Alliance was renewed. 

"The cordial cooperation of Italian and Austro-Hungarian diplo- 
macy should be based upon Article VII and the agreements covering 
the Sandjak of Novibazar and Albania. Should this not be the 
case, said cooperation would, it is feared, not be possible. It is 
upon these premises that the mutual friendship and confidence be- 
tween the two allied powers should rest. 

"Germany concurs in our interpretation of Article VII. 

"With reference to Count Berchtold's intention to take up the 
question of compensation when occasion arises, it is clear that an 
agreement on this point is urgent. As long as an understanding has 
not been reached, and as long as Austria-Hungary's interpretation of 
Article VII leaves room for doubt, Italy cannot pursue a policy which 
would, either now or at a later time, facilitate a temporary or per- 
manent occupation by Austria-Hungary ; on the contrary, Italy would 
have to support every measure calculated to prevent such a possible 
occupation, while at the same time endeavouring to harmonise as 
much as possible such a policy, dictated by her vital interests, with 
her keen desire to strengthen more and more the intimate relations 
existing between the two allied powers. During the last few years 
these relations have improved considerably and should still further 
develop for the strengthening of the existing amity and the adjust- 
ment of the mutual interests of the two countries. 

"We therefore hope that the frank and loyal exchange of views 
pending among the three allied powers in Vienna and Berlin may as 
soon as possible be concluded in a way which will enable them to 
cooperate in a common policy." 

This reply fully confirms my impression that this Government 
is chiefly concerned in the question of compensation; that it is de- 
termined to force a solution at this time and to this end invokes 
Germany's interpretation of Article VII and does not even shrink 
from attempts at blackmail (see penultimate paragraph). It is also 
worthy of note that the Italian Government desires the exchange of 
views to take place in Vienna and in Berlin. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 151 

No. 17. 
Von Merey to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Rome, July 30, 1914. 

Minister of Foreign Affairs spontaneously brought up to-day 
the question of Italy's attitude in the event of an European war. 

As the character of the Triple Alliance is purely defensive; as 
our measures against Servia may precipitate a European conflagra- 
tion, and finally as we had not previously consulted this govern- 
ment, Italy would not be bound to join us in the war. This, how- 
ever, does not preclude the alternative that Italy might, in such an 
event, have to decide for herself whether her interests would best be 
served by taking sides with us in military operations or by remain- 
ing neutral. Personally he feels more inclined to favour the first 
solution, which appears to him as the more likely one, provided 
that Italy's interests in the Balkan Peninsula are safeguarded and 
that we do not seek changes likely to give us a predominance detri- 
mental to Italy's interests in the Balkans. 



No. 18. 
Von Merey to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Borne, July 31, 1914. 

The statement contained in your telegram of July 28, already 
more than half concedes Italy's right to compensation as claimed 
by the Rome Cabinet. After this partial success, the blackmailing 
policy to extort the remaining claims is naturally further encouraged. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs actually told me to-day that, in reply 
to your statement, he had informed Vienna that your communication 
is vague and unsatisfactory. 

I firmly believe that, whether Italy joins in the war or remains 
neutral depends, not really upon the question of compensation, but 
chiefly upon the Italian Government's view of the international sit- 
uation in Europe and upon military considerations. We are, there- 
fore, running the risk of assuming far-reaching obligations concern- 



152 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

ing compensation, without, however, being certain of attaining our 
object, which is to assure Italy's military cooperation. 

Furthermore, the exact nature of the compensation is obviously 
vague, and we cannot anticipate and determine a compensation when 
we do not ourselves know what we might receive in return therefor. 
In my opinion it would be unwise for us to go any further than to 
declare our readiness to grant to Italy, in the spirit of Article VII 
of the Triple Alliance Treaty, an adequate compensation after the 
conclusion of the war — whether localised or extending to Europe — ■ 
provided Italy faithfully fulfils her duties as an ally, and also pro- 
vided we occupy territories in the Balkans, either permanently, or 
for a period exceeding in length that of the occupation of the Dode- 
canesos (the Turkish islands) by Italy. 



No. 19. 
Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 31, 1914. 

In a long interview with Duke of Avarna to-day, we reached 
a complete understanding concerning compensation. The German 
and Italian Ambassadors thereupon drafted a note based upon this 
interview and fully acceptable to the Duke of Avarna. The text of 
this note will be wired to Rome to-morrow. 

I hope that this question may now be considered as settled in 
agreement among the parties to the Triple Alliance. 

Please inform the Marchese di San Giuliano immediately of the 
foregoing and point out to him that we now confidently expect Italy 
to carry out her obligations as an ally, a matter about which I never 
have been in doubt. 

For your own information I wish to state that the natural fears 
of Italy's possible future attempts to misuse the right to compensa- 
tion for purposes of extortion have had to be relegated to the back- 
ground on account of the heavy responsibility which would have at- 
tached to an uncompromising interpretation by us of Article VII of 
the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 153 

No. 20. 

Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 1, 1914. 

Please inform immediately the Marchese di San Giuliano that I 
have made the following statement to the Duke of Avarna : 

(Translation from the French.) 

"I consider that a difference of opinion as to the interpretation 
of Article VII constitutes, with regard to our relation in the present 
and the future, an element of uncertainty likely to harm the close 
relations between the two Powers. I accept Italy's and Germany's 
interpretation of Article VII provided that Italy shall observe a 
friendly attitude toward the pending operations of war between 
Austria-Hungary and Servia and that she shall carry out her duties 
as an ally in case the present conflict should lead to a general con- 
flagration. ' ' 



No. 21. 

His 7. cmd R. Apostolic Majesty to His Majesty the King of Italy. 
(Telegram.) Vienna, August 1, 1914. 

(Translation from the French.) 

"Russia, who assumed the right to intervene in our conflict with 
Servia, has mobilised her army and her fleet and threatens the peace 
of Europe. 

"In agreement with Germany, I am resolved to defend the rights 
of the Triple Alliance and I have ordered the mobilisation of all 
my military and naval forces. We owe thirty years of peace and 
of prosperity to the treaty which unites us, and I am gratified that 
our Governments fully agree on its interpretation. 

"At this solemn hour I am happy to be able to count upon the 
support of my Allies and their gallant armies, and I cherish the 



154 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

heartiest wishes for the success of our arms and for a glorious future 
of our countries/ ' 



No. 22. 
Van Merey to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Rome, August 1, 1914. 

According to statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs, at a 
meeting of the Cabinet to-day there developed a desire that in case of 
an European war Italy should remain neutral. The prevailing senti- 
ment was that neither her obligations nor her interests would justify 
Italy 's participation in the conflict. The consensus of opinion was 
that the Triple Alliance is purely defensive; that the war has been 
precipitated by us without previously notifying the Italian Govern- 
ment of our action ; and that Italy could not be expected to sacrifice 
the lives of her people and their welfare and to expose her extensive 
coasts to the greatest danger, when the object of the war would at 
the very best be directly contrary to the interests of Italy, inasmuch 
as it would disturb the status quo in the Balkans in favour of Austria- 
Hungary, either materially or morally. 

During the discussion which followed, the Marchese di San 
Giuliano remarked incidentally that — as no formal decision had been 
reached — his statement did not definitely mean that Italy would not, 
possibly at a later date, participate in the war. The word " compen- 
sation' ' was again uttered on this occasion. 

My impression persists that this is a case of blackmail which 
already has been partly successful. It is Italy's desire, whether the 
war be localised or extended to the other Powers, that her attitude 
shall be purchased on the principle of cash payment before delivery. 



THE AUSTBO-HUNGAKIAN BED BOOK (NO. 2) 155 



No. 23. 

His Majesty the King of Italy to His Imperial and Royal Apostolic 

Majesty. 

(Telegram.) Rome, August 2, 1914. 

(Translation from the French.) 

"I have received Your Majesty's telegram. I need not assure 
Your Majesty that Italy, who has done all she could for the main- 
tenance of the peace and who will do all she can to contribute to 
its restoration as soon as possible, will preserve an attitude of cordial 
friendliness toward her allies, in conformity with the Treaty of 
the Triple Alliance, in accordance with her sincere sentiments and 
with due regard to the great interests she has to safeguard." 



No. 24. 
Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 2, 1914. 

I understand from your telegram of yesterday that the Italian 
Government is considering the eventuality of an active participa- 
tion at a later time in the European war. 

In consideration of this circumstance I made to-day the follow- 
ing statement to the Duke of Avarna: 

"Afin d'eviter tout malentendu je tiens a constat er que les 
ouvertures faites le I. ct. au Due d' Avarna au sujet de V inter pre- 
tation de V article VII de notre Trait e d' alliance ont ete faites sur 
la base de notre ferme conviction que Vltalie remplisse des le debut 
ses devoirs d'alliee conformement a l' article III."* ("With a view 
to avoid any misunderstanding I wish to point out that our declara- 
tions of the 1st instant to the Duke of Avarna concerning the in- 
terpretation of Article VII of our Treaty of Alliance were based 
upon our firm conviction that Italy from the very outset would 
fulfil her duties as an ally in accordance with Article III * of the 
Treaty of Alliance. ") 

* See Appendix No. 14. 



156 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

I added that the unjustified Russian mobilisation against us 
and Germany, and in particular the meantime reported incursion 
of Russian patrols across several points on the Russo-German border 
line, constituted an ample justification for applying the terms of the 
Alliance. 

Please express identical views to the Italian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. 

I add for your personal information that the Duke of Avarna 
gave warm expression to his conviction that, even if an intervention 
by Italy in our favour were not to be deducible from the letter of 
the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, Italy would be morally bound to 
side with her allies. He had strongly advocated this course in his 
reports to his government, but he did not know if his opinion would 
carry decisive weight. 



No. 25. 
Von Merey to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Borne, August 2, 1914. 

I have carried out the instructions contained in your telegram of 
yesterday. 

Up to 5 p.m. the Minister of Foreign Affairs had received from 
the Duke of Avarna no telegram with the concerted text; on the 
contrary, a report dated from yesterday evening had reached him, 
according to which you rejected the Italian interpretation. 

The Marchese di San Giuliano, therefore, declined to discuss, 
before knowing the text, the possibility of Italy reconsidering, on 
the ground of our concessions, her intention to remain neutral. I 
naturally insisted that our concessions were wholly dependent upon 
the strict carrying out on Italy's part of her duties as an ally, such 
as we understand them. 

In the course of the evening I had another conversation with 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who alleged he had just received 
from Vienna the text of the declaration. 

Though I endeavoured to obtain a declaration from the Marchese 
di San Giuliano, he could not be induced to make one. He said 
that he would have to consider this serious matter carefully before 



THE AUSTEO-HUNGARIAN BED BOOK (NO. 2) 157 

discussing it with the Prime Minister to-morrow ; he hoped to be able 
to reply to-morrow afternoon. 

As I further pressed for a statement, he remarked that his first 
impression was not favourable because we had laid down conditions. 
Our declaration, in any event, would be nothing more than one 
link in the chain, and the question of Italy's participation in the 
war or of her neutrality would not be decided solely by a satis- 
factory settlement of this matter. 



No. 26. 
Von Merey to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Borne, August 2, 1914. 

The Marchese di San Giuliano has just sent me in the form of 
a letter his reply concerning Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple 
Alliance. 

Its contents are as follows : 

(Translation from the French.) 

"Salandra and I examined yesterday evening the reply of Count 
Berchtold with regard to Article VII, and I hasten to inform you 
of the result of our conversation. 

11 Count Berchtold subordinates the acceptance of our interpre- 
tation of Article VII to Italy's attitude in the present crisis. Al- 
though any modification of a treaty can be subordinated to this or 
some other condition, its interpretation cannot be subordinated to 
any condition. It is not a question of expressing the present will 
of the contracting parties, but of determining their intentions at 
the time when the pact was concluded. For instance, Germany sub- 
ordinates to no condition her interpretation, which is similar to ours, 
and this is logical. 

"In the second place it must be borne in mind that the present 
crisis is temporary, whereas the Triple Alliance is to last twelve 
years and can be renewed; it is desirable, I might almost say neces- 
sary, that during this long period the policy of Austria-Hungary 
and Italy regarding Balkan questions should be identical. It is 
desirable and even necessary that their diplomatic action should 



158 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAE 

develop in thorough agreement, trust and mutual friendliness. In 
order to attain this end it is indispensable that we should be thor- 
oughly agreed as to the interpretation of Article VII. This necessity 
is clearer than ever in the present crisis, even if we do not participate 
in the war; we would not be able to lend an unswerving and strong 
diplomatic support to the military activity of our allies if we were 
not fully reassured as to the interpretation of Article VII by Austria- 
Hungary, particularly in anticipation of more complicated situations, 
when occasions might arise to apply Article VII. 

" Furthermore, the acceptance of our interpretation of Article 
VII, important as it is for determining our diplomatic attitude, will 
in itself not suffice to eliminate all the very weighty reasons which 
prevent us, at least for the time being, from joining in the war. 

n Asa matter of fact, this general statement does not clearly and 
definitely settle the nature and value of compensation in all cases, 
nor their relation to the perils and immeasurable sacrifices to which 
this war might expose us; perils and immense sacrifices which are 
greater than those to which our allies are exposing themselves. This 
enormous difference between the perils and sacrifices on the one 
hand and the advantages on the other is, in fact, the very reason 
why Austria-Hungary desired a war which she could easily have 
avoided, whereas we did all in our power to save Europe from this 
fearful misfortune. Nevertheless, we hope that there will be an 
opportunity, without our participating in the war, of giving our 
allies proof of our sincere, friendly sentiments, and we count, there- 
fore, on a settlement which will reconcile our respective interests. 

"All these considerations, serious as they might be, would not 
prevent us from doing our duty, were such a duty incumbent upon 
us; but inasmuch as the 'casus foederis' cannot apply to this war, the 
Cabinet yesterday evening decided upon neutrality, with the proviso 
that it might later on come to a decision more in accordance with 
the wishes of our allies, should this become our duty or should our 
interests make such a course advisable. 

"The balance of power in Europe, in the Balkans and on the 
sea which surrounds Italy represents a vital interest to our country, 
and it is not afraid to face any sacrifice or any decision which the 
protection of its interests, and of its existence, should impose upon it. 

"Since the day I took over the conduct of the foreign affairs 
of my country, one of the principal goals of my activities has been 
to bind ever more closely the ties of mutual friendship between 
Italy and Austria-Hungary. I shall continue to bend all my energies 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 159 

in this direction, for I consider it essential in the interests of our 
two nations. In order to attain this goal, their interests must be 
reconciled and those of each be satisfied without harming those 
of the other. 

"I rely upon Count Berchtold and upon you, my dear Am- 
bassador, to assist me in carrying out this task. ' ' 



No. 27. 
Von Merey to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Rome, August 3, 1914. 

The text of the Italian declaration of neutrality published to-day 
follows : 

"Several European Powers are in a state of war, and as Italy 
is on terms of peace with all belligerent parties, the Royal Govern- 
ment and the nationals of the kingdom are bound to observe the 
precepts of neutrality according to the principles of international 
law. Whosoever violates these precepts shall bear the consequences 
of his action and eventually be subjected to legal punishment." 



No. 28. 
Von Merey to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Borne, August 3, 1914. 

In compliance with your telegraphic instructions of yesterday, 
I had an explanation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

The Marchese di San Giuliano denied that an occasion for apply- 
ing the terms of the Alliance had risen for Italy and submitted argu- 
ments which my report will have meanwhile conveyed to you. 



160 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 29. 
Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 4, 1914. 

In conformity with the statements of the Marchese di San Giuliano 
to you, the Italian Ambassador to-day informed me, in accordance 
with his instructions, that in the matter of Albania Italy would 
adhere to the agreements made with Austria-Hungary as well as the 
decisions of the London Conference. He stated furthermore that 
Italy in no way wished to derive advantage from the fact that 
Austria-Hungary is at present preoccupied elsewhere, and that she 
wished to maintain a similar attitude regarding every situation that 
might arise later. 

The Italian envoy at Durazzo, he stated, had been instructed to 
issue very stringent orders in like spirit to the consulates subordinated 
to him. 

I request you to say to the Marchese di San Giuliano that I take 
note of this declaration with gratification; moreover, that I am con- 
vinced in advance that Italy will respect our agreement now, just as 
we respected it during her campaign in Lybia. 



No. 30. 
Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 4, 1914. 

Acting under instructions, the Italian Ambassador notified me 
yesterday that, according to a circular telegram, the Italian Govern- 
ment had decided to remain neutral in the present conflict. 

I replied to the Duke of Avarna that I considered this decision 
as hardly friendly on the part of Italy, that it is an attitude not in 
accord with the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, and that as Germany 
had been assailed by Russia, and France was siding with Russia, the 
occasion for applying the terms of the treaty was plain. 

Aside from these circumstances I should define it as an ex- 
tremely unwise policy on the part of Italy to separate herself from 
her allies at such a momentous time in the history of the world. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 161 

This is the first time since the conclusion of the Triple Alliance 
that a general alignment of nations was in progress. Were Italy 
to remain on the side of her allies, an opportunity would offer for 
the realisation of her far-reaching aspirations, such as the acquire- 
ment of Tunisia, Savoy and so on ; should she detach herself, then she 
would receive nothing. Italy was on the wrong path in allow- 
ing herself to be dominated by the fear that Austria-Hungary might 
extend her power in the Balkans. The Italian Government was well 
aware that we did not at all aspire to such an expansion but aimed 
solely at the maintenance of the existing situation. The outlook for 
Italy was, however, favourable for expansion and an increase of 
power. Nothing was further from our mind than to shift the balance 
of power. If such were really the view taken in Italy, he, as Am- 
bassador, should dissipate such suspicions and adduce the argu- 
ments furnished by our attitude during the thirty years that our 
alliance had lasted. I could not believe that the Marchese di San 
Giuliano intended to deceive us when he repeatedly emphasised at 
Abbazia that Italy wanted, nay needed, a strong Austria-Hungary. 
How could he reconcile such statements with his present departure 
aiming at a policy finally directed against the maintenance of the 
Monarchy in its present shape? This is all the more inexplicable 
at a time when feeling with us is turning in favour of Italy, when 
a wave of warm sympathy for the allied kingdom is noticeable. He 
could not have failed to observe the very friendly demonstrations 
which had occurred here lately. The Government intended to take 
advantage of this improvement in public feeling to exert itself in 
favour of the Italian element. 

When I pointed out the loyal attitude which His Majesty, my 
gracious Sovereign, had maintained toward Italy throughout all 
crises since the existence of the alliance, the Ambassador was obliged 
to confirm the truth of my observation. 

The Duke of Avarna finally told me that he had requested the 
Marchese di San Giuliano to grant him a short personal interview; 
if the Minister agrees, he will spend a few days in Rome. 



162 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 31. 

Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 4, 1914. 

The enquiry directed by the Austro-Hungarian Chief of the Gen- 
eral Staff to Cadorna, Chief of the Italian General Staff, regarding 
the execution of the measures agreed upon between the allies in 
case of war, has elicited the following reply : 

" Meeting without object, as Cabinet has declared Italy's neu- 
trality. 

" 'Moderate' mobilisation has been ordered. If Austria-Hungary 
refrains from occupying Lovcen and from disturbing balance of 
power in Adriatic, Italy will 'never take up arms against Austria- 
Hungary.' " 

From the foregoing statement you will gather how the policy of 
blackmail is still being pursued. 

The Duke of Avarna leaves to-day; I have requested him to tell 
the Marchese di San Giuliano that his letter of the 2nd inst., addressed 
to you, indicates that stand taken by us had been somewhat mis- 
understood. 



No. 32. 
Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 4, 1914. 

Austro-Hungarian Military Attache in Rome reports that from 
a conversation with Italian Chief of General Staff he understands 
that fears entertained by Italy concerning disturbance of balance 
of power in Balkans and Adriatic are ascribable to possible occupa- 
tion of the Lovcen. 

Please inform the Marchese di San Giuliano that we have abso- 
lutely no intention to wage war against Montenegro. We shall not 
invade Montenegrin territory so long as the small border kingdom 
shall refrain from hostile acts against the Monarchy. 

You will renew suggestions to the Marchese di San Giuliano to 
consider advisability of repeating in Cetinje his counsel favouring 
neutrality. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 163 

No. 33. 
Von Merey to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Rome, August 5, 1914. 

I fear that Italy will attempt to force us to continue discussions 
regarding compensation with the intention of demanding cession of 
Trentino, to the exclusion of compensation elsewhere. 

Italy is likely to depart from neutrality sooner or later. If 
our group achieves swift and decisive success, Italy will probably 
join us and possibly become more moderate in her claims to com- 
pensation ; in contrary eventuality she might be tempted to reinforce 
her moral extortion by means of military measures. 

I have as yet no tangible indications to support my apprehension. 
But rumours of such intentions on the part of Italy reach me from 
different sources. 

Such an interpretation of events is in complete accord with the 
overt references in the official press to the Trentino as compensa- 
tion, the reported withdrawal of troops from Genoa and Naples, the 
prohibition of the export of grain and flour purchased by us, as well 
as the reports published in Milan newspapers regarding events in 
Trent. 



No. 34. 

Von Merey to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Rome, August 5, 1914. 

Minister of Foreign Affairs appeared pleased at statement I made 
in accordance with your telegram of yesterday and said he was quite 
willing once more to warn Montenegro to remain neutral. 



No. 35. 

Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 9, 1914. 

Your telegram of 2nd instant conveyed the text of a letter from 
the Marchese di San Giuliano. As his letter contains many incorrect 



164 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

statements, I consider it advisable to revert to them. Please bring 
the following to the attention of the Marchese di San Giuliano in 
any way you may deem suitable. I leave it to your judgment either 
to add complementary arguments, or to modify any passage so as to 
make it fit in with the situation which may prevail on your side. 

The Italian contention that we wish to construe Article VII of 
the Treaty of the Triple Alliance according to our present conveni- 
ence — "volonte actuelle" — is contrary to facts. We have always held 
that, in accordance with the original intent of the treaty, Article VII 
could not apply to a conflict such as our present one with Servia. 
We have nevertheless expressed our willingness to extend the appli- 
cation of Article VII to the present case, but we considered ourselves 
entitled to expect Italy to fall in with the views of her two allies 
regarding the interpretation of Article II of the same treaty in the 
case of an European conflagration. 

We fully agree with the Rome Cabinet that it is highly desirable 
that the policy of Austria-Hungary and Italy concerning Balkan 
questions shall be tuned to the same key, and that the diplomacy of 
both countries shall be guided by principles of perfect agreement 
and mutual confidence, not only for the long period of twelve years 
during which the present treaty is to remain in force, but even with 
a view to its possible renewal after the expiration of that period. For 
this very reason, in accepting the Italian interpretation of Article 
VII, we did not limit our concession to the present conflict with 
Servia and Montenegro, but did it in a way — "pour nos relations du 
present et de I'avenir" — which could leave no room for doubt that 
we intended that our agreement with Italy's interpretation should 
remain in force for the whole duration of the treaty. 

We must strongly emphasise that the present great war has been 
forced upon us and Germany by Russia, who sought to prevent us 
from punishing a state, independent from Russia, for acts which 
roused the indignation of the civilised world and threatened our 
existence. 

The undeniable fact that for years we have, under most difficult 
circumstances, sacrificed important interests solely for the sake of 
avoiding a conflict, is the surest proof that we did not desire war. 
When a settlement of our difference with Servia became unavoid- 
able, we hoped that the conflict might remain localised. Germany 
supported us to the same end. 

We will not question the self-evident fact that a participation 
in the war would involve Italy in sacrifices and expose her to dangers, 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 165 

but we cannot agree with the opinion expressed that these sacrifices 
and dangers would be greater than those we have to face. Though 
Italy may be exposed to very dangerous attacks by the British and 
French navies, even the most fatal issue of such an engagement would 
not endanger her territorial integrity and her existence. On the 
other hand, most important advantages would accrue to Italy in the 
event of victory: predominance in the Western Mediterranean and 
the first place among Latin nations. 

We note with satisfaction the suggestion expressed by the Italian 
Government of an eventual decision at a later date upon a course 
complying with the wishes of her allies, and we are willing to coop- 
erate as far as possible in effecting such a change in the situation. 

With reference to the contention that the general wording of 
Article VII is not sufficient and does not express clearly the nature 
and extent of eventual compensation, it should be recalled that we 
already have declared that we do not seek territorial acquisition in 
the Balkans. Under the circumstances we had no cause to suggest 
an exchange of views with Italy concerning specific compensation. 

The closing words of the Marchese di San Giuliano's letter meet 
with our appreciative sympathy. He must be perfectly aware that 
the aim which he set for himself when he assumed office and toward 
which he has been steering his policy, are fully in accord with those 
which I, too, considered consistent with our policy when I succeeded 
Count Aehrenthal. I, too, hope that the mutual good-will and 
friendly spirit which inspire our recently inaugurated exchange of 
views will easily dissipate the difference of opinion which followed the 
outbreak of the present crisis. I further hope that it will prove pos- 
sible to effect the desired agreement, not only as applying to the 
present crisis but also for the duration of the Treaty. 



No. 36. 

Count Ambrozy to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Borne, August 11, 1914. 

By order of Ambassador von Merey, I handed to-day to the 
Secretary General a written memorandum drafted in the sense of 
your telegram of the 9th instant. 

After having carefully read the document he remarked that 



166 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

opinions were certainly divided as to whether in our conflict with 
Servia we had adhered to Article I * of the Treaty of the Triple 
Alliance; that the second paragraph of this Article provides that 
the contracting parties are bound to mutual consultation and support 
in defence of their interests. 

Sgr. de Martino further argued that, even conceding that we did 
not seek any permanent territorial acquisition in Servia, we might 
nevertheless wish to seize the Oriental Railway. If such an in- 
tention existed on our side — and he would not deny that it would be 
legitimate — it would have been of great value to Italy to have had 
first an exchange of views with us, in order that we might be enabled 
to protect her interests in connexion with the construction of a 
railway from Servia to the Adriatic. He finally requested me to 
consider his remarks as merely his private views, as it is incumbent 
solely upon the Marchese di San Giuliano to define Italy's stand- 
point. 



No. 37. 
Count Berchtold to Count Ambrozy. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 12, 1914. 

The Italian Ambassador called on me to-day after his return from 
Rome. 

The Duke of Avarna said that he had submitted a detailed re- 
port on the situation created by Italy's declaration of neutrality to 
His Majesty King Vittorio Emanuele, to the Marchese di San Giuliano 
and to the Prime Minister, Sgr. Salandra. He had emphasised the 
point that the position taken by the allied kingdom had impressed 
us very unfavourably and even had the effect of shaking our faith 
in Italy's loyalty and the value of her word. The explanations given 
to the Ambassador — Italy's political and military unpreparedness, her 
consideration for England, etc. — concur with the reports on the sub- 
ject which already have reached us from Rome. The publication of 
the White Book concerning the exchange of views between us and 
Berlin with regard to Russia's possible intervention had caused 
particular dissatisfaction in Rome, as we had failed to discuss the 
subject with the Italian Government. 

* See Appendix No. 15. 



THE AUSTBO-HUNGAKIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 167 

In reply, I insisted that Italy's declaration of her neutrality had 
undoubtedly created ill-feeling here when it became known. Mean- 
while we had learned the reasons which had impelled Italy to choose 
a neutral attitude, and we were inclined to view her course in an- 
other light. Considering the situation, we accepted Italy's neutrality 
and were convinced that she would loyally maintain it. 

With regard to the publication of the White Book it should be 
stated that, as the Ambassador was well aware, I never had concealed 
from him that the investigation instituted at Serajevo might possibly 
lead to explanations with Servia and to our demand for guarantees ; 
an eventuality which the Duke of Avarna fully admitted. It had 
always been our intention to settle the difference with Servia by 
ourselves and to localise the possible conflict that might ensue. All 
other powers, with the exception of Russia, had supported us in our 
endeavour. We had, it is true, received the assurance from Germany 
that she would stand by our side if Russia should intervene. Our 
action against Servia was, however, not aimed at provoking Russia. 

The Duke of Avarna was gratified to find that Italy's attitude 
is viewed now in a more friendly way than was the case at the time 
of his departure for Rome. 

I confirmed this in reasserting my conviction that if Italy had 
not wholly fulfilled her duties as an ally, this was due only to the 
pressure of particularly difficult circumstances. I then brought to 
the Ambassador 's knowledge the contents of our reply to the Marchese 
di San Giuliano's letter of August 2nd received by von Merey. I 
pointed out in particular that we had no intention whatever of 
disturbing the existing balance of power in the Balkans or in the 
Adriatic, and that we should certainly consult with our Italian ally if 
any modification of our position in this respect were contemplated. 



No. 38. 

Count Berchtold to Baron Maechio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 16, 1914. 

Acting on instructions, the Italian Ambassador informed me 
yesterday that Italian War Office is concentrating troops in the Valley 
of Lagna and of Cornazzo, in the vicinity of Tarcento, Province of 
Udine, for manoeuvres which had been decided upon long ago. 



168 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 39. 
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 20, 1914. 

The Duke of Avarna to-day read to me a long despatch from 
his Government. 

The Marchese di San Giuliano first of all states that the German 
Military Attache had greatly exaggerated the military preparations 
made by Italy on all her frontiers. Three reasons had compelled 
the Government to resort to these measures: the wish to appease 
public opinion, the necessity of preserving order at home, and finally 
the impossibility of otherwise keeping in check the thousands of 
Italian labourers who are flocking back from abroad as a consequence 
of the state of war. 

With regard to the attitude of the Italian press, the Marchese di 
San Giuliano refers to his endeavour to induce it to remain im- 
partial. His influence, however, is small as the greater part of the 
press is not subsidised. 

While insisting upon the desirability of dispelling the existing 
mutual distrust, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs expresses 
the belief "que tant qu'on ne s'entend pas sur des moyens con- 
crets a concilier les interets des deux Parties la mefiance reciproque 
per sister a 9 bien qu'elle ne soit pas justifiee ni par les intentions du 
Gouvernement italien ni par celles — bien connues — de Sa Majeste 
VEmpereur et Roi Frangois Joseph et du Comte Berchtold"; ("that 
the mutual distrust will continue as long as no agreement is reached 
concerning positive measures toward conciliating the interests of 
both parties; this, notwithstanding the fact that such distrust is 
warranted neither by the intentions of the Italian Government nor 
by those— so well known — of His Majesty the Emperor-King Francis 
Joseph and of Count Berchtold"). 

At this juncture the Ambassador asked me to express my opinion ; 
I assured him that this view would meet with understanding on our 
side. Thereupon he asked if Baron Macchio might not receive in- 
struction in this direction. 

The Duke of Avarna added that his Minister's despatch drew 
attention to the news again circulating in Italy about "the con- 
centration of large Austro-Hungarian forces on the Italian frontier" 
and also concerning the alleged preparations for the departure from 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 169 

Riva of officers of the military and civil service and of their 
families. 

I authorised the Ambassador to deny these rumours as wholly 
unfounded. 

The despatch of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs closes 
with the assurance that he will steadfastly "persevere" in his en- 
deavours, the object of which is that the relations between Austria- 
Hungary and Italy, if possible, shall be improved at the conclu- 
sion of the present crisis, and that under all circumstances they 
shall be safeguarded from further derangement. In this connex- 
ion the Marchese di San Giuliano points out that should stringent 
measures be adopted for the repression of "Austrian or Hungarian 
nationals of Italian extraction, the result might be very dangerous." 
As to the Italian Government, it had recently issued orders to the 
prefects to prevent carefully, within the limits of the law, any anti- 
Austrian demonstrations; and to suppress such demonstrations if 
they should break out nevertheless. 



No. 40. 
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Rome, August 21, 1914. 

Minister of Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that it was a 
necessity for Italy to remain neutral. While frankly admitting the 
enticements and inducements of the Entente Powers, he assured me 
that they would be unavailing. 

Certain military preparations, it is true, were being made — 
in such time of uncertainty some precautions are necessary — but a 
further call to arms on a large scale was not contemplated. He 
had besides applied to General Cadorna to furnish him with a sum- 
mary of the measures already taken which would be placed at my 
disposal; I approved this course with satisfaction, especially on 
account of the news disseminated from various quarters for the 
obvious purpose of promoting mutual distrust; I mentioned the 
ridiculous rumours concerning our alleged aggressive preparations 
in the Trentino and elsewhere, and suggested an occasional frank 
explanation of such delicate matters as the safest means of counter- 
acting a campaign aimed at creating ill-feeling. 



170 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

The Minister then also referred to the serious perplexity which 
hundreds of thousands of unemployed workmen were causing to 
Italy. The emigration to Argentine, which usually sets in in Sep- 
tember, would be impossible this year; uncounted labourers are 
streaming back from other countries, and many factories in Italy 
had been obliged to shut down or at least to reduce their output. 
It is a serious matter to keep in check these people, among whom 
many turbulent elements are to be found; as far as I could under- 
stand him, the military measures up-to-date were to a great extent 
connected with that problem, though there was no question of calling 
all these people to arms. 



No. 41. 
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 21, 1914. 

When a suitable occasion offers you will show the Marchese di 
San Giuliano that you are conversant with the contents of the Duke 
of Avarna's statement which was telegraphed to him yesterday. 

Should the Minister ask if you have received specific instructions, 
you will reply that your mission and the general instructions which 
it carried with it naturally predisposes you to join gladly in every 
conversation tending to dissipate possible misunderstandings and to 
consolidate the mutual relations of the two allies. Under those cir- 
cumstances and in accord with instructions I sent you after my last 
conversation with the Italian Ambassador, you are prepared to seek, 
together with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, though non- 
committally for the time being, such concrete means as could lead to 
the goal which Italy, in common with ourselves, is trying to reach. 

For your personal information I add that on the one hand I lay 
stress on not breaking off our negotiations with Italy, while on the 
other hand I do not wish to see Italy advance such demands as the 
cession of a part of the Monarchy's territory. If the Marchese di 
San Giuliano opens the conversation with positive proposals you will 
show a willingness to listen ; however, if the Minister should refer to 
the cession of the Trentino or some other part of the Monarchy, you 
will point out that such a proposal could not possibly lead to the 
desired understanding. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 171 

As against this you might refer to a previous conversation that 
took place between Count Ambrozy and the Secretary General and 
bring up the subject of Italy 's interest in the construction of a rail- 
way to connect Servia with the Adriatic, as well as of the Kingdom's 
important interests in the Mediterranean. 



No. 42. 
Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, August 22, 1914. 

The Under-Secretary of State to-day advised me to suggest that 
we issue statements to the effect that we willingly recognise the 
Italian Kingdom's neutral attitude; this with a view to soothing 
Italy's guilty conscience and thus confirming her in her present 
attitude. 

An unreserved acceptance by you of the Italian interpretation 
of Article VII would be welcomed here with gratification. 

In the view of the German Government, Austria-Hungary and 
Germany should at the earliest possible date make the analogous 
declaration that they acknowledge the Italian interpretation of said 
Article, i.e., that an acquisition of territory in the Balkans by Austria- 
Hungary would, even if Italy remained neutral, be subject to a prior 
understanding with and an adequate compensation for the Kingdom. 



No. 43. 

Count Berchtold to Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 23, 1914. 

You will have gathered from my statement to the Duke of Avarna 
(last conversation of 20th instant) that I am constantly endeavour- 
ing to soothe Italy's guilty conscience, and I request you to remind 
the Under-Secretary of State of this fact ; you will recall that I told 
the Duke of Avarna on the 12th instant that, "considering the situa- 
tion, we accepted Italy's neutrality and were convinced that she 
would loyally maintain it." 



172 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

With regard to Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Al- 
liance, I have explained that my first statement, which was to a 
certain degree conditional, meant that I had thought myself entitled 
to expect in exchange that Italy would fall in with the opinion of 
her allies concerning the occurrence of the " casus foederis." Wish- 
ing to avoid any misunderstanding, I expressly stated in a subsequent 
conversation with the Duke of Avarna that I had not made the 
acceptance of the Italian interpretation subject to any condition but 
had simply expressed the hope that Italy would consider the " casus 
foederis" as actually existing. 

You will inform Herr Zimmermann that he may consider him- 
self authorised by us to expressly affirm to the Rome Cabinet that 
the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin unreservedly accept the Italian 
interpretation of the words "dans les regions des Balcans" of Article 
VII, not only with regard to the present crisis, but as applying to the 
whole duration of the Treaty. I am sending identical instructions to 
Baron Macchio, should he and Baron Flotow * have to make a similar 
joint declaration in Rome. 

This declaration implies our willingness to enter into negotiations 
with Italy concerning compensation in the case of a temporary or 
permanent occupation of territory in the Balkans by us. 

You will further inform the Under-Secretary of State that I should 
have no objection to conceding to Italy specific rights, in the form 
of territorial acquisitions at the expense of others, should she remain 
neutral or join in the war on the side of her allies at a later date. 



No. 44. 
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 23, 1914. 

I authorise you to declare to the Rome Cabinet, in conjunction 
with your German colleague, that we accept unreservedly the Italian 
interpretation of the term "dans les regions des Balcans" in Article 
VII, not only for the present crisis, but also for the whole duration 
of the Treaty. 

This declaration implies our willingness to enter into negotia- 

* German Ambassador to Italy. 



THE AUSTBO-HUNGABIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 173 

tions with Italy concerning compensation in the case of a temporary 
or permanent occupation of a territory in the Balkans by us. 



No. 45. 
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Borne, August 25, 1914. 

My German colleague having received instructions to-day which 
authorise him to declare the acceptance of the Italian interpretation 
of Article VII, we to-day individually made to Marchese di San 
Giuliano an analogous verbal statement. 

He appeared to be favourably impressed but stated that at the 
present stage of the war there was as yet no basis for entering into 
a conversation. 

I declared that I was always ready for such a conversation, but 
that I understood perfectly well his wish to postpone it. 



No. 46. 
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio, 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 25, 1914. 

The German Ambassador to-day read to me the contents of a 
telegram from Baron Flotow reporting on a conversation with the 
Prime Minister, Salandra. 

The Italian Prime Minister informed him that the majority in 
Parliament and almost the entire country are for the maintenance of 
neutrality ; that the Government is determined to hold steadfastly to 
this attitude. 

The military measures taken by Italy did not go beyond those of 
other neutral states, such as Switzerland, for instance. 

He had formally declared to the socialists that Italy would re- 
main neutral. He had made a similar statement to the republicans, 
represented in the Chamber by eight Deputies, who are said to favour 
war. 

Salandra finally stated with emphasis that neutrality would be 



174 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

maintained as long as nothing happened in those parts of Austria- 
Hungary inhabited by a population speaking the Italian tongue. 

Sgr. Bollati is said to have expressed similar views in Berlin. 



No. 47. 
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Rome, August 27, 1914. 

In complete agreement with the declarations of the Marchese di 
San Giuliano, Sgr. Salandra to-day laid stress upon the Italian Gov- 
ernment's firm determination not to allow itself to be forced out of 
its neutrality. 

The Prime Minister recounted Italy's domestic difficulties and 
the measures taken by him for influencing the press and the political 
world. He expressed a strong hope that our relations would not only 
not suffer from the present international crisis, but that they would 
grow even more intimate after the crisis. 



No. 48. 

Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 28, 1914. 

The Italian Ambassador, in accordance with instructions, informed 
me to-day of the declarations made by you and Baron Flotow to 
Marchese di San Giuliano concerning the interpretation of Article 
VII. Although gratified by the declaration that we agreed to the 
German and Italian interpretation and extended it to the full dura- 
tion of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, the Italian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs agreed with you and Baron Flotow that a concrete 
conversation on the application of said article could not well be 
entered into while the war situation continued uncertain. 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGAKIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 175 

No. 49. 
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, August 28, 1914. 

The Duke of Avarna told me to-day that he had received tele- 
graphic information from his Government, with liberty to communi- 
cate it to me, that the British and French Governments had declared, 
in Eome, their intention not to occupy Valona. These two govern- 
ments at the same time, by means of more or less veiled references, 
tried hard to find out if Italy would eventually depart from her 
neutrality. The Marchese di San Giuliano had declared categorically 
that Italy would maintain her policy of strict neutrality. 

I thanked the Ambassador for the information and requested 
him to tell his Minister that I considered this a confirmation of that 
loyal adherence to neutrality which I had expected from Italy. 



No. 50. 
Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, September 5, 1914. 

The Under-Secretary of State informs me that Sgr. Bollati made 
a long call upon him to-day and, after remarks on the general situa- 
tion, finally brought to light Italy's great desire to occupy the island 
of Saseno, of course only in perfect harmony with Austria-Hungary 
and Germany and only for the purpose of upholding the agreements 
concerning Albania. 

Bollati said he was very much in favour of this plan, which would 
enable Italy to display some activity and thus divert public opinion 
from its attitude of hostility to the Triple Alliance. Besides, it would 
serve a useful purpose to state publicly that the occupation had been 
decided upon by the Triple Alliance; the Entente Powers would 
understand — probably to their discomfiture — that the Triple Alliance 
is still working together. 

Finally, the Ambassador requested Herr Zimmermann to use 
his influence in Vienna in that direction. 



176 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

A few hours later the Under-Secretary of State received from 
Bollati the following letter : 

" Au sujet de I 'occupation de Vile de Saseno, il est bien entendu 
que cette mesure conservatoire, a effectuer par un petit detachement 
italien et qui devait etre faite en plein accord avec I'Autriche- 
Hongrie, n'aurait qu'un caractere purement temporaire pendant la 
duree de la guerre et sans aucun but territorial. Plus j'y pense plus 
je crois que cette idee presente de serieux avantages. Vous feriez, 
j y en suis convaincu, ceuvre tres utile en y obtenant aussitot que pos- 
sible V adhesion du Cabinet de Vienne, adhesion qui serait naturelle- 
ment rendue publique, et qui produirait les meilleurs resultats en 
Italic et ailleurs." ("With regard to the occupation of the island 
of Saseno, it is well understood that this conservative measure, to be 
carried out by a small Italian detachment and to be undertaken in 
full agreement with Austria-Hungary, would be a purely temporary 
undertaking for the duration of the war, without any territorial aim. 
The more I consider this plan, the more it seems advantageous to 
my mind. I am convinced that it would prove very useful if you 
would obtain as soon as possible the consent of the Vienna Cabinet; 
this consent, of course, would be made publicly known, and its publi- 
cation would produce excellent results in Italy and elsewhere.") 

Herr Zimmermann has instructed von Tschirschky to discuss the 
matter with you. 



No. 51. 
Count Berchtold to Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, September 6, 1914. 

Herr von Tschirschky called on me yesterday; he brought up 
the question of the island of Saseno and asked me if the Duke of 
Avarna would possibly lay himself open to a refusal if he were to 
sound me in connexion with Italy's desire. 

I replied to the German Ambassador that the Duke of Avarna 
had no reason to fear a refusal on my part. 

I am contemplating a reply to the Duke of Avarna to the follow- 
ing effect: 

In response to Sgr. Bollati 's statement to Herr Zimmermann, and 
considering the assurances repeatedly exchanged between Vienna and 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN BED BOOK (NO. 2) 177 

Rome, that our agreement with Italy and the decisions of the Lon- 
don Conference concerning Albania remain in force, I agree to the 
temporary occupation of the island of Saseno by Italian troops during 
this war. 

We naturally must lay stress upon the occupation of Saseno by 
Italy as having been decided upon by the Triple Alliance and as 
being announced by simultaneous official publication in Vienna, 
Berlin and Rome. I shall also give expression to my hope that the 
Italian Government will appreciate our consent all the more, as 
public opinion in the Monarchy is particularly sensitive with regard 
to all questions concerning Albania. 



No. 52. 

Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, September 8, 1914. 

The Under-Secretary of State told me that Sgr. Bollati informed 
him to-day that the negotiations concerning Saseno should be con- 
ducted in Berlin, and that the Duke of Avarna would not approach 
you on the subject. Herr Zimmermann replied to Bollati that he 
failed to understand this. At Bollati 's request he consented to find 
out how the proposal would be viewed in Vienna, but ventured the 
opinion that, after the conciliatory reply he had received from you, 
he considered that the Duke of Avarna should negotiate directly 
with you on the matter. 



No. 53. 

Count Berchtold to Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, September 9, 1914. 

I am unable to discern the reasons for transferring from Vienna 
to Berlin the negotiations concerning Saseno. Since we have given 
our consent to the temporary occupation of Saseno we shall main- 
tain it; we are even prepared to conduct negotiations on the matter 
by way of Berlin. We hold, however, that since the proposed occupa- 



178 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

tion is to satisfy an Italian desire, excessive complaisance on our 
part might lead the Italian Government to undervalue the tokens we 
have so far given of our willingness to meet its wishes. 



No. 54. 
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Borne, September 11, 1914. 

In reply to a despatch from the Prince of Wied appealing for 
his sympathy, King Vittorio Emanuele has sent him the following 
telegram : 

"Je remercie Votre Alt esse des sentiments qu'Elle vent "bien 
m'exprimer aussi au nom de la Princesse, et je tiens a L' assurer que 
je forme les vo&ux les plus sinceres pour le succes de Sa haute 
mission et que mon Gouvernement continuera de faire tout ce qui 
sera possible pour la prosperity de I'Albanie." ("I thank Your 
Highness for the feelings kindly expressed also on behalf of the 
Princess. I wish to assure Your Highness of my most sincere wishes 
for the success of your high mission. My government will continue 
to do all in its power for the welfare of Albania.") 

Through the medium of the press, Italy semi-officially denies 
any intention to occupy Valona, although the local newspapers for 
the past few days have been discussing such an eventuality, and 
although, according to reports from Naples, troops are in readiness 
there for an expedition to Valona. 



No. 55. 

Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, September 12, 1914. 

The Under-Secretary of State told me to-day that, according to 
reports from Rome, the Marchese di San Giuliano is said to state 
that the question of an occupation of Saseno broached here by Sgr. 
Bollati is to be ascribed to a misunderstanding and was in no way 
meant seriously. Sgr. Bollati, on the contrary, told Herr Zimmer- 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 179 

mann yesterday that it has been decided in Rome not to occupy 
Saseno because it had become apparent that Greece would respect 
Albania's neutrality, and also because the intended diversion of public 
opinion from the relations with Austria-Hungary had become super- 
fluous since these relations had become quite satisfactory. 



No. 56. 
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Rome, September 29, 1914. 

I had a conversation yesterday with the Secretary General on 
the subject of fresh rumours about an impending Italian expedition 
to Valona ; he renewed the statement made to me by the Marchese di 
San Giuliano weeks ago, that such an undertaking was quite out of 
the question, unless Epirote forces occupied Valona. In such a case 
the Italian Government would find it impossible to disregard public 
opinion, which is extremely sensitive on that point. 

"When I pointed out that this decision is likely to be known in 
Athens, Sgr. de Martino said that Venizelos, in spite of all his denials, 
had been prone to favour the activities of the Epirotes. The very 
reservations made formerly by Zografos that they would advance 
only if they were provoked by Mohammedan raids, proved, in his 
opinion, that such an eventuality was not excluded, since such raids 
can be brought about at any time. 

I took occasion to emphasise our common interest in the con- 
tinued existence of Albania in conformity with our agreement; I 
also pointed out how far we were from an expansion policy in the 
Adriatic, a fact demonstrated by our decision to conduct a purely 
defensive war against Montenegro. 



No. 57. 

Von Moricz to Count Berchtold. 

(Report.) Ancona, October 3, 1914. 

The editorial in to-day's issue of V Or dine, the local organ of 
the governmental party, urges the immediate occupation of Valona 
by Italy. 



180 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

This occupation, to be carried out by a detachment of marines, 
should be confined to Yalona and the island of Saseno. 

The necessity of such an occupation is explained by the argu- 
ment that Italy should forestall Greece and Servia, who will advance 
claims upon Albania and have already begun underhanded military 
and diplomatic activities. 

It is pointed out to Austria-Hungary, who may object to Italy 's 
proposed action, that she must recognise Italy's right to proceed 
alone, in view of the Dual Monarchy's inability to join in an action 
in Albania at the present time. 



No. 58. 
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, October 5, 1914. 

According to confidential information, France has now also 
promised Tunisia to the Italians, if Italy places herself on the side 
of the Triple Entente. The aim of the Entente is evidently to check- 
mate the Austro-Hungarian fleet with the Italian fleet and thus re- 
lease the Anglo-French naval units in the Mediterranean for use in 
the North Sea. 

You might, in the course of conversation, pass a remark at com- 
petent quarters to the effect that the Entente is anxious to engage 
the Austro-Hungarian and Italian fleets in a fight for their mutual 
destruction in order, first to destroy the German fleet by all available 
means, and then to obtain unlimited power in the Mediterranean. 



No. 59. 

Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Rome, October 6, 1914. 

Information received from Salandra quarters indicates that an 
occupation of Valona, limited to a detachment of marines, may take 
place soon. The endeavour to convince the Prime Minister that this 
would be a good means to divert the mind of the nationalists and 
their followers from the northern neighbour, has been successful. At 
the same time it would give an opportunity to obtain a foothold in 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGAEIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 181 

the Balkans with the avowed object of safeguarding the interests 
of the Balkan States under Italy's lead at the time of the great 
settlement of affairs. 

On various occasions my opinion on the subject has been directly 
sought, and I have expressed my personal view that Italy, in con- 
sequence of her repeated declarations, stood on the same ground as 
to our agreement and the London decisions as we do. Even a tem- 
porary separate action, therefore, could not alter the situation but 
would only accentuate the necessity for the existence of an inde- 
pendent Albania in the interests of Europe. 



No. 60. 
Count Berchtold to Baron Maechio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, October 7, 1914. 

Should your conversation with the Marchese di San Giuliano about 
the dangers of mines in the Adriatic offer an opening, I leave it to 
your discretion to point out that this situation constitutes a proof 
of the detrimental effects of the Anglo-French action in the Adriatic 
upon Italian interests. 

This complication would surely have been avoided had the two 
above-mentioned powers had any reason to fear that Italy would in 
this case abandon her neutrality. 



No. 61. 

Baron Maechio to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Rome, October 8, 1914. 

In various conversations of a general nature concerning Albania, 
and lastly with Sgr. Salandra, I have been unable to discover any 
inclination to discuss with me the possible occupation of Valona. 

Should it actually be planned to carry it out in a small way, 
namely, without any other preparations than those which have been 
mentioned of late, it is possible that a fait accompli might be created 
in the belief that the Central Powers could not interfere at present ; 



182 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

the old song of woe would be struck up that Italy had not been 
notified in good time of our intentions against Servia. 



No. 62. 
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, October 9, 1914. 

Referring to your telegram of yesterday : 

Separate action on the part of Italy in Albania would constitute 
an open breach of our Albanian agreement and would oblige us to 
formulate certain reservations. In any case, the contemplated step 
on the part of Italy would furnish us with the occasion, in the 
event of a successful war, either to demand at a later date the resti- 
tution of equality in Albania or else to consider the occupation of 
Valona as Italy 's chosen measure of compensation for a possible terri- 
torial expansion on our part in the Balkans. 

At the commencement of our enquiry at Serajevo, I informed 
the Duke of Avarna of the possibility that complications might 
arise with Servia. Therefore no comparison can be made between 
the Italian procedure in Albania and ours in Servia. 



No. 63. 
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Rome, October 10, 1914. 

In a conversation dealing with the contents of your telegrams of 
the 5th and 7th inst., I was interested to learn from the Marchese 
di San Giuliano that he fully shares your views concerning the in- 
tentions of the Entente in regard to the fleets, as set forth in your 
first-mentioned telegram. 

Only in this way, he said, could the hitherto passive and watch- 
ful tactics of the Anglo-French fleet in the Adriatic be explained. 

To his mind, the Entente would not attain this object, and he 
would do all in his power to prevent it. This is the chief reason 
why he remained at his post, despite his serious illness. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 183 

I told him that you, who are well acquainted with his intentions, 
would receive his decision with great satisfaction. I also ventured 
to say that in so doing he was carrying out logically and consistently 
his own policy, which he had introduced on the day of his entry 
into the Consulta. The Minister replied that this would remain his 
policy forever, and that it was the only one which Italy could reason- 
ably pursue. 

The Marchese di San Giuliano then said that his opponents are be- 
ginning to realise that they cannot win the day. Their anger over this 
discovery, however, will impel them to redoubled efforts, and they 
will make the best possible use of every trifling incident in their at- 
tacks. The agitation- should not be taken too seriously, he advised me ; 
it would recur time after time, and the Italian Government is doing 
its best to counteract it as far as the liberal institutions of the country 
permit. In so doing, the Government must be careful not to put new 
weapons into the hands of the opposition. The recent arrest in Rome 
of propagators of irredentistic pamphlets should prove that the 
Italian Government is in earnest, and that it is paying due atten- 
tion to the matter. 



No. 64. 

Count Berchtold to Baron MaccMo. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, October 12, 1914. 

I hear from Berlin that the Marchese di San Giuliano has told 
the German Ambassador in Rome that should an expedition to Albania 
be effected, detachments would be landed from time to time, to be 
used according to the development of affairs. The occupation of 
Saseno, as originally contemplated, would be of no avail. 



No. 65. 

Baron MaccMo to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Borne, October 18, 1914. 

According to instructions I conveyed to-day to the Italian Prime 
Minister the condolences of the Austro-Hungarian Government and 



184 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

the expression of your personal sympathy on the occasion of the 
Marchese di San Giuliano's death. 

Sgr. Salandra asked me to express the sincere thanks of the 
Italian Cabinet to the Austro-Hungarian Government and especially 
to your Excellency for the kind expressions. 

Subsequently the Prime Minister informed me that he had taken 
over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ad interim in order to cut short 
all discussions among the public and to avoid giving rise to specula- 
tions as to the possibility of a change in Italy's foreign policy as a 
result of the change in the person of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
As long as he remained at the head of the Cabinet, the Marchese di 
San Giuliano's course would be adhered to, the Minister assured 
me. 



No. 66. 
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Borne, October 19, 1914. 

Secretary General informs me Italian Government has received 
news from French sources that Greek troops are advancing on 
Argyrokastro. 

Simultaneous information is available, that thousand armed men 
with machine guns are planning to land in Albania by means of 
sailing vessels. Also that Essad's intentions are doubtful, and that 
he endeavoured to draw troops from Valona. Albania's neutrality 
appears, therefore, in danger. In view of these discoveries the Con- 
sulta intends to address a circular note to the Italian Ambassadors 
to the signatories of the London protocol. In that note Italy, as the 
only neutral power among them, will emphasise her strict adherence 
to the protocol and express her intention to prevent any attempts 
to land expeditions. For that purpose Italy would increase the num- 
ber of ships in those waters. 

I confined myself to the assurance that we also adhered to the 
terms of the London protocol and that therefore our cooperation 
with Italy in those regions holds good even though it may confine 
itself to moral action for the time being. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 185 

No. 67. 
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, October 22, 1914. 

Report from Berlin says that Italian Ambassador there has in- 
formed Under-Secretary of State of Italy's decision to have war-ships 
cruise off Albanian coast to prevent importation of foreign arms and 
ammunition. 

As the other Powers who have guaranteed Albania's independence 
are at war, Italy considers it her duty to assume this part. 

Bollati added he could confidentially inform Zimmermann that this 
measure involved no other purpose, but that Rome looked upon it as 
a welcome opportunity to divert public opinion from demonstrations 
hostile to the Triple Alliance. 



No. 68. 
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Borne, October 22, 1914. 

De Martino tells me Sir Edward Grey has called attention of the 
Italian Government to the great misery and famine among the 
Mohammedans in Epirus, and has given the Italian Government to 
understand that it should consider the idea of a helpful interven- 
tion. Sir Edward Grey emphasised the danger that these adverse 
conditions may result in a massacre of the Christian population. 

The Consulta, therefore, is considering the idea of some minor 
action "avec des gardes" (with guards) to remedy the prevailing 
conditions. A military expedition, as discussed in the local press, 
is out of the question. 

Italy would in any case adhere to the two principal points of 
the London decisions, namely, the neutrality and the integrity of 
Albania. 



186 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 

No. 69. 

Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, October 24, 1914. 

I beg to hand you herewith copy of notes from an interview 
which I had yesterday with the Duke of Avarna concerning an 
Italian action in Albania. 



(Enclosure.) 
(Translation from the French.) 

The Italian Ambassador read to me on October the 23rd, a tele- 
gram from his Government, the gist of which is : 

The British Ambassador, Sir J. Rennell Rodd, has called the 
attention of the Italian Government to the miserable conditions pre- 
vailing in Epirus and to the danger of massacres. The autonomous 
government would not be in a position to cope with the situation. 

Venizelos could not do less than send one regiment to Argyro- 
kastro to avert massacres, under a promise to withdraw his troops 
at a later date should the Powers so desire. The Greek Government 
would not object to an Italian occupation of Valona. 

Sir J. Rennell Rodd hopes that the Italian and Greek Govern- 
ments will find a way to a mutual understanding. 

In consideration of this request by the British Ambassador, the 
Italian Prime Minister is said to have expressed the following views : 

Sgr. Salandra could not accept the suggestion of a direct under- 
standing with Greece in the matter of an even temporary occupation 
of Epirus by Greek troops. 

He, however, appreciated the humanitarian motives invoked by 
the Greek Government and would not oppose the sending to Argyro- 
kastro of one Greek regiment for police purposes, while noting Veni- 
zelos 's promise to withdraw the Greek troops at a later date. Finally 
he reserved to himself the right to carry out at Valona such police 
operations and humanitarian measures as might be needed for the 
welfare of the refugees. The London decisions with regard to Al- 
bania would remain in force. 

The Duke of Avarna, instructed to communicate to me the above 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 187 

in strict confidence, added that in view of the abnormal conditions 
at Valona, and in order to protect for humanitarian reasons the 
Moslem refugees, the Italian Government proposed to undertake 
strictly necessary operations without giving them the character of 
a military expedition with the purpose of an actual occupation of 
the city. The London decisions concerning Albania would remain 
intact. 

In acknowledging the Duke of Avarna's communication I laid 
stress upon the reservations made by the Italian Government in con- 
nexion with the character of the police and humanitarian operations 
as proposed by the Italian Cabinet, and especially upon the main- 
tenance of the London decisions as the basis of the expedition referred 
to. I made the point that I also considered the Italian action from 
the point of view of our Albanian agreement with Italy, and that it 
must be understood that that agreement should be maintained in full 
vigour. 

The Duke of Avarna promised me to telegraph to his govern- 
ment in that sense. 



No. 70. 
Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Valona, Octoler 26, 1914. 

Italian battleship "Dandolo" made port this afternoon; is said to 
have sanitary expedition on board. 

Special correspondents of leading Italian papers have arrived in 
Valona, 



No. 71. 

Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Valona, Octoler 30, 1914. 

Italian flotilla has landed small detachment of marines on Saseno. 
My Italian colleague informed me of this fact without touching 



188 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

upon the question of the purpose of this measure (observation or 
military occupation). 

On highest point of island the Italian flag has been hoisted. 



No. 72. 

Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, October 31, 1914. 

In pursuance of my communication about the installation of an 
Italian sanitary station at Valona (which is already known) the 
Italian Embassy, acting on instructions, announced to-day that the 
Italian Government has proceeded to the provisional occupation of 
the island of Saseno for the effective preservation of Albania's neu- 
trality. 



No. 73. 
Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Valona, November 1, 1914. 

Local Italian representative has verbally informed the local 
authorities of the occupation of Saseno and described it as a measure 
for the protection of Albania's neutrality and for the maintenance 
of the London agreement. He added that no similar measures were 
contemplated in respect of Valona. 

I note that the provisional character of the measure has not been 
specifically stated. 



No. 74. 

Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, December 12, 1914. 

The Italian Ambassador called on me yesterday and gave me the 
following verbal information under instructions: 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 189 

The military invasion of Servia by Austria-Hungary has created 
a new situation which demands a conversation between us and Italy 
in the spirit of Article VII of the Triple Alliance agreement. Under 
the terms of that article we were obliged to come to an understanding 
with Italy before our occupation of Servian territory, were it only 
temporary. We, therefore, should have notified the Italian Cabinet 
and effected an understanding before we crossed the Servian frontier. 

Baron Sonnino did not wish to dwell upon this delay or to ham- 
per our military measures ; this fact, he pointed out, should be appre- 
ciated as a proof of Italy 's conciliatory disposition. The Ambassador 
then hinted at objections on our part to various operations which 
Italy proposed to undertake during the Italo-Turkish war, and espe- 
cially to our reservations against any action in the Dardanelles. He 
further declared that Italy had a vital interest in the preservation 
of Servia 's full integrity and in her political and economic inde- 
pendence. Our repeated declarations to the effect that we did not 
aspire to any territorial acquisitions at Servia 's expense, did not 
constitute a formal and permanent obligation. Moreover, an inva- 
sion of Servian territory — even a temporary one — is sufficient in 
itself to disturb the equilibrium in the Balkans and to give Italy a 
right to compensation. Even in the event of Austria-Hungary gain- 
ing any advantages of non-territorial nature, Italy would have that 
right under the terms of Article VII. In the opinion of the Italian 
Government it is necessary to proceed without delay to concrete 
negotiations, because of the new situation which closely affects most 
vital political and economic interests. The Duke of Avarna then re- 
ferred to the uneasiness which prevailed in the Italian Parliament 
and to Italian public opinion, which clearly indicated the direction 
of Italian national aspirations and which the Italian Government 
would have to take into serious account. An understanding between 
the two governments on the basis which Baron Sonnino has in mind, 
would eliminate the old causes of friction and put an end to the 
frequent and deplorable incidents; a condition of cordial and per- 
manent friendship would thus be established without which all official 
agreements are void and barren. 

In conclusion the Ambassador emphasised the friendly feeling 
which inspired his representations. 



190 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 75. 

Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, December 12, 1914. 

In reply to the Duke of Avarna's communication which I trans- 
mitted to you to-day, I have expressed my surprise at his declara- 
tions; the starting point, namely, the assumption that we should 
have sought an understanding with Italy before we crossed the 
Servian border, seems unfounded in view of the actual situation. I 
recalled to his mind that I informed him then of our intention to 
face all the consequences that might result from Servia's attitude 
and that the Marchese di San Oiuliano, at that time, gave us his 
formal assurances that Italy would not impede our military opera- 
tions; all she desired was that we should recognise the applicability 
of Article VII to the present situation. We then noted the first- 
mentioned promise; as to the latter demand, the Italian point of 
view was accepted after some arguing on our part. In a letter to von 
Merey at the beginning of August, the Marchese di San Giuliano re- 
ferred to the circumstances which required clarification in order to 
put the relations of the allies upon a sound basis. Although we re- 
plied thereto in a friendly manner, the Italian Government failed to 
revert to the subject. 

As to our reservations during the Lybian war, I must point out 
that Count Aehrenthars objections to the operations on the Albanian 
coast were primarily based upon our Albanian agreement; that the 
seizure of the islands in the iEgean Sea practically constituted an 
occupation, as this was not a military operation in the theatre of 
war and was done solely because Italy wished to hold a pledge; 
finally, that the action in the Dardanelles endangered the status quo 
of the Turkish Empire and was therefore in conflict with the terms 
of the Triple Alliance agreement, which had been effected for the 
preservation of the Turkish possessions in the Balkans. Besides, in 
the matter of the last-mentioned action, we had confined ourselves to 
calling Italy's attention to the danger involved in it and to a re- 
fusal to share the responsibility for its possible consequences. The 
Ambassador also recalled our previous objection to the extension of 
the Lybian war to the mainland of Asia Minor ; I pointed out to him 
the fundamental differences between the situation in those days, when 
Italy contemplated the creation of a new theatre of war, and the 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 191 

present instance, when we are fighting on the only available battle- 
ground. 

I further explained to the Duke of Avarna that there could be 
no question of a temporary occupation in the present case. The 
expression "temporary occupation' ' had been used in the Triple 
Alliance agreement in reference to the occupation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. It can hardly be asserted that our present military 
operations could be construed as an occupation of a certain terri- 
tory. Moreover, I could not possibly be in a position to state with 
certainty at this moment that one or the other particular locality 
was at present in our possession, as continued changes are taking 
place in this respect. 

As to Servia's integrity, the Ambassador should be well aware 
that we never intended to interfere with it ; but on the contrary that 
it was Servia's lust for our territory that brought on the war. At 
the present time we still hold the same standpoint and desire no 
more than the maintenance and protection of our possessions. Should 
we seriously consider the occupation of some defined territory, we 
would acquaint the Italian Government in a loyal manner of our in- 
tention to do so, and would then broach the subject of compensation. 

It is impossible to-day to foresee what turn events may take, and 
therefore I could not accept the view that the mere fact of our ad- 
vance into Servia has already disturbed the equilibrium in the Bal- 
kans. Any agreement presupposes a well-defined basis ; but an agree- 
ment reached at this time could not provide for every eventuality, 
and it would be subject to daily modifications. 

However much I would like to assist in the clarification of the 
matter, I could really find no basis for specific negotiations to-day; 
all the less so as our agreement clearly stipulates that the com- 
pensation should be in proportion to the advantages gained by the 
other party. 

In concluding the conversation, I requested the Ambassador to 
point out to his Government the inconsistency of adopting Servia 's 
standpoint — as it appears to do — namely, the standpoint of a State 
whose foreign policy is aimed mainly at the acquisition of our posses- 
sions in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia. Any unbiased judge of 
the present situation must realise the grave dangers which Italy 
would incur by adopting such a policy. 



192 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 76. 
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, December 13, 1914. 

In pursuance of my telegrams of yesterday, I send you the fol- 
lowing for your guidance : 

The Triple Alliance agreement provides for the events of tem- 
porary and permanent occupations. Our advance into Servia does 
not even partake of the character of a temporary one. In the course 
of the last few months the theatre of war has been frequently on 
Servian soil but at times also in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Hungary. 
In the nature of things it is necessary that we should endeavour to 
carry the war as much as possible beyond our border. But even when 
that has been accomplished there can be no question of an occupation. 
A temporary occupation would exist only if, after the termination 
of the war, some of the enemy's territory were held as a pledge or 
if for some reason beyond the purposes of the war such territory were 
to be kept under military occupation. 

Should the Italian Government refer to a disturbance of the 
equilibrium in the Balkans in connexion with the provisions of the 
Triple Alliance treaty, you will point out that Count Aehrenthal had 
drawn Italy's attention at the beginning of the Lybian war to the 
dangers of a reaction on the Balkan peninsula, for the possible con- 
sequences of which Italy would have to bear the responsibility. In 
the same way I warned Italy of the dangers which an extension of 
the sphere of that war would involve. Events which have since 
then followed in quick succession have ultimately brought about 
a disturbance of the Balkan equilibrium, and especially a strengthen- 
ing of Servia, which considers that the time has now arrived when 
she may extend her aspirations to the territories of the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy. 

If the Italian Government desires at this early stage of events 
to open negotiations with us concerning a possible compensation, I 
have no material objection to such a course, but am confronted with 
the practical difficulty of finding a concrete starting point for such 
negotiations at the present time. It is naturally out of the question 
to involve in such a discussion any territory belonging to the Dual 
Monarchy if such territory be the object of the Duke of Avarna's 
insinuations about national aspirations. It would rather have to 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 193 

deal with the question of the islands in the iEgean Sea, still occupied 
by Italy, and the evacuation of which had been expressly promised; 
also \vith the taking possession of the island of Saseno. 



No. 77. 
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, December 13, 1914. 

Under instructions from his government, von Tschirschky to-day 
communicated the following: 

The German Foreign Office has been informed that the Duke 
of Avarna has been instructed to open negotiations on the question 
of compensation in the spirit of Article VII of the Triple Alliance 
agreement. The Rome Cabinet has added to this information the 
request that the German Government support its proceedings at 
Vienna. 

Von Jagow replied that the time had not yet come for a division 
of the spoils, whereupon Bollati explained that it was only a ques- 
tion of an exchange of views. The fact that his Government desired 
to communicate its wishes to Vienna at this time proved its intention 
to adhere to its agreement and to maintain its neutrality. 

The Italian Ambassador decidedly rejected the objection of the 
Secretary of State that such a representation on the part of Italy 
could easily be taken as a threat. 

In the further course of the conversation between von Jagow and 
Sgr. Bollati reference was made to the uncertainty of Italy's real 
desires; the Secretary of State gave the Italian Ambassador con- 
fidentially his private opinion that the word "Trentino" should not 
be mentioned. 

The instructions to von Tschirschky express the views of the Ger- 
man Government in concise form that, however unpleasant the ques- 
tion of compensation, it appeared most advisable under the circum- 
stances to accede to the exchange of views desired by the Italian 
Government. 

The Secretary of State assumes that Italy has in mind the Tren- 
tino, but can hardly believe that the Rome Cabinet would dare pro- 
nounce the word. Should this, however, happen against his expec- 
tation, he would consider it advisable to avoid a harsh refusal but to 



194 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

explain the reasons which make that cession by Austria-Hungary im- 
possible. 



No. 78. 
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, December 21, 1914. 

The Duke of Avarna has been supplied by his government with 
arguments with which to reply to those that I have recently brought 
up in the question of compensation. 

The Ambassador has consequently expressed himself on the 19th 
inst. in the following sense: 

Baron Sonnino does not agree with the differentiation between 
a temporary occupation and an "occupation momentanee derivant 
d' operations de guerre" (momentary occupation resulting from war- 
like operations.) Such a differentiation would be against the spirit 
and wording of Article VII. 

We should have sought an understanding with Italy before we 
crossed the border. On this point Italy had made no difficulties and 
thereby had given ample proof of her friendly intention to take into 
account Austria-Hungary's military urgencies. Nevertheless, it was 
Austria-Hungary's duty to come to an agreement with Italy on the 
matter of compensation. 

Our arguments based upon Austria-Hungary's attitude during the 
Lybian war are being opposed by the contention that we not only 
impeded temporary or momentary occupations, but even the mere 
bombardment of coasts and so forth. The apprehension that the 
status quo may be disturbed, could not be cited by us, as at the 
present time, by her measures against Servia, Austria-Hungary, her- 
self had disturbed the equilibrium stipulated in Article VII. 

Italy could not be satisfied with our promise to refrain from the 
annihilation of Servia, as she herself had declared that she would 
not permit any encroachment upon Servia 's integrity and independ- 
ence, which would be contrary alike to Italian interests and to the 
provisions of the agreement. There was a wide margin between the 
preservation of the political and economic integrity and independence 
of a country on the one hand and its annihilation on the other; this 
margin should be the object and the basis of negotiations and an 
agreement. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 195 

The occupation of territory, whether partial, permanent, or tem- 
porary, as well as advantages of a non-territorial nature and even 
the acquisition of a merely political influence or of economic privi- 
leges, should be made the object of a previous agreement on the basis 
of a compensation. 

Our declaration that we would seek an understanding whenever 
we should be about to proceed to an actual occupation was not suffi- 
cient, and the Italian Government would regret it if we held to the 
view that we are not yet called upon to enter into negotiations on 
the subject. 

Finally, it was pointed out that prolonged discussions about the 
principles of the interpretation of Article VII, while events are tak- 
ing their course and may confront Italy with accomplished facts, 
must be considered as decidedly prejudicial to Italian interests; and 
that it would be of the greatest importance to place our mutual rela- 
tions upon a sound basis of permanent mutual confidence. 

I gave the Ambassador the opportunity to speak without inter- 
ruption and then expressed myself virtually in the following sense: 

To begin with, I considered it both regrettable and unjustified 
that the Italian Government should qualify our attitude during the 
Lybian war and at the commencement of our war with Servia as un- 
friendly to Italy. Nothing could be more incorrect than this state- 
ment. It evidently had been forgotten in Rome that we made no 
difficulties about her fighting in Africa, when Italy began the mili- 
tary operations in 1911 without informing us ; that we have repeatedly 
exerted our influence during the peace negotiations to induce the 
Porte to accede to the Italian demands, and that we had been the 
first to recognise Italy's new possessions. Both Count Aehrenthal 
and I had pointed out the dangers which the transfer of the theatre 
of war to European Turkey would bring about, as the status quo of 
that country would be endangered by such an action, and the main- 
tenance of that status quo was the main object of the Triple Alliance. 
We have met Italy as far as possible in the matter of the islands of 
the Dodecanesos, the continued occupation of which surely repre- 
sented more than a mere incident of war. 

The Ambassador should not forget the many official and semi- 
official demonstrations which took place in Italy after the conclusion 
of the war — demonstrations which gave full recognition to and appre- 
ciation of our friendly attitude. 

I then reminded the Duke of Avarna that not long ago it was 
stated on both sides, here and in Rome, that our alliance after thirty 



196 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

years of existence had never been stronger than after the Lybian war ; 
that the two governments had been in perfect harmony as to the 
fundamental principles of the Albanian question which had come to 
the fore during the Balkan war, and were brought into closer touch 
with each other by the daily labours in connexion with minor affairs 
of common interest. We should not forget the great aims for the 
future. Italy, as much as Austria-Hungary, has vast cultural in- 
terests to protect from common dangers which we can overcome in 
the long run only by our united efforts. This thought was the guid- 
ing principle of my Italian policy, and I would sincerely regret it if 
this were not understood in Italy. 

As to the contention that we should have reached an under- 
standing with Italy before we crossed the Servian border, I would 
say that this view was unfounded, because we opened war upon 
Servia solely to defend ourselves against Servian aggression. We 
at that juncture accepted Italy's interpretation of Article VII and 
certainly would not have refused to enter into negotiations on the 
basis of that article, had the Italian Government desired it. 

We now still adhere to the same views, namely : 

1. We do not question the claims which Italy may advance on 
the ground of Article VII, if the proper occasion should arise. 

2. We are prepared to enter into negotiations with Italy on the 
question of compensation, although we realise fully that it will be no 
easy matter to find a stable basis for such negotiations in view of the 
shifting war situation, especially in the Balkans. 

With regard to the distinction between temporary occupation and 
war operations, I called the attention of the Italian Government to 
the fact that this differentiation was to be traced back to the occupa- 
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had not the character of a 
permanency and was taken as a precedent when the Triple Alliance 
agreement was drawn up. The temporary occupation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina could not under any interpretation be construed as a war 
operation, pure and simple. But even should the present war opera- 
tions justify the claims for compensation, both governments would 
still find it impossible to come to an agreement even by means of an 
analogous interpretation of the facts, as it is impossible to foresee 
all eventualities connected with the military activities. 

In comparing our objections to the imperilment of the status quo 
in European Turkey during the Lybian war with the dangers arising 
for the status quo in the Balkan peninsula by reason of our armed 
action in Servia, Italy seems to overlook the fact that in those days 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 197 

the question concerned the status quo as defined in the Triple Alliance 
agreement, and which since then has been upset in favour of Servia by 
the treaty of Bucharest. 

With reference to the Italian contention that it would not suffice 
if we merely gave assurances that we did not intend to annihilate 
Servia, I must fully admit that Italy's claim for compensation is not 
confined to this sole event ; but no assertion to the contrary has ever 
been made by us. 



No. 79. 
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Borne, December 21, 1914. 

As early as two days ago, Baron Sonnino directed a conversation 
with me to the subject of the discussion which the Duke of Avarna 
has entered into with you on his instructions. He observed that its 
starting point, namely, the occupation of certain parts of Servia by 
Austro-Hungarian troops, must now of course be eliminated. 

I was in a position to state that he already had received your 
reply, and had given counter-arguments thereon to the Italian Am- 
bassador in Vienna. As neither he nor I had as yet been acquainted 
in what way these had been received, and as I did not wish to fore- 
stall your instructions, I confined myself to the assertion, in reply 
to Sonnino 's statement that he was anxious to discuss that question 
without delay and in a friendly manner with the Austro-Hungarian 
Government, that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to my knowl- 
edge, was willing to pursue that discussion on principle. I do not 
think the impression prevails here that we declined further dis- 
cussion. 



No. 80. 

Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Valona, December 25, 1914. 

Single shots were fired this morning in various parts of the city. 
Italian colony took refuge at the Consulate. 



198 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUKOPEAN WAR 

Subsequently Italian ships at anchor landed 300 men with land- 
ing guns, which occupied public buildings. 



No. 81. 
Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Valona, December 25, 1914. 

After the occupation of city, Italian Consul called on me and made 
the following explanation: 

In consequence of revolutionary feeling in neighbourhood of 
Valona and of to-day's incident (rifle shots) he had requested Ad- 
miral Patris for military occupation of city for efficient protection 
of Italian and foreign colonies. Fulfilment of this measure also in- 
volves occupation of Kanina and Svernez. 

Admiral Patris moved from anchored ship to Italian Consulate. 

City is quiet. 



No. 82. 
Count Berchtold to Count Ambrozy. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, December 26, 1914. 

The Duke of Avarna called on me to-day and spoke in the follow- 
ing sense, according to instructions: 

Anarchy prevails in Albania. Under the stress of existing con- 
ditions, the Government in Durazzo unanimously decided on thd 
20th inst. to appeal to Italy for protection, requesting earliest possible 
intervention and maintenance of public order. 

The Italian Government has furthermore received news from 
Valona in the last few days, that dangerous events with unknown 
aims were under way. Public feeling in Valona is intense ; rifle shots 
have been fired; the population is restless, and the Italians who had 
taken refuge at the Consulate requested Admiral Patris to land 
marines. This request was granted. 

The Italian Government informs the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment that it will take the requisite measures to reestablish normal 
conditions in the city. 



THE AUSTEO-HUNGAEIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 199 

Italy has no intention to proceed to further occupations beyond 
Valona. Even in the case of that city, the measures are provisional. 
The provisional character of the proceedings is evidenced by the 
circumstance that the measures have been taken by a signatory to the 
London Conference, and because Italy has great interest in the main- 
tenance of its agreement concerning Albania. 

I confined myself to the response that I noted the Ambassador's 
declaration and especially his assurance that Italy was acting in the 
interest of the decisions of the London Conference and would en- 
deavour to enforce them. 



No. 83. 
Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold. 

(Eeport.) Valona, December 26, 1914. 

Five individuals of no particular account fired several shots in 
various streets of Valona at 7 a.m., December 25, without hitting 
anybody. 

The population remained quiet; the police started in pursuit of 
the disturbers of the peace, several of whom fled to the Italian ( !) 
Consulate. 

The Albanian notable, Tschako, appeared at the window of his 
residence and declared that he had been shot at ; one of his servants 
ran into the street and shouted the Greeks were coming. 

Several Italians carrying their packed portmanteaux repaired 
to their Consulate, where, according to his neighbours, the Consul had 
been awaiting events for some time despite the early hour. 

At 8 a.m. a detachment of marines was landed and occupied 
the cross-roads, the Albanian Government buildings and the branch 
office of the Banking Syndicate. Several members of the local ad- 
ministration (the head of which, Osuman Nuri, had been in Durazzo 
for several days) proceeded to the Italian Consulate, where Admiral 
Patris had meanwhile arrived. After apologising for their early 
call, they declared that the public safety was not endangered, and 
that they considered all extraordinary measures unnecessary. 

They were informed, in reply, that the prevailing anarchy was 
menacing to foreign interests and that it had been found necessary 
to end it. 



200 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Subsequently I received a visit from my Italian colleague, who 
offered to me the explanation which I have reported by telegram. 



No. 84. 

Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Valona, December 28, 1914. 

Italian landing detachment has sent squads of fifteen or twenty 
men to Kanina, Djuverina and the height east of Arta. Svernez 
is not occupied. 



No. 85. 

Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Valona, December 28, 1914. 

General Italian interference with civil administration is expected. 
Special symptoms consist in scrutiny of financial administration of 
district, and an order against the delivering of moneys to Central 
Government in Durazzo. 



No. 86. 
Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Valona, December 29, 1914. 

About six hundred men of the 10th Bersaglieri Regiment landed 
this afternoon and entered the town. Landing not yet completed; 
engineers and artillery are expected. 

Local authorities and population (the latter in compliance with 
public proclamation) and students of Italian schools, with Albanian 
and Italian flags, went to meet Italian troops, who were objects of 
ovations. 

The Italian and Albanian flags were hoisted over the prefecture 
this morning without special ceremonies, replacing the Turkish flag 
which was flying until yesterday. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN BED BOOK (NO. 2) 201 

No. 87. 
Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold. 

(Report.) Valona, January 1, 1915. 

The Italian troops landed in Valona consist of three battalions 
of the 10th Regiment of Bersaglieri, four mountain batteries and 
about fifty engineers. 

The detachment, which has an approximate total strength of 2,000 
men, is under command of Colonel Mosca. 

The three commanders of battalions are at Valona, Kanina, and 
on height of Asna (No. 241 north of Valona). 

Companies of the two detached battalions are at Djuverina, Kish- 
bardha and in the vicinity of Risili. 

Moreover, Krionero is held by sixty marines, the harbour by 
twenty, and Porto Nuovo by one company of landing troops. 

The presence of two officers of Carabinieri and of a police official, 
the latter already cooperating with the local police, points to a 
project for the reorganisation of the native gendarmerie and police. 



No. 88. 

Count Berchold to Baron Macchio. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, January 4, 1915. 

The German Ambassador, in conformity with his instructions, 
to-day read to me two long reports by Prince Bulow from Rome. 
They referred to his conversations with Baron Sonnino and Giolitti 
on Italy's attitude toward the Dual Monarchy. 

The contents of these reports may be condensed as follows : 
Both the Italian statesmen reaffirm their friendly attitude toward 
the Triple Alliance and regret that Italy was not in a position to 
enter the war on the side of her allies. It should not be forgotten 
that the war had taken Italy by surprise; that Austria-Hungary 
failed to communicate with the Italian Government before she ad- 
dressed her note to Servia; that the note was couched in aggressive 
terms which produced a bad impression in Italy; and finally that 
the view generally prevailed in Italy that Austria-Hungary, in view 



202 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

of her present internal situation, could not conduct a war and that 
the Dual Monarchy was doomed to destruction. Moreover, the gen- 
eral situation in Italy should be remembered; the profound public 
irritation, the inability of the Dynasty to maintain its throne if Italy 
should fail to obtain territorial advantages from the general con- 
flagration, and the consequent necessity of making preparations for 
war. 

The Trentino was named as the territorial compensation, with a 
hint that many considered this as insufficient, as their aspirations 
extended even to Trieste. 

Many Italian circles certainly desired the preservation of the 
peace and deprecated the idea of any departure from neutrality. On 
the other hand a minority of war agitators clamoured all the more. 
Notoriously it is the spouters who for the most part come to the sur- 
face in Italy. 

In connexion with the communication, the Ambassador was in- 
structed to emphasise the importance of not dropping the thread of 
the negotiations on the question of compensation and of reaching a 
timely and friendly understanding. 

I remarked to von Tschirschky that negotiations on the question 
of compensation had been initiated, as he was aware; it now rested 
with Italy to express her views. 

With particular reference to the cession of the Trentino, I deemed 
it necessary to draw von Tschirschky ? s attention to the fact that it 
appeared very doubtful whether even in this manner a guarantee 
could be obtained that Italy would remain inactive to the end. I 
asked whether Prince Billow's conversation contained any reference 
to Italy's action in Albania. The Ambassador replied that the reports 
before him included nothing of that kind, but suggested that this 
might be a subject for interchanges between Vienna and Rome. 



No. 89. 
Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Valona, January 5, 1915. 

The Albanian officials are still at their posts, but Italian control 
of the civil administration has been allotted as follows: 

The superintendency of the prefecture and the supreme com- 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EBD BOOK (NO. 2) 203 

mand of the police and gendarmerie, in charge of Carabinieri officers, 
to Captain Castoldi ; the post of adviser to the municipality, to Naval 
Lieutenant Pericone. 



No. 90. 
Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Borne, January 6, 1915. 

During my visit to-day, Baron Sonnino discussed the general 
situation and led the conversation to the question of compensation. 
He expected that we would soon resume our advance into Servia, 
and that thereby the formal basis for entering into negotiations would 
be restored. Therefore he thought it expedient to take advantage of 
the present lull until the next meeting of the Italian Parliament, to 
discuss the matter frankly and without reserve, and to analyse the 
viewpoints of both sides; possibly even to determine the main points 
for an agreement, as far as it may be possible to do so in a general 
way before the outcome of the world-war is known. 

He then outlined the obvious difficulties of Italy's internal situa- 
tion ; the necessity, which was equally ours, of supporting the existing 
order in Italy and not exposing ourselves to the adversities that the 
existence of a Republican country on our border would imply; 
vigorous efforts which the Entente was making to bring Italy over to 
her side by all sorts of promises; finally, the dangers which any 
Italian Government would have to face should it fail to produce 
tangible results at the conclusion of the great crisis. Not only would 
the Anglo-French efforts collapse completely, but the maintenance 
of the Triple Alliance on principles adapted to the modified situation 
would appeal strongly to the country, if the Government were in a 
position to point to an existing and acceptable basis for the con- 
clusion of an agreement, instead of talking of an empty willingness 
to discuss the principle of compensation. 

Only in the interest of safeguarding the old alliance, which he 
thought the only suitable arrangement for Italy's interests, had he 
decided to enter these delicate negotiations; he had accepted his 
portfolio with the understanding that he would attempt such an 
agreement in order to remove the old causes of friction and to bring 



204 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

about a sounder basis for our relations. If he were to fail in this, he 
would resign. 

We then broached the subject of the various modes of compensa- 
tion and of the difficulty of anticipating a solution to the numerous 
alternatives, which would meet all the possibilities that later develop- 
ments might bring about. When I expressed the wish that the Italian 
aspirations for territorial compensations be specified, and referred 
to Albania, I found Baron Sonnino adverse to that question, as he 
does not at all approve the Albanian adventure. He held that Italy's 
interests in Albania consisted solely in preventing others from gain- 
ing a foothold there, but not in establishing herself on Albanian soil. 

Without pronouncing the word ' ' Trentino, ' ' he hinted that Italy's 
territorial aspirations could be satisfied in one direction only. 

After this I turned the conversation to more hypothetical discus- 
sions of the give-and-take principle and the like; I encouraged the 
Minister in his views upon the expediency of these negotiations. 
Thereupon he expressed his intention to instruct the Duke of Arvana 
to continue the discussions with you, as negotiations could be carried 
on simultaneously in Vienna and here. Particularly should the 
mediation of a third party be avoided, he thought ; the conversations 
should be conducted directly, so as to prevent misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations. 

Moreover, I gathered from Baron Sonnino 's utterances, that, judg- 
ing from the tone of the press and from all indications in political 
circles, he did not consider the situation in Italy any worse than it 
was two months ago. 



No. 91. 

Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, January 7, 1915. 

Baron Sonnino 's deprecatory utterance with respect to Albania 
may be explained, to my mind, by the fact that Italy since her 
occupation of Valona is in possession of the locality most valuable 
to her and on the other hand because it is obviously in the interest 
of the Italian Government to assume now toward us the appearance 
of attaching but little value to Albania in general. 

For that reason I think it desirable that you should not permit 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 205 

yourself to be diverted by that assumption of indifference from per- 
sistently reverting to the Albanian matter in your conversation on 
the compensation question. You might base an argument as to Al- 
bania's value to Italy not only upon Italy's own attitude on the 
Albanian problem but also upon the disturbing effect which the 
despatch of a Greek man-of-war to Albanian waters has notoriously 
produced in Italy. 



No. 92. 
Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, January 8, 1915. 

I note with satisfaction that you have succeeded in having an 
extended amicable conversation with Baron Sonnino on the ques- 
tion of compensation, despite the delicate nature of the subject. I can 
but agree with the Minister, that misunderstandings and miscon- 
structions may best be avoided by a direct explanation. 

To my mind mediation by a third party should be invoked only 
if a deadlock should be threatened. 

In pursuing the negotiations, it would appear desirable to treat 
the Italian claims for compensation not as the main theme but rather 
as a secondary item in the aggregate of all the questions referring to 
the alliance. 

I consider it most important that it be made clear to the Italian 
statesmen that their claims are derived from the provisions of an 
article of the treaty of alliance, to the maintenance of which — I am 
glad to say — they adhere; and that the spirit and wording of that 
article require at this time a continuous keeping in touch and the 
pursuance of negotiations on the give-and-take principle. 

Inasmuch as we recognise in principle Italy's right to eventual 
compensation and are willing to conduct friendly negotiations on that 
subject, Italy on her part must also remember her obligations to the 
alliance. Having admitted the merits of the Italian interpretation 
of the casus foederis, we are entitled to demand Italy's benevolent 
neutrality on the ground of the agreement. Although this has not 
always been the case (as for instance in economic questions) we have 
made no complaints, giving due consideration to the difficulties that 
confront Italy. On the other hand we cannot fail to note that the 



206 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Italian statesmen in their utterances in Parliament have maintained 
a silence on the existing alliance and that they have made little use 
of their possibilities to create a friendly feeling in the country by 
means of the press. 

In this connexion attention should be drawn to the mobilisation 
and to the at least striking coincidence of the concentration of troops 
exactly on our border, which we have been observing without excite- 
ment or recrimination, in view of the existing alliance. These meas- 
ures, however, have not failed to produce an effect upon public feel- 
ing in Italy itself, and have been regarded by foreign countries as 
directed against us. Our attitude in the matter of the Italian land- 
ing at Valona has been in full accord with our alliance; we have 
viewed Italy's military preparations in precisely the same spirit. 

It appears to me desirable to lay stress upon these matters in dis- 
cussing the question of compensation, without, however, making any 
recrimination in the sense above indicated; also to suggest to the 
Italian statesmen that, in negotiations purporting to be based upon 
the agreement, we expect an endeavour on Italy's part to give us 
tangible proof of her professed desire to maintain and intensify the 
friendly spirit of our alliance. 

The attainment of Italy's territorial aspirations is a matter of 
Italian interest, and it should therefore be left to the Rome Cabinet 
to take the initiative in this respect. 



No. 93. 

Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Valona, January 11, 1915. 

Italian Consul informed me in course of conversation, that Italian 
customs officers would arrive soon for organisation of customs service. 



No. 94. 

Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Borne, January 12, 1915. 

In connexion with the despatch of a Greek war-ship to Durazzo, 
I took occasion on my visit to Baron Sonnino to-day to express my 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGAEIAN BED BOOK (NO. 2) 207 

astonishment at the fact that the Minister now seemed so little con- 
cerned about Albania, an attitude which is contrary to all previous 
impressions and to the former moulding of public opinion in Italy. 
Seeing that the value which Valona represents to Italy has been 
appreciated by us for a long time, and in view of the fact that we 
also held to the axiom that no other Great Power should be allowed 
to obtain a foothold there, our readiness now to consider such a 
possibility must be regarded as a great concession. 

The Italian uneasiness about the Greek ship also is in contradic- 
tion with the disinterestedness which Italy now professes. 

Baron Sonnino retorted that we had both overestimated the value 
of Albania. He realised that an intervention in Albania involves the 
intervening power in the danger of being drawn into all Balkan 
affairs. He still adhered to the London agreement and therefore 
looked upon the present occupation as provisional; especially since 
the public at present was not interested in Albania and — so to speak — 
prevented the Government from going too far. 

It was, therefore, not possible to make any successes in Albania 
palatable to the public. 

My remark, that public opinion should be directed by the Govern- 
ment and that I had seen to my regret that for many months it 
had been left entirely to itself, was answered by the frank admission 
of my statement. The Minister described this situation as being a 
deplorable consequence of local conditions and of the lack of in- 
formation since the outbreak of the war. 

I emphasised the point that we had met the wishes of the Italian 
Government also on these questions by having consented in the mean- 
while to the occupation of the Dodecanesos ; by so doing we had made 
an advance compensation to Italy. I also resorted to the arguments 
you suggested in the telegram of the 8th instant and impressed upon 
the Minister our expectation that Italy should prove by actions what 
she always expresses in words, namely, her desire to consolidate our 
alliance, as a response to our generous interpretation of the terms of 
the alliance on all the issues involved. 

Baron Sonnino had little to reply to this. As to the concentration 
of troops upon our border, he endeavoured to justify it in the usual 
way by referring to our own measures. I had no difficulty in point- 
ing out the inconsistency of this argument, by saying that our terri- 
tories bordering upon Italy could not be exempted from the general 
mobilisation, and that our troops in those localities had subsequently 
been removed to the theatre of war. 



208 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 95. 

Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, January 12, 1915. 

I beg to transmit to you the enclosed notes on an interview which 
I had yesterday with the Italian Ambassador on the question of 
compensation. 



(Enclosure.) 
(Translation from the French.) 

The Italian Ambassador read to me on January 11th a telegram 
from his Government with the following contents: 

In the course of a conversation which took place on December 
the 19th last, between Baron Sonnino and Baron Macehio, the former 
remarked: "Although the situation in the Balkans, where Austria- 
Hungary has embarked on a war likely to modify the equilibrium, ' ' 
justified a discussion about the applicability of Article VII, the with- 
drawal of the Austro-Hungarian troops from Servia divested such a 
conversation of its actuality and urgency. 

Nevertheless, Baron Sonnino holds that the logical and political 
reasons remained unchanged and retained their original importance. 

The logical reasons which required discussion, consisted in the 
fact that the war had been started from the very first with an object 
entirely at variance with the interests of Italian policy in the Balkans. 

The political reasons which favoured a similar discussion were 
to create a basis of thorough good faith between the two Powers, to 
eliminate the continuous friction between them and to render possible 
their cooperation toward the common aims in matters of general 
policy. Any alliance which is not based upon friendship and does not 
tend to enhance that friendship, cannot be successful and is doomed 
to remain barren and useless. 

In order to reach a relation of that kind it is necessary to possess 
the courage and the calm judgment to broach at the proper time the 
subject of compensation provided for in Article VII — a delicate 
question dealing with the possible cession of territory at present per- 
taining to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 209 

Baron Sonnino put the question whether the Austro-Hungarian 
Government felt inclined to enter upon negotiations on that basis 
and pointed out that Italy as a neutral power could not at present 
consider a discussion which may involve territories belonging to other 
belligerents, as this would mean a participation in the conflict from 
now on. 

When the Ambassador had finished reading, I reaffirmed our 
desire to consolidate and develop the friendly relations between 
Austria-Hungary and Italy and to take Article VII as a starting 
point for the conversations on the subject of the compensation ques- 
tion referred to in that article. While reserving the right to give 
a definite answer later on, I expressed to the Ambassador my astonish- 
ment and my regret that the Italian Government should have placed 
itself upon a ground which will hardly make it possible for us to 
enter upon negotiations. Moreover, the Italian viewpoint was at 
variance with the fundamental stipulations of the Triple Alliance 
agreement, which distinctly states that the alliance is designed to 
safeguard the absolute maintenance of the political status of the 
contracting parties and to protect them from any dangers that might 
threaten their safety. 

"It is clear," I added, "that the proposition made by the Italian 
Government would involve an encroachment upon the fundamental 
idea of our alliance.' ' Neither was that proposition in conformity 
with the spirit of Article VII, as the compensation provided for in 
that article could refer solely to territories on the Balkan peninsula. 
In fact, the equilibrium in the Balkans and the maintenance of the 
status quo in the Near East having been the point of departure of 
Article VII, the occupation of a territory on the peninsula by one 
of the contracting parties would necessarily give the other party the 
right to a compensation in the same region. Compensation beyond 
these limits could never have been contemplated at the time when 
the alliance was perfected. 

I protested emphatically against the assertion by the Italian Gov- 
ernment that the war against Servia had, from the very first, been 
started for a purpose adverse to the interests of Italian policy in 
the Balkans, and pointed out again that the war had been resorted 
to for the sole purpose of maintaining our status quo. This purpose 
not only did not militate against Italian policy in the Balkans but 
was essentially in accord with the spirit of that policy as sanctioned 
by the Triple Alliance Treaty. 

Before closing our conversation, I drew the Ambassador's atten- 



210 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

tion to the fact that the occupation of Valona by the Italians gave 
us the right to compensation from Italy on the ground of Article VII. 
The Duke of Avarna did not attempt to deny this. 

Finally, I expressed the opinion that it seemed desirable to proceed 
to a general clearing of the ground for our future relations. In this 
connexion it appeared to me necessary to call the attention of the 
Italian Government to the almost daily advices of difficulties which 
Italy was putting in the way of the transit and the importation into 
Austria-Hungary of merchandise consigned to us, although she was 
bound by the terms of Article VII to observe a benevolent neutrality 
toward us. Aside from the above-mentioned circumstances, it must 
be noted that the fact of Italian troops having been massed quite 
close to our border for many months past, is incompatible with a 
benevolent neutrality. 

The Duke of Avarna admitted the last contention but observed 
that the principle of give-and-take should apply to the exchange of 
merchandise, but that it would appear to him opportune if we were 
to lodge a complaint in Rome concerning the concentration of troops 
on our border. 



No. 96. 

Baron Burian to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, January 14, 1915. 

In anticipation of later instructions I request you to remain 
merely receptive during the conversation you may have with Italian 
statesmen on the question of compensation. 



No. 97. 

Baron Burian to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, January 19, 1915. 

Von Tschirschky read a telegram to me from Prince Bulow to 
Foreign Office, dated 18th inst. Prince Billow urged Italian Foreign 
Minister to conduct discussions with us for clearing of our relations 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 211 

and solution of pending questions with full consideration of our posi- 
tion and of our integrity as a Great Power. On that occasion he 
left no doubt in Baron Sonnino's mind that should he not succeed 
in keeping the peace with Austria-Hungary, Italy would find Ger- 
many with all her might at our side. 



No. 98. 

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, January 20, 1915. 

I beg to transmit to you for your information the enclosed notes 
on my interview with the Royal Italian Ambassador which took place 
on the 7th inst., on the question of compensation. 



(Enclosure.) 



Vienna, January 17, 1915. 

The Italian Ambassador called on me to-day to resume the con- 
versation on the topic of compensation, which had been interrupted 
after his discussion with Count Berchtold on January the 11th. 

After having agreed to conduct an entirely friendly and there- 
fore more frank exchange of views, the Duke of Avarna proceeded 
to reiterate Baron Sonnino's instructions, which were known to me 
from Count Berchtold 's notes. These instructions show with com- 
plete clearness that the aim of Italian policy is the acquisition of 
Austro-Hungarian territory. 

The Ambassador having carried out his mission, a conversation 
ensued in the course of which we considered each individual point. 

The Duke of Avarna, first of all, explained that the Italian Gov- 
ernment, as well as the great majority of the Italian people, were 
inclined to a conservative policy, including the preservation of our 
alliance, "mais avec la superposition de quelque satisfaction des 
aspirations nationales n ("but with the presupposition of some satis- 
faction of the national aspirations"). Without such a success their 
efforts would be unavailing, and moreover, the dynasty and the exist- 
ing order would be endangered. 



212 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

I replied with hearty assurances of our sincere desire to meet 
all acceptable conditions for the preservation and consolidation of 
our close relations with Italy; at the same time I was in doubt as 
to whether Italy was at present on the right path to the goal at 
which we both aimed. I noted with great regret that strong popular 
tendencies were at work in Italy toward contestable aspirations and 
that still more extremist political factions threaten a general dis- 
ruption in the event of a disappointment in their now awakened 
purposes of greed. Nevertheless, I was considerably surprised that 
Italy should expect us, her ally, to sacrifice our territory in order to 
assist Italy in the suppression of a dangerous internal turbulence. 

The Duke of Avarna replied that he recognised the great diffi- 
culties which would present themselves to the solution of the problem 
of Italian desires, and he would not conceal this fact from his gov- 
ernment. Nevertheless, he thought himself justified in assuming that 
the Italians of the Dual Monarchy could not be regarded in the same 
light as the other nationalities, as they were not as numerous and 
therefore were of no great importance to the Monarchy; moreover, 
they were unable to resist attacks on their nationality and had no 
support. I took a stand against this differentiation with the obvious 
arguments, whereupon we dealt with the individual point of his 
instructions. 

First of all I objected to the assumption that " Austria-Hungary 
had engaged in a war likely to modify the equilibrium in the Bal- 
kans," upon which Baron Sonnino based his justification of a dis- 
cussion of compensation even at the moment when our retreat from 
Servia is divesting it of its actuality. 

I reiterated our readiness to discuss at any time with Italy the 
question of compensation on the basis of Article VII, even in an 
academic way. Yet, we could no more accept the above-mentioned 
motive than the subsequent assertion in the instructions: "que le 
guerre avait ete initiee des le premier jour avec un but tout contraire 
aux inter ets de la politique italienne dans les Balcans" ("that the 
war had been started from the very first with a purpose totally ad- 
verse to the interests of Italian policy in the Balkans" ). Italy must 
be aware that the war was undertaken solely for defence against the 
Servian machinations which threatened our integrity. 

The two above-quoted contentions were explained by the 
Ambassador to mean only that the natural consequences of the war 
were bound to encroach upon the Italian sphere of interests, and that 
claims for compensation would arise from this fact. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGABIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 213 

It stands to reason that the part of the instructions which deal 
with the Italian desire to strengthen and consolidate our alliance by 
the elimination of all causes of friction developed no difference of 
opinion between us. We then took up the delicate point wherein 
Italy's desire for a cession of Austro-Hungarian territory based 
upon the claims derived by Italy from Article VII, was enunciated 
in the following words: "qu'il faut avoir le courage et le calrne 
d'aborder a V occasion la discussion au sujet de cette question deli- 
cate" ("it is necessary to possess the courage and the calm judgment 
to broach at the proper time that delicate question ,, ). 

I did not conceal from the Ambassador the fact that I was dumb- 
founded at so bold an inference from the premises of the situation. 

We had already conceded the reasons which prompted Italy to 
declare her neutrality, to the amazement of our public opinion. We 
had also accepted the interpretation of Article VII as Italy has chosen 
to construe it. 

We were then confronted with the fact that Italy was determined 
to regard the invasion of Servian territory in the course of the 
military operations as a "provisional occupation" within the mean- 
ing of Article VII. These preposterous assumptions had given us 
ample occasion to give proofs to Italy of our conciliatory spirit and 
of our friendship in accordance with the alliance. Nevertheless, the 
first concrete formulation of Italy's desires in the way of compensa- 
tion has exceeded all expectations. I now found myself under the 
necessity of reserving the right to examine whether Article VII re- 
ferred in any way to compensation elsewhere than on the Balkan 
peninsula. I took positive exception to the reason given in the in- 
structions as to why no claims for compensation could be based 
upon territories belonging to other belligerents; namely: "Comme 
Puissance neutre, Vltalie ne pourrait pas accepter aujourd'hui une 
discussion sur la base eventuelle concernant des territoires possedes 
par d'autres belligerants, attendu que cela correspondait a participer 
des a present au conflit" ("Italy as a neutral power could not at 
present consider a discussion which might involve territories belong- 
ing to other belligerents, as this would mean a participation in the 
conflict from now on"). To put it in another way, this would mean 
that Austria-Hungary, though also a belligerent power, was entitled 
to worse treatment at the hands of Italy, although and because she was 
her ally! The scruples of neutrality in this instance were taking a 
queer turn, which suggests the following reflection: how can the 
remedy which Italy had devised for her protection at our expense 



214 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

against internal crises, possibly be brought into harmony with Italy's 
own conception of her alliance with us, for which new guarantees are 
to be created for the future ? I repeated to the Duke of Avarna the 
contention which Count Berchtold had put to him once before, that 
the Italian demand was in contradiction with the fundamental prin- 
ciples of the Triple Alliance, which primarily purported to safeguard 
in every respect the integrity of the allies. 

The Ambassador was visibly impressed by my explanation. As 
we both were guided by the desire not to drop the thread of our 
conversation, we refrained at this time from a further polemic. I 
therefore made a resume of our conversation in the sense that our 
Governments were as one in their desire to place their alliance upon 
a new and solid foundation; that we considered the friendly con- 
tinuance of our conversation as useful and necessary, and that we 
were both willing to pursue it. The differences between us consisted 
at present in Italy's preference for the acquisition of territory belong- 
ing to Austria-Hungary, while we proposed to choose the object of 
compensation in other countries. 



No. 99. 
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, January 29, 1915. 

On receipt of new instructions, the Italian Ambassador yesterday 
reverted to the question of compensation : 

Considering that it was, even in our opinion, Italy's business to 
define the compensation she aspired to on the ground of Article VII, 
in order to counterbalance the advantages which we may gain by 
our renewed invasion of Servia, the Ambassador has been instructed 
to explain to me that no compensation could be considered at present 
by the Kingdom save the cession of a part of the Austro-Hungarian 
possessions, which was the sole proposal of his government. Baron 
Sonnino had instructed him to urge me "d' accepter la discussion sur 
la base d'une cession de territoire" ("to accept discussion based on 
a territorial cession"). No reference could be made to territories of 
other belligerents, as this would constitute a breach of neutrality. 
We were at liberty to cede voluntarily some of our own territory. By 
this odd declaration Baron Sonnino evidently wishes to get around the 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 215 

contention I raised the other day to the effect that we were also 
belligerents and that this would be no reason why we should be 
treated worse than others by an ally. 

Baron Sonnino in his instructions to the Duke of Avarna, which 
was read to me, stated that time was pressing and that he was very 
anxious to be in possession of our virtual acceptance by the time of 
the opening of Parliament. Against this preposterous presump- 
tion, I pointed out to the Ambassador that I could hardly accept 
Italy's contention that she is entitled to obtain a definite advance 
compensation for the mere possibility of a future acquisition on our 
part, especially if such compensation was to consist in a slice of our 
own flesh — an idea which Italy deduces from the right provided in the 
agreement, to obtain adequate advantages in the Balkans or elsewhere 
in the event of Austro-Hungarian acquisitions in the Balkans. Never- 
theless, I was willing to enter into a discussion of that subject in order 
to give proof of our serious intention to come to a satisfactory under- 
standing with Italy. 

For the present I requested Baron Sonnino to be content with 
a declaration to the effect that we consent to discuss the question on 
the basis of a territorial cession ; this would be equivalent to a virtual 
acceptance and to a concession of the main point. There would re- 
main only a discussion as to the mode and time. The Italian Govern- 
ment was at liberty to advance any proposal regarding compensation, 
however extensive it might be; but, on the other hand, we should 
have an opportunity to examine and consider it carefully. The Am- 
bassador should appreciate that the task was an exceedingly difficult 
one under the existing conditions, and that it was in the interest of 
the continuance of our negotiations that Italy should not press for 
a quick reply. 



No. 100. 

Von Mayrhauser to Baron Buridn. 

(Report.) Valona, January 29, 1915. 

Sgr. Devoto, Gommissario del esercito (Captain of the Italian 
commissariat), who had been connected with the financial administra- 
tion of Skutari, assumed control of the financial administration of 
the Kaza of Valona to-day. 



216 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 

In compliance with a decree issued to-day and signed by Colonel 
Mosca, the commander of the Italian forces of occupation, criminal 
jurisdiction will be exercised henceforth by a military Court of 
Justice (with its seat at the prefecture) according to the provisions 
of the Italian military penal code. 



No. 101. 

Von Mayrhauser to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Valona, February 1, 1915. 

Italian customs officials (two officers and eight men) have ar- 
rived. 



No. 102. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, February 2, 1915. 

The Prime Minister in conversation to-day expressed the conviction 
that the relations between Italy and Austria-Hungary would not be 
injured by the present crisis. He had noted with interest the com- 
mencement of the negotiations and hoped that means would be found 
to meet the national aspirations of Italy. I replied by calling atten- 
tion to the discussions which were progressing between you and the 
Duke of Avarna, and expressed the hope that, in the course of time, 
means would be found to attain results satisfactory to both parties. 



No. 103. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Borne, February 4, 1915. 

Baron Sonnino spontaneously told me to-day that Prince Billow, 
obviously for the purpose of maintaining the conversations between 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 217 

Vienna and Rome, had advised him to specify more closely his desires. 
To this suggestion he had replied that it was impossible for him to 
do so as long as he did not know whether you considered his initial 
suggestion about the cession of Austro-Hungarian territory as a basis 
for further negotiations, as at all acceptable. 

The Minister then said that he had hoped to be in a position, when 
Parliament meets, to submit a basis for an accord. I responded that 
the fact that the friendly conversations were in progress bore evi- 
dence of the good intention on both sides to come to an understanding, 
and that this may possibly be of use to him. 

Finally Baron Sonnino told me that Parliament would have its 
hands full, as sufficient matter for debates was furnished by the bills 
introduced in connexion with the earthquakes, with the provisions 
for the regulation of grain supply, and lastly by the budget. 



No. 104. 
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, February 11, 1915. 

The Italian Ambassador called on me the day before yesterday 
and brought up the question of compensation, in behalf of his Gov- 
ernment. 

He read to me his instructions from the Italian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. They contained no fundamentally new items, but betrayed 
a slightly increased impatience and laid stress upon the necessity of 
reaching a palpable progress in our conversations before the meeting 
of Parliament. 

I replied that the Italian Government, if pressed, should simply 
declare that it is in friendly negotiation with us on all pending ques- 
tions ; more than that we were unable to say at present. 

With reference to the matter itself I recalled to the Duke of 
Avarna my previous statement that I was so deeply concerned about 
reaching an understanding satisfactory to both sides, that I would 
bring the suggestion of a territorial cession to the attention of the 
other competent authorities of the Dual Monarchy, however great 
the difficulties ; but I had no power to accept or reject it on my own 
initiative. 



218 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

This exchange of views was still in progress, but we did not wish 
to lose time in the meanwhile. The starting point of the Italian 
demands for compensation was the express desire that the alliance 
between us and Italy should be consolidated, that all causes of fric- 
tions should be eliminated and that real friendship should develop 
from it. This again demanded a settlement of all existing questions 
and difficulties. As we were guided by the same sincere feelings, I 
considered it most expedient to discuss simultaneously with the Italian 
claims for compensation our own claims, to which we are undoubtedly 
entitled by the clear wording of Article VII. In this way we would 
avoid the necessity of raising another question after having cleared 
the one which is now the subject of our discussions. 

The temporary occupation of Yalona, as well as of the Dode- 
canesos, gives us the full right to compensation under the provisions 
of Article VII, a right in any case more tangible than the one claimed 
by Italy, in view of the fact that the latter has effectively taken 
possession of those localities, whereas our position in Servia, which 
according to Italy calls for compensation, constitutes no more than a 
future possibility. 

I therefore begged to announce our claim to compensation for 
the temporary Italian occupation of the eight islands of the Dode- 
canesos, which are in the iEgean Sea, as well as for Valona, in the 
same cordial and friendly spirit which Italy professed in her case. 

The Duke of Avarna was somewhat perplexed by this newly 
raised question. He also failed to find a reply about the Dodecanesos, 
concerning which I recalled to him that we had already stated our 
claim under Article VII and had added that we would enforce it 
"a un moment donne" ("when occasion should arise"). 

As to Valona he attempted to prove that this was no occupation 
in the real sense of the word. Order had to be restored there and 
Albania's integrity had to be protected. Italy, in view of her neu- 
trality, had been the only Power who could accomplish that task in 
behalf of Europe. Italy had done nothing there for her own benefit. 

I pointed out to the Ambassador that Article VII did not deal 
with the cause, object, extent or duration of the occupation and that 
the Italian action in Valona, to which we had raised no objection, 
was subject without doubt to the definition of an "occupation tern- 
poraire" as given in that article. "When Italy filed her claims for 
compensation on account of our invasion of Servia, and did so even 
at a time when we had again evacuated that country, she admitted 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGARIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 219 

neither the latter reason nor the fact that we had invaded Servian 
territory solely in the course of pending military operations and 
therefore by force of circumstances. Italy had taken the ground that 
Article VII allowed no exception. We now apply the same inter- 
pretation. 

When I stated that Italy's measures in Valona had already con- 
siderably overstepped what she had then declared to us to be her 
purpose, the Duke of Avarna refrained from further polemic and 
only expressed his fears that this announcement would be construed 
in Italy as an indication of ill-will on our part. 

I assured him that this was, of course, not the case. The two 
discussions could be conducted in equally friendly terms and inde- 
pendently of each other. If I have chosen this moment to advance our 
justified claims, I have done so with the sincere desire to do all in 
my power in order that our mutual relations might be cleared all the 
earlier of all causes of friction and of unsolved questions, in exactly 
the same spirit which had guided the Italian Government when it 
started these negotiations. 

The Ambassador promised to bring my declaration to the knowl- 
edge of his Government and asked me to give it to him in writing. 
I sent him to-day a personal memorandum, a copy of which I enclose. 



(Enclosure.) 

(Translation from the French.) 

(Memorandum.) 

Vienna, February 11, 1915. 
At the beginning of the negotiations which for some time past 
have been in progress between Austria-Hungary and Italy on the 
subject of compensation which Italy may claim on the ground of 
Article VII of the Triple Alliance agreement in the event that Austria- 
Hungary derives any territorial or other advantages from her action 
against Servia and Montenegro, the Eoyal Italian Government has 
advanced the opinion that the political reasons in favour of such a 
discussion were : to create complete confidence between the two Powers, 
to eliminate the constant friction between them and to render possible 



220 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 

a mutual cooperation toward the common aims of our general 
policy. 

Guided by the same sincere feelings, the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment also realises the advantages of clearing the ground at once 
of all matters which might impede the future development of the 
thoroughly cordial relations between the two Powers. In this sense 
it considers it necessary, first of all, to bring about an understanding 
on all questions concerning our mutual rights deriving from Article 
VII of our treaty of alliance. This applies especially to two ques- 
tions, one of which dates back several years, while the other has 
arisen more recently, and both of which concern our most vital and 
fundamental interests. Reference is made here to the question of 
the islands in the JSgean Sea, occupied by Italy, and to Italy's action 
in Albania. 

As to the first of these questions, it seems needless to recapitulate 
at this time the different phases of the pourparlers on that subject ; 
they were conducted in 1911 and 1912 between Vienna and Rome 
and are still fresh in our minds. Besides, they are filed, in all proba- 
bility, in the archives of the Consult a. It will suffice to state the fol- 
lowing points : 

1. Regardless of the obvious danger that the modification of 
the status quo as a result of Italy's occupation of the islands of the 
Dodecanesos would sooner or later exert a disturbing effect upon the 
Balkans, Austria-Hungary, guided by her desire not to hamper in 
any way the military operations of her ally, has not formally op- 
posed it. 

2. Nevertheless, the Government of the Dual Monarchy, on the 
occasion of the occupation, referred to Article VII of the Triple 
Alliance agreement and in several instances (on November 6, 7, 
and 14, 1911; on April 13, 15, and 20, 1912; on May 20, 21, and 31, 
1912, and on June 5, 1912) declared to the Italian Government that 
Austria-Hungary's right to a previous accord based on the principle 
of compensation as stipulated by said article, had been put into effect 
by Italy's occupations which have been declared to be temporary; 
furthermore, we reserved the right to apply those provisions at a 
proper time. 

3. Concerning the duration of this occupation — a question in 
fact immaterial to the validity of the right to compensation— Italy 
has repeatedly and most categorically assured the Austro-Hungarian 
Government that this occupation was only temporary and would be 
terminated after the cessation of hostilities between Italy and Turkey. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGAEIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 221 

Discussions were even conducted concerning a written declaration 
which the Royal Italian Government would hand to the Austro- 
Hungarian Government in this matter, although no agreement was 
reached as to the wording of such a note. Nevertheless, the Austro- 
Hungarian Government wishes to reproduce herewith the following 
text of that declaration, such as it was proposed by the Royal Italian 
Government : 

"II est entendu que dans la pensee du Gouvemement Royal italien 
V occupation effectuee jusqu'a ce jour ou qui pourrait s'effectuer dans 
la suite des lies de la mer Egee (Archipel) a un car act ere provisoire 
et que lesdites ties seront restitutees a la Turquie apres la cessation 
des hostilites entre Vltalie et la Turquie et, par consequent, apres 
V evacuation de la Tripolitaine et de la Cyrenaique de la part des 
troupes et des offlciers ottomans et aussitot que la realisation des con- 
ditions indiquees dans le note italienne dm 15 mars 1912, aux Grandes 
Puissances aura etc obtenue. II est egalement entendu que la presente 
declaration qui decoule des dispositions de V article VII du Trait e 
de la Triple Alliance sera consideree par le Gouvemement austro- 
hongrois ainsi que par le Gouvemement italien comme strictement 
secrete et confidentielle, car si elle etait connue par la Turquie elle 
n'atteindrait pas le but commun aux deux Puissances que est de hater 
et de faciliter la paix." ("It is understood that the Royal Italian 
Government considers the occupation of the islands in the iEgean 
Sea (Archipelago) as effected up to this day or which may be 
effected later to be of a provisional character and that the said 
islands will therefore be restored to Turkey after the evacuation of 
Tripoli and of the Cyrenaica by the Turkish troops and officers, and 
as soon as the conditions indicated in the Italian note to the Great 
Powers dated March 15, 1912, shall be carried out. It is also under- 
stood that this declaration, which derives from the provisions of 
Article VII of the Triple Alliance agreement, will be considered by 
the Austro-Hungarian Government, as well as by the Royal Italian 
Government, as strictly secret and confidential. For, should this 
become known to Turkey, it would no longer serve the common 
purpose of the two Powers, namely, to accelerate and facilitate 
peace.") 

It appears clear from the above text that the conditions to which 
the Royal Government had subjected the evacuation of the Dode- 
canesos no longer exist and that Italy, nevertheless, has not restored 
those islands to Turkey, although almost three years have elapsed 
since then. On the other hand the above-mentioned text proves that 



222 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Italy has recognised the bearing of Article VII of the Triple Alliance 
agreement upon those occupations. 

It seemed, therefore, obvious that if the Royal Government wishes 
to discuss at this time the compensation to which Italy would be 
entitled by virtue of Article VII in the event of a future and at 
least uncertain Austro-Hungarian occupation, Austria-Hungary can 
demand, with all the more reason, the discussion of compensation 
which is already due to her by the fact of the prolonged occupation 
of the Dodecanesos by Italy. 

Proceeding to the question of Italy's recent action in Albania, 
the Austro-Hungarian Government wishes to state that it has received 
but two communications on that subject from the Italian Government. 
On October 23rd last, the Duke of Avarna informed Count Berchtold 
that Italy had found herself obliged, in view of the penury among 
the refugees at Valona and of the anarchy which prevailed there, to 
provide by means of a small sanitary expedition for "des operations 
de police et mesures humanitaires necessaires, en faveur des refugies, 
sans donner a ces operations un car act ere d' expedition militaire con- 
stituant une occupation, dans le sens propre du mot, de la ville de 
Valona" — (' 'police operations and humanitarian measures in behalf 
of the refugees without, however, giving those operations the char- 
acter of a military expedition representing an occupation of the city 
of Valona in the proper sense of the word")- The Duke of Avarna 
was instructed to add that Italy, in conformity with her declarations 
made at the beginning of the present war, would adhere to the Italo- 
Austro-Hungarian agreement now in force with regard to Albania; 
she would also respect and maintain the decisions of the London Con- 
ference, and especially those of them which provided for the neutrality 
and the territorial integrity of Albania. The Austro-Hungarian 
Government took note of that communication. On December 26th 
last, the Duke of Avarna informed Count Berchtold that the Royal 
Italian Government had found it necessary to land a detachment of 
marines at Valona in order to put an end to the anarchy which 
existed there. This would constitute a purely provisional measure, 
which would not be extended beyond the city of Valona. 

The declarations referred to above were renewed on that occa- 
sion. Count Berchtold confined himself to the acknowledgment of the 
communication. 

Since then, Italy's activities in Albania have been gradually ex- 
tended and intensified. The landing of a detachment of Italian 
marines at Valona was followed by the arrival of a transport of 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGAKIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 223 

Italian troops (infantry and artillery) and of a considerable quantity 
of war material. The city of Valona, as well as Kanina and Svernez, 
were occupied by military. The number of Italian war-ships in Al- 
banian waters has been constantly increased. At the time when an 
invasion by Essad Pasha's enemies was feared at Durazzo, one of 
those war-ships fired upon the besiegers — the very thing which the 
Eoyal Italian Government last year considered itself bound to refuse 
to do jointly with the Austro-Hungarian Government on a far more 
serious occasion. In addition to these military activities Italy has 
also — to a certain degree — taken over the civil administration of 
Valona, where the prefecture, the financial administration, the police, 
the gendarmerie and the municipality are actually under the control 
of Italian Government officers, some of whom have been designated 
" Royal Commissioners.'' A similar measure has recently been ap- 
plied to the Customs office at Valona. Another regulation of the 
Italian Government demands that all persons entering Valona must 
be provided with passports bearing the Italian vise. 

Notwithstanding the fact that these measures, from our point of 
view, are not in harmony with either the words or the sense of the 
repeated declarations of the Eoyal Italian Government, the Austro- 
Hungarian Government refrains from any complaint for the time 
being. However, it finds itself compelled to state that the Italian 
action undoubtedly comes under the definition of a "temporary occu- 
pation" according to our joint interpretation of Article VII and, as 
in the case of the occupation of the Dodecanesos, gives us the imme- 
diate right to a compensation. The fact that the Italian occupation 
of Valona ceased to be absolutely temporary, is immaterial to the 
issue. It is self-evident, however, that even this latter alternative, 
being incompatible with the Italo- Austro-Hungarian accord about 
Albania and constituting a disturbance of the equilibrium in the 
Adriatic, which Italy has so often invoked, confers upon Austria- 
Hungary an additional right to adequate compensation. 

As a resume of the aforegoing, the Austro-Hungarian Government 
holds that the amicable negotiations now in progress would be still 
more useful if they included the question of the compensation which 
Austria-Hungary is to receive for the Italian occupation of the Dode- 
canesos and for the Italian occupation of Valona — even should the 
latter be only temporary. 



224 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 105. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, February 15, 1915. 

On the occasion of to-day's diplomatic reception, Baron Sonnino 
made no mention whatever of your last conversation with the Duke 
of Avarna. 

On the other hand he made the spontaneous observation that to 
his mind the present session of Parliament would deal but little with 
foreign politics. After conferences with the leaders of various fac- 
tions he was under the impression that the latter had realised that 
it was premature to go into such matters in view of the present war 
situation. 



No. 106. 
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, February 15, 1915. 

The Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. He had received 
detailed instructions from his Government, in which Baron Sonnino 
first of all endeavoured to invalidate my counter-claim to compensa- 
tion for the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesos and of Valona. 

His argument in regard to the Dodecanesos consisted in a recapitu- 
lation of the entire diplomatic procedure since 1912, and culminated 
in the assertion that we had then actually referred to our claim for 
compensation according to Article VII, but had subsequently dropped 
it with a protest against any further extension of the occupations. 
Italy, in consequence of this objection, refrained from occupying 
Chios and Mytilene. 

I replied that there was no record of the sort among our docu- 
ments, but that only the assertion of our claims to compensation was 
discoverable — claims which would be advanced i( dun moment donne" 
(at a suitable occasion). 

As to Valona, Baron Sonnino stated again what the Duke of 
Avarna had already said, namely, that Italy had not sent forces there 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGAKIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 225 

for her own benefit, but in order to uphold European interests and to 
protect the status quo — but not to modify it. 

I repeated the explanation I gave the Ambassador the other day, 
that Article VII dealt solely with the fact of the occupation, without 
any reference to its purpose, extent or duration. Italy herself en- 
forced this interpretation toward us. Article VII by no means pre- 
vented the two Powers from taking whatever steps either might 
consider necessary. It acknowledged their right to act, in the event 
that they saw themselves compelled to alter the status quo, but 
stipulated the right to compensation for the preservation of the mu- 
tual equilibrium. 

I could, therefore, not agree with Baron Sonnino's conclusion and 
insisted upon the validity of our full title to compensation. 

The Italian Ambassador then broached the second and most as- 
tonishing part of his instruction, and said: 

Two months have elapsed since the Italian Government had first 
introduced the question of Article VII and had asked us for a friendly 
discussion about the compensation to be given Italy in consideration 
of the disturbance of the equilibrium in the Balkans. 

Although we had never declined to enter into such a discussion, 
weeks and months had elapsed and Italy had not yet succeeded in 
obtaining even as much as our reply to the fundamental question, 
whether or not we were willing to discuss the matter on the basis of 
a cession of Austro-Hungarian territory. "We had brought up new 
questions and arguments with the sole intent of evading the issue 
and of prolonging the negotiations. In the meanwhile, preparations 
were being made by us for a renewed expedition in the Balkans. 
In view of this attitude toward Italy, the Italian Government could 
no longer entertain any illusions as to the practical result of these 
negotiations. 

The Italian Government, therefore, is compelled, for the protec- 
tion of its dignity, to withdraw all its proposals and suggestions and 
to abide by the clear provisions of Article VII. The Italian Govern- 
ment declares that it would consider any Austro-Hungarian step, 
whether against Servia or Montenegro or any other Balkan State, as 
being in plain violation of the said article, provided no previous 
arrangement to that effect has been made in accordance with Ar- 
ticle VII. 

Should Austria-Hungary evade this obligation, serious conse- 
quences may result, for which the Eoyal Government in advance an- 
nounces its refusal to bear the responsibility. 



226 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

I expressed my regret to the Ambassador that Baron Sonnino 
seemed to have become impatient, although our negotiations could 
not possibly have been accelerated. The Minister might have real- 
ised how very difficult the ground is on which he had based the 
compensation question. We might surely have reached a speedier 
solution had Baron Sonnino accepted my suggestion and sought the 
object of compensation in other regions. Even so, I have taken great 
pains to deal thoroughly with the matter and to examine it jointly 
with the other competent authorities of the Government, with the 
firm intention of arriving at a friendly agreement with Italy. Baron 
Sonnino knew that I was engaged in assiduous negotiations between 
the two Governments. On his own initiative he has declined to await 
a reply and now has put an end to our conversations. 

All I could do now was to take cognisance of this fact and to 
consider more closely the standpoint which the Italian Government 
is taking. 

This being based upon Article VII, I should have no diffi- 
culty in following the Italian Government on that ground, as we 
also adhere to the interpretation of that article as accepted by both 
Powers. 

The "previous understanding" requisite for every occupation, 
could, within the meaning of the article, only apply to the initial 
stages of a military action, the results of which cannot be gauged 
beforehand, and for which therefore no "adequate" compensation 
can be determined according to the agreement. 

The Duke of Avama agreed with me on this point without 
hesitation. 

I further explained that it was an absolute impossibility, in the 
case of our war with Servia, to await the conclusion of negotiations 
with Italy before invading Servia, as these negotiations might be 
prolonged indefinitely and to no purpose, to the detriment of our 
military operations. The Duke of Avarna admitted that such a pro- 
ceeding would have been out of the question, and held the opinion 
that our obligation was limited to giving previous notice to Italy of 
a prospective resumption of our activities against Servia, and in 
opening without delay negotiations concerning compensation. 

Thereupon I gave him the following assurance, which seemed to 
satisfy him: "qu'a la veille de I'evenluelle reprise de noire action 
militaire contre la Serbie nous tiendrons presente la situation de droits 
et d' obligations que nous cree V article VII de notre Trait e d' alliance" 
("that on the eve of a possible resumption of our military operations 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 227 

against Servia we shall keep in mind the rights and obligations cre- 
ated by Article VII of our treaty of alliance"). 



No. 107. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, February 17, 1915. 

The recent emphatic declarations by prominent journals of Vienna, 
in opposition to every territorial concession, are said to have created 
a profound impression in journalistic circles in Rome, especially 
because of the fact that they have been passed by the censor. 



No. 108. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, February 19, 1915. 

Yesterday's first meeting of parliament was calm. Commemora- 
tion of earthquake disaster, formal questions, reading of bills, and 
interpellations. 

Salandra's speech contained references to foreign situation framed 
in the vague phrase, that the fatherland expected from its sons a 
confidence that its destiny will not be confined to its present interests, 
but also involves the glory of the past and the hopes and ideals of 
the future. 

I am informed that the feeling in parliamentary circles is calm 
and collected, indicating a growing sense of responsibility ; an attempt 
to provoke sentimental manifestations in parliament failed. 

In the same way little notice was taken of the street demonstra- 
tions which some hired youths had started in favour of intervention 
before the opening of the session, and against which large contingents 
of troops had been kept in readiness. 

The information I received that the Salandra-Sonnino Cabinet 
had decided five days ago to venture war if it should be unable to 
secure territorial concessions, though supposed to be authentic, is 
in striking contrast with the above-mentioned observations. 



228 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 109. 

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, February 23, 1915. 

I beg to send you the enclosed notes on my conversation yesterday 
with the Duke of Avarna on the question of compensation. 



(Enclosure.) 
(Translation from the French.) 

Vienna, February 22, 1915. 

The Italian Ambassador to-day acquitted himself of his mission 
from Baron Sonnino to me. The method now adopted by the Italian 
Government to induce us to cede Austro-Hungarian territory is marked 
by a notable advance upon any preceding action. 

The Duke of Avarna was instructed to declare to me, in contra- 
diction to his personal opinion as expressed at our last interview, and 
which coincided with mine, that Baron Sonnino has placed the 
following interpretation upon the "previous understanding' ' provided 
by Article VII of the treaty : 

The understanding must not only be initialed, but must also be per- 
fected before the commencement of the military action which it must 
precede — and not accompany or follow it — and which it is destined 
to sanction under the obvious meaning of Article VII, unless the 
other party has consented to another mode of procedure. 

This consent being out of the question under the existing cir- 
cumstances, the communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government 
is equivalent to a veto by the Italian Government upon all military 
measures by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans until the understand- 
ing provided for by the agreement has been perfected. 

Any mode of procedure of the Austro-Hungarian Government 
other than the above-mentioned, would be regarded as a flagrant 
violation of our treaty of alliance and as an open manifestation of 
its intention to resume its freedom of action. In such an event the 
Italian Government would consider itself likewise at liberty to resume 
its entire freedom of action for the conservation of its interests. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 229 

To this enunciation of his own views the Italian Minister adds 
that the Italian Government intended to follow the precedent set by 
us at the time of the Lybian war in 1912 with regard to the islands 
already occupied provisionally ; in the same way as we, at that time, 
renounced our rights to compensation for the occupation of the 
Dodecanesos, the Italian Government now renounces all discussions 
concerning our operations in Servia prior to this date. But from 
now on an absolute veto would be imposed upon any similar move, 
unless a previous understanding has been signed and initialed. 

At this juncture I interrupted the Ambassador by declaring cate- 
gorically that his Minister was grossly mistaken if he believed that 
we have renounced our rights to compensation for the occupation of 
the Dodecanesos. The circumstance mentioned by Baron Sonnino 
could only refer to our friendly attitude at the time of the occupation 
of the Dodecanesos, when we renounced the immediate enforcement of 
our right to compensation, in order not to hinder Italy's military 
operations. We have always expressly asserted that right, while 
reserving its application for a later date. Only in the event that 
Italy had extended her occupations beyond the Dodecanesos, as she 
had shown an inclination to do, especially with regard to Chios and 
Mitylene, did we intend to demand immediate compensation, which 
in any case was due to us. We have never signed a document, nor 
have we ever made a declaration equivalent to a renunciation of that 
kind — a renunciation which would have been in no way justified. 

Quite on the contrary, I formally announced to the Duke of 
Avarna, on February 9th last, our demand for the compensation which 
was undoubtedly due to us by virtue of Article VII, both for the 
occupation of the Dodecanesos and for Valona. Moreover, I declared 
to the Ambassador to-day, that I persisted in that demand in its full 
force and to its entire extent. 

As to Baron Sonnino 's interpretation of the "previous under- 
standing^ stipulated in Article VII, I first pointed out to the Duke 
of Avarna that the Italian Minister's interpretation constituted no 
law to us and that mine was equally authoritative; furthermore, it 
appeared to me inadmissible, because of the existence of a difference 
of opinion, to resort at once to the extreme measure of a violation of 
the Treaty which we have always taken the utmost care to respect 
scrupulously. 

To my mind it is evident that Baron Sonnino ? s interpretation 
oversteps the mark, and if put in effect would place us in an im- 
possible position. Discussions for the purpose of an understanding 



230 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

with Italy, conducted on the eve of our resumption of hostilities with 
Servia, would deprive us of our freedom of action and thus place us 
hopelessly at the mercy of our enemy, if, against our will, the nego- 
tiations should be protracted, in the event, for instance, of Italy 
choosing a ground where it would be difficult for us to follow. In 
these negotiations we would be subjected to intolerable pressure from 
two directions. 

Besides, there is another matter to be considered. The com- 
pensation, as provided for by Article VII, must be proportionate 
and equivalent in the plain sense of the words. Hence it will be 
impossible to perfect an arrangement for compensation at a time when 
the advantage subject to compensation is non-existent and depends 
entirely upon the future. It would be unthinkable to specify and 
define a compensation so long as the point of comparison is still com- 
pletely lacking. 

We fully and loyally acknowledge the obligation which Article 
VII imposes upon us and we do not mean to evade it. Yet, if we 
do not wish to reach an absurd situation, the references to com- 
pensation in Article VII can be interpreted only in the following 
sense: Each of the contracting parties is obliged to give timely notice 
to the other party and to open negotiations without delay on the 
subject of compensation. It will always be possible to fix the general 
basis of the accord in a short time; the details and concrete stipula- 
tions on the appraising of values, however, are inevitably subordi- 
nated to the possibility of comparing the advantages to be compensated 
for. This implies that the activities referred to must take their 
course without awaiting an adjustment of counter-proposals — a delay 
which at the present juncture could be nothing less than fantastic. 

We applied the logic of such a situation when, in order not to 
hamper Italy's military activities in the iEgean Sea, we confined 
ourselves to an assertion of our rights to compensation, while renounc- 
ing their enforcement for tlie time being. 

The Duke of Avarna took note of my statement and then com- 
municated to me a hint, which he had also been instructed by his 
Minister to give me. 

Baron Sonnino does not conceal his conviction that it would be 
useless to open negotiations on the subject of eventual compensation 
on the grounds which have been discussed in the course of the nego- 
tiations interrupted by him on February 14th, unless such negotia- 
tions are based on the cession of territories at present belonging to 
Austria-Hungary. As for the chances of reaching an understanding, 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGARIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 231 

any negotiation conducted on any other basis than the aforesaid 
would necessarily be futile. 

In reply to this plain talk I told the Duke of Avarna that I was 
justifiably surprised at the renewed introduction of this topic after 
the formal withdrawal of Baron Sonnino's previous proposals. 

I would confine myself to-day to the assurance that, if occasion 
should arise, we would inform the Italian Government at an oppor- 
tune time of our intention to enter into negotiations with Italy on the 
subject of a previous understanding, in compliance with Article VII ; 
this, however, without binding ourselves as to the basis of compen- 
sation which Baron Sonnino had asserted, because I do not admit the 
tenability of his assertion. 



No. 110. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, February 27, 1915. 

I observed that even in parliamentary circles here the incorrect 
assumption still prevails that no direct discussions have yet taken 
place between Vienna and Rome. For my guidance and for the 
reason that all referential information hitherto received from you 
was only destined for my personal cognisance, I request you for 
telegraphic instructions whether I shall continue the silence I have 
accordingly maintained or whether I may divulge the facts that 
negotiations have been in progress and that they have been brought 
to a stop through no fault of ours. 

For months past I have not regarded myself as authorised, in 
my talks with Italians outside of Government circles, to go beyond 
the statement that we always have shown our readiness for nego- 
tiations, provided these were not based upon unacceptable premises. 

As affairs are at present, I fear that before long the entire blame 
will be put on us, as the Government here evidently persists in its 
assiduous silence. This may result in an adverse change of sentiment 
on the part of the political factions which favour a compromise with 
the Government. 



232 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 111. 

Baron Burian to Baron Macchio. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, March 1, 1915. 

I beg to transmit to you the enclosed notes on a discussion on the 
compensation question which took place between me and the Royal 
Italian Ambassador on February 26th last. 



(Enclosure.) 



Vienna, February 26, 1915. 

Baron Sonnino endeavoured to invalidate my objections to his 
interpretation of Article VII and to the considerations he had prof- 
fered in rather spirited terms. He sent me a short reply thereto 
which the Ambassador conveyed to me to-day. 

The Minister reiterates his assertion that the "previous under- 
standing" concerning compensation must not only be initiated but 
also terminated before the commencement of any military action on 
our part. He persists in his two standpoints: that there must exist 
a complete previous understanding before we begin our action and 
that no discussion could promise practical results unless it were 
based on the principle of a cession of Austro-Hungarian territory. 

Baron Sonnino attempts once more to justify his view-point on 
the first question by the contention that Italy would incur the danger 
of delays in our negotiations until we had secured all the desired 
advantages in Servia ; she might find herself thwarted of all compen- 
sation if she consented to our resumption of hostilities against Servia 
prior to the completion of an agreement between us. 

I observed to the Duke of Avarna that a danger of that nature, 
if it existed at all, would be far greater in our case, as the Italian 
interpretation of Article VII would expose us to the possibility 
of being prevented indefinitely from resuming military activities by 
a protraction of the negotiations ; thus we would be deprived of any 
possibility of defending ourselves against the attacks and operations 
of our southern enemy — a situation unacceptable for a belligerent 
Power. 

The Ambassador replied that his latest instructions contained 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 233 

a clause concerning a possible modification of the method of procedure 
in our future discussions, and which, he thought, met my contentions 
to a certain extent. Baron Sonnino had suggested to him that the 
two parties might come to an understanding outside of the strict sense 
of Article VII, special circumstances made it advisable that the 
"accord pr Salable" concerning compensation be framed on an ad- 
justable scale, which would allow such compensation to be fixed in 
proportion to the possible and future results of the military activities 
upon which it is based. 

I received the Italian Minister's suggestion favourably and ac- 
knowledged that in my opinion it indeed tended to facilitate our 
future exchange of views in an advantageous and expedient manner. 

To my mind a special effort should be made to determine as 
quickly as possible the principles of the understanding and to direct 
the negotiations into the proper channel, without, however, making 
it necessary to postpone our military action until the details of the 
agreement have been definitely settled. The completion of the 
understanding in detail would in any case be impossible as long as 
no basis was available for the valuation of the advantages to be 
compensated for. 

On the other hand nothing would prevent us from dealing con- 
ditionally with the specific details of the agreement if it were under- 
stood that certain concessions would become valid only if we actually 
acquired or definitely secured a certain advantage in the course of 
events. 

Baron Sonnino *s presumption, "si des circonstances speciales le 
conseillent" ("if special circumstances made it advisable")* seems 
to be an existing situation in the full meaning of the term, in view 
of the fact that we are actually at war with Servia and that con- 
sequently every military measure which we might find it necessary 
to take against her will always bear the character of urgency. There- 
fore, I do not hesitate to accept sympathetically Baron Sonnino 's idea 
regarding conditional arrangements. 

The Ambassador again reverted to his intimation of the 22nd 
inst. that future discussions could be conducted profitably only if 
based upon a cession of our territory. I replied that I could not 
abandon my former standpoint, namely, that, as the negotiations 
were interrupted by the Minister's own desire, I could not at 
present bind myself as to the basis of our future conversations, and 
that this question had consequently no actuality. 

The Duke of Avarna endeavoured to convince me of the existence 



234 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

of a prospective actuality, which surely justified our discussing the 
subject. I recalled to him that I had adapted myself and adhered 
to the programme as set up by Baron Sonnino, who had stipulated 
for the opening of our negotiations at the time when we should resume 
our campaign against Servia. 



No. 112. 

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 2, 1915. 

Please do not generally abandon your adopted reserve on your 
own initiative. Only in the case of direct enquiries, or if in the 
course of conversation you have occasion to do so, you may say that 
the two Governments are now, as before, in direct negotiations of a 
frank and friendly nature, concerning questions of mutual relations 
and interests. 



No. 113. 

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, March 4, 1915, 

I beg to hand you the enclosed notes on a discussion concerning 
the compensation question, which took place between me and the 
Italian Ambassador on the 2nd instant. 



(Enclosure.) 



Vienna, March 2, 1915. 
The Italian Ambassador's visit to-day served no other purpose 
than the enquiry in behalf of his Government, as to whether I had 
not yet reached a decision concerning the basis of negotiations 
which had been designated by the Italian Government as the only 
profitable one. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 235 

I pointed out the present stage of the negotiations, which had 
been brought about by Baron Sonnino himself, in suspending the 
conversation for the time being, to be resumed only when, because 
of a prospective resumption of military activities in Servia, we shall 
have to seek an understanding with Italy on the "previous under- 
standing, " in conformity with Article VII. Hence, the issue lacked 
actuality; nevertheless, we would avoid delaying our decision un- 
necessarily. 

The Duke of Avarna still holds that the question is an actuality 
because it could not be withdrawn from the programme owing to 
the sentiment prevailing in Italy and also because a settlement may 
become more and more difficult. 

He then repeated Baron Sonnino 's stale and familiar statements, 
adding to them a new item in the shape of a denial of my assumption 
of the other day. The "special circumstances' ' which may occasion 
a conditional discussion of the compensation question were not ap- 
plicable in this case on the grounds which I had proffered, because 
the war against Servia had been started without Italy's knowledge 
and against her advice and her interests. Besides, the main point 
was the determination of the basis of the negotiations, and a certain 
minimum of compensation was due to Italy for the very fact of our 
military action. This in any case should be fixed immediately, even 
if further arrangements may possibly be governed by the actual 
results of the campaign at a later date. 

I maintained my standpoint, that naturally the basis of the nego- 
tiations had to be settled first, but that it always would be impossible 
to decide upon the extent of the compensation so long as our acquisi- 
tions or advantages could not be ascertained. 

Baron Sonnino was insistent for action on account of the diffi- 
culties arising from Italy's political situation; but I pointed out that 
he should also consider somewhat the difficulties he was causing us. 

Finally I reminded the Ambassador that we maintained in their 
entirety our claims to compensation for the seizure of the Dodecanesos 
and of Valona. 



236 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 114. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, March 6, 1915. 

Resume of my last week's reports, to my mind, involves two 
important phases in the progress of Italian situation : 

(1) Elimination of internal political difficulties. Action of Cabinet 
Sonnino-Salandra will henceforth alone direct further development, 
all the more so as Parliament realises heavy responsibility and on 
every occasion and with utmost unanimity emphasises its confidence 
in Government. Thereby it shows disposition to leave it in Govern- 
ment's hands to find issue compatible with Italy's interests. 

(2) Increasing anxiety about possibility that Turkish problem be 
brought to an issue by attack on Dardanelles, which may be expected 
to kindle general Balkan conflagration. 

Considering general aversion to a great war, country's majority 
may still prefer victory of Central Powers for Italy's future, pro- 
vided an understanding with us may be reached which would consist 
of minimum that Government could declare in parliament as ad- 
vantageous. 

In this respect I expect further attempts, which in view of general 
situation will probably be the last. 

Above resume of present situation appears to me more serious 
titan ever. 



No. 115. 

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 9, 1915. 

I declared to-day to the Italian Ambassador, who had come to 
see me, that we had decided to accept the principle of a cession of 
Austro-Hungarian territory as a basis for discussions in compliance 
with his Government's demands in the negotiations on the compen- 
sation question. This decision, however, did not involve any specific 
obligation on our part and we reserved to ourselves the definition 



THE AUSTEO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 237 

of the conditions under which a territorial cession may be effected. 
This concession makes possible the resumption of negotiations. 

I told the Duke of Avarna that I had already informed the Ger- 
man Government of our attitude, and through it also the Consulta. 
My action was based, I explained, upon the desire that in future 
negotiations I should be guided by the wishes which the Italian Gov- 
ernment has previously expressed and which I fully share, that the 
sacrifice we are about to make shall serve to enhance the interests of 
our future relations with Italy and of the continuance of the policy 
of the Triple Alliance. 

In the course of the conversation the Italian Ambassador ex- 
pressed the wish that the negotiations on the compensation should be 
conducted separately between us and Italy, to which I assented. 

Finally I mentioned to the Duke of Avarna that I would esteem 
it a favour if the Italian Government should come to a previous agree- 
ment with us on the wording of any declaration which it might feel 
desirable or necessary to make at this time in parliament on the 
prospective negotiations with us. 



No. 116. 

Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe to Baron Burian. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, March 10, 1915. 

Prince Bulow informs me that Baron Sonnino has received our 
declaration with thanks and said he would make an announcement in 
parliament only after the conclusion of the preliminary negotiations. 
He thought it better to come forward with an accomplished fact, in 
order to avoid all interference from Italian politicians. 



No. 117. 

Baron Burian to Baron MaccMo. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, March 13, 1915. 

I beg to send you the enclosed copy of notes on a conversation 
I had yesterday with the Duke of Avarna on the subject of com- 
pensation. 



238 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

(Enclosure.) 
(Translation from the French.) 

Vienna, March 12, 1915. 

In reply to my declaration of the 9th instant, the Italian Am- 
bassador to-day communicated to me the following instructions from 
his Government: 

The Austro-Hungarian Government having assented to the ques- 
tion of compensation as proposed by the Italian Government, the 
latter agrees to open the discussions on that subject. For the time 
being, it has no intention to make any declarations in parliament or 
to publish anything concerning the impending negotiations. The ac- 
cord being once concluded, the two Governments would easily agree 
on the form of its publication. 

Baron Sonnino hopes that the task will be begun without delay 
and that the conversations will be conducted speedily in order to 
arrive as soon as possible at the agreement which must be concluded 
before any Austro-Hungarian military action is undertaken in the 
Balkans. 

These conversations should be conducted directly between us, 
without the intervention of a third party. 

Baron Sonnino desired to make clear the following starting 
points : 

(1) Absolute secrecy of the fact and of the progress of the 
negotiations. Any indiscretion would compel the Italian Gov- 
ernment to break off the negotiations at once. 

(2) The agreement once concluded, must be perfected imme- 
diately. Otherwise, the Italian Government would not have 
sufficient political power to obtain the ratification indispensable 
for the enforcement of the agreement. 

(3) In order to prevent the raising of any new question or 
contention, as well as any recurrence of adverse incidents between 
the two parties ; and also in order to assure to the Imperial and 
Royal Government the freedom necessary for the continuance 
of the war, the agreement should extend over the entire period 
of the war and cover all possible references to Article VII. 

When Austria-Hungary shall have accepted these formal points, 
Baron Sonnino will be ready to specify his demands. He will confine 
them to what he considers to be the minimum necessary to reach the 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 239 

aim of the accord, which consists in the elimination of all causes of 
friction between the two Powers and the creation between them of an 
atmosphere of confidence which will allow of their cooperation toward 
their common aims in international politics. 

The two parties are equally interested in a speedy conclusion of 
an understanding which will eliminate all suspicions of procrastina- 
tion. For that reason Baron Sonnino proposes to limit the time for 
the negotiations to a fortnight. Should no agreement have been 
reached at the end of that period, both parties would withdraw their 
proposals as null and void and would resume their freedom as before 
the commencement of the conversations. 

I told the Duke of Avarna that I noted all he had said at the end 
of his communication but at the same time maintained my interpre- 
tation of the expression, "previous agreement,' ' as against the one 
Baron Sonnino reiterated in his message. As I have amply explained 
before, the latter would make it impossible for us even to defend our- 
selves against attack. 

I added that I raised no objection to the Italian Minister's pro- 
posal that the negotiations should be carried on directly between our 
two Governments and without the intervention of a third party. 
Yet, it was understood that we mutually agree to keep Germany in- 
formed of all the phases in our negotiations, as befits the spirit of our 
relations as allies. 

Commenting on the three points proffered by Baron Sonnino, I 
remarked to the Ambassador in respect of No. 1 that I recognised 
the justification of his contentions and coincided in the Minister's 
desire for the strictest secrecy in the conduct of our negotiations, 
with the sole exception of Germany. For the reasons given above, 
it is indispensable that the latter should be taken into our confidence. 
Point 2 is absolutely unacceptable for us. If Baron Sonnino, accord- 
ing to the Ambassador, reasons that the agreement which must pre- 
cede the realisation of the advantage to be compensated for, in 
virtue of Article VII, must consequently be put into effect at once, 
I must state in return that this would involve too great a violation 
of the text. It is the agreement that must be "previous," but not its 
fulfilment. It would be positively impossible for us to transfer any 
territory before the conclusion of the peace, for various reasons 
which in themselves are imperative and which we could not possibly 
disregard. 

I hoped the Italian Government would not decline to reconsider 
this demand. 



240 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

I unreservedly subscribed to the considerations contained in 
Point 3. 

I finished by saying that I was guided by the same desire as Baron 
Sonnino, to arrive as quickly as possible at a happy conclusion of our 
prospective negotiations; if the period of a fortnight stipulated by 
him was the expression of his unalterable desire, then I would gladly 
accept his opinion ; yet it seemed to me difficult to fix a definite num- 
ber of days for negotiations of such importance. 



No. 118. 

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, March 15, 1915. 

I beg to send you the enclosed notes of my conversation to-day 
with the Duke of Avarna on the question of compensation. 



(Enclosure.) 
(Translation from the French.) 

Vienna, March 15, 1915. 

The Italian Ambassador informed me to-day that he had received 
Baron Sonnino 's reply to his report on our last conversation, however, 
without instructions toconvey it to me. Nevertheless, he did not wish 
to conceal from me that the Minister was not satisfied with the way 
in which I had received his latest propositions. 

Baron Sonnino did not wish to attach too much importance to 
my aversion to his interpretation of the term " previous agreement.' ' 
If we agreed upon the principles, this question would become a mere 
matter of form. 

Our opposition to the principle of immediate transfer would, on 
the other hand, represent an insurmountable obstacle to any under- 
standing. The execution of the agreement immediately after its con- 
clusion would be the conditio sine qua non, without which it would 
be of no avail to enter into any discussions. Without that condition 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGAKIAN BED BOOK (NO. 2) 241 

the Italian Government could give no guarantee for the acceptance 
of the prospective agreement by public opinion. 

Furthermore, my persistence in maintaining our claims to com- 
pensation for the Dodecanesos and for Valona indicates strong desire 
on my part to carry on our negotiations to a happy conclusion. 

I asked the Duke of Avarna first of all to reassure the Minister on 
the score of the apprehensions which he seems to entertain in regard 
to our military operations in the course of our prospective conversa- 
tions. Once the discussions are well under way we certainly shall 
refrain from any action which might retard their progress or endanger 
their happy conclusion. 

It is rather Baron Sonnino's persistence in his demand for imme- 
diate execution that I consider at this moment the only, and I hope 
ephemeral, impediment to a happy issue of our problem. 

I refrained from repeating what I had said before : if the reaching 
of an agreement had to be " previous/ ' it was impossible to derive 
from the text of Article VII that its execution had to be equally 
1 1 previous. ' y At the very least the advantage to be compensated for 
should be simultaneous with the transfer of the compensation. 

Leaving aside the formal part of the question, the Italian Govern- 
ment should realise the difficulties which the Dual Monarchy would 
have to face in order to comply with that demand. 

Public sentiment should also be considered, and the transfer could 
be perfected only when the aggregate results, probably more satis- 
factory in other directions, should be determined at the end of the 
great present crisis. Last, but not least, it would be impossible to 
change the fate of a province while its sons are bravely fighting with 
all the other soldiers of the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy for the in- 
tegrity of their country. Therefore, the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment, though it has assumed the responsibility of an eventual terri- 
torial sacrifice, remains firm in the conviction that it is its duty to 
postpone its execution until the end of the war. 

We have accepted in principle the basis proposed by Baron Son- 
nino, and have done so with the best intention to resume the con- 
versations immediately and to reach an amicable and complete under- 
standing with Italy. Yet the great sacrifice we are ready to make 
should not be rendered more difficult by the introduction of new 
demands. 

Baron Sonnino has construed my repeated assertion of our right 
to compensation for the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesos and 
of Valona as an indication of insufficient enthusiasm on my part to 



242 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

come to an understanding. He was wrong. In the face of the Italian 
Minister's constant denial of our right, I am obliged to persist in its 
incontestability. Our right is as clear as the one which Italy derives 
from Article VII for her own benefit; as I have not specified our 
demands, I can not admit the imputation that I intend to impede the 
negotiations. On the contrary, I have only one desire, namely, to 
see them continued and carried to a conclusion. 



No. 119. 
Baron Buridn to Baron MaccMo. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 17, 1915. 

You will have noted from the conversations I have had with the 
Italian Ambassador, the gist of which I have given you, that Italy's 
demand for a territorial cession has not yet been specified. On the 
other hand the fundamental demand has been laid down that the 
territory eventually to be ceded should be actually transferred to 
Italy immediately after the conclusion of the prospective agreement. 

Should you, in the course of your conversation, get the impression 
that this contestable Italian demand was prompted by the apprehen- 
sion that we might change our minds in the event of a successful 
issue of the war and refuse to transfer the territory ceded to Italy, 
you will combat such an assumption, not only on the ground that the 
very fact of our eventual cession being binding would make such a 
fear baseless, but also by suggesting that definite guarantees for our 
adherence to our obligations may be discussed. 

As the Entente Powers now appear to be making steadily aug- 
mented offers to Italy, I request you also to explain to the Italian 
Government — without, however, mentioning this circumstance — that 
we would include in our calculations a far-reaching participation 
of Italy in the advantages that would result from the conclusion of 
peace, in the event of Austria-Hungary and Germany being vic- 
torious. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 243 

No. 120. 
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 19, 1915. 

I gather from your reports that Baron Sonnino desires a closer 
intercourse with you on the subject of our relations with Italy. 

I entirely share this wish. Although it appears necessary that the 
principal negotiations, which have been initiated in Vienna, be con- 
centrated here, it will be desirable to give you a possibility to maintain 
our closely defined position while affording Baron Sonnino an oppor- 
tunity to convey his ideas to me chiefly by consecutive and direct 
discussions between you. 

I therefore request you to place yourself, when the next occasion 
arises, at the disposal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and possibly 
of the Prime Minister. 



No. 121. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, March 19, 1915. 

I had occasion to-day to discuss the compensation question with 
Baron Sonnino. 

The Minister reiterated his demands exactly as set forth in your 
notes. He referred without any curtness to the difference of opinion 
on the question of the immediate transfer of the territory to be ceded. 
He said Prince Billow had suggested leaving this phase of the question 
open and proceeding meanwhile to negotiations on the concrete points. 
Baron Sonnino expected little from such a procedure, which would 
increase the difficulties and, in a way, make the prospective discussions 
problematic. Nevertheless, he was prepared to accept this modus 
procedendi if you approved it, so as to avoid giving me the impression 
that he was creating difficulties. 

In the course of the conversation it became clear that two conten- 
tions had particularly prompted Baron Sonnino ? s demand: 

(1) Public feeling, which, as on various previous occasions dur- 
ing this war, might take a dangerous turn if those who by virtue of 



244 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

the accord have become Italian subjects, were to shed their blood for 
a foreign cause. Notwithstanding this contention, he did not seem 
unresponsive to our reasoning from the military standpoint and was 
rather inclined to put this matter in a secondary place. 

(2) The ratification of the territorial cession by parliament. He 
calculated upon the necessity of submitting the eventual accord for 
acceptance immediately after its conclusion. In that event Italy 
would be bound definitely, while we would still have a loophole in the 
possibility that the Houses of Representatives might withhold their 
consent if the accord is not submitted to them until after the con- 
clusion of peace. The consent of a Government could be binding 
only upon itself; in the event of a parliamentary refusal, it would 
have to resign. In this case Italy would have fulfilled her engage- 
ments resulting from the agreement, and yet the cession would be 
void. He failed to see what guarantees could be given. I told him 
that you surely would be prepared to discuss this matter of guar- 
antees. 

Otherwise, the conversation was conducted on friendly terms. The 
Minister also reiterated his desire that the matter be brought to a 
speedy conclusion and suggested "un palo di settimane" ("a couple of 
weeks"). This, however, he did not regard as a fixed period, but his 
only desire in specifying a time-limit was to remove any suspicion 
of an intention to procrastinate on either side. 



No. 122. 
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 19, 1915. 

I observe that a misunderstanding has arisen which has made 
an unfavourable impression upon the Italian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. 

In my last conversation with the Italian Ambassador, in rejecting 
the demand for an immediate transfer of the territory to be ceded, 
I said, among other things, that as our possible future acquisitions in 
the Balkans will definitely materialise only after the conclusion of 
peace, the taking possession by Italy of the territory to be ceded 
could also be effectuated only at that time. It now appears that 
Baron Sonnino interprets this utterance as a design to connect the 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 245 

transfer to Italy of the territory to be ceded with the question as to 
whether, and what kind of, acquisitions in the Balkans would fall 
to us at the end of the war. This is by no means my intention. Quite 
on the contrary, my standpoint is that our territorial cession to Italy 
should in no way depend upon the circumstance whether, and what 
kind of, territorial or other advantages we would gain by avail- 
ing ourselves of the freedom of action in the Balkans which Italy 
would concede to us for the entire duration of the war. My utter- 
ance to the Duke of Avarna was misconstrued by error. I only 
meant to say that the territorial cession to Italy could be definitely 
effected only at the conclusion of peace, in the same manner as would 
our eventual acquisitions in the Balkans. 

With the above explanation I request you to clear up, without 
delay, the misunderstanding referred to, and to convey simultane- 
ously to Baron Sonnino my willingness to enter forthwith into 
negotiations. 



No. 123. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Burian. 

(Telegram.) Borne, March 20, 1915. 

On receipt of your telegram of yesterday, I called on Foreign 
Minister and elucidated the misunderstanding. Baron Sonnino 
listened to explanation with visible satisfaction. To make case more 
clear, I summed matter up by saying you regarded eventual terri- 
torial cession to Italy and the advantages which accrue to us from 
eventual freedom of action in Balkans, as two independent issues, 
both of which, however, would only become effective after the con- 
clusion of peace. 



No. 124. 

Baron Burian to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 21, 1915. 

I also explained the misunderstanding to the Duke of Avarna 
yesterday, and said we did not subject the later fulfilment of the 



246 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

"previous agreement' ' to the circumstance, whether, and what kind 
of, advantages we would acquire in Servia. As a starting point for 
our negotiations Baron Sonnino has offered us unlimited freedom of 
action against Servia and Montenegro for the entire duration of the 
war, in return for a territorial cession. On our part I took this under 
consideration, without, however, binding myself in any direction, as 
neither have the Italian desires been specified as yet nor have we had 
an opportunity to define our conditions. 

In any case, it would then be our business to see what advantages 
we might derive from our freedom of action, and that the fulfilment 
of our agreement shall not be governed by the extent of our acquisi- 
tions. 

According to his instructions, the Duke of Avarna further en- 
deavoured to advance more arguments in an endeavour to show that 
it could make no material difference to us whether we effected the 
cession at once or after the conclusion of the peace. After an agree- 
ment has been perfected it would be necessary to make some state- 
ment to the public. From such a disclosure all concerned would learn 
of the change in their destinies; moreover, the political and moral 
effect which the event might produce in the Dual Monarchy would 
likewise be immediate and could not be postponed till the time of the 
actual cession. 

I explained in detail to the Ambassador that his remarks in no 
way invalidated any of the arguments which render it impossible for 
us to carry out the eventual cession before the end of the war. 

The Ambassador then informed me that Baron Sonnino did not 
wish to assume the initiative any longer and that he left it to us to 
make acceptable proposals. I replied that the Minister had reached 
that decision under the impression of a misunderstanding which has 
since been cleared up, and that he would, therefore, most likely 
abandon this view. On my part, I now propose to commence nego- 
tiations without delay and shall expect definite proposals from Baron 
Sonnino, to which we will at once give our reply and state our 
conditions. 

The Duke of Avarna also mentioned Baron Sonnino 's concern 
about the possibility that we might contest an agreement which was 
not immediately carried out, and about the risk which Italy might 
run thereby. I reassured him on that score by referring to Austria- 
Hungary's word and seal, which never yet have been broken. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 247 

No. 125. 
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 21, 1915. 

I share Baron Sonnino's doubts as to the advisability of your 
proposal contained in your telegram of the 19th inst, namely, to 
defer a decision on the Italian demand for immediate transfer to 
Italy of the territory to be ceded, until the conclusion of the negotia- 
tions with the Italian Government. Such a procedure would subject 
our understanding on all material points in the transaction to the 
final outcome of the negotiations on an important, fundamental, pri- 
mary question. 

I request you to discuss the matter in this sense with the Italian 
Minister. 

In reply to Baron Sonnino's query about guarantees which may 
possibly be given for the adherence to our promise, you will tell the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs that this matter might be discussed in the 
course of the negotiations; I had primarily in mind Germany's guar- 
antee for the fulfilment of our obligations, a guarantee which Ger- 
many is willing to give. 



No. 126. 
Von MayrJiauser to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Valona, March 22, 1915. 

The office of harbour captaincy under Italian supervision was 
established at the port of Valona on the 19th inst. 

Lieutenant- Commander A. Puliti acts as chief of that authority, 
a lieutenant being his assistant ; both are officers of the Italian Navy. 



248 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 127. 

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchdo. 

(Translation from the Freneh.) 

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 23, 1915. 

The Italian Ambassador told me to-day that Baron Sonnino has 
expressed to him his satisfaction with the explanation by which I 
have dissipated the misunderstanding concerning the question whether 
or not the obligations to be entered into by the future agreement 
between us would be independent of the eventual results of our activi- 
ties in the Balkans. 

The Italian Minister also has been pleased to note my good dispo- 
sition to open negotiations without delay and has authorised the 
Duke of Avarna to lend his assistance to that end. Baron Sonnino 
now awaits my specific and exact proposals toward the understanding 
we both desire to reach. 

He still maintains the view that the execution of the agreement 
should follow immediately upon its conclusion, as it would be impos- 
sible for any Italian Government to take upon itself serious engage- 
ments before the country and parliament — engagements which would 
bind Italy's freedom of action for an unlimited period — on a mere 
promise on the part of Austria-Hungary. 

I replied to the Duke of Avarna that I would not decline to 
consider Baron Sonnino 's new proposition to take the initiative in 
specifying the subject of our negotiations; I would inform him of 
my decision as soon as I have had an opportunity to reach it. 

As to the question whether the execution of the agreement should 
be immediate or deferred, I regretted my inability to share Baron 
Sonnino 's view, as, to my mind, an agreement duly concluded and 
signed by two Governments with all the formalities required to give 
that act the character of an international convention, could not be 
qualified as a "simple promise." No more could I agree with the 
idea that it was only the Italian Government that would take a serious 
engagement binding its freedom of action. Austria-Hungary, by 
signing the agreement, would undertake engagements at least equally 
serious which, by the very fact of their being generally known, would 
be equally binding upon her, regardless of all measures which might 
be considered suitable and practicable in the course of the nego- 
tiations. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 249 

No. 128. 
Baron MaccMo to Baron Burian. 

(Telegram.) Rome, March 23, 1915. 

In to-day's conversation with Baron Sonnino, he still adhered to 
his established standpoint concerning the immediate, actual transfer 
of the territory to be ceded. I gave him a detailed explanation of 
the practical impossibility of his proposal. 

Baron Sonnino admitted my contentions to be very justifiable, 
but argued that this question was no mere matter of form for him; 
he was guided by the apprehension that the Government would not 
be strong enough to convince parliament of the absolute certainty of 
the deferred cession. 

I referred to your willingness to discuss the question of guarantees 
and emphasised Germany's promise of her guarantee. 

In compliance with your telegraphic instructions of the 21st inst., 
I informed Baron Sonnino of your doubts about the advisability of 
my suggestion to defer decision on time of cession. 

Baron Sonnino reiterated his doubts, but declared his readiness 
to discuss concrete questions in order to show his good intentions and 
to avoid loss of time. Yet, he was unable to define his claims so long 
as this preliminary question was not settled; he could only receive 
your proposals with the chief object of keeping up the negotiations. 

He regarded this course as positively non-committal and without 
prejudice, so that neither party can, at a later date, inject suggestions 
which the other party had not agreed to. 

I do not doubt Italian Government will in both cases endeavour to 
put on us the blame of a possible failure, whether you or Baron Son- 
nino comes forward with specific proposals. 

However urgent the talk here about accelerating matters, I cannot 
help suspecting that the inclination prevails to gain time before en- 
gaging anywhere in any way. 



250 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 129. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Report.) Rome, March 24, 1915. 

Summing up the impressions I have gathered in all circles from 
the time when the public here began to glean some information about 
the change of attitude on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment, I have come to the conclusion that this news has been received 
here with a sigh of relief. I mean to say that the great majority of 
so-called serious political and intellectual circles — with the exception, 
of course, of professional agitators — consider an understanding with 
the Dual Monarchy as most desirable for Italy's interests. Yet, in- 
timidated and confused as they have been by an intense internal and 
external pressure, they no longer entertained any hopes of success 
unless advances emanated from Vienna which would afford them a 
moral support against adverse currents and furnish them with suffi- 
cient excuse to stand by the Central Powers. 

Despite the continuance of military preparations, the anxiety of 
the past weeks has subsided. 

They seem to realise that intervention would be unreasonable 
under existing conditions, and a general feeling of relief on that 
score may be perceived. All this, without any knowledge as to what 
Austria-Hungary's advances really were, and how far they would 
go! The country's enthusiasm for war may be gauged by this cir- 
cumstance. It is evident that the public, including the politicians, 
would be content even with comparatively unimportant gains, if 
they could only escape the present intolerable uncertainty. It is 
obvious that the other side has realised this situation promptly. 
Consequently the press of the Entente has lost no time in inaugu- 
rating a new campaign to eliminate the possibility of an understand- 
ing by any available means. In this campaign, of course, the best 
is made of everything. More than ever does it enlarge on our un- 
favourable situation, hoping thus to prompt the Italians to increase 
their demands, in order to prevent a conclusion of our negotiations. 
New reports are being launched that Roumania had been induced to 
align herself against us, and rumours are being circulated of a change 
of regime in Sofia, and of Bulgarian aspirations to Constantinople — 
rumours which have been contradicted since — and all this in an 
attempt to make Italy believe her interests in the East could be 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGAKIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 251 

conserved solely by her entering the war on the side of the Entente. 
Finally, efforts are made to organise an imposing demonstration in the 
shape of a great meeting of the Associazione Trento-Trieste which 
would culminate in the usual rhetorical feats of Bissolati, Barzilai, 
Federzoni, Chiesa and others. 

In this way all the old and tried devices are availed of in the 
attempt to nip in the bud any amelioration which may take place in 
public opinion and to confuse the always wavering and aimless 
Government by the spectre of non-existent dangers. This design is 
made all the more feasible by the undoubted fact that there are 
persons in the highest Government posts who lend their aid to these 
activities. 

Basing a conclusion upon the above-mentioned observations, the 
whole weight of the situation rests now, since the adjournment of 
parliament, solely upon the Government, and therein lies the danger 
of future unfavourable developments. 

The attitude of these gentlemen strongly indicates that they do 
not seriously mean to come to an understanding. In contrast to 
this indication, due weight must be given to the feeling of relief which 
the hope for an amicable settlement has produced among the general 
public. 

It is likely that Salandra and Sonnino are coquetting with the 
influences emanating from the various camps; in this manner they 
can follow the war situation for some time yet, taking advantage of 
opportunities, and eventually secure for themselves the best possible 
results. 

I do not think it impossible that this policy may lead even to a 
mobilisation if a fairly plausible excuse can be found. 



No. 130. 

Baron Burian to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 25, 1915. 

Yesterday I declared to the Italian Ambassador my willingness 
to accept Baron Sonnino 's latest suggestion. I shall consequently 
make him a specific proposal, to serve as the starting point for nego- 
tiations toward a " previous agreement" on the basis we have already 
assented to in principle. 



252 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 131. 

Baron Buridn to Baron MaccMo. 
(Translation from the French.) 

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 28, 1915. 

Yesterday I made a proposal to the Italian Ambassador in the 
matter of an agreement to be concluded between our two Govern- 
ments on the following terms : 

Italy shall bind herself to observe toward Austria-Hungary and 
her allies throughout the duration of the present war a benevolent 
neutrality in matters political, military and economic. 

Within the meaning of this pledge, Italy shall undertake to leave 
to Austria-Hungary full and unrestrained freedom of action in the 
Balkans for the entire duration of the present war, and shall renounce 
beforehand all further claims to compensation for territorial or other 
advantages which Austria-Hungary may eventually derive from that 
freedom of action. 

This stipulation, however, shall not extend to Albania, in respect 
of which the existing agreement between Austria-Hungary and Italy, 
as well as the decisions of the London conference of Ambassaors, shall 
hold good. 

Austria-Hungary on her part will assent to a cession of territories 
situated in southern Tyrol, including the city of Trent. The details of 
delimitation shall be defined in such a manner as to comply with the 
strategic exigencies created for us by a new frontier, and with the 
wishes of the population. 

This territorial cession on the part of Austria-Hungary shall imply 
an obligation on Italy's part to take over the proportionate share of 
the Austrian public debt incumbent on these territories, as well as 
their provincial, municipal and other liabilities, inasmuch as the latter 
are guaranteed by the State. Italy shall also pay to Austria-Hungary 
a lump sum as an indemnity for all investments made by the State 
within the territories to be ceded, independently of the purchase of 
the railroads pertaining to that territory and of collective and indi- 
vidual indemnification for Church properties, entails, pensions of 
former public officials, etc. 

As soon as the fundamental points of the agreement shall have 
been determined on the above-mentioned basis, Austria-Hungary and 
Italy will proceed to the discussion of details. 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 253 

The final agreement resulting from this discussion shall be em- 
bodied in a secret convention between Austria-Hungary and Italy. 

The transaction referred to will also necessitate the revision of 
certain treaties which exist between the two Powers, such as those 
concerning the new junction of railroads, the arrangements relating 
to border transit trade, navigation on Lake Garda, etc., etc. 

The Duke of Avarna observed that Baron Sonnino might find the 
designation of the object of cession a little vague. I replied that the 
indication of southern Tyrol, including the city of Trent, showed 
clearly the extent of the sacrifice we were prepared to make. 

The border-line could not be defined in this initial verbal com- 
munication as made to-day, but I was prepared to do so at our next 
meeting. 

The Ambassador further observed that Baron Sonnino would not 
assent to the condition of secrecy on the agreement to be concluded; 
he had expressed the desire for secrecy pending the negotiations, 
but he intended to make the agreement public as soon as it was 
perfected. 

I asked the Duke of Avarna, nevertheless, to communicate my 
proposal to the Minister, who had promised to confer with me about 
the declaration he would make in parliament concerning our pro- 
spective arrangements. Besides, we could take up this phase of the 
question in the course of the negotiations. 



No. 132. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, March 31, 1915. 

Not until to-day have I had an opportunity to discuss your pro- 
posals with Baron Sonnino. 

He declared them to be very insufficient and insisted especially 
that they were vague. Thereupon I explained, according to my in- 
structions, that you had only meant to sketch the outlines of an agree- 
ment and that you intended to offer more detailed proposals before 
long. 

Baron Sonnino told me that he had conferred on the matter with 
Salandra yesterday, but not yet with the King ; he hoped to be able 
to despatch his reply to-night or to-morrow. 



254 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 

He refrained from discussing the individual points of the pro- 
posal with the exception of the one relating to the obligation into 
which Italy would enter, to maintain a benevolent neutrality on 
economic matters among others. 

His desire to avoid misunderstandings compelled him to state 
in advance that in this respect Italy could not engage herself any 
further than to a strict and impartial neutrality. England's pres- 
sure was so heavy that any suspicion of a preferential treatment 
of the Central Powers would lead to immediate reprisals, which 
may even include the closing of the Straits of Gibraltar to Italian 
supplies. Many Italian industries depended entirely upon Great 
Britain for their supply of raw material, and therefore would run 
the risk of being compelled to close. This would mean the dismissal 
of thousands of workmen, which in its turn would create most serious 
problems. 

While admitting Italy's peculiar geographical position, I took 
occasion to describe her attitude up to this time as one of benevolent 
neutrality toward the Entente Powers. 

I also cited instances where export matters were strangely held 
up after they had already been decided upon in our favour on prin- 
ciple. 

Baron Sonnino refused to admit any bad intent in that respect 
and ascribed it all to the terrible pressure from England. 



No. 133. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, April 1, 1915. 

Latest news bears out reports that large transports laden with 
troops have been converging during the past few days from various 
directions to Udine and right up to our border. This operation is 
equivalent to a secret deployment, whereby eventual mobilisation is 
considerably facilitated. 

To-day's situation may be summarised as follows: 

Alleged offer by Great Britain to provide for war expenses; 

territorial inducements, which cannot exactly be defined; constant 

fear of missing opportunity in the East; underhand pressure, as 

exerted by Free Masons and Republicans, simultaneously with similar 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGAEIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 255 

work of Entente, in which Cabinet Minister Martini is taking the 
leading part; and above all, the daily tightening fist of England, 
against which Italy is developing no energy of opposition. All this 
would explain possible failure of weak Italian Government to resist 
any longer. 

Baron Sonnino's further attitude in the present negotiations will 
best show whether the Italian Government wishes to procrastinate or 
to overstep the mark by exorbitant counter-proposals and thereby to 
shift the blame of an eventual breach upon the Austro-Hungarian 
Government, which is bound by its pledge of secrecy ; or whether the 
Italian Government intends to use the pressure of military prepara- 
tions in conducting the negotiations. 



No. 134. 

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, April 2, 1915. 

I beg to send you the enclosed notes on my conversation with the 
Italian Ambassador yesterday. 



(Enclosure.) 
(Translation from the French.) 

Vienna, April 1, 1915. 

The Italian Ambassador to-day brought me Baron Sonnino's reply 
to my proposals of March 22nd, concerning the basis of the agreement 
to be negotiated. 

Eeferring to the benevolent neutrality which we demand from 
Italy, the Minister had given instructions that I be informed that 
Italy would have no objection to assuming that obligation for the 
entire duration of the war, provided Austria-Hungary understood 
the term neutrality to mean a complete and sincere neutrality, such 
as Italy has observed up to this time toward both belligerent parties ; 
but Italy's geographical position in the Mediterranean prevented her 



256 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

from adopting a neutrality inclined to favour us, as such a step might 
provoke reprisals from the other side. 

I replied that we demanded a benevolent neutrality in the sense 
of Article IV of our Treaty of Alliance. It is obvious that we would 
not think of demanding anything that might expose Italy to justi- 
fiable reprisals from any party. Yet, a neutral country has at its 
disposal numerous legitimate means to be of assistance to a belligerent 
neighbour and ally. 

As to the freedom of action we were compelled to demand for 
our activities in Servia — a freedom which was understood not to apply 
to Albania, in the face of the further validity of our special agree- 
ment — Baron Sonnino's attitude has taken an astounding turn: he 
informed me that Italy could not possibly consent to Austria-Hun- 
gary's unlimited freedom of action in the Balkans without obtaining 
Austria-Hungary's renunciation of her interest in Albania. 

I pointed out to the Duke of Avarna that this was an entirely 
new pretension, which I must decidedly oppose as being adverse to 
our unchangeable interests in Albania, which Italy has always recog- 
nised. We have entered into mutual engagements with Italy, and 
mean to maintain them. Our demand for compensation for the occu- 
pation of Valona is a consequence of that occupation. 

I found no difficulty in accepting Baron Sonnino's view that the 
questions concerning the carrying out of a territorial cession are 
subordinated to the solution of the fundamental issue. This phase 
would be discussed in detail in due time, and the Italians would 
certainly present no obstacle to an understanding. 

As to that fundamental issue, the Minister characterises my pro- 
posals as insufficient and vague. He holds, "that in order to create 
a cordial relation between the two Powers, which will eliminate all 
causes of friction in future, and to make possible a collaboration 
toward common political aims, it is necessary to establish conditions 
of greater equality and security on the frontiers and in the Adriatic — 
conditions which would prevent new and frequent irredentistic move- 
ments. For the accomplishment of such an end the cession of a 
strip of land in Tyrol would certainly not be sufficient. " 

To this enigmatic, yet very clear statement, I replied that the 
aims to which Baron Sonnino referred now, as he had done previ- 
ously, were in entire accord with my frequently expressed views. On 
the other hand I found it hard to understand just what was meant 
by the reference to irredentistic movements and to conditions of 
equality and security between the two Powers. Whatever the phrases 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 257 

may mean, our offer of all the districts which constitute what is 
commonly called the "Trentino" could certainly not be spoken of 
as the "cession of a strip of land in Tyrol." 

The Italian Minister had qualified my first proposal as vague. 
To-day, having examined the situation, I am in a position to specify 
it. The territories which Austria-Hungary would be prepared to 
cede to Italy under the conditions indicated would comprise the dis- 
tricts (politische Bezirhe) of Trent, Eovereto, Riva, Tione (with the 
exclusion of Madonna di Campiglio and its surroundings), and the 
district of Borgo. In the valley of the Adige, the frontier line would 
run to Lavis, which place would fall to the Italian side. 

I expressed my hopes to the Duke of Avarna, that Baron Sonnino, 
after having familiarised himself with the extent of the proposed 
cession, will change his mind as to its importance. 

The Minister did not fail to remind the Ambassador, at the 
beginning of his instructions, that serious differences still existed as 
to the time when the agreement should be put into effect; but he 
advised him not to insist at this time, so as not to complicate the 
negotiations. 



No. 135. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn, 

(Telegram.) Borne, April 2, 1915. 

I have received from a reliable source an exposition of the present 
state of our negotiations with Italy. It emanates from an official of 
the Consulta and corresponds exactly with the facts, though it does 
not include the merits of your proposals. This shows what secrecy 
here means. 

Official referred to adds that there will be no hurry in replying 
as it is necessary to see first when and whether the Russians will 
invade Hungary and the allies will take the Dardanelles. 

There is no doubt that systematic endeavours are being made to 
learn the truth about Austria-Hungary's power of resistance and 
about her general situation. This is borne out by the fact that the 
Italian Consul General in Budapest has been sent for. It is signifi- 
cant in this connection that the newspapers, ever-ready to follow 
the Government's hints in their leading editorials, have published 



258 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

during the past few days a particularly large number of articles 
on the economic misery, the discouragement, dissatisfaction, and the 
craving for peace in various parts of the Dual Monarchy. These 
articles, together with contemptuous remarks, chiefly emanating 
from military circles, on the chances of an attack upon us, evidently 
serve the purpose of stimulating their own courage and of justifying 
an opportune attempt to secure a share in the booty as a legitimate 
undertaking. 



No. 136. 
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 2, 1915. 

From the notes which were attached to my communication of 
yesterday you will have gathered that Baron Sonnino's reception of 
my proposals is unsatisfactory. 

In view of this attitude of the Italian Government, as well as 
of various still more unfavourable news received lately, it would be 
of great value for my future action to obtain the best possible infor- 
mation concerning the real aims of the Italian Government in this 
entire question, and to discover whether it is in earnest about its 
professed endeavour to reach an understanding with us. 



No. 137. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, April 3, 1915. 

For many months past the conviction has been taking root in 
Italy that the Kingdom could not emerge from the general crisis 
without acquiring a territorial expansion, as otherwise the main- 
tenance of her position as a Great Power — an idea cherished with 
increasing jealousy — would be menaced. By repeated utterances in 
parliament the Government has anticipated this aspiration and has 
reserved to itself the right to decide how, when and to what extent 
it may be realised. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 259 

England's entrance into the war brought Italian sympathies 
from the very start to the side of the Entente, whose power was ex- 
pected to be overwhelming. 

For many years past a cleverly conducted press campaign, coupled 
with the intense activities of the Free Masons, has directed the eyes 
of the nation to the northeast and has thus kindled the glowing 
irredentism. 

Out of weakness at first, and later as a matter of internal party 
politics, the Government may have looked upon these activities as 
a means to divert the population from the unpleasant questions at 
home. 

Then, humiliated by her complete military impotence at the be- 
ginning of the war, Italy endeavoured to relieve this situation by 
extensive armaments. 

Incidentally, Salandra is entertaining the idea of acquiring the 
laurels of a great statesman by making best use of this opportunity, 
which never will recur, when all her great neighbours are engaged in 
other directions. 

The slow progress of the war, the increasing exhaustion on both 
sides, the economic situation, and lastly her gradually enhanced 
military preparedness, accentuated more and more Italy's importance 
as the only undamaged Great Power. These considerations have 
aroused in Italy the highest imaginable ambitions to be satisfied 
with as little sacrifice as possible. 

For Italy the aim is, first of all, territorial conquest at Austria- 
Hungary's expense; a fact which has been expressed in all circles 
openly or under cover. 

For the Entente, however, the aim is war itself — to increase the 
numbers of enemies ranged against the Central Powers. It is said 
that at the beginning of March the Entente had reckoned with cer- 
tainty on Italy's entrance into the war, basing its confidence upon 
the presumption that the Austro-Hungarian Government would prove 
stubborn. Our acceptance of the Italian basis of negotiations was a 
heavy blow to the Entente. The Entente is now endeavouring to 
represent the situation in the Dual Monarchy as becoming daily more 
desperate. Sgr. Martini is said to have succeeded lately in obtaining 
an audience with Baron Sonnino for Barzilai. 

On that occasion Barzilai is said to have explained to the Minister 
that his followers would not accept an arrangement with us without 
provoking disturbances, unless such arrangement included a satis- 
factory settlement of the Adriatic aspirations. Under the pressure 



260 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

of all these influences the Italian Government is augmenting its pre- 
tensions; all the more so as the daily Russian reports of victories 
lead it to the belief that Austria-Hungary's power is broken. 

Just now the papers announce quite seriously that the Russians 
have invaded the Hungarian plains and give the most incredible 
details about the invasion. 

On the other hand, the Government is anxious to avoid making 
permanent enemies of the Central Powers, and especially of Germany, 
in the event that their collapse should not materialise as it has been 
imagined here. At the same time the Government also fears to be 
left to the mercy of the Entente, as it realises that the greater part 
of the country is opposed to war, and would only accept it if the 
goal of its aspirations could not be reached otherwise. Furthermore, 
the Government hesitates at the dubious chances for success and at 
the material sacrifices. For the above-mentioned reasons the Italian 
Government probably will attempt to postpone the weighty decision 
which would bind her definitely to either side. 

In the aforesaid I have purposely ignored the ethical points like 
loyalty, faithfulness to the alliance, etc., as they do not apply in this 
case; the whole matter may be viewed only according to Italian 
mentality, intensified by the general conflagration. It stands to 
reason that under such conditions there can be no question of argu- 
ing, but simply of discussing adverse contentions. 

Nevertheless, I fear that an eventual declination to pursue the 
negotiations may lead to dangerous consequences. 



No. 138. 

Baron Buridn to Baron MaccMo. 

(Translation from the French.) 

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 6, 1915. 

The Italian Ambassador called on me to-day and I asked him 
whether he had yet received his Government's reply to my last 
proposal. 

On his negative reply I asked the Duke of Avarna to telegraph 
to Rome asking Baron Sonnino to be so kind as to let me know in 
his turn the proposition he had to make, since he considered my 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 261 

first proposal as insufficient and vague and had given no reply to my 
subsequent specific proposal; then each of us could try and find 
an acceptable agreement on the matter of territorial cession. I added 
that my request was inspired by the desire to see our negotiations 
speedily nearing a happy conclusion to the mutual and urgent interest 
of our respective countries to establish our future relations on a more 
definite and cordial footing. 



No. 139. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, April 7, 1915. 

Baron Sonnino told me to-day he had been informed by the 
Duke of Avarna of your request as contained in yesterday's tele- 
gram. 

Without discussing your latest proposals, the Minister told me that 
he would confer again to-night with Sgr. Salandra about it, and he 
hoped to be able to formulate his specific counter-proposals either 
to-morrow or the day after. 

I emphasised the point that he could once more see from your 
expressed desire that the good intention still prevails in Vienna 
to come as soon as possible to an understanding which would secure 
the good relationship between the two neighbouring Powers for the 
future. 

I made a special effort to emphasise your friendly attitude in 
order to counteract the Minister's boundless innate distrust, which is 
stimulated daily by the Entente. 



No. 140. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Eeport.) Rome, April 7, 1915. 

Aside from the powers and factors which are well known to you 
and which work on parallel lines toward the incitement to action in 
this country, the psychological moment also deserves consideration. 



262 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Personal and national vanity is deeply affected by Italy's enforced 
idleness in the gigantic struggle between the Great Powers, regardless 
of the fact that the main reason for this inaction is to be found in 
local conditions. 

The Italians consider it unendurable that they should have no hand 
in the game which might set them up as a Great Power and give 
them the satisfaction of being appreciated at their full value. This 
feeling is so intense that I do not doubt many still wish that some 
action be taken, no matter for or against whom. Such feelings may 
lie dormant in the ordinary man, but combined with other motives, 
are active forces in the minds of those who think. 

It is easy to build on a foundation of that sort, and the Entente 
has been enabled, through England's agency, to keep Italian sym- 
pathies on its side by exploiting in the most contemptible way the 
alleged violation of little Belgium and of her neutrality; also by 
exerting England's economic pressure daily and most inconsiderately 
upon Italy, who has little disposition to heroism. 

In this way it was easy for our enemies to enmesh the Kingdom 
more and more in their artful network of lies, and even to disseminate 
doubts as to the invincibility of Germany, which has always been so 
much admired in this country. 

A few years ago it would have been considered an act of madness 
to incur the wrath of Germany ; now, this danger seems to fade away 
in the presence of the false reports on the real situation. In their 
blind hatred against Austria-Hungary the Italians willingly believe 
what they wish to believe. 

It would seem that a serious Government would in the first place 
listen to its own most competent sources of information: to its own 
representatives. It is significant that most Italian Ambassadors advise 
the maintenance of neutrality; I believe I may say this with certainty 
of the Ambassadors in Vienna, Berlin, St. Petersburgh and Con- 
stantinople. Yet, all this good advice is cast to the winds. 

On a contrary assumption, it would be impossible to explain the 
Government's calm toleration of the utterances of all the newspapers 
which are within the scope of its influence; and, despite all assur- 
ances to the contrary, there are a good many of them. To my mind 
this represents an ominous symptom, or at least a dangerous playing 
with fire. 

As long as the Government had to reckon with the attitude of 
political parties in domestic affairs, greater reserve toward the press 
might have been explicable. But now, since the majority in parlia- 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 263 

merit, with the exception of the interventionists, has adopted a pro- 
gramme of cautious reserve and is unmistakably in favour of the 
maintenance of neutrality, it is the Government itself that keeps up 
the agitation alive in the press, and thereby betrays the duplicity 
of its policy. This is all the more obvious, in view of the fact that 
just at present the existing severe restrictions would make it par- 
ticularly easy to give a desired direction to political discussions. 

I have gained the impression that the Government's policy in 
press matters is aimed at arousing public feeling against the Dual 
Monarchy as a factor in its dealings with us, and at the same time 
at discrediting our internal situation in order to encourage the agi- 
tators in Italy and to create sentiment for an attack upon us if such 
a step should appear desirable. 

The Government's game with the press seems to me doubly 
dangerous as the war preparations are now nearing completion. This 
latter development represents the great difference between the present 
situation and that of last autumn. 

In any case the Government is assuming incalculable risks. 
Whether these activities must be ascribed to Sgr. Salandra or to 
Baron Sonnino remains to be seen. 

The late Macchiavelli may be proud of his disciples. Yet, neither 
of these gentlemen seems to have considered the question as to whether 
any one will consider Italy's friendship worth seeking after this 
episode. 



No. 141. 

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Translation from the French.) 

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 11, 1915. 

The Duke of Avarna called on me yesterday. After having en- 
larged on many points of historical, ethnographical and military na- 
ture, as well as on Italy's alleged secondary position in the Adriatic, 
the Ambassador proceeded to read a memorandum to me. That docu- 
ment, written in answer to my request, comprises eleven articles 
enumerating the conditions and stipulations which the Italian Gov- 
ernment considers indispensable to the establishment of an agreement 
and a permanent understanding between the two Powers. 



264 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

The memorandum, which the Ambassador subsequently handed to 
me, is framed in the following terms : 

Article 1. 

Austria-Hungary shall cede to Italy the Trentino with the boun- 
daries denned for the Regno Italico in 1811, or, in other words, 
according to the Treaty of Paris, February 28, 1810. 

The new boundary line shall diverge from the present frontier 
at Monte Cevedale and shall follow for a certain distance the mountain 
range between Valle Venosta and Valle del Noce; it shall then come 
down to the Adige at Gargazone, situated between Meran and 
Bolzano ; from there it shall run to the top of the plateau on the left 
bank of the river, divide the Valle Sorentina in two halves and cross 
the Eisack Valley at Klausen; then it shall lead across the Dolomites 
on the right of the river Avisio, exclusive of the valleys of Garden and 
Badia and inclusive of the region of Ampezzo (Ampezzano) until it 
rejoins the present boundary line. 

Article 2. 

The eastern boundary shall be rectified by Austria-Hungary in 
Italy's favour, to include the cities of Gradisca and Goricia. 

Starting from Tragkofel, the new boundary line shall diverge 
from the present frontier by running westward to Osternig, whence 
it shall follow the slope of the Carnic Alps to Saifniz. It shall then 
run to the Wiseberg by the mountain range between Seisera and 
Schliza; subsequently it shall merge into the old boundary until it 
reaches Sella di Nevea. Therefrom it shall follow the banks of the 
Rombone to the Isonzo, leaving Plezzo to the west. The boundary 
shall then follow the course of the Isonzo as far as Tolmino. Leav- 
ing the Isonzo, it shall assume a more easterly direction, passing the 
eastern side of the plateau of Pregona-Planina and following the track 
(solco) of the Chiappovano. It shall then run east of Goricia and 
across the Carso di Comen and reach the sea between Monf alcone and 
Trieste in the neighbourhood of Nebresina. 

Article 3. 

The city of Trieste, with its territory extended northward to 
Nabresina inclusive (thus making it adjoin the new Italian border — 
Art. 2) and southward, comprising the present administrative dis- 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 265 

tricts of Capodistria and Pirano, shall be constituted into an autono- 
mous and independent state in matters political, international, mili- 
tary, legislative, financial and administrative. Austria-Hungary shall 
renounce all rights of sovereignty over that state, which shall remain 
a free port. Austro-Hungarian and Italian troops shall not enter 
that territory. 

The new state shall assume a proportional share of the Austrian 
public debt. 

Article 4. 

The groups of islands called Curzolari, including Lissa (with the 
adjoining isles of Sant' Andrea and Busi), Lesina (with the isles of 
Spalmadori and Torcola), Curzola, Lagosta (with the adjoining isles 
and ledges) , Cazza and Meleda, as well as Pelagosa, shall be ceded to 
Italy by Austria-Hungary. 

Article 5. 

The territories ceded by Austria-Hungary shall be occupied im- 
mediately by Italy (Art. 1, 2 and 4). On the other hand, the Austro- 
Hungarian authorities and troops shall evacuate Trieste and its terri- 
tory (Art. 3) and all natives of those territories in military service, 
whether in the land or sea forces, of Austria-Hungary shall be dis- 
charged at once. 

Article 6. 

Austria-Hungary shall recognise Italy's unrestricted sovereignty 
over Valona and its bays, including Saseno and as much territory in 
the hinterland as may be required for the defence thereof. 

Article 7. 

Austria-Hungary shall unreservedly renounce all her interests in 
Albania, as defined by the London Conference. 

Article 8. 

Complete amnesty and immediate release shall be granted by 
Austria-Hungary to all persons belonging to the ceded (Art. 1, 2, 4) 
and evacuated (Art. 3) territories, who have been condemned or are 
committed to trial for reasons either political or military. 



266 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 

Article 9. 

In order to relieve the ceded territories (Art. 1, 2, 4) of their 
proportional share in the Austrian and Austro-Hungarian public 
debts, as well as of the liabilities in connexion with the pensions of 
former Austro-Hungarian officials ; furthermore, in exchange for the 
immediate and integral transfer to the Kingdom of Italy of all 
state property, movable and immovable, with the exception of arms, 
which may be within those territories; also in lieu of compensation 
for the necessary rights connected with the territories in question as 
they apply to the present and the future — without any exception — 
Italy shall pay to Austria-Hungary the sum of Two Hundred Million 
Italian lire in gold. 

Article 10. 

Italy shall pledge herself to maintain absolute neutrality toward 
Austro-Hungary and Germany throughout the duration of the present 
war. 

Article 11. 

Italy shall renounce for the entire duration of the present war 
her right to invoke afterwards for her benefit the dispositions of 
Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty, and Austria-Hungary shall 
make a similar renunciation in respect of the effected Italian occupa- 
tion of the islands of the Dodecanesos. 

I did not conceal from the Duke of Avarna the painful impres- 
sion which Baron Sonnino's excessive pretensions had made upon me 
while I listened to the reading of his proposals. I informed him 
that I would examine each point in his communication with all due 
care and that I would convey to him my reply with as little delay 
as possible. 



No. 142. 

Prince Gottfried zu Hdherilolie to Baron Burian. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, April 12, 1915. 

The Secretary of State agrees with you that Italy's demands are 
unacceptable, but he presumes that they have been made merely for 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 267 

the purpose of negotiations and in order thus to make sure of obtain- 
ing a part of them. 

General Pau is said to have greatly influenced the Italian demands 
during his stay in Rome, by declaring that our military power of re- 
sistance has been broken and by telling wonders about the Russian 
reserves still to be expected. 



No. 143. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, April 14, 1915. 

Prince Billow has given me the following information on a con- 
versation he had yesterday with Baron Sonnino : 

The two gentlemen went over each individual article of the latest 
Italian demands together. In the matter of the Trentino, Baron 
Sonnino admitted that he had included purely German districts but 
endeavoured to excuse this by saying that you in your proposal had 
retained purely Italian districts for the Dual Monarchy. 

Prince Biilow gained the impression that the Italians would be 
open to negotiations as to the extent of territory to be ceded as well 
as on the question of the Isonzo border. 

Prince Biilow considered the stipulations about Trieste to be 
entirely obscure in their disclosures of Baron Sonnino 's real aspira- 
tions. When Baron Sonnino explained that he had in mind a status 
similar to that of Hamburg, Prince Biilow retorted that Germany 
was a confederation of states and that therefore an analogy between 
the two situations could hardly be established. Moreover, he re- 
capitulated with all his available energy all the reasons why Austria- 
Hungary could not renounce Trieste. 

The most heated conversation ensued on the subject of the Dal- 
matian group of islands. Baron Sonnino admitted that this phase of 
the proposed cessions involved the entire so-called Adriatic question. 
The Italian coast in the Adriatic, from Venice to Tarent, did not 
afford a single suitable port (read: Naval port!). On this account 
the Italian Navy is in a position of inferiority in the Adriatic Sea. 
The Minister of Marine and his entire department had exerted pres- 
sure upon him on that score and the whole country expected him to 
bring about an improvement of the situation. The Minister added 



268 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 

in a most cynical manner that the present opportunity must be 
availed of to the best advantage as it would never occur again. 

Prince Billow asked how these exorbitant demands could possibly 
be brought into harmony with Sonnino 's repeatedly asserted desire to 
create a better basis for the renewal of the Triple Alliance. To this 
question the Minister replied that it was precisely by the most radical 
extermination of irredentism that he meant to serve that end! 

Eeferring to Albania, the German Ambassador pointed to the 
repeated Italian declarations concerning the maintenance of the Lon- 
don decisions and the provisional character of the occupation of 
Valona. Baron Sonnino became visibly embarrassed as he replied 
that that matter was only a proposal, open to discussion. 

Toward the end of the conversation Baron Sonnino had become 
more tractable, and in parting said: "Je vous promets, je vais dis- 
cuter et je serai tres raisonnable." ("I promise you I shall discuss it 
and shall be very reasonable.") 

The chief elements which dominate the Italian Government still 
remain the same : Fear of England, fear of revolution — and at Court 
revolution seems to be feared even more than war — and on the other 
hand the uncertainty as to the relative power of the two camps. 



No. 144. 

Baron Buridn to Baron MaccMo. 

(Translation from the French.) 

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 16, 1915. 

I intend to hand this day to the Italian Ambassador the following 
reply to Baron Sonnino 's latest proposal: 

The Austro-Hungarian Government has carefully examined the 
proposals which the Duke of Avarna has made in the name of the 
Italian Government in connexion with the agreement to be concluded 
between Austria-Hungary and Italy. 

To its sincere regret the Austro-Hungarian Government has found 
a great part of those proposals, and especially those embodied in 
Articles 2, 3 and 4, unacceptable for political, ethnographical, strategic 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 269 

and economic reasons, which it would be of no avail to enlarge upon. 
These proposals in their entirety would place the Austro-Hungarian 
Government in a position incompatible with its vital interests, and 
are not calculated to answer the purpose which the Italian Govern- 
ment has always proffered, namely, the consolidation of the mutual 
relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy, their establishment on 
a basis of perfect good faith, and the elimination of all causes of fric- 
tion between them to the end that their collaboration on questions of 
general policy might be made possible. Sincerely concerned about 
these considerations, and desiring to prove to Italy its wish to arrive 
at a definite and permanent understanding up to the highest admis- 
sible limit, the Austro-Hungarian Government is prepared to augment 
the territorial cession in southern Tyrol which it had consented to in 
its communication to the Duke of Avarna, dated April 1st. Under 
our new proposal the future boundary-line would diverge from the 
present frontier in the vicinity of the Zufallspitze and would follow 
for a certain distance the boundary between the district of Cless on 
the one side and the districts of Schlanders and Meran on the other, 
coinciding with the watershed between the Noce and Adige rivers as 
far as the Illmenspitze. The boundary-line would then run west of 
Proveis in such a manner that this district would remain a part of 
Tyrol; then join the Torrente Pescara and follow its course up to 
its confluence with the Noce. Thence it would run along the course 
of the Noce as far as a point south of Tajo; whence it would lead up 
the Corno di Tres; the new boundary-line would subsequently be 
identical with the northern boundary of the district of Mezzolombardo 
and cross the Adige south of Salurn. Thence it would lead up the 
Geiersberg, would follow the watershed between the valleys of the 
Avisio and the Adige, passing by the Castion and taking a direction 
toward the Hornspitze and the Monte Comp. There it would turn 
southward, describe a semicircle, leaving the district of Altrei to 
Tyrol, and would then run upward to the Pass of San Lugano. Sub- 
sequently the new boundary-line would be formed by the boundary 
between the districts of Bozen and Cavalese, marked by the watershed 
between the valleys of the Avisio and the Adige ; it would pass by the 
Cima di Rocca and the Grimm-Joch as far as Latemar. From Pass 
Carnon it would follow the slopes down to the Avisio, would cross that 
river between the districts of Moena and Farno and would then rise 
to the watershed between the valleys of San Pellegrino to the north 
and the valley of Travignolo to the south. It would rejoin the 
present boundary-line east of the Cima di Bocche. 



270 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUKOPEAN WAR 

The Austro-Hungarian Government consequently could not accept 
the boundary-line as described in Article 1 of the Italian proposals 
and which would include the cession to Italy of districts with a Ger- 
man population. 

As to the proposal contained in Article 5, which provides that the 
territories ceded by Austria-Hungary shall be transferred to Italy 
immediately, the precipitate measures which such a proceeding would 
involve, technically impracticable for many reasons of general admin- 
istration and on other considerations, even in time of peace, would 
be all the more so in time of war. 

Without wishing to cite any more instances in history, it will 
suffice to recall the mode of procedure applied at the time of the 
cession of Nice and Savoy to France in 1860, when even after the 
conclusion of peace a certain number of months elapsed between the 
conclusion of the convention and the actual transfer of the ceded 
territories. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government has no objection to the pro- 
posal contained in Article 8, referring to an amnesty to be granted 
to all persons belonging to the territories ceded to Italy who are 
either condemned or committed for trial for military or political 
offences. 

With regard to the question of Albania in general, and of Valona 
in particular, the Austro-Hungarian Government is compelled to 
state that it seems difficult to bring into harmony the proposals made 
by the Italian Government in Articles 6 and 7 with the engagements 
into which Italy has entered on four occasions — namely : by the Italo- 
Austro-Hungarian accord of 1900-1, by the decision of the London 
Conference, by its declaration of August 4th of last year, to remain 
true to its engagements toward Austria-Hungary as well as to the 
decisions of the London Conference, and not to take advantage in 
Albania of the fact that Austria-Hungary is at war; finally, by its 
formal and clear declarations on the occasion of the Italian occupation 
of Valona. On the other hand the Austro-Hungarian Government, 
in full consciousness of the necessity to uphold the mutual rights 
and obligations resulting from the arrangements now in force, and 
to maintain the attitude it always has held on the Albanian question, 
could not renounce its interests in Albania — a country so very close 
to the sphere of Austria-Hungary's most vital concerns. Moreover, 
the Dual Monarchy has, in conjunction with Italy, contributed to 
the creation of Albania, not only politically, but also by considerable 
sacrifices of a military nature (partial mobilisation of 1913), as well 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 271 

as economically and financially. Besides, in consequence of the de- 
cisions of the London Conference, the Albanian question has become 
a European question and neither one individual Power nor several 
Great Powers may, single-handed or by virtue of an agreement, inter- 
fere with Albania, whose existence and neutrality have been guar- 
anteed by Europe. Only by the concordant will of the Great Powers 
could the political situation of Albania be modified — an eventuality 
impossible during the present war. 

Nevertheless, the Austro-Hungarian Government adheres to the 
spirit of the Italo-Austro-Hungarian accord about Albania and 
recognises that this very Albanian question constitutes a problem 
of general policy, in the solution of which Austria-Hungary and Italy 
may profitably cooperate in the future. The Austro-Hungarian 
Government, therefore, declares itself ever ready to discuss with the 
Italian Government our respective interests in Albania, either on the 
basis of the present situation or in whatever way political changes 
in the future may make it incumbent for either party to subject our 
arrangements to a revision. 

Proceeding to the examination of the engagements which Italy 
would have to take, the Austro-Hungarian Government would point 
out that Turkey, by her entrance into the war, has joined Austria- 
Hungary and Germany; consequently, the neutrality which Italy 
would be bound to observe until the end of the war toward Austria- 
Hungary and Germany should also include the Ottoman Empire. 

As to Article XI of the proposal we would be prepared to accept 
it, provided that the phrase: " et relativement aussi aux avantages 
territoriaux on autres qui resulteraient pour V 'Autriche-Hongrie du 
trait e de paix terminant cette guerre" ("and also in respect of the 
territorial and other advantages, which may accrue to Austria-Hun- 
gary by virtue of the peace treaty terminating this war") be inserted 
after the words "guerre actuelle" ("present war"). 

Our renunciation of a compensation for the occupation of the 
islands of the Dodecanesos would also be subject to this condition. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government is not yet prepared to state 
the precise figure which would correspond to the proportional share 
of the territories to be ceded to Italy in the public debts nor of the 
lump sum to be demanded from Italy as an indemnity for all invest- 
ments made by the State in the territories referred to; but it can 
state at the outset that the figure proposed by the Italian Government 
would be absolutely inadequate and would not by a considerable 
margin constitute an equitable indemnification. To cite only one 



272 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

item here, the value of military structures alone within the terri- 
tories to be ceded to Italy would considerably exceed the sum total 
proposed by the Italian Government. 

Yet, the Austro-Hungarian Government does not wish to pre- 
vent the conclusion of the agreement by differences of a purely 
financial nature and declares itself willing, in the event of a dis- 
agreement with the Italian Government, to submit the question of 
monetary indemnification to the Court of Arbitration at The Hague. 



No. 145. 
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 16, 1915. 

The Entente Powers, and especially France, have disseminated 
the news of an alleged possibility that the conclusion of a separate 
peace between Austria-Hungary and Russia may be imminent. 

We are informed that this news has caused an unfavourable 
impression in Italy as in other countries. I therefore have ordered 
a denial to be published in to-morrow's issue of the Fremdenblatt. 



No. 146. 

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Translation from the French.) 

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 17, 1915. 

I gave my reply to the Italian Ambassador yesterday; its text 
has been communicated to you. 

I told the Duke of Avarna that although I was unable, for im- 
perative reasons, to consider demands which would involve the renun- 
ciation to [of] some of our most important interests, our offer, on the 
other hand, was of so great a value and was so much in excess of all 
that Italy used to describe as the most important of her national 
aspirations, that the Italian Government could not fail to recognise 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGAEIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 273 

in it a conspicuous proof of our active desire to create a relation of 
cordial friendship with Italy, free from all causes of friction and 
such as Baron Sonnino, agreeing with us, had professed to be his 
desire from the beginning of the negotiations. 

The Ambassador refrained from comment and confined himself 
to an expression of his apprehension that my reply may be un- 
favourably received, as it would probably be considered in Rome as 
too far short of what the public is clamouring for. 



No. 147. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, April 18, 1915. 

On the occasion of my call at the Consulta to-day, I first of all 
urged Baron Sonnino to construe your reply and the important 
concession the Austro-Hungarian Government had decided to make 
in southern Tyrol, as proof that we have done all in our power to 
show our serious desire to arrive at an understanding calculated to 
place the relations between the two Powers on a sound footing also 
for the future — a wish which must coincide with the intentions of 
the Italian Government as indicated by its repeated assurances. 

The Minister agreed with me; so I continued by saying that to 
that end all obstacles must be removed which might eventually bar 
the way; therefore it did not seem consistent with this intention to 
place before us demands which are unacceptable because they are 
incompatible with our most vital interests, as, for instance, the recti- 
fication of the frontier on the Isonzo, the creation of the free state of 
Trieste and the cession of the Dalmatian islands. 

I then enlarged upon the political and economic necessity for 
an inland country to have a free outlet to the sea and pointed out 
that Austria-Hungary, even under existing conditions, was confined 
in this respect to a small part of the Adriatic. To Austria-Hungary 
it would be like depriving a human being of air if the Italian border 
were to be pushed to the very gates of Trieste, if a free state were 
to arise which would cut off our access to the sea, and would in time 
become an even worse focus of irredentism than any now existing, 
and shortly would succumb to the national agitation and join the 
Kingdom of Italy. Dalmatia would be in a similar position if its 



274 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

most important group of islands were to become the possession of a 
foreign country; the defence of the country against any enemy 
whatsoever would thus be rendered impossible and the valuable port 
of Spalato would be barred from traffic on the seas. 

I finally called the Minister's attention to the fact that Italy was 
thus attempting to strangle Austria-Hungary, with her population 
of fifty millions, by shutting her off from the Adriatic, which would 
become an Italian sea; and pointed out that Italy was trying to do 
this while she herself was complaining of the closing of the Mediter- 
ranean by Great Britain. 

Baron Sonnino retorted that the present Isonzo border was for 
strategical reasons absolutely unsatisfactory for Italy, and that its 
rectification was imperatively necessary. Speaking of Trieste, he 
said he only contemplated making it a free port; about Dalmatia 
he referred to the open Italian coast on the Adriatic which afforded 
no naval base whatever. When I mentioned Ancona and Brindisi, 
he insisted that Ancona had now been declared an open seaport 
because its harbour was absolutely useless, but he found himself 
obliged to admit that the construction of Brindisi might be com- 
pleted so as to make it serve the purpose of a base. The very poor 
way in which he defended his demands gave ground for the suspicion 
that he had never studied the matter seriously, and I am more than 
ever convinced of the truth of the assertion that he has been egged 
on by the General Staff in the matter of the Isonzo border, by the 
Minister of Marine in the matter of the islands, and by Barzilai in 
the matter of Trieste. 

Concerning Albania, the Minister presumed that he had been 
misunderstood, as it had never entered his head to ignore our 
existing agreement; he had only meant to replace it by another; 
this, he thought, could be done without prejudice to an eventual 
decision by the Great Powers on the final destiny of Albania. 

He regarded our acceptance of the article on the amnesty as a 
natural consequence of the cession. The same applies to the mutual 
renunciation of a further invocation of Article 7, inclusive of the 
phrase you desired in regard to eventual advantages at the conclusion 
of peace. Although the Minister at first had observed that the reply 
did not appear satisfactory to him, and that, besides, he had not 
yet read it carefully, he was not at all disturbed; his replies to 
my arguments betrayed little enthusiasm or conviction. On his own 
accord he said it would be necessary to confer with Sgr. Salandra 
and with His Majesty before he could give a reply. Nothing what- 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 275 

ever in his words or bearing suggested that he had no intention to 
continue the negotiations. 



No. 148. 

Baron Buridn to Baron MaccMo. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 18, 1915. 

Should Baron Sonnino still insist upon immediate occupation 
of territories ceded to Italy, you may state that we would be willing 
to adopt certain measures, such as the convening of mixed com- 
missions for the settlement of questions arising from the cession. By 
this means every doubt would be removed as to the earnestness of 
our intention to carry out our obligation. Besides, our sincerity 
is made evident by the very fact that we propose an eventual de- 
cision by an international court — namely, The Hague Court of 
arbitration — in the matter of the extent of [pecuniary] indemnifica- 
tion. 



No. 149. 

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Translation from the French.) 

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 19, 1915. 

The Italian Ambassador told me very confidentially to-day that 
he had heard from a reliable source that I manifested an intention 
to take up, in subsequent discussions, a standpoint completely at 
variance with the one indicated in the memorandum of April 16th, 
and that I would make concessions exceeding all those demands 
which we have qualified as unacceptable. I am represented as 
having suggested that I was unapproachable in the matter of the 
Isonzo, that I would permit an extension of the autonomy and of 
the Italian institutions of Trieste, cede to Italy some port or island 
in Dalmatia to accept the proposals concerning Albania. 

The Duke of Avarna added that he could not disclose the origin 



276 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

of that information, but that it had reached even his government. 
He had come to tell me that, in order to forestall erroneous impres- 
sions in Rome — impressions likely to influence the reply we expect 
from Baron Sonnino — he would be obliged if I stated to him myself 
whether this information is correct or wrong. 

I deemed it unnecessary to enter into details with the Duke of 
Avarna on the meaning of this strange move. However, I grasped 
this opportunity to explain to the Ambassador the serious considera- 
tions which prevented Austria-Hungary from discussing demands 
which so closely touch the problems of our very existence. I once 
more assured him that Italy would find us ever ready to examine 
carefully any proposal she may put before us; to further to the 
utmost her interests in the questions which particularly concern 
her, and to come to an amicable understanding with her on any point 
where our interests run on parallel and conciliable lines. Accord- 
ingly, we would be willing to accept the change of conditions in 
Albania ; and although it would be impossible for us to renounce our 
interests there for reasons which the Italian Government would not 
fail to find justifiable, Italy on the other hand would find us inclined 
to enter into the merits of her actual position in Albania and to har- 
monise it with our own interests in that country by means of a 
revision of the existing agreement. 

The Duke of Avarna was pleased with my explanation, which 
confirmed the anticipations so clearly referred to in the memoran- 
dum concerning the possession of Valona. He was surprised to 
learn from my demonstrations on a map what an infinitesimal part 
the watchword " national aspirations" really played in the proposed 
rectification of the Isonzo border and how very far purely German 
and Slav territories would be penetrated by a boundary line which 
would be strategically advantageous to Italy, yet impossible for 
Austria-Hungary. 



No. 150. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Borne, April 20, 1915. 

Had extensive conversation with Sgr. Salandra to-day. 

The Prime Minister particularly dwelt on the question concern- 
ing Trieste. He explained that Italy meant to meet Austria-Hun- 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGAKIAN BED BOOK (NO. 2) 277 

gary half-way by proposing to make that city a free port, as Italy 
realised that the Dual Monarchy could not afford to cede it. Italy's 
chief object was to secure the national existence of the Italian 
majority in Trieste, which, in the view of the wildly aroused national 
sentiment here, appears impossible under Austro-Hungarian rule. 
In opposition to this I endeavoured to prove that the forcible creation 
of a free port at Trieste would necessarily lead to its ultimate 
junction with Italy, an eventuality which he himself had just admit- 
ted as impossible as far as Austria-Hungary is concerned; and 
that any new arrangement of that description would also constitute 
an unbearable hindrance to our outlet to the sea. 

I then enlarged upon the historical, material, technical and com- 
mercial importance which Trieste represented to us. I endeavoured 
to disprove his contentions that the Italian aspirations were 
prompted by the requirements of the economic welfare of the greater 
part of the population, and not by selfish ambitions of individuals ; 
such aspirations, I pointed out, develop even more relentlessly in 
a free state and would eventually lead to the annexation and material 
ruin of the city. 

Sgr. Salandra, though appreciating our far-reaching concession 
in Tyrol, asserted that this particular question was so thoroughly 
inherent in the national sentiment that he would not dare to submit 
to parliament an arrangement which in no way responded to that 
feeling. He thought that in such an event he would then have to 
resign. This, however, would be the lesser evil; the real danger 
consisted in the imminence of general disturbances, and he could 
therefore not recommend such an arrangement to the King. The 
dynasty is not on a firm foundation and His Majesty would run the 
risk of unpopularity, if not worse. When I expressed my doubts 
as to the validity of all this buncombe he admitted his belief that 
the majority of Italians desired an amicable settlement. This led 
back to the old and worn subject of the inspiration of public opinion 
by the government. 

With regard to the islands Sgr. Salandra expressed the same 
view as Baron Sonnino did yesterday. I laid particular stress on 
the circumstance that in maritime matters in the Adriatic, Italy 
would be better off if the agreement desired by both parties were to 
be concluded on a sound basis, enabling Austria-Hungary and Italy 
to establish joint mastery of the Adriatic and cooperation in its 
defence. 

The Minister's remark concerning Albania is significant. He 



278 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 

said that this question was only of secondary importance to him; 
Albania could not become the cause of a conflict between us. He 
admitted that the other Powers had also a word to say in that 
matter. He would have preferred to keep Valona, but felt confi- 
dent that some understanding about Albania's future may be found, 
possibly upon the basis of spheres of interests; but he emphasised 
his viewpoint that this was a matter of secondary importance. 

It also was interesting to hear him say, in the matter of Tyrol, 
that Italy did not wish to acquire any German subjects, but that the 
ethnographical limits should be adhered to as closely as possible. 

I finally pointed out that you felt sure the Italian reply would 
be drawn up with due consideration of all the reasons which arise 
from the necessary protection of our vital interests; I also sug- 
gested that a certainty always appeared to me preferable to a doubt- 
ful chance. Sgr. Saiandra quite followed my argument and answered 
that this too would certainly have to be considered. 

In conclusion he said that the entire subject had to be examined 
carefully and he would have to confer with the Chief of the General 
Staff and with the other ministers. 

The conversation was carried on in the most friendly terms. 



No. 151. 
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 21, 1915. 

I share your opinion that continuance of negotiations by Italy 
is by no means out of question. 

Referring to Trieste, you will maintain refusal of territorial 
or constitutional concessions, but you will point out specifically in 
reply to Sgr. Saiandra 's references to the national sentiment, that 
that independent city in any case enjoys a broad autonomy; that 
her municipality enjoys the functions of " Landtag' y (provincial 
diet), and that the national existence, as well as the cultural and 
economic life, of the Italian element there is safeguarded by the 
very fact of its numbers and its economic importance. 



THE AUSTBO-HUNGARIAN BED BOOK (NO. 2) 279 

No. 152. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, April 22, 1915. 

I called on Baron Sonnino to-day, and enquired whether he 
had received your reply. He stated that he had studied the entire 
subject, but refrained from entering into the merits of it. He told 
me that you had sent him a message through the Duke of Avarna, 
and that he would reply before long. 

I asked for an explanation of this utterance, which I found 
hard to follow. To my surprise I learned that the Italian Ambassa- 
dor had been instructed to hand you yesterday what Baron Sonnino 
called his " observations' ' to your reply of the 16th, and that you 
had promised your speedy reply, according to a telegram which 
arrived here to-day. 

He also mentioned that those " observations' ' had been couched 
in the spirit of our previous conversation. I could obtain from 
him no further information on the subject; he ostentatiously refused 
a further discussion. 



No. 153. 
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 22, 1915. 

Baron Sonnino has brought to the knowledge of the Duke of 
Avarna his observations on my reply of the 16th inst. Without 
being specifically instructed to do so, he has communicated them 
to me. 

According to the Italian Minister my reply does not afford a 
proper basis for the good understanding and the permanent harmony 
we strove for. 

He admits that we have made some new concessions in Tyrol, 
but to his mind they were not sufficient for a satisfactory settlement 
of the military and ethnographical questions in those parts, as they 
do not include certain territories of Italian speech, such as a part 
of the val di Noce, the val di Fassa and di Ampezzo. 



280 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Against his demands in respect of Albania I had referred to 
our previous arrangements. The precise meaning of his proposi- 
tion was a modification of those arrangements by a mutual agree- 
ment wherein we would avow our complete disinterestedness in all 
new arrangements which the Royal Government might enter into 
with the other Powers concerning Albania, in the same way as Italy 
would have no further interest in whatever arrangements Austria- 
Hungary might be able to make on her part with regard to the 
Balkans. 

As to Article IX, Baron Sonnino admits that the amount of the 
proportional share in the public debts of the State devolving upon 
the ceded territories and to be paid by Italy may be made a subject 
for negotiation. 

In regard to the valuation of the investments made by the 
State, the Minister refers to his observation in reply to our first 
proposal on that point. 

He is willing to accept the amendment to Article XI as proposed 
by me, relating to our freedom of action in the Balkans. This, he 
said, would entirely correspond with his ideas. 

Baron Sonnini again insists upon the necessity of the imme- 
diate execution of the cession and in this connexion refers to his 
previous explanations and especially to the impossibility of any 
Italian Government submitting an accord without that particular 
clause. 

The Minister concluded his observation by saying that I had 
replied to all his other demands by a plain refusal, paying no atten- 
tion to the motives he had proffered in support of his contentions. 

I took cognisance of the Ambassador's communication, and told 
him of my intention to give him my answer with as little delay as 
possible. 



No. 154. 

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 22, 1915. 

The stubborn persistence of the Italian Government in all its 
demands, as well as the deficient and stale arguments it invariably 
advances in their support in almost the identical phrases, brings to 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 281 

the fore the question whether Italy is really aiming at an under- 
standing with us, possibly at the price of more extensive sacrifices 
on the part of Austria-Hungary, or whether she is continuing the 
conversations only for the sake of appearances and with the con- 
cealed motive either to gain time for a later definite decision, or 
else to join soon the camp of the Entente after having ascertained 
what our highest offer would be. 

In any case you will keep up your conversations with Baron 
Sonnino by reverting in the most friendly manner to the arguments 
against the various Italian demands and by endeavouring to explain 
and rectify any erroneous views entertained by the Italian Govern- 
ment. 



No. 155. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Burian. 

(Telegram.) Rome, April 26, 1915. 

I learn from reliable source that some time ago a scheme was 
worked out in the Consulta, which contemplates the acquisition of 
the territory between the rivers Skumbi in the north and Vojussa in 
the south — the latter is said to be considered as future boundary 
of Greek Epirus — as the hinterland of Valona. 

That strip of territory, which comprises roughly the part of 
Albania inhabited by the Toscs, is supposed to extend as far as 
Lake Ochrida. According to that project the northern part, which 
is occupied by the Ghegs, is expected to constitute independent 
Albania, with the exception of the outlet on the Adriatic which is to 
be given to Servia in that region. 



No. 156. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Burian. 

(Telegram.) Rome, April 26, 1915. 

Pepino Garibaldi, the leader of the lately dissolved Garibaldi 
Legion in France, was recently clandestinely received by the King. 



282 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 

The fact, however, was so sensational that naturally it could 
not be kept concealed in this country. 

There is no doubt that this audience was not granted without 
the advice of the Government. 



No. 157. 
Baron Burian to Baron MaccJtio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 27, 1915. 

It may further the conclusion of our accord with Italy and — 
as I understand — it would also please Baron Sonnino, if a prominent 
political personage of Austria-Hungary were given an opportunity 
to enter into extensive discussion of our mutual interests as a whole 
with the Italian Ministers in Rome. In such an event an explicit 
explanation should be made of our views and of the reasons why 
we cannot accept certain points of the Italian pretensions. 

Count Goluchowski, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
and now a member of the Upper House, is intimately conversant 
with my views and would be willing to pay a short visit to Rome. 
He could undertake the task of such an explanation with Baron 
Sonnino and Sgr. Salandra on political matters and more especially 
on the future development of our relations with Italy. 

I ask you to bring this confidentially to the knowledge of the 
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and to find out whether he 
would be favourably inclined to a similar conference. Should the 
answer be in the affirmative, I would acquaint Count Goluchowski 
with the details of the present status of our negotiations with the 
Italian Government. 



No. 158. 

Baron Burian to Baron MaccMo. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, April 28, 1915. 

I intend to give to the Italian Ambassador to-morrow my reply 
to Baron Sonnino 's observations, which the Duke of Avarna con- 
veyed to me on the 21st instant. The text of the reply is contained 
in the enclosure. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 283 

(Enclosure.) 
(Translation from the French.) 

To judge from the Duke of Avarna's last communications, Baron 
Sonnino 's observations on Baron Burian ? s reply of the 16th instant 
refer primarily to the general trend of that reply, which the Italian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs considers not "comme une base propre 
a assurer la bonne entente et lliarmonie durable que nous avians 
en vue" ("a proper basis to assure the good understanding and the 
permanent harmony we aimed at"). 

Baron Burian, on his part, wishes to observe that his sincere 
desire, so often manifested by him, to reach a definite understanding 
with Italy has met with serious obstacles, inasmuch as several of 
the Italian propositions touched to the quick the most vital inter- 
ests of Austria-Hungary. The renunciation of these interests would 
create for Austria-Hungary a position which would impair con- 
siderably her participation in the political collaboration which Baron 
Sonnino contemplates for the future, not only so far as Italy is 
concerned, but also in respect of the other Powers. 

Baron Sonnino also asserts that Baron Burian had not taken 
into account the motives he had proffered in support of several 
of his proposals. Although the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in 
Rome already has had occasion to explain our viewpoint to Baron 
Sonnino, as well as to Sgr. Salandra, Baron Burian is quite ready 
to enlighten them further on these questions. 

As to Trieste, it must be stated first of all that that city enjoys 
an extensive autonomy under the Austrian constitution. Trieste 
represents an individual territory and her municipality is simul- 
taneously vested with the prerogatives of a provincial diet. The 
Italian element is extensively represented in the autonomous admin- 
istration of the city. In addition to the constitutional guarantees, 
the numbers, as well as the cultural level and economic position, of 
this element safeguard its satisfactory existence in every respect. 
By separating Trieste and her environments from the Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy and by making her an independent state, a death- 
blow would be struck at the economic prosperity of that city. Once 
deprived of her hinterland, she would lose all importance, and not 
even an eventual annexation by Italy, of which she would be no 
more than a superfluous port on her outskirt, could alter that fact. 



284 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Trieste has always been the object of particular care on the 
part of the Austrian Government, which will continue in the future, 
for the sake of the state itself, to favour the material and moral 
progress of the municipality in conformity with the desires of the 
population whose prosperity depends entirely upon the ties which 
bind it to the Dual Monarchy. Austria-Hungary on her part, while 
demanding the allegiance of her citizens, has never done anything 
that might encroach on their national character. Baron Burian 
will readily discuss with Baron Sonnino all questions on which he 
may seek enlightenment in regard to the real interests of Trieste. 

The proposition to cede the Curzolari Islands to Italy equally 
meets with insurmountable difficulties. Aside from the fact that 
these islands have a purely Slav population, they would in the 
hands of Italy constitute a strategic position which would command 
the upper part of the Adriatic, thus putting an end for Austria- 
Hungary to the balance of power in that sea, and would be a menace 
to our possession of the adjacent coast. 

The proposed territorial cession in Austrian Friuli would deprive 
Austria-Hungary of a boundary line indispensable for the defence 
of the coast, as well as of several central provinces, while it would 
push the Italian frontier still nearer to her principal port. Be- 
sides, the Italian element is little represented in the greater part of 
that region, which is inhabited by Slavs. 

If the last Austro-Hungarian proposal has delimited the Tyrol 
in such a way as to exclude from the proposed territorial cession 
the val di Noce and the valleys of Fassa and Ampezzo, this was 
certainly not done with the intention on our part of retaining some 
territories of Italian tongue. Such a charge in any case would not 
apply to the valleys of Fassa and Ampezzo, where the population is 
"Ladinian" (Grison) and desires intensely to remain united with 
Austria-Hungary; all its interests also gravitate exclusively toward 
the north. Nobody in Italy has ever considered the Grisons in 
Switzerland to be Italians, and Italy has likewise no reason to reclaim 
the Grison population of the two valleys in question, whose existence 
is completely identical with that of the inhabitants of the adjoining 
Pustertal. 

Imperative strategical reasons compel Austria-Hungary to retain 
the eastern part of Val di Noce, as otherwise the heights protecting 
the environments of Bozen would be poorly defensible. 

Presuming that Italy will, in the case of the one or the other 
of the above-mentioned localities, advance more or less analogous 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGABIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 285 

arguments against our reasons of defence, it should not be forgotten 
that Austria-Hungary is offering an amicable cession of a part of 
her territorial possessions; it stands to reason that the arguments 
of the giver, who in this instance relinquishes a safe frontier, must 
have precedence over those of the acquirer. 

As to the persistence in the demand for immediate execution 
of the territorial cession, Baron Burian does not abandon hope that 
Baron Sonnino will himself, on renewed and close investigation, 
realise the material impossibility of such a measure. The strict 
secrecy which both parties are observing, at Baron Sonnino 's own 
suggestion, both on the fact and on the different phases of the nego- 
tiations, would prohibit, until after the conclusion of the accord, 
all preparations, military, administrative and otherwise, that should 
precede the transfer of the ceded territories. All these preliminary 
measures require time and can hardly be improved at the last min- 
ute. Besides, Austria-Hungary would be placed in a more than 
abnormal position if Italy were to take possession of the territories 
referred to at a time when the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is en- 
gaged in a gigantic war and when consequently the greater part of 
her territory is deprived of all means of defence, as her armies are 
concentrated in the various theatres of war. 

Notwithstanding the above, and in order to ameliorate as much 
as possible the Italian Government's position toward Parliament 
and public opinion, measures may be considered which would, at 
the proper time, demonstrate before the whole world our loyal and 
serious purpose to faithfully carry out the engagements entered 
into. To that end mixed commissions may be detailed immediately 
after the conclusion of the agreement, for the purpose of settling 
the numerous minor questions involved in the territorial cession. 
The establishment and the deliberations of these commissions would 
remove every doubt as to the complete and definite execution of 
the cession. Should Baron Sonnino on his part wish to propose 
other measures for the same purpose, Baron Burian would not fail 
to examine them with the best intention of adopting them as far 
as possible. 

Although it can be proved easily and conclusively that the sum 
offered by the Italian Government for the proportional share in the 
public debts and for indemnification is considerably below the value 
of public property ceded to Italy, Baron Burian 's view coincides 
with Baron Sonnino 's, that this question should not prevent the 
conclusion of the accord, once an understanding has been reached 



286 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

on all other matters. It is exactly in this spirit, and as another 
proof of his desire to assure the territorial cession by outward and 
definite guarantees, that Baron Burian suggests the submission of 
the financial controversy to an international tribunal, namely, The 
Hague Court of Arbitration, if occasion should arise. 

Baron Buridn reiterates the expression of his friendly desire 
to discuss with Baron Sonnino the respective interests of the two 
Powers in Albania with due consideration of the changed conditions 
since the present war began, and to arrive at a new understanding 
with Italy in this respect. The Albanian question would thus be 
placed once more in the hands of Europe, while Austria-Hungary 
might even renounce her interests there provided that Italy would 
likewise renounce her interests in Albania with the exception of 
Valona and the sphere of influence of which Valona is the centre; 
provided, also, that adequate guarantees be furnished against any 
operations and the establishment of other Powers in Albania — an 
eventuality equally menacing for the political and maritime interests 
of Austria-Hungary and Italy. 

This represents the outlines of a basis for negotiations and 
could be worked out in the course of the discussions with such 
modifications as might be proposed, and which might be made 
acceptable to both sides. 



No. 159. 
Baron MaccMo to Baron Burian. 

(Telegram.) Rome, April 28, 1915. 

I informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs confidentially and 
without delay of Count Goluchowski's possible visit to Rome, accord- 
ing to my instructions. 

Baron Sonnino will, of course, gladly receive him; yet, I easily 
discerned some suspicion on the part of the Minister, that this 
proposal may mean another delay. 

He expressed the view that special missions, as a rule, have 
little value. Thereupon I endeavoured to explain that Count Golu- 
chowski would arrive here without delay. I emphasised the great 
advantage that might accrue from a conversation with a personage 
who is not dependent upon written instructions, as I am, but who 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 287 

has conducted our foreign policy for so many years, and who is 
more fully acquainted with your intentions and ideas by means of 
recent and detailed discussions with you. 

Baron Sonnino seemed gradually to realise the force of my rep- 
resentations. 



No. 160. 
Baron MaccJtio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, April 28, 1915. 

Sgr. Tittoni arrived here yesterday and had long interview with 
Baron Sonnino and was received by the King. 

I understand that Tittoni in behalf of France made many prom- 
ises of no specific nature. In return for these he demanded an 
Italian army for assistance in France. It is said that France has 
offered Djibuti, a part of Tunisia and a rectification of the border 
in the Depart ement des Alpes Maritimes — all within her own terri- 
tories — besides several offers at the expense of others. Only the 
latter constitute new offers, as the cessions in Africa are said to have 
been offered some time ago. 



No. 161. 
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 29, 1915. 

You reported by telegram of the 28th that Baron Sonnino would, 
of course, gladly receive Count Goluchowski and that the Italian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed himself on that occasion as 
being sceptical as to the value of special missions. 

To-day the Duke of Avarna informed me in conformity with 
a telegram from Baron Sonnino, that the latter had no particular 
reason against receiving Count Goluchowski, but that he failed to 
see what good it would do to use a third mediator, in view of the 
good relations existing between me and the Italian Ambassador here, 
as well as between himself and you. 



288 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

In view of this information from the Duke of Avarna, the tone 
of which somehow differs from your report, I request you to ask 
Baron Sonnino confidentially to tell you quite frankly whether 
Count Goluchowski's visit to Rome would appear to him agreeable 
or undesirable. 

At the same time you will once more explain that in sending 
Count Goluehowski I would be chiefly guided by the desire to offer 
to the Italian Government a new proof of my friendly intentions 
and of my earnest wish to reach an understanding with Italy. 



No. 162. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Borne, April 30, 1915. 

All my information and observation lead to the conclusion that 
the negotiations with the Entente Powers are conducted now at a 
feverish pace. The initiative is not, in all probability, emanating 
from the ever undecided Baron Sonnino. M. Barrere visits him 
daily. Constantly the same offers are mentioned to me, including 
a more important cession in Tunisia, if Alsace-Lorraine should become 
French. The French offer concerning the rectification of the border 
near Ventimiglia is said to comprise only a few square kilometers 
of territory. 

British Ambassador is said to offer loan of two billions, at low 
rate, also realisation of Italian aspirations in Asia Minor and the 
Dodecanesos, and the discontinuance of Senussi movement. 

I believe the Italian Government is availing itself of the double 
negotiations primarily to exert pressure on either side in order to 
increase bids as much as possible while reserving its own decision. 

It is not likely that # the tension which the Government has cre- 
ated upon the public mind by the secret mobilisation, may be kept 
up much longer without leading to an explosion in one way or the 
other. 

Cadorna's entourage is exploiting the view that war against 
Austria-Hungary must be waged now, as it is unavoidable in any 
event. 

A voluntary cession, it is pointed out, would soon bring in its 
wake a war of "revanche"; Italy would then stand alone, while she 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN BED BOOK (NO. 2) 289 

can now rely on the assistance of the Entente. I also hear from 
well-informed quarters that the present military Attache in Vienna 
represents the situation in Austria-Hungary to be such that the war 
would merely be a military excursion; this, of course, is like pour- 
ing oil on the fire and consequently favours Cadorna's policy. 

Considering that Italy's ambitious monomania has swelled to ex- 
treme proportions in consequence of the courting she receives from 
all sides, such military self-deception finds most fertile soil and the 
influence of the General Staff is ominous. 



No. 163. 
Baron MaccJiio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 1, 1915. 

I addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs the alternative 
question concerning Count Goluchowski 's visit according to your 
telegram of the 29th instant. He replied that Count Goluchowski 's 
mission seemed to him inopportune at this moment and therefore 
could hardly be of any use. 

In addition to the reasons given by the Duke of Avarna, Baron 
Sonnino also expressed his apprehension that Count Goluchowski 's 
presence here, which could not be concealed, might create an unde- 
sirable sensation and give rise to all kinds of comments. 

The Minister was pleased with the message contained in the 
last paragraph of your telegram. Lastly, he requested that you 
inform him of your decision in this matter. 



No. 164. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 1, 1915. 

In my conference with Baron Sonnino to-day the conversation 
led up to the reply he had received from you last night. 

In reply to the Minister's remark that the answer was certainly 
more detailed but scarcely contained anything new, I pointed to 



290 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

the last sentences in lines 2 and 5, as well as to the decided approach 
toward the Italian point of view contained in the clause which refers 
to Albania. I pointed out that every sentence breathed our sincere 
effort to come to a lasting and complete understanding. At the 
same time, I suggested, he would surely admit the validity of the 
Austro-Hungarian standpoint as to the vital questions involved, 
after the conclusive proof we had proffered. 

I presumed that he would find in it sufficient ground for further 
discussions. Baron Sonnino replied that he would have to examine 
the question in detail with Sgr. Salandra and the ministry (should 
probably read: General Staff). 

Then he complained of the restricted position into which the 
Government here had been placed by the general crisis and by 
internal difficulties and tendencies, and observed that our opinions 
were still far asunder. 

I observed that negotiations as a rule make good progress only 
when both parties make concessions, and I had not noticed any step 
in that direction on the part of Italy up to this time. Baron Sonnino 
replied that the Italian demands in any case were very small, and 
that it would be difficult to curtail them. 

I indicated my surprise at this view and retorted that in this 
case there could hardly be a question of negotiations but rather of 
dictation on Italy's part, which was not apt to advance matters. 

The Minister declared this to be incorrect, without, however, 
losing his temper, and subsequently resumed his habitual taciturnity. 



No. 165. 

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 2, 1915. 

Please inform Baron Sonnino that, in consideration of his 
views, I shall refrain, for the time being, from sending Count 
Goluchowski to Rome. Yet, I reserve the privilege of reverting 
to the matter at an opportune moment. You may also suggest that 
I had all the more reason to expect that Baron Sonnino would 
accept my proposal, as he had recently come into touch with the 
former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Hanotaux, during 
that gentleman's visit to Rome. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 291 

No. 166. 
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 2, 1915. 

I consider it highly important that you should maintain the nego- 
tiations with the Italian Government in their full vigour and to that 
end you will not only enter into the minute details of each Italian 
demand but will also discuss the political situation that may result 
therefrom. Should Baron Sonnino show a disposition to confine 
himself once more to short utterances, you might stimulate the 
conversation by pointing out our repeated and detailed explana- 
tions and arguments, and in return urge that, in the name of fair- 
ness, an effort be made on the part of Italy to explain and justify 
her standpoint and her demands. 

Among the subjects which would especially lend themselves to 
thorough discussion, the Albanian question certainly stands to the 
fore. In connexion with this matter, you could point to the fact 
that not only do we not protest against the Italian occupation of 
Valona, but would even be prepared to cede to Italy an additional 
sphere of interest, with Valona as its centre. This alone constitutes 
a far-reaching concession. As to our objection to declaring a com- 
plete disinterestedness in Albania on the part of Austria-Hungary, 
we are impelled by the consideration that we could not be indif- 
ferent to the fate of a territory so close to our Adriatic dominion. 

This question, and possibly the creation of spheres of influence 
in Albania, may be the subject of a discussion with the Italian 
Government in which I am always ready to participate and which 
could prove advantageous to both parties. 

In your conversations with the Italian statesmen you should 
make a particular effort to find out what degree of importance is 
attached to the cession of territory on the Isonzo among the various 
Italian demands. 

It would be of importance to me to know whether special im- 
portance is attached in Rome to that demand, inasmuch as con- 
cessions on that point may help to eliminate the other difficulties and 
thereby facilitate the agreement with Italy. 

Should you reach the conclusion that such is the case, you will 
tell the Italian Minister, on your own responsibility, that you will 
enquire in Vienna and ascertain whether we would feel inclined to 



292 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

bring about an understanding with. Italy by a concession on this 
point. 



No. 167. 
Baron MaccMo to Baron Burian. 

(Telegram.) Borne, May 2, 1915. 

The Chamber of Deputies is to meet on May 12, but only for 
the purpose of a vote of confidence in the Government. It is 
believed that Sgr. Giolitti has no intention to take advantage of this 
occasion to cause any difficulties to the Government in the Chamber 
of Deputies. 

In order to win public opinion, which is three-quarters opposed 
to war, it is necessary for the Government to foster the belief, under 
cover of the promise to keep the negotiations secret, that we are 
offering nothing or so little that war is imposed upon the Govern- 
ment as the only means of attaining the justified aspirations. 

The negotiations, therefore, are serving no other purpose than 
to put things off until the most suitable moment shall come for Italy 
to show her cards. 

In political circles the opinion prevails that only an authentic 
publication of what we are prepared to cede to Italy, could create 
such an impression as would be likely to frustrate the designs of the 
Government. It certainly would be difficult to determine when 
we might consider ourselves absolved from the promise of secrecy; 
we must, also, consider the fact that the time may come when such 
publication may be made in Vienna, but would no longer find its 
way into the Italian press. 



No. 168. 
Baron MaccMo to Baron Burian. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 3, 1915. 

From my telegram of yesterday, you will have concluded that 
I consider the situation very grave and that the beginning of the 
crisis is imminent. 

Since then, I have learned from reliable source that the nego- 



THE AUSTRQ-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 293 

tiations with, the Entente have practically reached maturity and are 
ready to be closed. 

If it be a fact that all competent quarters have already accepted 
Cadorna's conception — a preventive war — the conclusion of an 
agreement can no longer be thought of. 

Yet, it is possible that the Government has not yet come to a 
definite decision, and we should leave nothing undone in an attempt 
to reach an understanding at the last moment. In this connexion, 
Baron Sonnino's character, which I have so often analysed, deserves 
particular consideration. On account of his very suspicious nature 
his first thought is always a presumption that we wish to dupe him 
and Italy, as I often have had occasion to state. Therefore the 
idea of "revanche" has easy access to his mind. His mental state 
is aggravated by the great advances made to him by the Entente. 
As soon as he definitely loses his last grain of faith in our earnest 
intentions, he will sign the agreement with the other side. To my 
mind there is no hope of success in promising small concessions step 
by step. We should try to attain as quickly as possible at least 
the basis for an accomplished fact. 

To this end it will be necessary for us to offer something in 
the region of the so-called vital interests ; I here refer to the Isonzo, 
in regard to which I deduce from your telegram of yesterday a 
certain receptiveness on your part; then to Trieste, where some 
assurances might perhaps be given with regard to the extension of 
the municipal autonomy, after the style of the self-government of 
Hamburg, and possibly including the establishment of a Faculty of 
Laws. 

With reference to Albania, an agreement will hardly be difficult ; 
the Dalmatian Islands being in my opinion the most difficult point. 

With respect to carrying out of our pledges, some effective 
guarantee in addition to the guarantees of the two governments and 
of the mixed commission should be offered. 

My appointment with Baron Sonnino to-day was deferred by 
his unexpected summons to the King; I shall see him to-morrow 
morning and will make every effort to induce him to state definitely, 
clause by clause, what settlement really would be accepted here as 
satisfactory ; in other words, in what way the Italian demands might 
be drawn closer to the Vienna offer. 

My suggestions mean another attempt; but, as I said before, 
in my judgment of the situation and of the personalities involved, 
it is the only one that might still lead to the goal. 



294 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 

No. 169. 
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 4, 1915. 

Referring to your yesterday's telegram. 

"With reference to the cession on the Isonzo you may concede 
a boundary beginning at the coast near the mouth of the Isonzo 
(Sdobba), following the course of the river upward to a point 
north of Gradisca (leaving this city to Italy) , and running thence in 
a northwesterly direction to Medea on the Judrio, which would rep- 
resent the border line from this point. 

In respect to Trieste, you may express our willingness to con- 
cede in principle the establishment of a university, inasmuch as 
this would correspond with the wishes of the population; also to 
submit the municipal statute to a revision by which the national and 
cultural existence of the Italian-speaking population would be safe- 
guarded. 

As to Albania, our disinterestedness may be declared in the case 
of extreme necessity, with the reservation that guarantees must be 
provided against the establishment there of a third power. 

With reference to the Italian demand for immediate occupa- 
tion of the ceded territories, you may, in addition to the guarantee 
of Germany and the mixed commissions, mention the possibility of 
a manifesto which would remove every doubt as to the execution of 
the territorial cession. 

I request you to make use of this maximum of concessions as 
soon as possible. 



No. 170. 

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 4, 1915. 

Under instructions from his Government, the Italian Ambas- 
sador has communicated to me the following note, and has handed 
me a copy of it. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 295 



(Translation from the French.) 

The Ambassador of His Majesty the King of Italy has been 
instructed by his Government to make the following communication 
to his Excellency, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
and to hand him a copy of it. 

The alliance between Italy and Austria-Hungary proved itself, 
from the beginning, an element and a guarantee of peace and was 
directed primarily to the principal end of mutual defence. In view 
of later events, and of the new situations which resulted therefrom, 
the Governments of the two countries were obliged to seek another 
aim no less essential, and in the course of successive renewals of 
the treaty they addressed themselves to safeguarding the continuity 
of their alliance by stipulating the principle of previous agreements 
regarding the Balkans, to the end of conciliating the divergent inter- 
ests and tendencies of the two Powers. 

It is absolutely clear that the loyal observance of these stipula- 
tions would have sufficed to furnish a solid basis for common and 
effective action. 

On the contrary, Austria-Hungary, during the Summer of 1914, 
without any agreement with Italy, without even letting her have 
the slightest notification of her intentions, and without taking into 
account the counsels of moderation which were addressed to her 
by the Italian Government, addressed to Servia on the 23rd of July 
the ultimatum which was the cause and the starting point of the 
present European conflagration. 

Austria-Hungary, in ignoring the obligations existing under the 
treaty, profoundly disturbed the status quo in the Balkans, and 
created a situation from which she alone was destined to profit, 
to the disadvantage of interests of the greatest importance, which 
her ally had many times affirmed and proclaimed. So flagrant a 
violation of the letter and the spirit of the treaty, not only justified 
the refusal of Italy to place herself on the side of her allies in a 
war provoked without her knowledge, but at the same time deprived 
the alliance of its essential meaning and of its reason for existing. 

Even the pact of benevolent neutrality provided for by the 
treaty was affected by this violation. Eeason and sentiment alike 
are repugnant to the view that benevolent neutrality can be main- 
tained when one of the allies takes up arms for the realisation 
of a programme diametrically opposed to the vital interests of the 



296 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

other ally, interests the safeguarding of which constituted the prin- 
cipal reason of the alliance itself. 

Notwithstanding this, Italy has endeavoured for several months 
to create a situation favourable to the reestablishment between 
the two states of those friendly relations which constitute the 
essential foundation of all cooperation in the domain of general 
politics. 

To this end, and with this hope, the Italian Government was 
disposed to enter upon an understanding having as its basis the 
satisfaction in an equitable manner of the legitimate national aspira- 
tions of Italy, and which would have served at the same time to 
reduce the existing inequality in the reciprocal situation of the two 
states in the Adriatic. 

Nevertheless, these negotiations did not lead to any appreciable 
result. 

All the efforts of the Italian Government encountered the resist- 
ance of the Austro-Hungarian Government, which, after several 
months, decided only to acknowledge the special interests of Italy 
in Valona and to promise an insufficient concession of territories in 
the Trentino — a concession which cannot be considered a normal 
settlement of the situation, either from the ethnical, political, or 
military point of view. 

Furthermore, this concession was to be put into effect only at 
the end of an indeterminate period, that is, only at the end of the 
war. 

In this state of affairs, the Italian Government must renounce 
the hope of reaching an agreement, and sees itself constrained to 
withdraw all its propositions for an accord. 

It is equally useless to keep up an appearance of formal alliance, 
which would only help to disguise the existence of a continuous 
distrust and of daily disagreements. 

Accordingly Italy, confident in her good right, affirms and pro- 
claims that from this moment she resumes her entire freedom of 
action, and declares her treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary 
to be void and henceforth of no effect. 

I expressed to the Ambassador my perplexity at this manifesta- 
tion, which does not seem to me justified, especially at a moment 
when we are in the midst of negotiations which we on our part 
have conducted in the most friendly and conciliatory spirit. I 
declared to the Duke of Avarna that I henceforth declined all 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 297 

responsibility for the consequences which might result from the 
situation created by Baron Sonnino 's step. 



No. 171. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Burian. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 4, 1915. 

I had a conversation with Baron Sonnino to-day lasting one 
hour and a half. By way of an introductory remark, I said I felt 
convinced of the possibility of reaching an understanding between 
the two countries which are so dependent upon each other ; especially 
so, as the Italian Government itself had so often, and only recently, 
expressed the desire to attain that end. I added that I not only 
presumed, but knew for certain, that my Government too is guided 
by this sincere desire. The Minister then surprised me with the 
remark that he had entertained the same wish, but had scarcely any 
hope left on account of the dilatory policy of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government and that he had therefore telegraphed yesterday to the 
Duke of Avarna in this sense, with the addition that in view of 
the vague replies from Vienna he could offer no more proposals 
and withdrew those he had hitherto advanced. 

I then tried to impress upon Baron Sonnino the enormous respon- 
sibility which a breach would involve and denounced, as a chimera, 
the idea of an Austro-Hungarian revanche, as propagated here; 
war was more likely to breed such a tendency, which would logi- 
cally be out of the question in the event of an agreement. The 
Austro-Hungarian Government had accepted the Italian basis for 
negotiations for the very purpose of creating a sound relation of 
friendship for the future. 

The Minister was disposed to admit that your propositions were 
showing some improvement, but these also were couched in general 
phrases, which invariably gave them the appearance of precarious 
prospects for the future instead of affording a practical basis for 
an agreement. After five months of discussion hardly any progress 
had been achieved, and he could not escape the impression that the 
matter would once more be involved in delays. I specified the 
reasons on both sides which had hampered the negotiations. I gave 
him to understand that it was time to be more precise, and asked 



298 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

him to convince himself that a greater approachment has taken 
place than he wished to admit, by recapitulating all the points in 
question. 

First of all I explained the Trentino boundary, which you had 
suggested, and I used maps and arguments to carry my point. The 
Minister observed that an agreement may be reached on this point. 
With respect to the Isonzo, I declared that I could take it upon 
myself to induce my Government to grant some further concession 
despite the serious objections which had hitherto existed. A more 
detailed discussion ensued on the subject of Trieste. He holds that 
his aim of suppressing irredentism could solely be attained by his 
scheme of a free state which should cooperate commercially with 
the Austrian hinterland, as it would otherwise be unable to exist. 
Trieste would then have no reason for drawing further toward 
Italy. I made use of all conceivable arguments to demonstrate the 
indispensability of Trieste for the Monarchy and the inability of 
a state thus created to exist. He admitted that the main object was 
to secure incontestably the national independence of the people of 
Trieste, and that this was considered here as indispensable. I 
pointed to the phrase in your last reply which expresses your readi- 
ness for further discussion. Baron Sonnino remarked that he could 
not conceive what arrangement might be devised which would pre- 
vent subsequent encroachments upon the administration of Trieste, 
upon its educational and other matters. He failed to see what pro- 
posal he could proffer, but would be glad to consider any suggestion 
Vienna could make, provided that it deserved consideration. 

Nevertheless, I obtained the impression in this matter that a 
course similar to the one suggested by us would be feasible and 
that the creation of a free state would not be insisted upon here. 

We then talked of Albania. The Minister admitted that we 
had made advances, but said that he looked upon the disinterested- 
ness of the Dual Monarchy in Albania as a counterbalance to the 
free hand which Italy was to grant us in the other parts of the 
Balkans. 

Even so, it appeared to him necessary to define more precisely 
the advances you had suggested, in order to formulate the integral 
parts of Italy's desires, many of the details of which may be reserved 
for a separate agreement. 

The question of islands, now as before, proved to be only strateg- 
ical. After having enlarged on the well-defined respective stand- 
points, I asked the Minister whether he thought it justifiable to 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 299 

jeopardise the conclusion of the agreement on account of a single 
question, although ,an understanding could be reached on all other 
points. With greater emphasis than ever he then defended his pet 
idea, namely, the time of putting our cessions into execution. 

He declines to see in the mixed commissions anything more 
than merely advisory bodies, which could decide nothing and there- 
fore could have no value whatever. He particularly enlarged with 
much verbiage on his topic that all the gilt may be taken from the 
accord by the continuous stirring up of animosity by the anti-Austro- 
Hungarian agitators — an agitation which would last to the very 
end of the war, possibly for many months after its conclusion. 

The retention at the front of soldiers who in virtue of the 
agreement would have become Italian subjects, every punishment 
of such soldiers, every case of desertion and numerous other imagi- 
nable incidents, would operate to prevent the subsidence of the 
existing hatred. Thus the purpose of the new agreement would be 
jeopardised in advance. He readily admitted the difficulties of 
the question; but here too, he thought, means should be found to 
carry out the cession in the same way as means exist for the 
cession of territories which have been occupied by an enemy during 
a war, and have not subsequently been evacuated. I need not 
mention that on this point also I employed all available arguments 
for the defence of our position. 

Nevertheless, Baron Sonnino announced his willingness to con- 
sider any new proposals you may proffer, if they are specific, and 
to submit them to the Cabinet, provided that they would not be 
such as to give rise to protracted interpretation; he, on his part, 
had no further proposals to make. 

The situation, he added, is such that it is necessary to acquaint 
the Cabinet with the progress of these negotiations, which can no 
longer be delayed in view of the public being in so high a state of 
tension. 

I do not entertain any illusions; the situation has become still 
more unfavourable by the withdrawal of the Italian propositions, as 
it leaves the Italian Government a perfectly free hand in dealing 
with our new proposals. On the other hand I have gained the 
impression that the agreement with the Entente, though not yet 
perfected, may be signed by the Italian Government at any time. 

If we are anxious to make another and final attempt to come 
to an understanding, only quick action in drafting new and suffi- 
ciently extensive proposals can serve the purpose. Considering 



300 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Baron Sonnino 's character and temperament, any new suspicion in 
his mind would inevitably put an immediate stop to the negotiations. 



No. 172. 

Baron Buridn to Baron MaccMo. 

(Telegram.) "Vienna, May 5, 1915. 

I approve the position you have taken in your conference with 
Baron Sonnino as reported in your telegram of yesterday. Accord- 
ingly I inform you of the furthest limits of our concessions: 

1) Trentino: 

Baron Sonnino 's statement that an understanding on this point 
might well be possible, indicates that Italy does not consider an 
extension of our concessions as hitherto proposed as a condition 
sine qua non for the conclusion of the agreement. 

2) Isonzo district: 

Concerning this point you already have been authorised by my 
telegram of yesterday to make a concession which represents to us 
a considerable sacrifice. 

3) Trieste: 

"While emphasising once more, that Trieste is a sovereign city 
and enjoys a far-reaching municipal and provincial autonomy — 
the municipal council being vested with the functions of a provincial 
diet — the establishment of a university and the revision of the 
municipal regulations for the purpose of safeguarding the Italian 
character of the city may be promised. 

4) Albania : 

Renouncing all reservations and restrictions, we are ready to 
declare our complete disinterestedness in Albania. 

5) Immediate occupation of the ceded territories. 

The physical impossibility of this demand should be demon- 
strated once more by the basic arguments which we have hitherto 
employed. Baron Sonnino 's contention that territories occupied by 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGAKIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 301 

the enemy in war and subsequently not being evacuated may yet 
eventually be receded, may be met with the statement that this 
method of solving the problem would be one-sided, compulsory and 
catastrophic, but certainly not peaceful and friendly, such as he 
and I had intended it to be in the course of our negotiations. 

The Italian Minister's tendency to minimise the importance of 
the mixed commissions, should be opposed with the arguments that 
the activities of these commissions would not be of a merely advisory 
scope but that their work would mean the beginning of the execu- 
tion of the cession; that these commissions would have authority to 
reach decisions, subject only to sanction by the Government, a 
sanction which can hardly be questioned. In addition to the solemn 
declaration of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and to the guar- 
antee by the German Government, as well as to the operations of 
those commissions, another proof may be given of our honest and 
earnest intention to fulfil our obligations after the conclusion of 
peace, by our promise not to engage at the front any persons belong- 
ing to the ceded territories, once the agreement with Italy has been 
perfected. 

I request you to communicate the above concessions to Baron 
Sonnino as soon as possible. They are, of course, conditional upon 
the fulfilment of the Italian obligation (neutrality until the end of 
the war, consent to our freedom of action in the Balkans, with the 
exception of Albania, in conformity with the project previously 
agreed upon, discharge of financial liabilities and indemnification). 
You will endeavour to convey to the Italian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs the impression, amply borne out by the actual facts, that 
our concessions come very close to the realisation of his demands 
in their entirety, both as to individual points and collectively. 
Should Baron Sonnino appear inclined to conclude an agreement 
based on the above-mentioned points, you are authorised to pro- 
ceed with the Italian Foreign Minister to the drafting of the text 
of the agreement — possibly in conjunction with Prince Billow. 

If Baron Sonnino should lay particular stress upon some spe- 
cific demand, while otherwise indicative of a perceptible inclination 
to reach an understanding, or else should introduce new or some- 
what modified demands, you will note them ad referendum and 
report them to me by telegram. 



302 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 173. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Burian. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 5, 1915. 

As a result of the tearing up of the treaty of Triple Alliance, 
which Baron Sonnino had not mentioned to me, a critical moment 
seems to have arisen. After the Ministry had induced the King 
to promise to attend the Quarto festival, the whole country has 
been plunged into feverish excitement by the sudden withdrawal 
of his acceptance, which was accompanied by the announcement 
that neither King nor Government could leave Rome even for two 
days, in view of the gravity of the moment. 

The Ministry realises that this awkward proceeding has weak- 
ened its position and is now apparently trying to precipitate a 
decision and possibly to confront the coming man (Giolitti) with 
an accomplished fact. Salandra and Baron Sonnino are striving 
to achieve a great success or else make their fall brilliant. 

In the very next days, therefore, the decision must come; it 
is possible that the situation can still be saved by making immediate 
and most extensive concessions, and especially by submitting our 
offers in definite form, adapted to the prompt conclusion of an 
agreement. 



No. 174. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Burian. 

(Telegram.) Borne, May 6, 1915. 

I employed the contents of your telegram of yesterday in my 
conversation with Baron Sonnino to-day. 

I conveyed to the Minister our concessions in detail, and en- 
deavoured particularly to emphasise the newly added points, in 
conformity with your wishes. I recapitulated also the counter- 
obligations expected from Italy and reiterated the belief of the Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Government that its present propositions satisfy many 
of Italy's former contentions and that they come as close as pos- 
sible to meeting her demands in their entirety. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGAKIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 303 

Baron Sonnino noted minutely all my propositions and obser- 
vations and made the following remarks: 

The last phase of the negotiations is terminated by the with- 
drawal of the former Italian demands and by the cancellation by 
Italy of the treaty of Triple Alliance in Vienna. Italy has resumed 
complete freedom of action. He particularly mentioned that the 
linguistic boundary in Trentino still excludes the three aforemen- 
tioned valleys, that the proposed change of frontier along the 
Isonzo is insufficient and that the revision of the municipal statute 
of Trieste was likely to be rendered ineffective at any moment by 
the dissolution of the municipal council and by the appointing of 
a Governmental Commissioner, a proceeding which is not unusual in 
political life. With respect to the time of putting the cessions in 
effect, the Minister still retains his former scruples. He did not 
refer to the question of the islands; neither, of course, did I. 

Baron Sonnino promised to submit the propositions I had prof- 
fered to the council of ministers for their approval, and to obtain 
its opinion thereon. Asked if he had any special and modified 
wishes, he answered in the negative. I can explain this non-com- 
mittal attitude by the assumption that he is now entrenching himself 
entirely behind the decisions of the Cabinet. With the object of 
attempting once more to disarm his notorious distrust, I again pointed 
out that you had authorised me to proceed immediately to the draft- 
ing of the text of the agreement, if the present concessions should 
be accepted as a basis thereto, and laid stress upon the fact that 
this represented a new proof of the Austro-Hungarian Government's 
firm desire for a speedy understanding. Baron Sonnino noted this 
remark as well, for reference at the council of ministers. 

I immediately communicated the gist of the above-mentioned 
conversation to Prince Billow. The main point gained is that the 
negotiations are not suspended and that time is gained by the refer- 
ence of the matter to the council of ministers. On the other hand, 
the rejection of our terms by the latter body would create a dead- 
lock. My German colleague, who has been authorised to offer Ger- 
many's mediation in the event that direct negotiations can not be 
continued, will announce this to Baron Sonnino this afternoon and 
hopes by that means to tide over these critical days. 



304 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 175. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Bv/rian. 

(Telegram.) Borne, May 6, 1915. 

It may be expected almost with certainty that the council of 
ministers will reject the propositions I communicated to Baron 
Sonnino to-day as insufficient to justify new negotiations with Aus- 
tria-Hungary. 

If, therefore, the imminent conclusion of the agreement with 
the Triple Entente — which means war — is to be averted at this 
last moment, the assent in principle to Baron Sonnino 's original 
demands as a basis of negotiations would appear to me the only 
means of accomplishing that end. By that means we would gain 
more time. 

If you desire that this experiment be made, I ask for authority 
to communicate this to Baron Sonnino in case of extreme necessity. 



No. 176. 

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 9, 1915. 

In our negotiations with Italy there has been a dominant sus- 
picion at Rome that we would offer far-reaching concessions solely 
under the present pressure of events, but with the mental reserva- 
tion to ignore them as soon as the occasion should present itself. 
A means which may possibly serve to dispel this distrust, may be 
found in the declaration to Italy of our own and Germany's will- 
ingness to inaugurate a new and closer political relation with her, 
at any time and independently of the object of the present negotia- 
tions. The German Government has offered to approach the Italian 
Government in this direction. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 305 

No. 177. 

Baron Burian to Baron MaccMo. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 10, 1915. 

In your next conversation with Baron Sonnino yon must keep 
in mind, and be guided by the necessity of making the most strenu- 
ous effort to prevent a suspension of the negotiations with Italy. 

If Baron Sonnino in no way agrees with our last offer, and, 
of his own accord neither reverts to former demands nor brings 
forth any new ones, but confines himself to the rejection of our 
proposals, you may advance the proposal suggested in your tele- 
gram of May 6th, namely, the acceptance in principle of Italy's 
former propositions as a basis for negotiations with the suggestion 
that still further concessions might be made on one point or another. 

In the following I give you the extreme limit of concessions 
which we might still consider. You are authorised even to draft 
the text of a preliminary agreement on this basis: 

1) Southern Tyrol: 

On this point the Italian Government seems to be more or less 
satisfied with our offer. 

2) Isonzo: 

An extension of the concessions, as hitherto made, to wit : Along 
the western bank of the Isonzo to a point on the boundary between 
the German and Italian speaking population; consequently, includ- 
ing the cession of Carmons. 

3) Trieste: 

The granting of a title, such as "Free City," may be considered. 

4) Islands: 

Pelagosa may be ceded in consideration of its proximity to the 
Italian coast. 

5) The putting into execution: 

The suggested division of points may be effected on any rea- 
sonable basis and the execution of the proposals affecting Albania, 
Trieste and Pelagosa may be made immediate. 



306 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 178. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 10, 1915. 

It appears that the King as well as most of the members of 
the Cabinet have been systematically misinformed by Baron Sonnino, 
both as to our concessions and as to the state of feeling in the 
country. I have heard in particular that the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs made a very incomplete report to the council of ministers 
concerning my explicit communication (see my telegram dated May 
6), although he had written them down, had read them to me and 
then had promised expressly to submit them to the council of min- 
isters. For instance, he omitted mention of the concession in regard 
to the time of putting the cessions into effect. 

For the purpose of enlightening the influential personages, of 
whom some at least are friendly disposed to the Triple Alliance, 
although they may be influenced by the general distrust, it now 
seemed necessary to furnish them immediately with a list of the 
Austro-Hungarian concessions, authenticated by Prince Billow and 
myself. In this manner it might be possible to block the political 
intrigues of Salandra, Sonnino and Martini. This list had to be 
supplemented so as to leave a margin for further concessions in 
the spirit of the original Italian demands. 

After having drafted the following document with the German 
Ambassador's assistance, I assumed, in view of the urgency of the 
situation, the responsibility of signing it jointly with Prince Billow 
and to submit it to Sgr. Salandra, Baron Sonnino and other political 
personages. 

(Translation from the French.) 

Austria-Hungary is willing to make the following concessions 
to Italy: 

1) The entire Tyrol of Italian nationality. 

2) The entire western bank of the Isonzo of Italian nation- 
ality, including Gradisca. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 307 

3) Complete municipal autonomy, Italian university, a free port 
in Trieste, which will be a free city. 

4) Valona. 

5) Complete disinterestedness of Austria-Hungary in Albania. 

6) Guarantee for the national interests of Italian inhabitants 
of Austria-Hungary. 

7) Amicable examination of demands which Italy may yet pro- 
pose in connexion with the entirety of the questions which form the 
object of the negotiations (especially Goricia and the Islands). 

8) Germany assumes full responsibility for the correct and 
faithful execution of the agreement to be concluded between Austria- 
Hungary and Italy. 

The Ambassador of Austria-Hungary and the Ambassador of 
Germany guarantee the authenticity of the above-mentioned propo- 
sitions. 

From the drafting of Article III you will see that the idea of 
granting a suitable title to the city of Trieste has been taken under 
consideration. Moreover, Articles VI and VII are drafted in a man- 
ner suggesting our willingness to give further consideration to Italy's 
wishes. 



No. 179. 

Baron Buridn to Baron Maccliio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 10, 1915. 

Have just received your telegram of to-day. 

Under the present conditions you will adhere to the following 
points whenever you discuss this list of concessions: 

1) Southern Tyrol. Apart from the fact that the Italian Gov- 
ernment does not seem to insist absolutely upon an extension of 
our concession concerning the Trentino, the proposition referred 
to could not include the valleys of Ampezzo and Fassa, both of 



308 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

which, are Ladinian, nor that part of the Val di Noce, the possession 
of which we could not relinquish for vital strategical reasons. 

2) Isonzo. Concession may be made in conformity with my 
previous telegram of to-day. 

3) Trieste. It must be noted that we have by no means con- 
sidered making Trieste a free port, and that there has been only 
a question of conferring upon it the title of a "Free City," but 
not the functions of such a municipality. 

6) Position of citizens of Italian nationality. This concession, 
under which the wording of a definite agreement might prove ex- 
tremely precarious, should at all events be considerably modified. 



No. 180. 
Baron MaccMo to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 12, 1915. 

Meanwhile I do not propose calling on Baron Sonnino. Dis- 
sensions among the Ministers and a gradually dwindling confidence 
in his foreign policy in certain parliamentary circles, can no longer 
be concealed from him and he feels the ground tottering under him. 
He is accordingly in a precarious frame of mind and may in his 
stubbornness contemplate some desperate move which might be pre- 
cipitated by my calling. Besides, he, as well as Sgr. Salandra, is in 
possession of the propositions signed by Prince Billow and myself; 
and it is therefore left to his discretion to reply or not. 

Should he reject them, either here or in Vienna, there would 
still be left a resort to your telegram of the 10th instant, and the 
proposal of the original Italian demands as a basis for negotiations, 
as mentioned therein. 

I may reiterate once more my last report by saying that there 
is no further doubt as to Baron Sonnino J s disloyal intention to make 
war in any event. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGABIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 309 

No. 181. 
Baron Buridn to Baron MaccMo. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 13, 1915. 

I agree with your decision not to call on the Italian Minister for 
the time being. 

Should he in the further course of events reject the list of 
concessions referred to as inadequate, you will merely take note 
of his action and proffer no further proposal until you receive new 
instructions. 

I also must draw your attention to the fact that naturally all 
our concessions are conditional upon the full observance of the 
counter-obligations assumed by Italy. 



No. 182. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 13, 1915. 

Council of Ministers was in session all day yesterday, and con- 
siderable differences of opinion seem to have developed. I shall 
report on the subject as soon as I receive reliable information. 

Baron Sonnino positively urges war, but can not at present 
count upon the unanimous support of his colleagues; therefore the 
possibility of various eventualities must be considered. 

The fact that Baron Sonnino will still have the opportunity 
to bring his views before the public by means of the press or in 
parliament, must also be reckoned with. 

My attention has been called from various quarters to the pos- 
sibility that Baron Sonnino may, for instance, in some way or another, 
endeavour to describe the Austro-Hungarian Government's policy 
of deliberation as incompatible with Italy's dignity or else he may 
take the ground that Italy had entered into negotiations solely for 
the sake of complying with our desire, but had repeatedly dropped 
them because the offers of the Austro-Hungarian Government had 
been inadequate. 



310 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 183. 
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 14, 1915. 

With reference to your telegram of yesterday. 

In reply to the assertion that Italy had entered into negotia- 
tions solely in compliance with our desire, you will point out that, 
on the contrary, it was the Italian Government that had already 
initiated the discussions with my predecessor and subsequently with 
me, basing its claims for compensation on Article VII of the treaty 
of Triple Alliance. Should Baron Sonnino also endeavour to prove 
a policy of procrastination on the part of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government, incompatible with Italy's dignity, you will meet this 
charge by saying that the Italian Government on its part had 
declined for a long time to specify its demands. It demanded from 
us the acceptance of the vague, and therefore, doubly precarious, 
basis of negotiations involving the cession of some of our own ter- 
ritories; it had subsequently rejected our successive offers as inade- 
quate and had only at a very much later stage of the negotiations, 
and only at our specific request, advanced her own very far-reach- 
ing demands. Baron Sonnino has consequently no cause to reproach 
us with a certain hesitation; his part as demander was infinitely 
easier than ours, considering that we were expected to make sacri- 
fices which were hard to submit to. Besides, Baron Sonnino con- 
tradicts himself if, while qualifying our tactics as procrastinating, 
he states in the same breath that he has himself repeatedly dropped 
the negotiations — a proceeding which could surely not facilitate their 
smooth and speedy progress. 

On the whole you will hardly find it difficult to combat effectively 
any possible animadversions by Baron Sonnino, in an adequate man- 
ner, as you are thoroughly in touch with all the stages and details 
of our negotiations. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 311 

No. 184. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 14, 1915. 

The Agenzia Stefani announces: 

"The constitutional parties having been unable to give their 
undivided support to the trend of the Government's foreign policy 
at a time when the seriousness of the situation makes such support 
imperative, the council of ministers has decided to hand its resig- 
nation to His Majesty.'' 

Seven ministers are said to have taken sides with opposition 
at Cabinet meeting two days ago, and I have been told action is 
imminent and is not likely to be confined to the Chamber of Depu- 
ties; decision is considered all the more desirable as disturbances 
are steadily increasing since the arrival of d'Annunzio. 

Reports are already coming in from all larger cities about dem- 
onstrations by the hired mob, and for two days past Rome has been 
actually as in a state of siege. One-half of the garrison is on duty; 
traffic and freedom of movement are likewise suspended or ham- 
pered by the closing of streets on an extensive scale. The insulting 
of politicians who adhere to the Triple Alliance and similar inci- 
dents are the order of the day. 

The King has not reached a decision yet on the resignations. 
All indications point to a reconstruction of the Cabinet under the 
presidency of Salandra as the most likely solution. 



No. 185. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 15, 1915. 

In my opinion it would be advisable to decide as quickly as 
possible upon the text of an eventual agreement with Italy, so that 
we could, if circumstances permit, approach a new Ministry with 
a ready proposal. Protracted negotiations, or to wait for Italian 
proposals, would mean a change that the distrust, which it has 



312 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

been so difficult to dispel, would break forth again with elementary 
violence and upset everything at the last moment. 

I have therefore drafted the following proposal; which I have 
discussed with Prince Biilow, who has signified his approval: 

(Translation from the French.) 

Inspired by a sincere desire to consolidate the mutual relation 
between Austria-Hungary and Italy, to place them upon a founda- 
tion of absolute good faith, to eliminate every cause of friction 
between them, and to reach a final and lasting understanding, the 
Austro-Hungarian and the Italian Governments have agreed as fol- 
lows : 

Article I. 

In compliance with the wish expressed by Italy to take possession 
of those parts of Tyrol, the inhabitants of which are of Italian 
nationality, Austria-Hungary accepts a new boundary line which 
shall diverge from the present frontier near the Zufallspitze and 
shall follow for a distance the frontier between the districts of 
Cles on the one side and those of Schlanders and Meran on the other, 
i.e., the watershed between the Noce and the Adige as far as the 
Illmen-Spitze. It shall lead to the west of Proveis, so that this 
district shall remain a part of the Austrian Tyrol, and then join 
the Torrente Pescara and follow the latter 's course up to its mouth 
in the Noce. It shall follow the course of the Noce as far as south 
of Tajo, then ascend the Corno di Tres, follow the northern boundary 
of the district of Mezzolombardo and join the Adige to the south 
of Salurn. It shall ascend the Geiersberg, follow the watershed 
between the valleys of the Avisio and the Adige, crossing the Cas- 
tion toward the Nornspitze and Mount Comp. It shall then turn 
southward, describe a semicircle, leaving the district of Altrei in 
the Austrian Tyrol and ascend up to the pass of San Lugano. It 
shall follow the boundary between the districts of Bozen and Cavalese, 
i.e., the watershed between the valley of the Avisio and that of the 
Adige, and extend to Latemar across the Cima di Rocca and the 
Grimm-Joch. From the Carnon pass it shall descend to the Avisio, 
cut across that river between the districts of Moena and Forno and 
ascend again toward the watershed between the valley of San Pelle- 
grino to the north and that of Travignolo to the south. It shall 
rejoin the present boundary to the east of the Cima di Bocche. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN BED BOOK (NO. 2) 313 

Article II. 

Austria-Hungary further agrees to cede to Italy the territories 
on the west bank of the Isonzo, inasmuch as their inhabitants are 
of Italian nationality. 

Starting at the mouth of the Isonzo (Sdobba) the boundary 
shall follow the course of that river upstream beyond the town 
of Gradisca, which will be included in the territory ceded to Italy. 
Above Gradisca it shall depart from the Isonzo and running in a 
northwesterly direction toward Medea follow up to the Judrio a line 
to be drawn in accordance with the nationality of the inhabitants. 
The new boundary shall then follow the course of the Judrio. 

Article III. 

The title "Kaiserliehe Freistadt" shall be conferred on the city 
of Trieste. It will have a university and receive a new municipal 
regulation which, while maintaining its present full autonomy, will 
furnish absolute guarantees that the predominance of the Italian 
element shall not be modified. 

The present zone of the free city will be maintained and, if need 
be, extended. 

Article IV. 

Austria-Hungary recognises Italy's unrestricted sovereignty over 
Valona and its bay, as well as over the sphere of interest surround- 
ing it. 

Article V. 

Austria-Hungary renounces all her interests in the future fate 
of Albania within the boundaries of that country drawn by the 
London Conference. 

Article VI. 

Although after this agreement the subjects of Italian nationality 
in Austria will be considerably diminished, the Austro-Hungarian 
Government will conserve their national interests with special care. 

Article VII. 

All natives of the territories thus ceded to Italy who, for political 
or military reasons, have been condemned or are being prosecuted 
will be set free immediately and a general amnesty will be granted. 



314 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Article VIII. 

Italy undertakes to maintain absolute neutrality toward Austria- 
Hungary and Germany and Turkey as long as this war lasts. 

Article IX. 

For the whole duration of the present war, and also with regard 
to territorial and other advantages which Austria-Hungary might 
derive from the treaty of peace at the conclusion of the war, Italy 
renounces any and every claim to invoke subsequently in her favour 
former stipulations applying to this matter with regard to the 
Balkans, with the exception of Albania. 

Article X. 

Concerning the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesos Islands, 
Austria-Hungary renounces on her side the claim to invoke in her 
favour former stipulations applying to this matter with regard to 
the Balkans. 

Article XI. 

Italy agrees to indemnify all possible claims arising from the 
cession to herself of the above-mentioned territories by the payment 
of one lump sum. A mixed commission shall be appointed to define 
the mode of payment and the amount to be paid; in case of dis- 
agreement the commission will submit the matter to the decision 
of the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague. 

Article XII. 

Mixed commissions shall be appointed in the districts affected 
by this agreement with powers to effect decisions which will be put 
into effect as the work proceeds. The detailed powers of these com- 
missions will be defined in a supplementary protocol. 

Article XIII. 

Military persons born in the territories ceded to Italy shall cease 
serving at the front in the Austro-Hungarian army as soon as the 
agreement shall have been concluded. 

Article XIV. 

The German Empire undertakes to guarantee the faithful and 
loyal execution of this agreement. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 315 

Article XV. 

A solemn declaration shall be issued to the above effect by the 
Austro-Hungarian Government immediately after the agreement will 
have been signed. 

This draft deals only with the questions concerning us and Italy, 
as I do not know if tripartite agreement would be preferred in 
Vienna and Berlin. 

In the latter case the concessions to be granted by Germany 
would have to be added. 

Considering the great importance which is attached here to the 
time and method of putting our cessions into execution, I think 
it indispensable that you should include the respective proposals in 
the agreement, all the more so as Germany's guarantee is already 
provided for in the document signed here previously. 

I considered it important to omit none of the questions which 
appear in that document; though drafted only in general outline, 
it constitutes the basis of our proposals. Article VII of that docu- 
ment has, of course, been omitted; it stipulates only a willingness 
to examine and its text therefore can not be drafted before a dis- 
cussion of the subject. Regarding this discussion, I intend to try 
and offer Carmons instead of Goricia and — if the Italian demand 
concerning the islands is not withdrawn — to remove the difficulties 
by offering Pelagosa; I have so far mentioned neither Carmons nor 
Pelagosa. 

Remarks concerning the draft: 

Article I. 

The new boundary corresponds exactly with your former pro- 
posal; if the Italian Government should revert to the central Noce 
valley, and to the Fassa and Ampezzo valleys, I would object to 
this on the grounds already indicated, and report on the subject. 

Article II. 
This article mentions neither Carmons nor Goricia. 

Article III. 

The title "Kaiserliche Freistadt" implies the same basis of free- 
dom as that of Fiume. The wording of the last paragraph repre- 



316 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

sents an attempt to place the question of the free port within rea- 
sonable limits. 

Article V. 

The expression "future fate" is used to emphasise the purely- 
political character of our renunciation. 

Article VI. 

As some kind of statement in this direction will be insisted upon, 
the proposed wording is the least dangerous of those among which 
we would have to choose. 

Article IX. 

Article VII of the treaty of Triple Alliance has intentionally not 
been referred to, as it is uncertain whether the new Cabinet will con- 
sider the situation from the point of view of the Triple Alliance, 
or from that of a settlement on another basis. The same consider- 
ations apply to Article X. 

Article XII. 

With regard to the execution of the agreement, I think that the 
greatest importance should be attached to giving the mixed com- 
missions as extensive powers as possible, as this would, in my opin- 
ion, best demonstrate our intention to carry out the cession at the 
earliest possible date. The agreement should provide for the imme- 
diate convention of that commission, which would define and lay 
down in writing its programme and its powers. 

The commission's programme ought, I believe, to provide for the 
demarcation of a neutral zone as an initial measure to avert possible 
conflicts. 



No. 186. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 15, 1915. 

More particulars of the game prearranged between the Govern- 
ment and the representatives of the Entente Powers are gradually 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 317 

becoming known. I have previously reported that one is here ap- 
parently at a loss how to construe the casus belli. According to 
information from reliable sources, the moving spirit, the Colonial 
Secretary Martini, who calls every morning on the British Ambas- 
sador for orders, at first proposed to organise an incursion with 
Garibaldian irregulars or with regular troops; Baron Sonnino had 
under consideration a plan to stun Vienna by the issuance of some 
new document as astounding as the recent abrogation of the Alliance, 
or to combine this action with the step proposed by Martini. 

The General Staff having recommended a postponement of the 
decision for a few days, Sgr. Martini suggested, as a first step, the 
cancellation of the treaty of Lausanne on the ground of the alleged 
presence of Turkish officers among the Lybian rebels; he hoped by 
this method to involve the Central Powers in the controversy and 
thus to gain the days required by the General Staff. 

In agreement with the Entente Powers, this day, May 15th, had 
been selected for the decisive step. When these proposals were made, 
the unanimity of the Cabinet had already vanished and the final 
acceptance of the plan was still blocked. 

Though the final break may be inevitable, it has at least been 
postponed. 

Meanwhile the formation of the new Cabinet seems to meet with 
difficulties. 



No. 187. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 15, 1915. 

Information reaches me to-night from several sources that the 
resignation of the Cabinet may not be accepted. The main object 
of the street demonstrations, partly organised, partly favoured by 
the Government in cooperation with the Entente Powers,, is to 
influence and to mislead the King as to the true feelings of the 
country, which are essentially in favour of neutrality. This appar- 
ently has been successfully accomplished, and the King seems to 
accept the explanation that the street demonstrations must be re- 
garded as the preliminaries to a revolution and that the throne can 
only be saved by adhering to the present policy. 



318 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Should this information prove accurate the decision against us 
might be taken as early as to-morrow or on one of the succeeding 
days ; it is true that the Cabinet crisis possibly might be taken advan- 
tage of to reenforce the blackmailing of the Entente Powers with 
a view to extorting the maximum of concessions obtainable from 
that side before a final understanding is reached. 



No. 188. 
Baron Buridn to Baron MaccMo. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 16, 1915. 

I concur in the view that the prompt drafting of an eventual 
agreement with Italy is desirable ; an agreement only between us and 
Italy should be sought, and not a tripartite one. 

I approve on the whole the text proposed by you, and I also 
assent to the endeavour to substitute Carmons for Goricia and to 
offer Pelagosa if the question of the islands is raised, in case Italy 
should insist upon the exemplifications added in parenthesis to para- 
graph 7 in the document drafted on the 10th instant by you and 
your German colleague. 

I communicate to you herewith my comments on the separate 
items of the drafted agreement and the modifications which must 
be made. 

There is no objection to the introduction and to Article I. 

Article II. 

In the first sentence, the following should be added after the 
word "Isonzo": "en tant que la population est purement de nation- 
alite italienne." ("As far as their population is of purely Italian 
nationality.") 

The sketch of the boundary-line in the second paragraph should 
read after the word "Isonzo": "Ensuite elle se tournera au nordouest 
vers Medea et rejoindra le Judrio dont le talweg continuera a former 
la frontiere." ("It will then turn to the northwest toward Medea 
and meet the Judrio, the course of which will continue to be the 
boundary-line.") 



THE AUSTEO-HUNGARIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 319 
Article III. 

In the first sentence "Le titre de ville libre Imperiale' " ("Im- 
perial free city") should take the place of "Le titre ( KaiserlicJie 
Freistadt.' " After the word "actuellement" the second sentence 
should read "assurer a en plus le car act ere it alien de cette ville." 
("Will besides insure the Italian character of that city.") 

The paragraph concerning the free port zone is approved. 

Article IV. 

Inasmuch as Italy has so far not proclaimed her sovereignty 
over Valona, it should read: "L'Autrich,e-Hongrie est prete, en ce 
qui la concerne, a reconnaitre, etc" ("As far as she is concerned, 
Austria-Hungary is prepared to recognise, etc.") 

Article V. 

Should read: " L'AutricJie-Hongrie declare son desinteressement 
politique concernant VAlbanie comprise entre les frontier es traces 
par la Reunion de Londres." ("Austria-Hungary proclaims her 
political disinterestedness with regard to Albania as comprised within 
the borders drawn by the London Convention. ,, ) 

Article VI. 

This article should read: "Un certain nombre de sujets de na- 
tionality italienne se trouvant encore en Autriche-Hongrie apres la 
conclusion de cet accord, les Gouvernements autrichien et "hongrois 
veilleront tout particular ement a la sauvegarde de leurs interets 
nationaux." ("As a certain number of subjects of Italian nation- 
ality will still remain in Austria-Hungary after the conclusion of 
this agreement, the Austrian and Hungarian Governments will 
devote special attention to safeguard their national interests. ,, ) 

Articles VII and VIII. 
Meet with no objection. 

Article IX. 

Since Italy has abrogated the treaty of Triple Alliance in our 
relations with her, not only a specific but even a hypothetical refer- 
ence to any of its provisions must be avoided; as we have further- 



320 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 

more to forestall possible future chicaneries on the part of Italy 
in the event of territorial acquisitions by us in another direction, 
for instance, in Russian Poland, this article should read: "L'ltalie 
declare son desinteressement au sujet de tout avantage territorial 
on autre resultant pour VAutriche-Hongrie, soit du cours de la guerre 
actuelle, soit des trait es de paix qui la terminer ont" (" Italy de- 
clares her disinterestedness in any territorial or other advantage that 
might accrue to Austria-Hungary as a result either of the present 
military operations or of the treaties of peace that shall mark their 
end.") 

Article X. 

The proposed wording of this article should be replaced by the 
following: "L'Autriche-Hongrie renonce pour sa part a toute pre- 
tention se basant sur le fait de V occupation italienne des Ues du 
Dodecanese/ 7 ("On her part, Austrian-Hungary waives any claim 
to be based on the fact of the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesos.") 

Article XI. 
Remains unchanged. 

Since the solemn proclamation of the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment would apply only to the carrying out of the territorial ces- 
sions, whereas Article XV in its proposed wording and by its place 
at the end of the agreement would apply to all the clauses, this 
provision should be inserted as Article XII and should read: "Le 
Gouvernement I. et R. procedera aussitot apres la conclusion de cet 
accord a une manifestation solennelle relative aux cessions terri- 
toriales." ("The Austro-Hungarian Government will issue a solemn 
proclamation concerning the territorial cessions immediately after 
the conclusion of this agreement.") 

Article XII op the Draft Becomes Article XIII. 

Instead of the first paragraph read: "Des commissions mixtes 
seront institutes sur les lieux pour regler les details relatifs a la 
cession des territoires en question. Ces commissions seront auto- 
risees a prendre des decisions qui seront soumises a la ratification 
des Gouvernements." ("Mixed commissions will be appointed on the 
spot to settle details in connexion with the cession of the territories 
in question. These commissions will be authorised to reach deci- 
sions that will be submitted to the ratification of the Governments.") 

The second paragraph to remain unchanged. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGAKIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 321 
Article XIII of the Draft, Now Article XIV. 

In order to avoid misunderstandings this Article should read: 
"Des que cet accord aura ete conclu, les militaires originaires des 
territoires cedes a Vltalie seront retires des lignes de combat de 
Varmee Austro-Hongroise." ("As soon as this agreement will have 
been concluded, military persons born in the territories ceded to 
Italy will be withdrawn from the fighting lines of the Austro-Hun- 
garian army.") 

Article XIV of the Draft, Now Article XV. 

The following wording should be used in this article: 
" L'Autriche-Hongrie et Vltalie accept ent la garantie assumee par 
VAllemagne pour V execution fidele et loyale de cet accord." ("Aus- 
tria-Hungary and Italy accept the guarantee assumed by Germany 
for the faithful and loyal execution of this agreement.") 



No. 189. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Burian. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 16, 1915. 

Eoyal decree issued to-day states that His Majesty has not 
accepted the resignation of the Cabinet. 

It must be taken for granted that Baron Sonnino's and Sgr. 
Martini's foreign policy will be continued. 

The street demonstrations here and in the provinces against 
Sgr. Giolitti and in favour of war have assumed more serious pro- 
portions in the last few days. There are indications that this was 
part of the political activity of the resigned Cabinet with a view to 
influencing and intimidating the King on the one hand and the 
members of Parliament supporting Sgr. Giolitti on the other. Both 
ends have been attained and Sgr. Salandra has become popular over 
night. 

I am informed that the King continues to waver and cannot 
take it upon himself to decide the issue of war or peace. He is 
said, in particular, still to entertain misgivings as to the chances 
of success in a war, misgivings which have been strengthened since 
General Cadorna, who resents the assistance demanded from the 



322 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

allies, has offered to resign. This would confirm the widely accepted 
belief that the King wishes to leave the decision to the Parliament 
and has verbally prevailed on Sgr. Salandra not to create a fait 
accompli before Parliament so decides. 

If these reports are correct, it would mean a brief postponement 
of the decision. I must say, however, that the majority, which so 
far has stood for neutrality, is undergoing a change ascribable to 
Salandra 's machinations. A renewed vote of confidence would thus 
be secured for Sgr. Salandra in the Chamber of Deputies. 

I intend to-morrow, when the Cabinet will have been re-organ- 
ised, to ask Baron Sonnino to appoint a meeting, for I wish to 
avoid everything that might enable him to assert that I have avoided 
meeting him. 



No. 190. 
Baron Buridn to Baron MaccMo. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 17, 1915. 

The resignation of the Salandra Cabinet having been rejected, 
I instruct you to act in cooperation with Prince Billow and com- 
municate immediately to Baron Sonnino the draft of the agreement 
with Italy as drawn up in my telegram of yesterday. 

Should Baron Sonnino describe as inadequate, or reject the 
concessions contained in the draft, then the instructions sent you in 
my telegram of the 10th instant will again apply. 

In such an eventuality you will receive in a friendly way and, 
without committing yourself, immediately submit to me such modi- 
fied or new wishes as the Italian Government may propose either 
spontaneously or at your suggestion. 



No. 191. 

Baron MaccMo to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 17, 1915. 

In reply to my request for an interview the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs has asked me not to call until to-morrow morning. It 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 323 

thus becomes clear that the same Baron Sonnino who charged us 
with procrastination is constantly postponing meetings. I shall hand 
him the draft of the agreement in the wording prescribed by you, 
and shall endeavour to find out from his attitude if an outbreak of 
war is imminent. 

The meeting of the Cabinet this morning may already have come 
to some decision in this matter. 

The public manifestations continue here and throughout Italy 
under various aspects; they assume more and more the character 
of national and patriotic demonstrations, though they are palpably 
artificial. 



No. 192. 

Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 18, 1915. 

Since the Italian Government has persistently remonstrated 
against the remoteness of the actual transfer of the ceded territories 
— any form of military occupation being, however, absolutely ex- 
cluded — you will, if this can influence the situation favourably, be 
prepared to make the concession set forth below and which could 
be incorporated in the draft of the agreement after Article XIII, 
which deals with the commissions. 

(Translation from the French.) 

The mixed commission mentioned in the preceding Article shall 
begin work immediately after the conclusion of this agreement. 

The transfer of the ceded territories will take place as soon 
as the decisions taken by aforesaid commissions shall have been 
satisfied; it will be completed within one month. 

You are empowered, in cooperation with Prince Biilow, to com- 
munipate immediately to Baron Sonnino and Sgr. Salandra the draft 
agreement thus extended. 



324 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 193. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 18, 1915. 

The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies here have been con- 
vened for the 20th instant. Order of the day is hearing of declara- 
tions by the Government. 



No. 194. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 18, 1915. 

I have just seen Baron Sonnino. I opened the conversation 
by telling him that you had instructed me to hand him a draft 
agreement with the Austro-Hungarian Government based on our 
last proposals. This should convince him that you are ever willing 
to come to terms with Italy, and the fact that the various clauses 
for the proposed agreement are already worked out is a new proof 
of our sincere desire to avoid all that could cause unnecessary delay. 
Baron Sonnino asked if he could keep the document, and I ac- 
quiesced. He accepted my offer to read the contents to him. I 
wished to induce him to talk and to remind him of our former con- 
versations in the course of the reading. 

The conversation, however, remained a monologue. 

When I was through, he only enquired whether the boundary- 
line in the Trentino was the same as that designated in the former 
proposals from Vienna. 

I replied in the affirmative and added that my Government was 
still prepared to consider in a most conciliatory way any new Italian 
proposals, remarks, wishes or amendments of whatever kind. 

I could see that Baron Sonnino also took serious note of this 
statement. To my question whether I could report to Vienna that 
he had received the draft and would submit it to the Cabinet, he 
replied affirmatively and observed this might be done to-night; that 
the Chamber would certainly meet on the 20th instant, and that it 
had been agreed to let the Chamber decide the whole question. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 325 

Baron Sonnino could not be induced to express any opinion 
on the draft agreement. Former experience suggests that we must 
view the future discussion with the utmost scepticism. He has for 
the time being avoided everything that might resemble a break. 
It is most likely, however, that on the 20th instant the decision of 
the Chamber will be against us and then matters will progress 
rapidly. The fact that the Senate is to meet two hours after the 
opening of the Chamber indicates that there is no expectation of 
any further action than a mere vote on a prepared declaration by 
the Government ; if, as everything points, this be a vote of confidence, 
adjournment and the break with us are likely to follow simultan- 
eously. 

No. 195. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Burian. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 19, 1915. 

I immediately communicated in writing to Baron Sonnino and 
Sgr. Salandra the text of the concessions to be inserted as a new 
article in the draft agreement in accordance with your telegram of 
yesterday. 

Reports in the newspapers state that at to-morrow's meeting 
the Chamber will take cognisance of and approve the declaration of 
the Government without further debate. 

* I take a sceptical view of the demonstrations planned for to-day 
by the socialists in favour of neutrality; experience shows that the 
Government has always suppressed such demonstrations far more 
effectively than the riotous scenes staged by its proteges, the so- 
called interventionists. 

The report of Giolitti's departure is confirmed. 



No. 196. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Burian. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 19, 1915. 

The King reviewed the garrison to-day and then received d'An- 
nunzio in private audience. The press does everything to arouse 



326 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

enthusiasm and reports patriotic demonstrations and alleged whole- 
sale applications from volunteers who want to join the colours. 

The Agenzia Stefani published our concession concerning the 
putting of the cessions into effect and most of the newspapers have 
reproduced it with invidious comments. The conviction prevails here 
generally that Italy's entanglement with the Entente is already ad- 
vanced to such a point that nothing can be done to prevent it. 

The first intoxication that had seized everybody on the occasion 
of the street demonstrations of the 14th, 15th and 16th, is neverthe- 
less beginning to evaporate; a more earnest and calm state of mind 
prevails now that more than one man views the outlook with doubt 
and that the horrors of war are almost beginning to be felt. Some 
people express regret at Sgr. Giolitti's departure, but they hardly 
raise their voices to an audible pitch. 



No. 197. 
Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 20, 1915. 

Up to this hour I have not received a reply from either of the 
two Ministers to my written communication concerning our con- 
cession as to the putting of the cessions into effect. 

I am therefore reduced to draw conclusions from indirect indi- 
cations as to the way in which the Italian Government has received 
the concession. For instance, the absence so far of a reply to my 
letters is such an indirect indication, as is generally the passive atti- 
tude of the Government, which contrasts with the unfavourable press 
comments already reported. 

This morning's "Popolo Romano' ' is the only newspaper which 
still has a friendly word for the Triple Alliance, but its utterances 
are resigned. 



No. 198. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 20, 1915. 

An eye-witness gives me the following report on to-day's ses- 
sion of the Chamber. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGAKIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 327 

Sgr. Salandra read a Government bill demanding extraordinary 
powers in the event of war. After the speaker had said a few 
words, the urgency measure was put to vote. It was passed without 
debate by 377 against 54 votes. Forty-eight socialists and six depu- 
ties from Southern Italy voted against the bill. A number of depu- 
ties were unable, it is stated, to obtain access to the Chamber. My 
informant also professes to have heard several deputies asking to 
be heard; their voices were, however, silenced by the shouts of the 
majority. Before the opening of the session, when the poet d'An- 
nunzio appeared on the scene, a demonstration against him was 
tentatively undertaken, but it was overwhelmed by the applause of 
the majority and the cheers of the spectators. 

The introductory sentence of the bill refers to the Triple Alliance 
which had stood for the European balance of power and the mainte- 
nance of peace. To that end Italy is represented as having set aside 
the insecurity of her frontier districts and her national aspirations; 
she has even had to witness with concealed distress the systematic 
attempts to suppress the Italian character of certain districts. 

The bill then proceeds to state that the Triple Alliance was 
disrupted through the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia — out- 
wardly in that Austria-Hungary omitted to inform Italy beforehand, 
and inwardly in that she intended to disturb the status quo and 
the spheres of influence in the Balkans. In any event, however, 
the spirit of the treaty has been violated, for the precipitation of the 
European war is contrary to the sentiments and interests of Italy 
and constitutes a disturbance of the European balance of power 
which the Treaty of the Triple Alliance was designed to preserve. 
The Italian Government had, nevertheless, pursued for months a 
policy of patience and tried to come to an agreement. These nego- 
tiations were subject, however, to a limit with regard both to time 
and to Italy's dignity. For that reason the notification was issued 
in Vienna on May 4th withdrawing all previous proposals, cancel- 
ling the treaty and asserting Italy's freedom of action. On the 
other hand it was no longer possible to leave Italy isolated, without 
security and without prestige at a decisive moment in history. 

Under these circumstances, and in view of the seriousness of 
the international situation, the Government was obliged to formulate 
a policy which might lead to the ultimate test of force. 

The Government, it was declared, is conscious of having taken 
the measures imposed by the noblest aspirations and the most vital 
interests of the country. Then follows a warm appeal for the union 



328 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

of all classes and parties for the attainment of the ideal goal: La 
fortuna e la grandezza d } Italia. 

The final sentence refers to the army and the navy, as well as 
to the King, who will lead them in the achievement of the destinies 
of the new history. 

The foregoing indicates that the King was not placed to the 
fore, that a war against the Dual Monarchy was only alluded to, 
in the same way as an agreement with the Entente Powers was 
only hinted at. 

After the Cabinet had introduced the bill in the Senate, the 
Ministers appeared once more in the Chamber of Deputies. The 
speaker, Roselli, in a passionate speech urged the passing of the bill ; 
while he talked the enthusiasm rose and belligerent cries, such as: 
"Long live Italian Trieste!'', "Long live the avengers of Lissa!", 
etc., were applauded, even from the Government benches. After him 
Barzilai addressed the House and then the socialist Turati, whose 
speech against war visibly caused some impatience. After Colojanni, 
the reform socialist Ciscoti spoke and in spite of his socialistic theories 
declared himself in favour of the war because "it is a war for the 
protection of civilisation against barbarism." 

After almost all the deputies had obtained access the vote stood 
407 for and 74 against the Government. 

The Chamber adjourned sine die; the Senate will meet again 
to-morrow. 

The socialist bodies, which are said to have prepared various 
plans for making themselves conspicuous, were prevented from carry- 
ing out any demonstration by the stringent measures of the Gov- 
ernment and by numerous arrests. 

Feeling in the street was to-day more calm; the demonstration 
in the Chamber by the scum of the populace, obviously hired for the 
purpose, was directed solely against Sgr. Giolitti. 

It may be that the Government will make use of its powers 
to-morrow, without delay, to complete the military measures by 
further calls to the colours. We must be prepared for a rupture of 
relations at any moment. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 329 

No. 199. 

Baron Buridn to Baron MaccJtio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 21, 1915. 

I deem it desirable that you call on Baron Sonnino and rep- 
resent to him in a friendly way that, though you are cognisant of 
yesterday's tumultuous session of Parliament, you must call his 
attention to the fact that the Italian Government still owes you a 
reply to your last communications. 



No. 200. 
Baron Buridn to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 21, 1915. 

I gave, this afternoon, to the Italian Ambassador my reply to 
his communication of the 4th instant concerning the cancellation of 
the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, and I handed him a written copy 
of it. 

The reply reads as follows: 

The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister has had the honour to 
receive the communication concerning the cancellation of the Treaty 
of the Triple Alliance, which the Italian Ambassador made on the 
4th of May by order of his Government. 

With painful surprise, the Austro-Hungarian Government takes 
cognisance of the decision of the Italian Government to put an end 
in such a summary manner to a treaty which was based on a com- 
munity of our most important political interests, which has guar- 
anteed security and peace to our respective States for so many 
years, and which has been of obvious benefit to Italy. 

This surprise is all the more justified since the facts invoked 
in the first instance by the Italian Government in justification of 
its decision date back more than nine months and since the Royal 
Government in the meantime has repeatedly asserted its desire to 
maintain and even to strengthen the bonds of the alliance between 
our two countries, a desire which has always found a favourable 
reception and a cordial echo in Austria-Hungary. 



330 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

The reasons which compelled the Austro-Hungarian Government 
in July of last year to send an ultimatum to Servia, are too well 
known to require repetition here. The aim of Austria-Hungary 
was purely and simply to safeguard the Monarchy against the sub- 
versive machinations of Servia and to prevent the continuance of an 
agitation which aimed at the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, 
and which had led to numerous outrages, culminating in the tragedy 
of Serajevo. This aim could in no way affect the interests of Italy, 
for the Austro-Hungarian Government never has supposed and con- 
siders it out of the question, that Italy's interests could in any way 
be identified with criminal intrigues against the security and ter- 
ritorial integrity of Austria-Hungary, unfortunately tolerated and 
encouraged by the Belgrade Government. 

The Italian Government, moreover, was informed and knew that 
Austria-Hungary had no purposes of conquest in Servia. It was 
expressly declared in Rome that if the war remained localised, Aus- 
tria-Hungary had no intention to encroach upon the territorial in- 
tegrity of Servia. 

When, in consequence of Russia's intervention, the purely local 
conflict between Austria- Hungary and Servia, contrary to our desires, 
assumed a European character, and Austria-Hungary and Germany 
found themselves attacked by several Great Powers, the Italian Gov- 
ernment proclaimed Italy's neutrality, without, however, making 
the slightest suggestion that this war, which had been provoked 
and planned far in advance by Russia, could deprive the treaty of 
the Triple Alliance of its raison d'etre. 

It suffices to recall the declarations made at that time by the 
late Marchese di San Giuliano and the telegram which His Majesty, 
the King of Italy, on August 2, 1914, addressed to His Majesty, 
the Emperor-King, to establish the fact that the Italian Govern- 
ment saw nothing at that time in Austria-Hungary's proceeding 
which was in conflict with the stipulations of our Treaty of Alliance. 

Attacked by the Powers of the Triple Entente, Austria-Hungary 
and Germany were obliged to defend their territories; but this 
defensive war was in no wise directed toward "the realisation of a 
programme opposed to Italy's vital interests." These vital inter- 
ests, or what we could know of them, were in no way menaced. If, 
moreover, the Italian Government entertained apprehensions in this 
direction it could have given expression to them and would cer- 
tainly have found both in Vienna and Berlin the best will to protect 
these interests. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 331 

The Royal Government at that time held the view that neither 
of its allies, considering the situation, could invoke the casus foederis 
as affecting Italy, but it made no communication which could justify 
the belief that it regarded the proceeding of Austria-Hungary as 
a "flagrant violation of both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty 
of Alliance.' 9 

The Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, even though deploring Italy's 
resolution to remain neutral, — a resolution which in our view was 
hardly compatible with the spirit of the treaty, — nevertheless loyally 
accepted the view of the Italian Government, and the exchange 
of views which then took place established the maintenance of the 
Triple Alliance. 

Precisely with reference to this treaty, and especially to Article 
VII, the Royal Government presented its claims, which aimed at 
securing certain compensation in the event of Austria-Hungary 
obtaining territorial or other advantages in the Balkan Peninsula 
from the war. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government accepted this standpoint, and 
declared itself ready to consider the question, at the same time 
pointing out that, as long as the eventual advantages accruing to 
Austria-Hungary remained unknown, it was difficult to specify such 
compensation. 

The Italian Government acceded to this view, as is shown by 
the declaration of August 25, 1914, by the late Marchese di San 
Giuliano, who said: "It would be premature now to talk of com- 
pensation," and by the remarks of the Duke of Avarna after our 
withdrawal from Servia: "At present there is no object of com- 
pensation." 

Nevertheless, the Austro-Hungarian Government has always been 
ready to enter into negotiations on this subject. 

When the Italian Government, while still repeating its wish to 
maintain and strengthen the alliance, presented certain demands 
which, on the plea of compensation, referred to the cession of terri- 
tories constituting integral parts of the Dual Monarchy, the Austro- 
Hungarian Government always showed that it was guided by a 
sincere desire to reach an understanding with Italy, and although 
for ethnical, political, and military reasons, which have been amply 
explained in Rome, it was impossible to accede to all the demands of 
the Italian Government, the sacrifices which the Austro-Hungarian 
Government was prepared to make were so important that they 
were only justified by its desire to continue an alliance which had 



332 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

existed for so many years to the mutual advantage of both coun- 
tries. 

The Italian Government contends that the concessions offered 
by Austria-Hungary were to be realised only at an indefinite time, 
namely, at the end of the war, and seems to conclude that these 
concessions would therefore lose their entire value. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government, while emphasising the ma- 
terial impossibility of an immediate surrender of the ceded territory, 
showed itself none the less ready to offer all necessary guarantees 
for the purpose of preparing for and insuring this transfer at no 
distant date. 

The obvious good-will and conciliatory spirit of which the Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Government has given proof in the course of the 
negotiations seem in no way to justify the opinion of the Italian 
Government that every hope must be abandoned of reaching an 
agreement. 

Such an agreement, however, can be reached only when both 
sides are animated by the same sincere desire to reach an under- 
standing. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government cannot take cognisance of 
the declaration of the Italian Government that it desires to recover 
complete freedom of action, and to consider the Treaty of Alliance 
with Austria-Hungary henceforth null and void, as such a declara- 
tion by the Italian Government is in absolute contradiction with the 
solemnly undertaken obligations which Italy assumed in the treaty 
of December 5, 1912, and which fixed the duration of our alliance 
to July 8, 1920, with a right to cancel it only on one year's notice, 
and with no provision for cancellation or abrogation of the treaty 
before that time. 

The Royal Italian Government having in an arbitrary manner 
freed itself from all its obligations, the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment declines the responsibility for all consequences that may arise 
from this procedure. 



No. 201. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Buridn. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 21, 1915. 

To judge from newspaper reports, to-day's debate in the Senate 
exceeded in patriotic superlatives yesterday's proceedings in the 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 333 

Chamber of Deputies. The speaker, Don Prospero Colonna, Sin- 
daco of Rome, gave the impetus to the enthusiasm and earned a 
storm of applause. The order of the day as proposed by Canevaro 
and seconded by Vice-President Torrigiani, was unanimously ac- 
cepted by the 281 Senators present. 
It read as follows: 

" After the hearing of the Governmental declarations which 
emphasised Italy's good right and the will of the nation with so 
much firmness, the Senate shall proceed to take a vote." 

To-night a great war manifestation is to take place on the Capi- 
tol. For that reason the massing of large bodies of troops and 
the closing of streets which have extremely impeded traffic and 
communication during last week, are still in progress. 

It is said that 240 socialists were arrested yesterday, with the 
result that to-day a meeting of socialist deputies has already advo- 
cated a change of front by their party in favour of war. 



No. 202. 

Baron Burian to Baron Macchio. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 22, 1915. 

In order to save our respective countries from a senseless war, 
I authorise you to make a final effort with Baron Sonnino and to 
ask whether he would be prepared to sign the agreement in con- 
formity with the entirety of our last proposal if we met Italy still 
further on the question of the putting of the cessions into effect, 
without, however, conceding immediate military occupation. 



No. 203. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Burian. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 23, 1915. 

In compliance with your telegram of yesterday I reminded Baron 
Sonnino in a friendly manner that he had not yet sent me his reply 



334 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

to your latest proposals, which he had promised to submit to the 
Cabinet. Sonnino referred to the demonstrations of the past few 
days and to the decisive vote in Parliament, which in accord with 
previous meetings of the Cabinet had pronounced those latest pro- 
posals too tardy. 

In the spirit of your telegram to-day, I responded that I had 
always been anxious to further the understanding up to the very 
last, and that I was still prepared to make another proposal to that 
end. I would undertake to induce my Government to take another 
step forward in the matter of putting the cessions into effect, not- 
withstanding the latest and very precise definition of time, provided 
he would agree to accept the last draft of the accord as a whole. 

The Minister replied that it was too late; he had from the very 
first looked upon the time of putting the cessions into effect as the 
pivot of the entire agreement; yet even the latest proposal, where 
the time was to begin with the ratification of the agreement, was 
calculated to postpone everything indefinitely. 

All my endeavours to continue the discussion were met with the 
ever-recurring phrase: "It is too late." 



No. 204. 

Baron Buridn to Baron MaccMo. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 23, 1915. 

The Duke of Avarna this afternoon handed to me the follow- 
ing declaration of war : 

(Translation from the French.) 

In compliance with the orders of his noble Sovereign the King, 
the undersigned, Royal Italian Ambassador, has the honour to com- 
municate the following to his Excellency, the Austro-Hungarian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs : 

On the 4th of this month the Austro-Hungarian Government 
was informed of the grave reasons for which Italy, confident of 
being in the right, declared that her alliance with Austria-Hungary 
was null and void, and without effect in future, since this alliance 
had been violated by the Austro-Hungarian Government, and that 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGARIAN EED BOOK (NO. 2) 335 

Italy resumed her full freedom of action. Fully determined to pro- 
tect Italian rights and interests with all the means at its disposal, 
the Italian Government cannot evade its duty to take such measures 
as events may impose upon it against all present and future menaces 
to the fulfilment of Italy's national aspirations. His Majesty the 
King declares that from to-morrow he will consider himself in a 
state of war with Austria-Hungary. 

The undersigned has the honour at the same time to inform his 
Excellency, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that to-day the Austro- 
Hungarian Ambassador in Rome will receive his passports, and he 
would be grateful if his Excellency would hand him likewise his 
own passports. 



No. 205. 

Baron Macchio to Baron Burian. 

(Telegram.) Rome, May 23, 1915. 

Passports received; departure of both Embassies to-morrow 
(Monday) night. 

APPENDIX 

No. 1. 

Article VII of the Treaty of Triple Alliance. 

(Translation from the French.) 

Austria-Hungary and Italy, being desirous solely that the terri- 
torial status quo in the near East be maintained as much as pos- 
sible, pledge themselves to exert their influence to prevent all ter- 
ritorial modification which may prove detrimental to one or the 
other of the Powers signatory to this Treaty. To that end they 
shall communicate to one another all such information as may be 
suitable for their mutual enlightenment, concerning their own dis- 
positions as well as those of other Powers. Should, however, the 



336 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

status quo in the regions of the Balkans, or of the Turkish coasts 
and islands in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas in the course of events 
become impossible; and should Austria-Hungary or Italy be placed 
under the necessity, either by the action of a third Power or other- 
wise, to modify that status quo by a temporary or permanent occu- 
pation on their part, such occupation shall take place only after a 
previous agreement has been made between the two Powers, based 
on the principle of reciprocal compensation for all advantages, ter- 
ritorial or otherwise, which either of them may obtain beyond the 
present status quo, a compensation which shall satisfy the legitimate 
interests and aspirations of both parties. 



No. 2. 

Instructions of Count Guiccardini to tlie Duke of Avarna, Dated 
Rome, December 15, 1909, Handed by the Latter to Count 
AeJirentJial on December 19, 1909. 

In the conversations which have lately taken place between Count 
Aehrenthal and yourself with a view to specifying and perfecting 
Article VII of the treaty of Triple Alliance, you have firstly agreed 
that, Austria-Hungary having renounced the rights which the Treaty 
of Berlin had conferred upon her in respect of the Sandjak of Novi- 
bazar, the provisions of the aforesaid article of the treaty of Triple 
Alliance apply equally to the Sandjak as to other parts of the Otto- 
man Empire. If, therefore, Austria-Hungary, in consequence of the 
impossibility of maintaining the status quo in the Balkans, shall 
be compelled by force of circumstances to proceed to a temporary 
or permanent occupation of the Sandjak of Novibazar, that occu- 
pation shall only be effected after a previous agreement has been 
reached with Italy, based on the principle of compensation. 

Faithful to the spirit which has inspired the Treaty of Triple 
Alliance, and with a view to defining exactly and by nvutual consent 
the mode of procedure which the two allied cabinets intend to adopt 
in certain eventualities, you have also arranged with Count Aehren- 
thal as follows: 

Each of the two cabinets binds itself not to effect with a third 
Power any agreement whatsoever concerning the Balkan question 
without the participation of the other cabinet on a footing of abso- 
lute equality. The two cabinets also bind themselves to communi- 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 337 

cate to one another all propositions which may be made to the one 
or to the other by a third Power, contrary to the principle of non- 
intervention and referring to a modification of the status quo in 
the regions of the Balkans or of the Turkish coasts and islands in 
the Adriatic and Aegean Seas. 

It is understood that Article VII of the treaty of Triple Alliance, 
which is defined and completed only by the aforesaid provisions, 
shall remain in force in its entirety. 

As to the duration of the obligations which the two cabinets 
assume by virtue of the aforesaid, it is understood that it shall 
coincide with that of the Treaty of Triple Alliance, in such a manner 
that these obligations will be implicitly renewed with the renewal 
of the Triple Alliance. 

Conforming with the analogous provisions of this Treaty, the 
two cabinets mutually promise secrecy on the obligations thus entered 
into. Only the Berlin Cabinet, in its capacity as an ally, shall 
be informed by the two governments without delay. 

In order to define exactly all that has been agreed upon in the 
conversations I have conducted through your mediation with the 
Austro-Hungarian Government, I request you to communicate this 
telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to leave with him 
a copy thereof. 



No. 3. 

Count AehrentJial to Baron Ambrozy. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, September 26, 1911. 

The Duke of Avarna told me to-day, in accordance with instruc- 
tions, that the Italian Government had resolved to bring the question 
of Tripoli to an issue. As motives to such action the Ambassador 
cited the circumstance that the situation had been constantly grow- 
ing worse, despite Italy's endeavours for many months past to estab- 
lish better relations with Turkey, and that affairs in Tripoli had now 
become absolutely intolerable. On the other hand the Duke of 
Avarna pointed to the international situation and more especially to 
the relations between Italy and France. The latter Power was on 
the eve of a very considerable territorial aggrandisement and was 
at present bound by an agreement not to put any obstacles in the 



338 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

way of Italy's action in Tripoli. It could not be foreseen whether 
a modification in the European situation would not, at a later date, 
render the consent of France less certain. Once the problem of 
Tripoli is solved in accordance with the Italian aspirations, the 
Ambassador continued, Italy will represent a perfectly contented and 
therefore all the more reliable member of the Triple Alliance. 

The Marchese di San Giuliano had considered in detail the con- 
tentions which I had proffered as early as June against an Italian 
action in Tripoli on account of a possible reaction in the Balkans. 
Yet, the Minister thought that there was no such danger, especially 
as Italy would make it Tier duty to confine Tier action to the Medi- 
terranean. The present moment was very favourable even from that 
point of view, because an extension of the conflict to the Balkans 
was least likely to occur during autumn and winter. Moreover, 
Italy's policy Jiad always aimed at the maintenance of the "status 
quo" in fhe Balkans, and Italy would certainly do nothing that could 
interfere with this policy, now any more than ever before. The 
Duke of Avarna then added that Italy will be in a better position 
to cooperate in the preservation of the status quo in the Balkans, 
after the question of Tripoli has been solved. 

In conclusion, the Italian Ambassador explained that his Gov- 
ernment, in advising the Austro-Hungarian Government at so late 
a date of its decision, had been guided solely by its desire to spare 
it the certainly inconvenient duty of taking a stand in the matter. 

I thanked the Duke of Avarna for this very important com- 
munication, which called for very minute consideration on my part. 
I informed him that I would report thereon to His Imperial and 
Royal Apostolic Majesty, and that I would let the Ambassador know 
the views of the Austro-Hungarian Government in a few days. 
For the time being I expressed to him, in accordance with our 
well-known friendly feelings toward Italy, my first impression that 
it should be left to her own discretion to decide how to protect her 
own interests, and that in such action she could rely upon our 
friendly benevolence; yet, I inclined to my former contention on 
account of the possibility of the extension of the conflict to the 
Balkans. 



THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 339 

No. 4. 

Von Merey to Count AefirentJial. 

(Telegram.) Rome, October 21, 1911. 

Have just received the following reply from Foreign Minister 
to my latest representations. 

(Translation from the French.) 

We have always reserved our freedom of military operations 
outside of the Turkish coasts in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. We 
would be delighted if we should not be compelled to take advantage 
of that freedom, but nevertheless we reserve it in its entirety. 



No. 5. 
Count AelirentJtal to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, November 6, 1911. 

In handing to me the circular telegram concerning the annexa- 
tion of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, the Duke of Avarna denied the 
news that Italian men-of-war were cruising off Salonica. 

I replied that I took cognisance of his communication with all 
the more satisfaction as I had actually received various reports from 
the Austro-Hungarian Consulates during the past few days which 
pointed to warlike operations in that vicinity on the part of Italy. 

I drew the Duke of Avarna's attention to the fact that Italy 
was bound by the Treaty of Triple Alliance to avoid all that may 
menace the status quo in the Balkans. That an Italian attack upon 
Salonica may involve a considerable menace to tlie peace of tlte 
Balkan Peninsula, was apparent, among other reasons, from the fact 
that the Bulgarian revolutionary organisation has declared in a 
recently published circular that it would carry on the fight for 
obtaining the autonomy of Macedonia with all available means. 

Austria-Hungary, as well as Germany, had adopted a most 
friendly attitude in the matter of the Italian action in Tripoli, which 
in any case constituted an encroachment upon the principle of the 



340 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

integrity of the Ottoman Empire. But Austria-Hungary in par- 
ticular is not in a position to accept calmly an eventual military 
action of Italy upon the coast of the Aegean Sea, in view of the 
above-mentioned apprehensions. 

The Duke of Avarna took my contentions as perfectly natural 
and added, in an enquiring manner, that a temporary occupation of 
the islands in the Aegean Sea would also be in contradiction to 
Article VII of the Treaty of Triple Alliance! In answering this 
hint I left no doubt in his mind that my previous declaration applied 
likewise to this eventuality. 



No. 6. 
Count Aehrenthal to von Merey 

(Instructions.) Vienna, November 15, 1911. 

The Duke of Avarna yesterday conveyed to me a series of com- 
munications from the Marchese di San Giuliano, among which were 
his thanks for our having refused to answer the two notes of pro- 
test from the Ottoman Government. 

The Ambassador then read to me a telegram from the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs on the possible extension of hostilities to the 
Aegean Sea. 

In reply, I requested him to report again to his Government 
that, for reasons well known to him, I must dissent from such an 
undertaking. I once more emphasised the friendship and benevo- 
lence which we surely have abundantly manifested toward Italy, 
and declared that — setting aside the duties of neutrality — I would 
overstep the mark which I had been obliged to define for myself, 
if I embarked upon renewed discussions of that topic; if I were 
to do so, I would assume a share in the responsibility which Italy 
would have to assume if she were to depart from the declarations 
made by her at the beginning of the war, or from her treaty obli- 
gations. 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 341 

No. 7. 
Count AeTirenthal to Count Szogyeny. 

(Instructions.) Vienna, November 29, 1911. 

Von Tsehirschky informs me that Italy has expressed a desire 
in Berlin to ascertain what warlike operations on her part would 
be admissible upon the Asiatic coast of the Aegean Sea, in the view 
of the Berlin Cabinet. 

"Without basing his step upon any intimation from the Rome 
Cabinet, the German Ambassador asked for my opinion in the mat- 
ter, under instructions. I replied to von Tsehirschky that I made 
it a point not to discuss the extension of Italian operations to the 
Asiatic coast of Turkey, without, however, intending to make any 
difficulties for the Italian Government, or even to incur the appear- 
ance of such a possibility. In closing my explanations, I said that 
I was guided by the consideration that it would be unwise for us as 
well as for Germany to embark upon a similar negotiation, as a 
subsequent military operation of that sort would then necessarily 
be considered as being performed with our consent. 



No. 8. 

Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 1, 1912. 

Expected British representations were made yesterday in the 
form of the following memorandum: 

(Translation from the French.) 

It is certain that international commerce would suffer consid- 
erable losses if the Ottoman Government decided for reasons of 
self-defence to close the Dardanelles by means of mines. Conse- 
quently, Sir Edward Grey desires to know whether or not the Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Government would deem it expedient that the Powers 
approach the Italian Government with the query whether it would 
be willing to give assurances that no military operations of any 



342 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

description will be undertaken in the Dardanelles or in the adjacent 
waters. 



No. 9. 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, 
Constantinople, London, Paris, Rome and St. Petersburgh. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, March 3, 1912. 

Sir F. Cartwright called on me yesterday and reiterated verbally 
the proposal made by the delivery of the Aide-Memoire. 

I told the Ambassador that, in my opinion, the Italian Govern- 
ment would not entertain the demand for a declaration that she will 
not undertake any warlike operations in the Dardanelles and the 
adjacent waters; it was our duty as neutrals to avoid all that might 
give the appearance that we wish to impede the freedom of action 
of either of the belligerent parties. 

In support of his representations Sir F. Cartwright asked whether 
the Italian Government had not previously made to the Vienna 
Cabinet a declaration coinciding in principle with the one which 
the five Powers were to demand now from Italy on Sir Edward 
Grey's initiative. I replied to the Ambassador that I had never 
heard of such a declaration by Italy. 



No. 10. 

Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 6, 1912. 

Acting on instructions, von Tschirschky made to me the follow- 
ing declaration: 

In consequence of the long duration of the Italo-Turkish con- 
flict, the situation is beginning to become serious for Italy, and both 
military circles and public opinion urge that a decisive blow be 
delivered. It is not a question of action in the Aegean Sea, but in 
the Dardanelles. 



THE AUSTBO-HUNGAKIAN EBD BOOK (NO. 2) 343 

The Ambassador added in strict confidence that the King of 
Italy had approached Emperor William on the subject at Venice. 

The question now arising for Germany is, what attitude the 
Allies will take up toward these intentions of Italy. 

You will please seek an occasion to converse with the Marchese 
di San Giuliano and tell him that you have perceived, from informa- 
tion received from Vienna, that it was a matter of great surprise to 
me to learn that von Tschirschky had been instructed by his Gov- 
ernment to make the aforesaid intimation. In consideration of 
our alliance, as well as of the friendly manner in which I have 
met Italy heretofore, I would have thought a direct discussion more 
natural and more expedient. At the same time you will hint that 
for conspicuous reasons I was obliged to adhere in principle to the 
standpoint which my predecessor had taken up in respect of an 
eventual extension of the hostilities. Von Tschirschky explicitly 
designated an Italian action in the Dardanelles ; the apprehension is 
easy to understand, that such action might find its echo in Con- 
stantinople and in the Balkans, the consequence of which may not 
be gauged to-day, but which would be diametrically opposed to the 
maintenance of the status quo — the policy pursued by both Italy 
and Austria-Hungary. Should, nevertheless, the Italian Govern- 
ment find an extension of the region of her warlike operations indis- 
pensable, then I would certainly consider a direct discussion of the 
matter the most natural course to take. Without obtaining a de- 
cided consent from me, which would to a certain extent imply our 
participation in the responsibilities for the consequences, Italy may 
secure our tacit passivity in the event of an intended temporary 
warlike action, confined to such territories as would not involve the 
danger of a reaction in the Balkans. 

If the Marchese di San Giuliano enters upon a discussion of 
any specific Italian operation, you will lead the conversation into 
other channels with the intimation that you consider such discussion 
inopportune. In fact, we must positively avoid every appearance 
that any specific warlike action had received our previous consent. 



344 DOCUMENTS KBLATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 11. 

Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, April 15, 1912. 

The Duke of Avarna again broached the subject of a possible 
extension of the Italian naval operation, though pointing out with 
emphasis that he spoke without instructions. 

I pointed out in the first place that, to my mind, an action by 
the Italian Navy outside of the north-African war theatre could 
accomplish its purpose only if it caused a strong enough impression 
in Constantinople to be felt in the Balkans. Such reaction, how- 
ever, could not leave us, Italy's allies, indifferent. A minor operation 
and a less extensive reaction would bring Italy no nearer to her 
aim, while it would still create a feeling of uneasiness with us if 
the scene of action comprised the territories referred to in Article 
VII of the Alliance Treaty. 

Under these circumstances I could not give my express consent 
to any similar action whatsoever. The Duke of Avarna had not asked 
me to give such consent; but I, on my part, was determined to 
leave the responsibility for the consequences upon Italy's shoulders. 

Concerning the islands of Rhodos, Karpathos and Stampalia, I 
expressed my willingness to consider it disputable whether or not 
they pertain to the islands of the Aegean Sea. The Duke of Avarna 
replied that he felt convinced that his Government would give us its 
express assurances, in the event of their occupation, that such occu- 
pation would be only temporary. 



No. 12. 

Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, May 21, 1912. 

Von Kiderlen-Waechter assured me that he gratefully acknowl- 
edged our conciliatory attitude in the matter of Italian action in 
the Archipelago. He still entertained hopes that the occupation 
of several islands in the Aegean Sea by Italy would not provoke 
a dangerous reaction in the Balkans. 



THE AUSTKO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2) 345 

No. 13. 

Count Berchtold to von Merey. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, May 23, 1912. 

The question of occupation of islands in Aegean Sea has repeat- 
edly been the subject of conversations between me and the Italian 
Ambassador in the last few days. 

The Duke of Avarna resumed the discussion yesterday. He 
especially expressed the apprehension that the decision we had prom- 
ised in respect of the occupation of several unimportant islands 
(he referred to Chios and the isles whence the Turkish officials had 
first been removed) might be such as to arouse profound ill-feeling 
in Italy. 

He further observed that it impressed him strangely to see that 
of all Europe, including Germany, it was Austria-Hungary, Italy's 
ally, who caused her the greatest difficulties in the attainment of 
her aim, which consisted in a speedy conclusion of the war. 

I pointed out, that in this case we were in a peculiar situation 
in two respects : Firstly, because we had entered into bilateral agree- 
ments with Italy concerning the matter in question; secondly, be- 
cause we were directly adjacent neighbours of Turkey, and conse- 
quently were the most closely concerned of all. Besides, I failed 
to understand his apprehension, inasmuch as there never had been 
a question of a "protest" against the occupation of the islands re- 
ferred to. Yet, we were compelled to specify our legitimate claim 
at this time in order to avoid possible future misunderstandings. 

I finally specified our standpoint on this question as follows: 

"We have been painfully impressed by the news of the occupa- 
tion of additional islands by Italian troops. Because of the con- 
sequences to be feared from such operations, we are compelled to 
express our most serious misgivings. At the same time it is our 
duty to point out that in our opinion the occupations in question 
are contrary to the provisions of Article VII of the Treaty of Triple 
Alliance, and give us the right to demand compensation on our part. 
True, for the time being we do not wish to make use of this right, 
out of a desire to avoid complicating Italy's position. However, we 
must declare emphatically that if Italy perseveres in this policy the 
responsibility for it will rest with her, while we would be con- 
strained to reserve the right to compensation which we are at liberty 
to use according to our own judgment. 



346 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 14. 

Article III of the Treaty of Triple Alliance. 

(Translation from the French.) 

If one or two of the high contracting parties should be attacked 
without direct provocation on their part, and be engaged in war 
with two or several Great Powers not signatory to this Treaty, 
the casus foederis shall apply simultaneously to all the high con- 
tracting parties. 



No. 15. 
Article I of the Treaty of Triple Alliance. 

The high contracting parties mutually promise peace and friend- 
ship, and shall not enter into any alliance or engagement directed 
against any one of their respective States. 

They bind themselves to proceed to negotiations on such political 
and economic questions of a general nature as may arise ; and, more- 
over, promise their mutual support within the scope of their own 
interests. 



No. 16. 

Article IV of the Treaty of Triple Alliance. 

In the event that a Great Power not signatory to this Treaty 
should menace the safety of the States of one of the high con- 
tracting parties, and that the menaced party should be forced to 
make war on that Power, the two others bind themselves to observe 
toward their ally a benevolent neutrality. Each one of them in 
that case reserves to herself the right to participate in the war, if 
she should consider it appropriate to make common cause with her 
ally. 



THE 
BELGIAN GREY BOOK 

(NO. 1) 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. I) 1 



No. 1. 

Count Errembault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M. 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Vienna, July 24, 1914. 

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the Austro- 
Hungarian ultimatum to Servia. 

Comte Errembault de Dudzeele. 



Enclosure in No. I. 2 



The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the 
following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through 
the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade : — 

"On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on 
the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following 
declaration to the Imperial and Koyal Government : — 

1 Miscellaneous. No. 12 (1914). Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the 
War, published by the Belgian Government. Presented to both Houses of Par- 
liament by command of His Majesty, October 1914. London: Printed under the 
authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1914. [Cd. 7627.] Translated and 
published by the British Government. No English translation was published by 
the Belgian Government. Title of publication in the original text: Royaume de 
Belgique. Correspondance Diplomatique Relative a la Guerre de 1914 (24 
Juillet-29 Aout). Septieme Edition. Paris, Librairie Hachette et Cie, 79, 
Boulevard Saint-Germain; Londres, 18, King William Street, Strand, 1915. 

2 This note is not printed in Miscellaneous, Wo. 12 (1914), which merely 
refers to No. 4 of Miscellaneous, Wo. 6 (1914). The translation as here repro- 
duced is taken from the latter source. 

349 



350 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

" 'Servia recognises that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has 
not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the 
decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25 
of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great 
Powers, Servia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude 
of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the 
annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify 
the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to 
live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter. ' 

"The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events 
of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive 
movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of 
Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its 
birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as 
to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the 
shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders. 

"Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in 
the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Govern- 
ment has done nothing to repress these movements. It has per- 
mitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations 
directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained lan- 
guage on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators 
of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in 
subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda 
in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of 
a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy 
and contempt of its institutions. 

"This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had 
not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last 
proved its fatal consequences to the whole world. 

"It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal 
perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assas- 
sinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives 
with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by 
Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Od- 
brana ; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and 
their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian 
frontier service. 

"The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do 
not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 351 

the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained 
for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and 
thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, 
on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the 
intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the 
Monarchy. 

"To achieve this end the Imperial and Eoyal Government see 
themselves compelled to demand from the Eoyal Servian Government 
a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda 
against the Monarchy ; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, 
the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories 
belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means 
this criminal and terrorist propaganda. 

"In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the 
Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their 
'Official Journal 7 of the 13/26 July the following declaration: — 

" 'The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda 
directed against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the general tendency of 
which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
archy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal 
consequences of these criminal proceedings. 

" 'The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and func- 
tionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus 
compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Gov- 
ernment were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st 
March, 1909. 

" 'The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea 
of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the 
inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it 
their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole 
population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed 
with the. utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such 
machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and 
suppress. ' 

"This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the 
Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and 
shall be published in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army. 

" 'The Royal Servian Government further undertake: — 



352 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

" '1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and 
contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tend- 
ency of which is directed against its territorial integrity ; 

" '2. To dissolve immediately the society styled "Narodna Od- 
brana," to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in 
the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia 
which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
archy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to 
prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under 
another name and form ; 

" '3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, 
both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of 
instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the 
propaganda against Austria-Hungary ; 

" '4. To remove from the military service, and from the adminis- 
tration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda 
against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, whose names and deeds the 
Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of 
communicating to the Royal Government ; 

" *5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of 
the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the sub- 
versive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the 
Monarchy ; 

" '6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot 
of the 28th June who are on Servian territory; delegates of the 
Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation 
relating thereto; 

" '7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tanko- 
sitch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian 
State employe, who have been compromised by the results of the 
magisterial enquiry at Serajevo; 

" '8. To prevent by effective measures the cooperation of the 
Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across 
the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the 
frontier service at Schabatz and Lozniea guilty of having assisted 
the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage 
across the frontier ; 

" '9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with 
explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian 
officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their 
official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 353 

to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro- 
Hungarian Government; and, finally, 

" '10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without 
delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding 
heads. ' 

"The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the 
Eoyal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, 
the 25th July. 

"A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial 
enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under 
heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note." 

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the con- 
tents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you 
are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following 
observations : — 

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed 
to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced 
above. 

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a 
policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of 
the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier. 

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation. 

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose 
object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on 
Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among 
their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and 
judges — in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in 
the kingdom. 

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propa- 
ganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day 
passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their 
readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to 
outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity. 

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every 
means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the 
youth in the frontier provinces. 

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of 
the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has 



354 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; indi- 
viduals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have 
come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda 
against Austria-Hungary. 

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has 
been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought it 
incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Govern- 
ment have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn 
declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the 
will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary. 

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face 
of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial 
disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope 
that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by 
appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By 
observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of 
Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom 
would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its 
own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development 
of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events 
of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested 
and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement 
of Servia possible. 

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the 
neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of 
the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propa- 
ganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the 
whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to 
the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched 
at Belgrade. 

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal 
Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at 
Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop 
the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and 
integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking 
this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the senti- 
ments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become 
a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, 
and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements 
emanating from Belgrade. 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 355 

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold 
at the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating the 
Servian intrigues and the connexion between these intrigues and the 
murder of the 28th June. 

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial 
and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers. 

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands 
of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 24, 1914. 



Annex. 

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against 
Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassina- 
tion committed by them on the 28th June last has up to the present 
led to the following conclusions : — 

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed 
at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, one Milan 
Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabez with the assistance of Commander 
Voija Tankosic. 

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition 
with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to 
Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez by the man Milan Ciganovic and 
Commander Voija Tankosic at Belgrade. 

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms depot of 
the Servian army at Kragujevac. 

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Ciganovic taught 
Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the bombs, and gave 
lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabez in a forest 
near the shooting ground at Topgchider. 

5. To enable Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez to cross the frontier 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms 
secretly, a secret system of transport was organised by Ciganovic. 

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina 
of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling 
the frontiers at Chabac (Rade Popovic) and Loznica, as well as by 
the customs officer Rudivoj Grbic, of Loznica, with the assistance of 
various individuals. 



356 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 



No. 2. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Peters- 
lurgfi. 

Sir, Brussels, July 24, 1914. 

The Belgian Government have had under their consideration 
whether, in present circumstances, it would not be advisable to ad- 
dress to the Powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neu- 
trality a communication assuring them of Belgium's determination to 
fulfil the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the 
event of a war breaking out on her frontiers. 

The Government have come to the conclusion that such a com- 
munication would be premature at present, but that events might 
move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable in- 
structions at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives 
abroad. 

In these circumstances I have proposed to the King and to my 
colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you now 
exact instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the prospect 
of a Franco-German war became more threatening. 

I enclose herewith a note, signed but not dated, which you should 
read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you should 
give him a copy, if circumstances render such a communication 
necessary. 

I will inform you by telegram when you are to act on these 
instructions. 

This telegram will be despatched when the order is given for the 
mobilisation of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope 
and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our informa- 
tion leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution. 

Davignon. 



Enclosure in No. 2. 
Sir, 

The international situation is serious, and the possibility of a 
war between several Powers naturally preoccupies the Belgian Gov- 
ernment. 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 357 

Belgium has most scrupulously observed the duties of a neutral 
State imposed upon her by the treaties of April 19, 1839 ; and those 
duties she will strive unflinchingly to fulfil, whatever the circum- 
stances may be. 

The friendly feelings of the Powers towards her have been so 
often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her territory 
will remain free from any attack, should hostilities break out upon 
her frontiers. 

All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have 
nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has 
been mobilised and is taking up such strategic positions as have 
been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect 
of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been 
put in a state of defence. 

It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature of these meas- 
ures. They are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfil her inter- 
national obligations; and it is obvious that they neither have been 
nor can have been undertaken with any intention of taking part in 
an armed struggle between the Powers or from any feeling of distrust 
of any of those Powers. 

In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to com- 
municate to your Excellency a copy of the declaration by the Belgian 
Government, and to request that you will be good enough to take 
note of it. 

A similar communication has been made to the other Powers 
guaranteeing Belgian neutrality. 



No. 3. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Borne, The Hague, and Luxemburg. 

Sir, Brussels, July 25, 1914. 

I have addressed an undated circular note, a copy of which is 
enclosed, to the Belgian representatives accredited to the Powers 
guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of Belgium. 

Should the danger of a war between France and Germany become 
imminent, this circular note will be communicated to the Governments 



358 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

of the guaranteeing Powers, in order to inform them of our fixed 
determination to fulfil those international obligations that are im- 
posed upon us by the treaties of 1839. 

The communications in question would only be made upon tele- 
graphic instructions from me. 

If circumstances lead me to issue such instructions, I shall request 
you also, by telegram, to notify the Government to which you are 
accredited of the step we have taken, and to communicate to them a 
copy of the enclosed circular note for their information, and without 
any request that they should take note thereof. 

My telegram will inform you of the date to be given to the 
circular note, which you should be careful to fill in on the copy 
which you hand to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

It is unnecessary to point out that this despatch and its enclosure 
should be treated as strictly confidential until the receipt of fresh 
instructions from me. Davignon. 



Enclosure in No. 3. 
(See Enclosure in No. 2.) 



No. 4. 

M. MicJtotte de Welle, Belgian Minister at Belgrade, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the 
reply returned by the Servian Government to the Austro- Hungarian 
note of the 10 (23) July. 

MlCHOTTE DE WELLE. 



Enclosure in No. 4. ] 



The Royal Servian Government have received the communication 
of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and are 

1 This note is not printed in Miscellaneous, No. 12 (1914), which merely 
refers to No. 39 of Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914), where it is printed. The transla- 
tion as here reproduced is taken from the latter source. 



THE BELGIAN GEEY BOOK (NO. 1) 359 

convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which 
may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia. 

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both 
from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations 
and actions of the responsible representatives of the State — protests 
which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Gov- 
ernment on the 18th March, 1909 — have not been renewed on any 
occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no 
attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Eoyal 
Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal 
state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Eoyal Gov- 
ernment draw attention to the fact that in this connexion the Im- 
perial and Eoyal Government have made no representation except 
one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial 
and Eoyal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. 
Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate 
policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to 
the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European 
peace that that peace has been preserved. The Eoyal Government 
cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, 
such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies — 
manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary 
course of events, and which as a general rule escape official control. 
The Eoyal Government are all the less responsible in view of the 
fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which 
arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a 
great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority 
of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries. 

For these reasons the Eoyal Government have been pained and 
surprised at the statements according to which members of the King- 
dom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations 
for the crime committed at Serajevo ; the Eoyal Government expected 
to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this 
crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness 
of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning 
whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with 
the desire of the Imperial and Eoyal Government, they are prepared 
to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his 
situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs 
are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be 



360 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

published on the first page of the " Journal Officiel," on the date of 
the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration: — 

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda 
which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all 
such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they 
sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal move- 
ments. The Royal Government regret that, according to the com- 
munication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain 
Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above- 
mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly 
relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly en- 
gaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, which declaration 
disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with 
the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria- 
Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the 
officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that hence- 
forth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons 
as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will 
use their utmost endeavour." 

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal 
Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, 
by His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be 
published in the next official army bulletin. 

The Royal Government further undertake : — 

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina 
a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punish- 
ment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general 
tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of 
Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching 
revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced 
into Article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such pub- 
lication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under 
the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution. 

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the 
Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the 
"Narodna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up 
to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceed- 



THE BELGIAN GEEY BOOK (NO. 1) 361 

ings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Eoyal Government 
will accept the demand of the Imperial and Eoyal Government, and 
will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other 
society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary. 

3. The Eoyal Servian Government undertake to remove without 
delay from their public educational establishments in Servia all that 
serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, 
whenever the Imperial and Eoyal Government furnish them with 
facts and proofs of this propaganda. 

4. The Eoyal Government also agree to remove from military 
service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to 
be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and 
Eoyal Government to communicate to them at a later* date the names 
and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the 
proceedings which are to be taken against them. 

5. The Eoyal Government must confess that they do not clearly 
grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial 
and Eoyal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the col- 
laboration of the organs of the Imperial and Eoyal Government upon 
their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration 
as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal pro- 
cedure, and with good neighbourly relations. 

6. It goes without saying that the Eoyal Government consider it 
their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or 
eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th June, and who 
happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the 
participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authori- 
ties appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Eoyal Govern- 
ment, the Eoyal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as 
it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal 
procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the 
results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro- 
Hungarian agents. 

7. The Eoyal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the 
delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As 
regards Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation) 
by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest 
him. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good 



362 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presump- 
tive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which 
have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for 
the purposes of the later enquiry. 

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the meas- 
ures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms 
and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they 
will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the fron- 
tier officials on the Schabatz-Loznica line who have failed in their 
duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass. 

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the 
remarks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in 
interviews after the crime and which according to the statement of 
the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile towards the Mon- 
archy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have com- 
municated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and 
as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by 
the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take 
steps to collect evidence and proofs. 

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal 
Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the 
above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present 
note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out. 

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this 
reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the 
common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are 
ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring 
this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The 
Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up 
of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th 
(31st) March, 1909. 

Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914. 



No. 5. 

Communication made on July 26, 1914, by fhe Austro-Hungarian 
Legation at Brussels to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

M. Pashitch gave the reply of the Servian Government to the 
Austro-Hungarian note before 6 o'clock yesterday. This reply not 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 363 

having been considered satisfactory, diplomatic relations have been 
broken off and the Minister and staff of the Austrian Legation have 
left Belgrade. Servian mobilisation had already been ordered before 
3 o'clock. 



No. 6. 

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 27, 1914. 

According to a telegram from the British Charge d 'Affaires at 
Belgrade, the Servian Government have given way on all the points 
on the Austrian note. They even allow the intervention of Austrian 
officials if such a proceeding is in conformity with the usages of 
international law. The British Charge d' Affaires considers that this 
reply should satisfy Austria if she is not desirous of war. Neverthe- 
less, a more hopeful atmosphere prevails here to-day, more particu- 
larly because hostilities against Servia have not begun. The British 
Government suggest mediation by Great Britain, Germany, France, 
and Italy at St. Petersburgh and Vienna in order to find some basis 
for compromise. Germany alone has not yet replied. The decision 
rests with the Emperor. 



No. 7. 

Count Errembault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M. 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has notified me of the declara- 
tion of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia. 



364 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 



No. 8. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, 
Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg. 

Sir, Brussels, July 29, 1914. 

The Belgian Government have decided to place the army upon a 
strengthened peace footing. 

This step should in no way be confused with mobilisation. 

Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium consists, in 
some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on the ordinary peace 
footing consists of only one class of armed militia ; on the strengthened 
peace footing, owing to the recall of three classes, her army divisions 
and her cavalry division comprise effective units of the same strength 
as those of the corps permanently maintained in the frontier zones 
of the neighbouring Powers. 

This information will enable you to reply to any questions which 
may be addressed to you. 

Davignon. 



No. 9. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London. 

Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914. 

The French Minister came to show me a telegram from the Agence 
Havas reporting a state of war in Germany, and said : — 

"I seize this opportunity to declare that no incursion of French 
troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are 
massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish 
to incur the responsibility, so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking 
the first hostile act. Instructions in this sense will be given to the 
French authorities. " 

I thanked M. Klobukowski for his communication, and I felt 
bound to observe that we had always had the greatest confidence in 



THE BELGIAN GEEY BOOK (NO. 1) 365 

the loyal observance by both our neighbouring States of their engage- 
ments towards us. We have also every reason to believe that the 
attitude of the German Government will be the same as that of the 
Government of the French Kepublic. 

Davignon. 



No. 10. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Heads of 
Belgian Missions abroad. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, July 31, 1914. 

The Minister of War informs me that mobilisation has been 
ordered, and that Saturday, the 1st August, will be the first day. 

Davignon. 



No. 11. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris. 

Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914. 

The British Minister asked to see me on urgent business, and 
made the following communication, which he had hoped for some 
days to be able to present to me: Owing to the possibility of a 
European war, Sir Edward Grey has asked the French and German 
Governments separately if they were each of them ready to respect 
Belgian neutrality provided that no other Power violated it : — 

"In view of existing treaties, I am instructed to inform the Bel- 
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say that Sir 
Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain 
her neutrality, and that she desires and expects that the other Powers 
will respect and maintain it." 

I hastened to thank Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, 
which the Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added 
that Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our inde- 
pendence could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain 



366 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other Powers, 
in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence which 
had always existed between us, would respect and maintain that 
neutrality. 

I did not fail to state that our military forces, which had been 
considerably developed in consequence of our recent reorganisation, 
were sufficient to enable us to defend ourselves energetically in the 
event of the violation of our territory. 

In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis seemed to 
me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided to 
mobilise our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands had 
come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that, moreover, 
the recent date of our new military system and the temporary nature 
of the measures upon which we then had to decide, made it necessary 
for us to take immediate and thorough precautions. Our neighbours 
and guarantors should see in this decision our strong desire to uphold 
our neutrality ourselves. 

Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated that 
his Government were awaiting this reply before continuing nego- 
tiations with France and Germany, the result of which would be 
communicated to me. 

Davignon. 



No. 12. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris. 

Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914. 

In the course of the conversation which the Secretary-General of 
my department had with Herr von Below this morning, he explained 
to the German Minister the scope of the military measures which we 
had undertaken, and said to him that they were a consequence of 
our desire to fulfil our international obligations, and that they in no 
wise implied an attitude of distrust towards our neighbours. 

The Secretary-General then asked the German Minister if he 
knew of the conversation which he had had with his predecessor, 
Herr von Flotow, and of the reply which the Imperial Chancellor 
had instructed the latter to give. 



THE BELGIAN GEEY BOOK (NO. 1) 367 

In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a con- 
sequence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of Flushing, certain 
newspapers had maintained that in the case of a Franco-German war 
Belgian neutrality would be violated by Germany. 

The Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a declara- 
tion in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign affairs 
would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the mistrust which 
was so regrettable from the point of view of the relations between 
the two countries. 

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he had fully appreciated 
the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared 
that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but 
he considered that in making a public declaration Germany would 
weaken her military position in regard to France, who, secured on 
the northern side, would concentrate all her energies on the east. 

Baron van der Elst, continuing, said that he perfectly understood 
the objections raised by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to the proposed 
public declaration, and he recalled the fact that since then, in 1913, 
Herr von Jagow had made reassuring declarations to the Budget 
Commission of the Eeichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian 
neutrality. 

Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with 
Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments ex- 
pressed at that time had not changed. 

Davignon. 



Enclosure in No. 12. 



Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Berlin, May 2, 1913. 

I have the honour to bring to your notice the declarations respect- 
ing Belgian neutrality, as published in the semi-official Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung, made by the Secretary of State and the Minister 
of War, at the meeting of the Budget Committee of the Eeichstag on 
April 29th :— 

"A member of the Social Democrat Party said: 'The approach 
of a war between Germany and France is viewed with apprehension 



368 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

in Belgium, for it is feared that Germany will not respect the neu- 
trality of Belgium.' 

"Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State, replied: 'Belgian neutrality 
is provided for by International Conventions and Germany is deter- 
mined to respect those Conventions.' 

"This declaration did not satisfy another member of the Social 
Democrat Party. Herr von Jagow said that he had nothing to add 
to the clear statement he had made respecting the relations between 
Germany and Belgium. 

"In answer to fresh enquiries by a member of the Social Democrat 
Party, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War, replied: 'Belgium 
plays no part in the causes which justify the proposed reorganisation 
of the German military system. That proposal is based on the situa- 
tion in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the 
neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international treaty.' 

"A member of the Progressive Party having once again spoken 
of Belgium, Herr von Jagow repeated that this declaration in regard 
to Belgium was sufficiently clear." 

Baron Beyens. 



No. 13. 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- 
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, August 1, 1914. 

Great Britain has asked Prance and Germany separately if they 
intend to respect Belgian territory in the event of its not being 
violated by their adversary. Germany's reply is awaited. France 
has replied in the affirmative. 



No. 14. 

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister 

for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, August 1, 1914. 

The British Ambassador has been instructed to enquire of the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of war, Germany 



THE BELGIAN GEEY BOOK (NO. 1) 369 

would respect Belgian neutrality, and I understand that the Minister 
replied that he was unable to answer the question. 



No. 15. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London. 

Sir, Brussels, August 1, 1914. 

I have the honour to inform you that the French Minister has 
made the following verbal communication to me: — 

"I am authorised to declare that, in the event of an international 
war, the French Government, in accordance with the declarations 
they have always made, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In 
the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, 
the French Government, to secure their own defence, might find it 
necessary to modify their attitude." 

I thanked his Excellency and added that we on our side had taken 
without delay all the measures necessary to ensure that our inde- 
pendence and our frontiers should be respected. 

Davignon. 



No. 16. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Minis- 
ters at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Peter sburgla. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 1, 1914. 

Carry out instructions contained in my despatch of the 24th 
July. 

Davignon. 
(See No. 2.) 



370 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 



No. 17. 

M . Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Minis- 
ters at Rome, The Hague, Luxemburg. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 1, 1914. 

Carry out instructions contained in my despatch of the 25th 
July. 

Davignon. 
(See No. 3.) 



No. 18. 

M. EyscTten, President of fhe Luxemburg Government, to M. Davi- 
gnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Luxemburg, August 2, 1914. 

I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency with the following 
facts: On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, 
according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand 
Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the 
bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly 
towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital 
of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with 
troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from 
"Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These 
occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the 
neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of 
London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to 
address an energetic protest against this aggression to the repre- 
sentatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An 
identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs at Berlin. 

Eyschen. 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 371 



No. 19. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Minis- 
ters at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. PetersburgJt. 

Sir, Brussels, August 2, 1914. 

I was careful to warn the German Minister through M. de Bas- 
sompierre that an announcement in the Brussels press by M. Klobu- 
kowski, French Minister, would make public the formal declaration 
which the latter had made to me on the 1st August. When I next 
met Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention, and added 
that up to the present he had not been instructed to make us an 
official communication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to 
the feelings of security, which we had the right to entertain towards 
our eastern neighbours. I at once replied that all that we knew of 
their intentions, as indicated in numerous previous conversations, did 
not allow us to doubt their perfect correctness towards Belgium. I 
added, however, that we should attach the greatest importance to 
the possession of a formal declaration, which the Belgian nation would 
hear of with joy and gratitude. 

Davignon. 



No. 20. 

Note presented by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at 
Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Imperial German Legation in Belgium. — Brussels, August 2, 1914. 

(Very Confidential.) 

Reliable information has been received by the German Govern- 
ment to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line 
of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt 
as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory 
against Germany. 

The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite 
of the utmost good-will, will be unable, without assistance, to repel 
so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success 



372 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Germany. It is 
essential for the self-defence of Germany that she should anticipate 
any such hostile attack. The German Government would, however, 
feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility 
against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents 
force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory. 

In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the 
German Government make the following declaration : — 

1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In 
the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain 
an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German 
Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee 
the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full. 

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to 
evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace. 

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in 
cooperation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessaries 
for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity 
for any damage that may have been caused by German troops. 

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular 
should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance 
of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, 
tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be 
compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy. 

In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards 
Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two 
States must be left to the decision of arms. 

The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope 
that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Govern- 
ment will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the 
occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the 
friendly ties which bind the two neighbouring States will grow 
stronger and more enduring. 



THE BELGIAN GEEY BOOK (NO. 1) 373 



No. 21. 

Memorandum of an Interview asked for at 1.30 a.m., on August 3, by 
Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, with Baron van der 
Elst, Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 

At 1.30 a.m. the German Minister asked to see Baron van der 
Elst. He told him that he had been instructed by his Government 
to inform the Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown 
bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in 
violation of international law, seeing that war had not been declared. 

The Secretary-General asked Herr von Below where these inci- 
dents had happened, and was told that it was in Germany. Baron 
van der Elst then observed that in that case he could not understand 
the object of this communication. Herr von Below stated that these 
acts, which were contrary to international law, were calculated to 
lead to the supposition that other acts, contrary to international law, 
would be committed by France. 



No. 22. 

Note communicated by M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister. 

Brussels, August 3, 1914 (7 a.m.). 

The German Government stated in their note of the 2nd August, 
1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended 
to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in 
spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, 
without assistance, an advance of French troops. 

The German Government, therefore, considered themselves com- 
pelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In 
these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government 
to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the 
conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and 
its possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium 
put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany 
would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the 



374 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the 
decision of arms. 

This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the 
Belgian Government. 

The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradic- 
tion to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name 
of the French Government. 

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality 
should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her interna- 
tional obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous 
resistance to the invader. 

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch for 
the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee 
of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the 
King of Prussia. 

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obliga- 
tions, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, 
and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for 
her neutrality. 

The attack upon her independence with which the German Gov- 
ernment threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of international 
law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law. 

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals 
submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and be- 
tray their duty towards Europe. 

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than 
eighty years in the civilisation of the world, they refuse to believe 
that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price 
of the violation of her neutrality. 

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly 
resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon 
their rights. 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 375 

No. 23. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tlte Belgian 
Ministers at St. PetersburgJi, Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, The 
Hague. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 3, 1914. 

At 7 p.m. last night Germany presented a note proposing friendly 
neutrality. This entailed free passage through Belgian territory, 
while guaranteeing the maintenance of the independence of Belgium 
and of her possessions on the conclusion of peace, and threatened, in 
the event of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time-limit 
of twelve hours was allowed within which to reply. 

Our answer has been that this infringement of our neutrality 
would be a flagrant violation of international law. To accept the 
German proposal would be to sacrifice the honour of the nation. 
Conscious of her duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel any attack 
by all the means in her power. 

Davignon. 



No. 24. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Peters- 
burgJi. 

Sir, Brussels, August 3, 1914 (12 noon). 

As you are aware, Germany has delivered to Belgium an ulti- 
matum which expires this morning, 3rd August, at 7 a.m. As no 
act of war has occurred up to the present, the Cabinet has decided 
that there is, for the moment, no need to appeal to the guaranteeing 
Powers. 

The French Minister has made the following statement to me 
upon the subject : — 

''Although I have received no instructions to make a declaration 
from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known 
intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal 



376 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

to the French Government as one of the Powers guaranteeing their 
neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to Bel- 
gium's appeal; if such an appeal were not made it is probable that, — 
unless of course exceptional measures were rendered necessary in 
self-defence — the French Government would not intervene until Bel- 
gium had taken some effective measure of resistance. ' ' 

I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French 
Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I 
informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal 
at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would decide 
later what ought to be done. 

Davignon. 



No. 25. 
His Majesty tJie King of the Belgians to His Majesty King George. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 3, 1914. 

Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship 
and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England 
in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I 
make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Maj- 
esty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium. 

Albert. 



No. 26. 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, August 3, 1914. 

I showed your telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who 
has laid it before the Cabinet. The Minister for Foreign Affairs 
has informed me that if our neutrality is violated it means war with 
Germany. 

Comte de Lalaing. 
(See No. 23.) 



THE BELGIAN GKEY BOOK (NO. 1) 377 



No. 27. 

Herr von Below SalesJce, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(The original is in French.) 

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914 (6 a.m.). 

In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to inform 
your Excellency that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian 
Government to entertain the well-intentioned proposals made to them 
by the German Government, the latter, to their deep regret, find 
themselves compelled to take — if necessary by force of arms — those 
measures of defence already foreshadowed as indispensable in view 
of the menace of France. 

von Below. 



No. 28. 

Note communicated by Sir Francis H. Villiers, BritisTi Minister at 
Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that if Ger- 
many brings pressure to bear upon Belgium with the object of 
forcing her to abandon her attitude of neutrality, His Britannic 
Majesty's Government expect Belgium to resist with all the means 
at her disposal. 

In that event, His Britannic Majesty's Government are prepared 
to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire, in tendering at 
once joint assistance to the Belgian Government with a view to 
resisting any forcible measures adopted by Germany against Belgium, 
and also offering a guarantee for the maintenance of the future inde- 
pendence and integrity of Belgium. 



378 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

No. 29. 

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, The Hague, August 4, 1914. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday evening 
that the Netherlands Government would perhaps be obliged, owing 
to the gravity of the present situation, to institute war buoying on 
the Scheldt. 

M. Loudon read me the draft of the note which would announce 
this decision to me. 

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the note 
in question which was communicated to me yesterday evening. 

As you will observe, the Scheldt will only be closed at night. By 
day navigation will be possible, but only with Dutch pilots who 
have been furnished with the necessary nautical instructions. In 
this way both Dutch interests in the defence of their territory, and 
Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp will be safeguarded. 

You will note that the Netherlands Government further ask that 
in the event of the war buoying being carried out, we should cause 
the lightships "Wielingen" and "Wandelaar" to be withdrawn in 
order to facilitate the maintenance of the neutrality of Dutch ter- 
ritory. 

I would point out that the phrase used in this note, " sailing up 
the Scheldt," is not sufficiently explicit; sailing down would be 
permitted under the same conditions. The Minister has, however, 
given me this assurance. 

As soon as the Netherlands Government have decided upon this 
exceptional measure I shall be informed of it. 

About six hours are necessary to carry out war buoying. 

I will at once telegraph to you. 

Baron Fallon. 



Note enclosed in No. 29. 

The Netherlands Government may be compelled, in order to 
maintain the neutrality of Dutch territory, to institute war buoying 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 379 

upon the Scheldt, that is to say, to move or modify a portion of 
the actual arrangement of buoys and lights. 

At the same time this special arrangement of buoys has been so 
drawn up that when it is brought into force it will still be possible 
to sail up the Scheldt as far as Antwerp by day, but only with Dutch 
pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instruc- 
tions. In thus acting the Netherlands Government are convinced 
that they will be able to serve equally both the Dutch interests in 
the defence of Netherlands territory and Belgian interests in the 
navigation of Antwerp. 

After the establishment of war buoying on the Scheldt, there 
would be no further reason to enter the tidal water of Flushing 
at night, and as the presence of the lightships "Wielingen" and 
"Wandelaar" is not indispensable to navigation by day, the Nether- 
lands Government would be much obliged if the Belgian Government 
would be good enough, in the event of the establishment of war buoy- 
ing, to withdraw these boats in order to facilitate the maintenance 
of the neutrality of Dutch territory. 



No. 30. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Minis- 
ters at London and Paris. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

The General Staff announces that Belgian territory has been 
violated at Gemmenich. 

Davignon. 



No. 31. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von 
Below Saleshe, German Minister at Brussels. 

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that from to-day 
the Belgian Government are unable to recognise your diplomatic 



380 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

status and cease to have official relations with you. Your Excellency 
will find enclosed the passports necessary for your departure with 
the staff of the legation. 

Davignon. 



No. 32. 

Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davi- 
gnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's 
note of the 4th August, and to inform you that I have entrusted the 
custody of the German Legation of Brussels to the care of my United 
States colleague. 

von Below. 



No. 33. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, 
Belgian Minister at Madrid. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

Please ask the Spanish Government if they will be good enough 
to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany, and whether in that 
event they will issue the necessary instructions to their Ambassador 
at Berlin. 

Davignon. 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 381 



No. 34. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Beyens, 
Belgian Minister at Berlin. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

The German Minister is leaving to-night; you should ask for 
your passports. We are requesting the Spanish Government to 
authorise the Spanish Ambassador to be good enough to take charge 
of Belgian interests in Germany. 

Davignon. 



No. 35. 

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Berlin, August 4, 1914. 

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of 
part of the speech made to-day in the Eeichstag by the Imperial Chan- 
cellor on the subject of the infamous violation of Belgian neutrality : — 

"We are in a state of legitimate defence, and necessity knows no 
law. 

' ' Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already 
entered Belgium. This is contrary to the dictates of international 
law. Prance has, it is true, declared at Brussels that she was pre- 
pared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was respected 
by her adversary. But we knew that France was ready to invade 
Belgium. France could wait ; we could not. A French attack upon 
our flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been fatal. 
We were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over the legitimate 
protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. For the 
wrong which we are thus doing, we will make reparation as soon as 
our military object is attained. 

" Anyone in such grave danger as ourselves, and who is struggling 
for his supreme welfare, can only be concerned with the means of 
extricating himself; we stand side by side with Austria." 



382 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg recognises, 
without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating international 
law by her invasion of Belgian territory and that she is committing 
a wrong against us. 

Baron Beyens. 



No. 36. 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Bavignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, London, August 4, 1914. 

I have the honour to inform you that in the House of Commons 
this afternoon the Prime Minister made a fresh statement with regard 
to the European crisis. 

After recalling the principal points set forth yesterday by Sir 
E. Grey, the Prime Minister read: — 

1. A telegram received from Sir F. Villiers this morning which 
gave the substance of the second ultimatum presented to the Belgian 
Government by the German Government, which had been sent to you 
this morning (see No. 27). 

2. Your telegram informing me of the violation of the frontier at 
Gemmenich, a copy of which I have given to Sir A. Nicolson. 

3. A telegram which the German Government addressed to its 
Ambassador in London this morning with the evident intention of 
misleading popular opinion as to its attitude. Here is the translation 
as published in one of this evening's newspapers: — 

"Please dispel any mistrust which may subsist on the part of 
the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating 
most positively the formal assurance that, even in the case of armed 
conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, 
annex Belgian territory. 

"Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we 
solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neu- 
trality. 

"It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian terri- 
tory without making at the time territorial acquisitions at the expense 
of Holland. 

"Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not 



THE BELGIAN GEEY BOOK (NO. 1) 383 

be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned 
according to absolutely unimpeachable information. 

"Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it 
being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance." 

Mr. Asquith then informed the House that in answer to this note 
of the German Government the British Government had repeated 
their proposal of last week, namely, that the German Government 
should give the same assurances as to Belgian neutrality as France 
had given last week both to England and to Belgium. The British 
Cabinet allowed the Berlin Cabinet till midnight to reply. 

COMTE DE LALAING. 



No. 37. 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, August 4, 1914. 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the British Min- 
isters in Norway, Holland, and Belgium, that Great Britain expects 
that these three kingdoms will resist German pressure and observe 
neutrality. Should they resist they will have the support of Great 
Britain, who is ready in that event, should the three above-mentioned 
Governments desire it, to join France and Russia, in offering an alli- 
ance to the said Governments for the purpose of resisting the use of 
force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain the 
future independence and integrity of the three kingdoms. I observed 
to him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity. The Minister for 
Foreign Affairs answered : This is in case her neutrality is violated. 

Comte de Lalaing. 



384 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 



No. 38. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Minis- 
ters at Paris, London, and St. PetersburgJi. 

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

I have the honour to inform you of the course of recent events 
as regards the relations of Belgium with certain of the Powers which 
guarantee her neutrality and independence. 

On the 31st July the British Minister made me a verbal com- 
munication according to which Sir E. Grey, in anticipation of a 
European war, had asked the German and French Governments 
separately if each of them were resolved to respect the neutrality 
of Belgium should that neutrality not be violated by any other 
Power. 

In view of existing treaties, Sir F. Villiers was instructed to bring 
this step to the knowledge of the Belgian Government, adding that 
Sir E. Grey presumed that Belgium was resolved to maintain her 
neutrality, and that she expected other Powers to respect it. 

I told the British Minister that we highly appreciated this com- 
munication, which was in accordance with our expectation, and I 
added that Great Britain, as well as the other Powers who had guaran- 
teed our independence, might rest fully assured of our firm deter- 
mination to maintain our neutrality; nor did it seem possible that 
our neutrality could be threatened by any of those States, with. whom 
we enjoyed the most cordial and frank relations. The Belgian Gov- 
ernment, I added, had given proof of this resolution by taking from 
now on all such military measures as seemed to them to be necessitated 
by the situation. 

In his turn the French Minister made a verbal communication 
on August 1st to the effect that he was authorised to inform the 
Belgian Government that in case of an international war the French 
Government, in conformity with their repeated declarations, would 
respect Belgian territory, and that they would not be induced to 
modify their attitude except in the event of the violation of Belgian 
neutrality by another Power. 

I thanked his Excellency, and added that we had already taken 
all the necessary precautions to ensure respect of our independence 
and our frontiers. 

On the morning of the 2nd August I had a fresh conversation 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 385 

with Sir F. Villiers, in the course of which he told me that he had 
lost no time in telegraphing our conversation of July 31st to his 
Government, and that he had been careful to quote accurately the 
solemn declaration which he had received of Belgium's intention to 
defend her frontiers from whichever side they might be invaded. 
He added: "We know that France has given you formal assurances, 
but Great Britain has received no reply from Berlin on this sub- 
ject/ ' 

The latter fact did not particularly affect me, since a declaration 
from the German Government might appear superfluous in view of 
existing treaties. Moreover, the Secretary of State had reaffirmed, 
at the meeting of the committee of the Reichstag of April 29th, 
1913, "that the neutrality of Belgium is established by treaty which 
Germany intends to respect.' ' 

The same day Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister, called 
at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 7 o'clock, and handed to me 
the enclosed note (see No. 20). The German Government gave the 
Belgian Government a time-limit of twelve hours within which to 
communicate their decision. 

No hesitation was possible as to the reply called for by the amazing 
proposal of the German Government. You will find a copy enclosed. 
(See No. 22.) 

The ultimatum expired at 7 a.m. on August 3rd. As at 10 o'clock 
no act of war had been committed, the Belgian Cabinet decided that 
there was no reason for the moment to appeal to the guaranteeing 
Powers. 

Towards mid-day the French Minister questioned me upon this 
point, and said: — 

"Although in view of the rapid march of events I have as yet 
received no instructions to make a declaration from my Govern- 
ment, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in say- 
ing that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French 
Government as one of the Powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the 
French Government would at once respond to Belgium's appeal; if 
such an appeal were not made it is probable that — unless, of course, 
exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence — the 
French Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken 
some effective measure of resistance.' 9 

I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French 
Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and 
I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal 



386 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would decide 
later what ought to be done. 

Finally, at 6 a.m. on August 4th, the German Minister made the 
following communication to me. (See No. 27.) 

The Cabinet is at the present moment deliberating on the ques- 
tion of an appeal to the Powers guaranteeing our neutrality. 

Davignon. 



No. 39. 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, August 4, 1914. 

Great Britain this morning called upon Germany to respect Bel- 
gian neutrality. The ultimatum says that whereas the note addressed 
by Germany to Belgium threatens the latter with an appeal to the 
force of arms if she opposes the passage of German troops ; and whereas 
Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich; and whereas Ger- 
many has refused to give Great Britain a similar assurance to that 
given last week by France ; therefore Great Britain must once again 
demand a satisfactory reply on the subject of the respect of Belgian 
neutrality and of the treaty to which Germany, no less than Great 
Britain, is a signatory. The ultimatum expires at midnight. 

In consequence of the British ultimatum to Germany, the British 
proposal which I telegraphed to you is cancelled for the time being. 

Comte de Lalaing. 
(See No. 37.) 



No. 40. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British, French, 
and Russian Ministers at Brussels. 

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

The Belgian Government regret to have to announce to your 
Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany entered 
Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements. 



THE BELGIAN GEEY BOOK (NO. 1) 387 

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist by all 
the means in their power. 

Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co- 
operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory. 

There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose the forcible 
measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same time, 
to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and in- 
tegrity of Belgium. 

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake 
the defence of her fortified places. 

Davignon. 



No. 41. 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, August 5, 1914. 

Germany, having rejected the British proposals, Great Britain 
has informed her that a state of war existed between the two coun- 
tries as from 11 o'clock. 

Comte de Lalaing. 



No. 42. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Paris, London, and St. PetersburgJi. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 5, 1914. 

After the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmenich, Belgium 
appealed to Great Britain, France, and Russia through their repre- 
sentatives at Brussels, to cooperate as guaranteeing Powers in the 
defence of her territory. 

Belgium undertakes the defence of her fortified places. 

Davignon. 



388 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 



No. 43. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tlte Belgian 
Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg^ 

Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914. 

In my despatch of August 4 (see No. 38) I had the honour to 
inform you of the sequence of events which had attended the inter- 
national relations of Belgium from July 31st to August 4th. I added 
that the Cabinet was considering the question whether Belgium, 
whose territory had been invaded since the morning, should appeal 
to the guarantee of the Powers. 

The Cabinet had decided in the affirmative when the British 
Minister informed me that the proposal which he had communicated 
to me, and according to which the British Government were disposed 
to respond favourably to our appeal to her as a guaranteeing Power, 
was cancelled for the time being. (See No. 37.) 

A telegram from London made it clear that this change of atti- 
tude was caused by an ultimatum from Great Britain giving Germany 
a time-limit of ten hours within which to evacuate Belgian territory 
and to respect Belgian neutrality. (See No. 39.) During the even- 
ing, the Belgian Government addressed to France, Great Britain, 
and Russia, through their respective representatives at Brussels, a 
note, of which a copy is enclosed herewith. (See No. 40.) 

As you will observe, Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, 
and Russia to cooperate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of 
her territory and in the maintenance for the future of the independ- 
ence and integrity of her territory. She will herself undertake the 
defence of her fortified places. 

As yet we are not aware how our appeal has been received. 

Davignon. 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 389 



No. 44. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Heads of Missions in all Countries having Diplomatic Relations 
with Belgium. 

Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914. 

By the treaty of April 18th, 1839, Prussia, France, Great Britain, 
Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty 
concluded on the same day between His Majesty the King of the 
Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty 
runs: "Belgium shall form a State independent and perpetually 
neutral.' ' Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations, 
she has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she 
has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that 
neutrality to be respected. 

In these circumstances the Belgian Government have learnt with 
deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a Power guaranteeing 
Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian territory in violation of the 
obligations undertaken by treaty. 

It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage 
against international law provoked by no act of ours. 

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel by all 
the means in their power the attack thus made upon their neutrality, 
and they recall the fact that, in virtue of article 10 of The Hague 
Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral 
Powers and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral Power 
repels, even by force, attacks on her neutrality such action cannot be 
considered as a hostile act. 

I have to request that you will ask at once for an audience with 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this despatch to his 
Excellency, handing him a copy. If the interview cannot be granted 
at once you should make the communication in question in writing. 

Davignon. 



390 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 



No. 45. 

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, August 5, 1914. 

I have received my passports and shall leave Berlin to-morrow 
morning for Holland with the staff of the legation. 

Baron Beyens. 



No. 46. 

Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) St. Sebastian, August 5, 1914. 

The Spanish Government undertake the custody of Belgian inter- 
ests in Germany, and are to-day sending telegraphic instructions to 
their Ambassador at Berlin. 

Baron Grenier. 
(See No. 33.) 



No. 47. 

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Paris, August 5, 1914. 

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the notification 
of a state of war between France and Germany, which has been 
communicated to me to-day. 

Baron Guillaume. 



THE BELGIAN GEEY BOOK (NO. 1) 391 



Enclosure in No. 47. 

Notification by the French Government to the Representatives of the 

Powers at Paris. 

The German Imperial Government, after having allowed its 
armed forces to cross the frontier, and to permit various acts of 
murder and pillage on French territory; after having violated the 
neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in defiance of the 
stipulations of the Convention of London, 11th May 1867, and of 
Convention V. of The Hague, 18th October 1907, on the rights and 
duties of Powers and persons in case of war on land (Articles 1 
and 2), Conventions which have been signed by the German Govern- 
ment; after having addressed an ultimatum to the Eoyal Govern- 
ment of Belgium with the object of requiring passage for German 
troops through Belgian territory in violation of the Treaties of the 
19th April 1839, which had been signed by them, and in violation of 
the above Convention of The Hague 

Have declared war on France at 6.45 p.m. on the 3rd August 
1914. 

In these circumstances the Government of the Republic find them- 
selves obliged on their side to have recourse to arms. 

They have in consequence the honour of informing by these 
presents the Government of Belgium that a state of war exists 
between France and Germany dating from 6.45 p.m. on 3rd August 
1914. 

The Government of the Republic protest before all civilised 
nations, and especially those Governments which have signed the 
Conventions and Treaties referred to above, against the violation by 
the German Empire of their international engagements, and they 
reserve full right for reprisals which they might find themselves 
brought to exercise against an enemy so little regardful of its plighted 
word. 

The Government of the Republic, who propose to observe the 
principles of the law of nations, will, during the hostilities, and 
assuming that reciprocity will be observed, act in accordance with 
the International Conventions signed by France concerning the law 
of war on land and sea. 

The present notification, made in accordance with Article 2 of 



392 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

the Third Convention of The Hague of the 18th October 1907, relating 
to the opening of hostilities and handed to. . . . 

Paris, August 4, 1914, 2 p.m. 



No. 48. 

Communication of August 5, from Sir Francis Villiers, British 
Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for For- 
eign Affairs. 

I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that His 
Britannic Majesty's Government consider joint action with a view 
to resisting Germany to be in force and to be justified by the Treaty 
of 1839. 



No. 49. 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, August 5, 1914. 

Great Britain agrees to take joint action in her capacity of 
guaranteeing Power for the defence of Belgian territory. The 
British fleet will ensure the free passage of the Scheldt for the 
provisioning of Antwerp. 

Comte de Lalaing. 



No. 50. 

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 5, 1914. 

The war buoying is about to be established. 

Baron Fallon. 
(See No. 29.) 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 393 



No. 51. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, 
Belgian Minister at Madrid. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 5, 1914. 

Please express to the Spanish Government the sincere thanks of 
the Belgian Government. 

Davignon. 
(See No. 46.) 



No. 52. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh. 

Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914. 

I have the honour to inform you that the French and Eussian 
Ministers made a communication to me this morning informing me 
of the willingness of their Governments to respond to our appeal, 
and to cooperate with Great Britain in the defence of Belgian 
territory. 

Davignon. 



No. 53. 

Jonkheer de Weede, Netherlands Minister at Brussels, to M. Davi- 
gnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Brussels, August 6, 1914. 

I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy 
of the special edition of the "Staatscourant," containing the declara- 
tion of the neutrality of the Netherlands in the war between Belgium 
and Germany, and between Great Britain and Germany. 

JONKHEER DE WEEDE. 



394 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 

Enclosure to No. 53. 
Laws, Decrees, Nominations, &c. 



Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies. 

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the 
Colonies, authorised to that effect by Her Majesty the Queen, make 
known to all whom it may concern that the Netherlands Government 
will observe strict neutrality in the war which has broken out between 
Great Britain and Germany, and Belgium and Germany, Powers 
friendly to the Netherlands, and that, with a view to the observance 
of this neutrality, the following dispositions have been taken: — 

Article 1. 

Within the limits of the territory of the State, including the 
territory of the Kingdom in Europe and the colonies and possessions 
in other parts of the world, no hostilities of any kind are permitted, 
neither may this territory serve as a base for hostile operations. 

Article 2. 

Neither the occupation of any part of the territory of the State 
by a belligerent nor the passage across this territory by land is 
permitted to the troops or convoys of munitions belonging to the 
belligerents, nor is the passage across the territory situated within 
the territorial waters of the Netherlands by the warships or ships 
assimilated thereto of the belligerents permitted. 

Article 3. 

Troops or soldiers belonging to the belligerents or destined for 
them arriving in the territory of the State by land will be immediately 
disarmed and interned until the termination of the war. 

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, 
who contravenes the provisions of Articles 2, 4, or 7, will not be per- 
mitted to leave the said territory until the end of the war. 



THE BELGIAN GEEY BOOK (NO. 1) 395 

Article 4. 

No warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to any of the 
belligerents shall have access to the said territory. 

Article 5. 

The provisions of Article 4 do not apply to : — 

1. Warships or ships assimilated thereto which are forced to enter 
the ports or roadstead of the State on account of damages or the 
state of the sea. Such ships may leave the said ports or roadsteads 
as soon as the circumstances which have driven them to take shelter 
there shall have ceased to exist. 

2. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent 
which anchor in a port or roadstead in the colonies or over-sea pos- 
sessions exclusively with the object of completing their provision of 
foodstuffs or fuel. These ships must leave as soon as the circum- 
stances which have forced them to anchor shall have ceased to exist, 
subject to the condition that their stay in the roadstead or port shall 
not exceed twenty-four hours. 

3. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent 
employed exclusively on a religious, scientific, or humanitarian 
mission. 

Article 6. 

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent 
may only execute such repairs in the ports and roadsteads of the 
State as are indispensable to their seaworthiness, and they may in no 
way increase their fighting capacities. 

Article 7. 

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent 
who may at the commencement of war be within the territory of the 
State must leave within twenty-four hours from the moment of the 
publication of this declaration. 

Article 8. 

If warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to different 
belligerents find themselves at the same time, in the conditions set 
forth in Article 5, in the same part of the world and within the 
territory of the State, a delay of at least twenty-four hours must 
elapse between the departure of each respective belligerent ship. 



396 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Except in special circumstances, the order of departure shall be 
determined by the order of arrival. A warship or ship assimilated 
thereto belonging to a belligerent may only leave the territory of the 
State twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant ship which 
flies the flag of another belligerent. 

Article 9. 

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent 
to which Articles 5 and 7 are applicable may only be provisioned 
with foodstuffs in the ports and roadsteads of the country to the 
extent necessary to bring their provisions up to the normal limit in 
time of peace. 

Similarly they can only be supplied with fuel to the extent 
necessary to enable them, with the stock they already have on board, 
to reach the nearest port of their own country. 

The same vessel cannot again be provided with fuel until a period 
of at least three months shall have elapsed since it was last provisioned 
in the territory of the State. 

Article 10. 

A prize may only be brought into Dutch territory if such prize is 
unnavigable, or unseaworthy, or short of fuel or foodstuffs. 

Such prize must leave as soon as the reasons which caused her to 
enter Dutch territory cease to exist. 

Should such prize fail to do so, immediate orders shall be given 
her to leave. In the event of a refusal, all possible means shall be 
employed to liberate the prize, with her officers and crew, and to 
intern the crew placed on board by the belligerent who has taken it 
as prize. 

Article 11. 

It is forbidden, in State territory, to form a corps of combatants 
or to open recruiting offices on behalf of the belligerents. 

Article 12. 

It is forbidden, in State territory, to take service on board warships 
or ships assimilated thereto. 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 397 

Article 13. 

It is forbidden, in State territory, to equip, arm, or man vessels 
intended for military purposes on behalf of a belligerent, or to furnish 
or deliver such vessels to a belligerent. 

Article 14. 

It is forbidden, in State territory, to supply arms or ammunition 
to warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or 
to come to their assistance in any manner whatsoever with a view to 
augment their crew or their equipment. 

Article 15. 

It is forbidden, in State territory, failing previous authorisation by 
the competent local authorities, to repair warships or ships assimi- 
lated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or to supply them with 
victuals or fuel. 

Article 16. 

It is forbidden, in State territory, to take part in the dismantling 
or repairing of prizes, except in so far as is necessary to make them 
seaworthy; also to purchase prizes or confiscated goods, and to receive 
them in exchange, in gift, or on deposit. 

Article 17. 

The State territory comprises the coastal waters to a distance of 
3 nautical miles, reckoning 60 to the degree of latitude, from low- 
water mark. 

As regards inlets, this distance of 3 nautical miles is measured 
from a straight line drawn across the inlet at the point nearest the 
entrance where the mouth of the inlet is not wider than 10 nautical 
miles, reckoning 60 to the degree of latitude. 

Article 18. 

Further, attention is called to Articles 100, Section 1, and 205 of 
the Penal Code; "Indisch Staatsblad," 1905, No. 62; Article 7, Sec- 
tion 4, of the Law respecting the status of Netherlands nationality, 
and respecting domicile ("Nederlandsch Staatsblad," 1892, No. 268; 
1910, No. 216) ; Article 2, No. 3, of the Law respecting the status of 
Netherlands nationality ("Nederlandsch Staatsblad/' 1910, No. 55; 



398 DOCUMENTS KELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 

"Indisch Staatsblad," 1910, No. 296; Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal 
Code of Surinam ; Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal Code of Curagoa) . 

Similarly, the attention of commanding officers, owners, and 
charterers of ships is called to the dangers and inconveniences to 
which they would expose themselves by disregarding the effective 
blockade of belligerents, by carrying contraband of war, or military 
despatches for belligerents (except in the course of the regular postal 
service) , or by rendering them other transport services. 

Any person guilty of the acts aforesaid would expose himself to 
all the consequences of those acts, and would not be able, as regards 
them, to obtain any protection or intervention on the part of the 
Netherlands Government. 



No. 54. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, 
Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 6, 1914. 

Please communicate the following note to the Netherlands Gov- 
ernment : — 

The Belgian Government have taken note of the establishment of 
war buoying on the Scheldt and of the fact that the Netherlands 
Government will ensure the maintenance of navigation. 

It would be convenient that navigation should be possible from 
30 minutes before sunrise to 30 minutes after sunset, and that the 
exchange of pilots should take place at Bath. 

With every desire to fall in with the requests of the Netherlands 
Government, the Belgian Government think that it is desirable in 
the interests of the littoral ports to retain the lightships of Wielingen 
and of Wandelaar, and also the buoys of the Wielingen Channel. 

Davignon. 
(See No. 50.) 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 399 

No. 55. 

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 6, 1914. 

Navigation on the Scheldt is allowed from daybreak ? and so long 
as it is light. The Wielingen buoys will be replaced. The exchange 
of pilots at Hansweert is easier and better organised. Are you 
particularly anxious to have Bath? 

Baron Fallon. 



No, 56. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, 
Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 7, 1914. 

Please express to the Netherlands Government the sincere thanks 
of the Belgian Government for the measures taken to secure naviga- 
tion on the Scheldt. The Belgian Government are in agreement with 
the Netherlands Government on the subject of the extent of naviga- 
tion. They had proposed Bath, but accept Hansweert, since this 
port has better facilities for the exchange of pilots. 

Davignon. 



No. 57. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Paris and London. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 7, 1914. 

Belgium trusts that the war will not be extended to Central 
Africa. The Governor of the Belgian Congo has received instruc- 
tions to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. Please ask the French 
Government [British Government] whether they intend to proclaim 



400 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

the neutrality of the French Congo [British colonies in the conven- 
tional basin of the Congo], in accordance with Article 11 of the 
General Act of Berlin. A telegram from Boma reports that hostili- 
ties are probable between the French and Germans in the Ubangi. 

Davignon. 



No. 58. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at Paris and London. 

Sir, Brussels, August 7, 1914. 

With reference to my telegram of this morning, I have the honour 
to request you to bring to the notice of the French [British] Govern- 
ment the following information: — 

While instructions have been sent to the Governor- General of the 
Congo to take defensive measures on the common frontiers of the 
Belgian colony and of the German colonies of East Africa and the 
Cameroons, the Belgian Government have suggested to that officer 
that he should abstain from all offensive action against those colonies. 

In view of the civilising mission common to colonising nations, 
the Belgian Government desire, in effect, for humanitarian reasons, 
not to extend the field of hostilities to Central Africa. They will, 
therefore, not take the initiative of putting such a strain on civilisa- 
tion in that region, and the military forces which they possess there 
will only go into action in the event of their having to repel a direct 
attack on their African possessions. 

I should be glad to learn whether the French [British] Govern- 
ment share this view and in that case whether it is their intention, 
during the present conflict, to avail themselves of Article 11 of the 
General Act of Berlin to neutralise such of their colonies as are 
contained in the conventional basin of the Congo. 

I am addressing an identic communication to your colleague at 
London [Paris]. 

Davignon. 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 401 



No. 59. 

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Paris, August 8, 1914. 

I have had the honour of speaking to the President of the Republic 
with respect to your telegram of yesterday. I had received it during 
the evening and had immediately communicated it to the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs. They asked for time to consider it before 
answering. 

M. Poincare has promised me to speak on this subject to-day to 
the Minister of the Colonies. At first sight he could see little diffi- 
culty in proclaiming the neutrality of the French Congo, but he 
nevertheless reserves his reply. He believes that acts of war have 
already taken place in the Ubangi. He has taken the opportunity 
to remind me that the protection accorded us by France extends also 
to our colonies and that we have nothing to fear. 

Baron Guillaume. 



No. 60. 

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 9, 1914. 

The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has begged me to 
convey to you the following information, the United States Minister 
at Brussels having declined to do so : — 

The fortress of Liege has been taken by assault after a brave 
defence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody 
encounters should have resulted from the attitude of the Belgian 
Government towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy 
into Belgium, it is only through the force of circumstances that she 
has had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave 
decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liege as a base for 
her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has 



402 DOCUMENTS EELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

upheld the honour of its arms by its heroic resistance to a very 
superior force, the German Government beg the King of the Belgians 
and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium the further horrors 
of war. The German Government are ready for any compact with 
Belgium which can be reconciled with their arrangements with 
France. (See No. 70.) Germany once more gives her solemn assur- 
ance that it is not her intention to appropriate Belgian territory to 
herself and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Ger- 
many is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war 
will allow her to do so. 

The United States Ambassador had asked his colleague to under- 
take this attempt at mediation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs 
has accepted this mission without enthusiasm. I have undertaken it 
to oblige him. 

Baron Fallon. 



No. 61. 

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, 

(Telegram.) Paris, August 9, 1914. 

The French Government are strongly inclined to proclaim the 
neutrality of the possessions in the conventional basin of the Congo 
and are begging Spain to make the suggestion at Berlin. 

Baron Guillaume. 
(See No. 59.) 



No. 62. 

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, The Hague, August 10, 1914. 

In response to a call on the telephone, yesterday evening at 9 
o'clock, I went to the Department for Foreign Affairs. 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 403 

Jonkheer London told me that my German colleague had just 
left his room, and had handed him a document which the United 
States representative at Brussels had declined to forward to you. 

The United States official in charge of the German Legation at 
Brussels stated that he had received no special instructions from 
Washington to intervene officially with the Belgian Government in 
the interest of Germany. 

The United States Minister consequently telegraphed to his col- 
league at The Hague, who informed the German representative of 
Mr. Whitlock's refusal. 

The German Government, therefore, took the initial step by ap- 
proaching the United States Ambassador at Berlin. 

In these circumstances, and in view of the urgency of these 
matters, Herr von Miiller begged Jonkheer Loudon to act as the 
intermediary of the German Government in this negotiation with 
you. 

His Excellency read me the German text of the document. I 
did not hide my astonishment at this attempt at mediation, and its 
poor chance of success in this form ; but, solely in order to oblige the 
Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, I promised to telegraph 
to you immediately ; and this I did yesterday. 

You will find the German document enclosed in original and 
translation. 

Baron Fallon. 



Enclosure in No. 62. 



The fortress of Liege has been taken by assault after a brave 
defence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody 
encounters should have resulted from the Belgian Government's atti- 
tude towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy into 
Belgium. It is only through the force of circumstances that she has 
had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave 
decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liege as a base for her 
further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld 
the honour of its arms in the most brilliant manner by its heroic 
resistance to a very superior force, the German Government beg the 
King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium 
the horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any 



404 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUEOPEAN WAR 

compact with Belgium which can in any way be reconciled with their 
arrangements with France. Germany gives once more her solemn 
assurance that she has not been animated by the intention of appro- 
priating Belgian territory for herself, and that such an intention is 
far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium 
as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so. 

The United States Ambassador here concurs in this attempt at 
mediation by his colleague in Brussels. 



No. 63. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, 
Belgian Minister at TJie Hague. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 10, 1914. 

The Belgian Government have received the proposals made to 
them by the German Government through the intermediary of the 
Netherlands Government. They will forward a reply shortly. 

Davignon. 
(See No. 62 and Enclosure.) 



No. 64. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, 
Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 10, 1914. 

Doubt exists as to the meaning of the word " Auseinanderset- 
zung," which you translate by "arrangement." Please ascertain 
whether the German Government have in mind any arrangements 
which we may have come to with France, or a settlement of the dis- 
pute between France and Germany. 

Davignon. 



THE BELGIAN GEEY BOOK (NO. 1) 405 



No. 65. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the British, 
Russian, and French Ministers at Brussels. 

Sir, Brussels, August 10, 1914. 

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Belgian 
Minister at The Hague, at the request of the Netherlands Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, has forwarded to us the following proposal from 
the German Government. (See Enclosure in No. 62.) 

The Belgian Government propose to return the following reply 
to this communication: — 

"The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats 
the proposal formulated in their ultimatum of August 2. Faith- 
ful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate 
her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3 her 
neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on 
her territory, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded 
loyally and without delay to her appeal. " 

The Belgian Government consider that the Powers guaranteeing 
the neutrality of Belgium should have cognisance of these documents. 

Davignon. 



No. 66. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian 
Ministers at London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh. 

Sir, Brussels, August 10, 1914. 

I have the honour to inform you of the circumstances which led 
to the departure of the Belgian representative from Luxemburg. 

The General Officer commanding the German troops in the Grand 
Duchy of Luxemburg informed the German Minister in that town, 
on August 8, of the desire of the military authorities for the depar- 
ture of the Belgian representative at the Grand Ducal Court. 

Herr von Buch addressed to Monsieur Eyschen, President of the 
Government, a note, of which the following is a translation : — 



406 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

"Your Excellency, "Luxemburg, August 8, 1914. 

"In consequence of the completely hostile attitude adopted by 
Belgium towards Germany, the military authorities find themselves 
obliged to insist upon the departure of the Belgian Minister from 
Luxemburg. 

"His Excellency the General Officer commanding begs Count 
van den Steen de Jehay to arrange his journey home in such a way 
that he may be able, within twenty-four hours, to see General von 
Ploetz at Coblentz, with a view to settling the details of the further 
stages of his journey. It is impossible for him to travel except via 
Treves-Coblentz. 

(Signed) von Buch." 

Monsieur Eyschen forwarded this note the same day to Count 
van den Steen de Jehay, accompanied by a letter in the following 
terms : — 

"Sir, "Luxemburg, August 8, 1914. 

"I greatly regret to have to communicate to you the enclosed 
copy of a note from the German Minister, informing me that the 
German military authorities demand your departure. 

"You will find in it the conditions which they attach thereto. 

"Herr von Buch told me that the military authorities advise you 
to travel by railway, as an attempt to carry out your journey by 
motor would expose you to being too frequently stopped for rea- 
sons connected with the control of the roads. But the choice is left 
to you. 

"The German Minister will come to me for your answer. 

"I cannot tell you how painful it is to me to fulfil my present 
task. I shall never forget the pleasant relations which have existed 
between us, and I hope that your journey may be carried out under 
the best possible conditions. 

(Signed) Eyschen." 

The Belgian Government, considering that the Grand Ducal 
Government had no choice in their attitude, and that the course they 
had been obliged to adopt in no way implied any discourteous inten- 
tion towards the King of the Belgians or towards Belgium, decided 
that there was no reason, in these circumstances, for requesting the 
Luxemburg Charge d' Affaires to leave Belgium. 

Davignon. 



THE BELGIAN GEEY BOOK (NO. 1) 407 



No. 67. 

Mr. WMtlock, United States Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Brussels, August 11, 1914. 

The United States Legation received a telegram to-day from Wash- 
ington, conveying the information that the United States Government 
had, at the request of the German Government, consented, as a matter 
of international courtesy, to undertake the protection of German 
subjects in Belgium. 

In accordance with the instructions contained in this telegram, 
we will, therefore, if you see no objection, undertake to use our good 
and friendly offices with the Belgian Government for the protection 
of German subjects. The pleasant relations which we have had with 
you in this matter up to the present convince me that we may con- 
tinue them, with the same object on the same pleasant footing. 

Brand Whitlock. 



No. 68. 

Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Brussels, August 11, 1914. 

I have telegraphed to Sir E. Grey the German communication 
and the proposed reply. 

I have received instructions to express to your Excellency the en- 
tire concurrence of His Britannic Majesty's Government. The latter 
can only declare their approval of the terms of the reply which the 
Belgian Government propose to give to this attempt to sow discord 
between the Powers at present united for the defence of the treaties 
violated by Germany. 

P. H. Villiers. 
(See No. 65.) 



408 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 



No. 69. 

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Brussels, August 11, 1914. 

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the French 
Government give their entire concurrence to the reply which the 
Belgian Government propose to return to the new German ultimatum. 

That reply is one which was to be expected from a Government 
and a people who have so heroically resisted the hateful violation 
of their territory. 

France will continue to fulfil her duties as a guaranteeing Power 
of Belgian neutrality and as a faithful friend of Belgium. 

Klobukowski. 
(See No. 65.) 



No. 70. 

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 12, 1914. 

The German text contained a mistake: instead of "seine 
Auseinandersetzung," it should read "ihre," and thus be translated 
" their conflict with France." Baron Fallon. 

(See No. 64.) 



No. 71. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, 
Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 12, 1914. 

Please communicate the following telegram to the Netherlands 
Minister for Foreign Affairs: — 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 409 

"The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats 
the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum of August 2nd. 
Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate 
her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3rd, her 
neutrality has been yiolated, a distressing war has been waged on 
her territory, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded 
loyally and without delay to her appeal/ ' 

Davignon. 



No. 72. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, August 13, 1914. 

Please thank the Belgian Government for their communication, 
and express to them the pleasure which the Russian Government feel 
at the firm and dignified attitude, upon which they are heartily to 
be congratulated. 

Sazonof. 
(See No. 65.) 



No. 73. 

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, The Hague, August 13, 1914. 

I had the honour to receive your telegram of yesterday, and I at 
once communicated to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs 
the Belgian reply to the second German proposal. 



410 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

His Excellency undertook to forward the Belgian communication 
to the German Minister forthwith. 



Baron Fallon. 



(See No. 71.) 



No. 74. 

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Paris, August 16, 1914. 

In the course of a conversation which I had this morning with 
M. de Margerie, I turned the conversation to colonial affairs and to 
the action which you had instructed me to take in your telegram 
and your despatch of the 7th instant. 

M. de Margerie reminded me that the French Government had 
approached Spain, but the latter had not answered before knowing 
the views of Great Britain. It seems that the latter has still given 
no answer. 

M. de Margerie considered that in view of the present situation 
Germany should be attacked wherever possible ; he believes that such 
is also the opinion of Great Britain, who certainly has claims to 
satisfy ; France wishes to get back that part of the Congo which she 
had been compelled to give up in consequence of the Agadir incident. 

M. de Margerie added that a success would not be difficult to 
obtain. 

Baron Guillaume. 
(See Nos. 57 and 58.) 



No. 75. 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, London, August 17, 1914. 

In reply to your despatch of August 7th, I have the honour to 
inform you that the British Government cannot agree to the Belgian 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 411 

proposal to respect the neutrality of the belligerent powers in the 
conventional basin of the Congo. 

German troops from German East Africa have already taken the 
offensive against the British Central African Protectorate. Further- 
more, British troops have already attacked the German port of 
Dar-es-Salaam, where they have destroyed the wireless telegraphy 
station. 

In these circumstances, the British Government, even if they 
were convinced from the political and strategical point of view of 
the utility of the Belgian proposal, would be unable to adopt it. 

The British Government believe that the forces they are sending 
to Africa will be sufficient to overcome all opposition. They will 
take every step in their power to prevent any risings of the native 
population. 

France is of the same opinion as Great Britain on account of 
German activity which has been noticed near Bonar and Ekododo. 

COMTE DE LALAING. 

(See Nos. 57 and 58.) 



No. 76. 

M. Tombeur, Belgian Vice-Governor of tlte Katanga, to M. Eenkin, 
Belgian Minister for fhe Colonies. 

(Telegram.) Elizabethville, August 26, 1914. 

The Germans are continuing their skirmishes on Tanganyika 
and attacked the port of Lukuga, on August 22nd. Two of their 
natives were killed and two wounded. Fresh attacks are expected. 

Tombeur. 



No. 77. 

Count Clary and Aldringen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at The 
Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Forwarded through the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.) 

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 28, 1914. 

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to 
inform your Excellency as follows: — 



412 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

"Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals made 
to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording her military 
assistance to France and Great Britain, both of which Powers have 
declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and whereas as has just been 
proved, Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to 
submit, under the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment 
contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity and inadmissible 
even towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria finds 
herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations and considers herself 
from this moment in a state of war with Belgium. I am leaving the 
country with the staff of the legation and I am entrusting the pro- 
tection of Austrian interests to the United States Minister in Belgium. 
The Austro-Hungarian Government are forwarding his passports to 
Count Errembault de Dudzeele. ? ' 

Clary. 



No. 78. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, 
Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

(Telegram.) Antwerp, August 29, 1914. 

Please inform the Austrian Legation through the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs that I have received Austria-Hungary's declaration 
of war against Belgium, and add the following: — 

" Belgium has always entertained friendly relations with all her 
neighbours without distinction. She has scrupulously fulfilled the 
duties imposed upon her by her neutrality. If she has not been able 
to accept Germany's proposals, it is because those proposals contem- 
plated the violation of her engagements toward Europe, engagements 
which form the conditions of the creation of the Belgian Kingdom. 
She had been unable to admit that a people, however weak they may 
be, can fail in their duty and sacrifice their honour by yielding to 
force. The Government have waited, not only until the ultimatum 
had expired, but also until Belgian territory had been violated by 
German troops, before appealing to France and Great Britain, guar- 
antors of her neutrality, under the same terms as are Germany and 
Austria-Hungary, to cooperate in the name and in virtue of the 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1) 413 

treaties in defence of Belgian territory. By repelling the invaders by 
force of arms, she has not even committed an hostile act as laid down 
by the provisions of Article 10 of The Hague Convention respecting 
the rights and duties of neutral Powers. 

"Germany herself has recognised that her attack constitutes a 
violation of international law, and, being unable to justify it, she has 
pleaded her strategical interests. 

"Belgium formally denies the allegation that Austrian and Hun- 
garian nationals have suffered treatment in Belgium contrary to the 
most primitive demands of humanity. 

"The Belgian Government, from the very commencement of hos- 
tilities, have issued the strictest orders for the protection of Austro- 
Hungarian persons and property." 

Davignon. 



No. 79. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian 

Ministers abroad. 

Sir, Antwerp., August 29, 1914. 

Under date of the 17th August, I addressed a despatch to the 
Belgian Minister at London, in which I felt bound to call attention 
to certain allegations made by the German Government which are 
mentioned in the Blue Book recently published by the British Gov- 
ernment. 

I have the honour to enclose for your information a copy of the 
despatch in question and of its enclosures. 

I request that you will bring its contents to the notice of the 
Government to which you are accredited. 

Davignon. 



414 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 



Enclosure 1 in No. 79. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count de 
Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London. 

Sir, Brussels, August 17, 1914. 

The Blue Book [No. 1] recently published by the British Govern- 
ment contains (see No. 122) the text of a telegram despatched from 
Berlin on the 31st July by Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, in which 
the following passage occurs : — 

"It appears from what he [His Excellency the Secretary of State] 
said, that the German Government consider that certain hostile acts 
have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, 
he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed 
under an embargo already." 

The incident to which the German Secretary of State alluded in 
his conversation with Sir E. Goschen, and which he considered as an 
hostile act on the part of Belgium, doubtless refers to the application 
of the Royal decree of the 30th July, which provisionally prohibited 
the export from Belgium of certain products. As you will see from 
the explanation in the following paragraph, the incident with which 
we are reproached has in no wise the character which Germany has 
wished to attribute to it. 

The Royal decrees dated the 30th July and published in the 
Moniteur beige the following day forbade, provisionally, the export, 
both by land and by sea, of a series of products, more especially of 
cereals. On the 31st July the German Minister at Brussels called 
my attention to the fact that the Antwerp customs were detaining 
cargoes of grain addressed to Germany, which, as they were merely 
transshipped in our port, were in reality only in transit. Herr von 
Below Saleske requested that the vessels carrying these cargoes should 
be allowed to depart freely. The very day on which the German Min- 
ister's request was received, the Foreign Office brought the matter to 
the notice of the Ministry of Finance, and the following day, the 2nd 
August, that Department informed us that instructions had been for- 
warded to the Belgian Customs giving full and entire satisfaction 
to Germany. 

I cannot do better than enclose, for your information, copies of the 
correspondence exchanged on this subject with Herr Below Saleske. 
You will observe that nothing in our attitude can be taken as showing 



THE BELGIAN GEEY BOOK (NO. 1) 415 

any hostile dispositions towards Germany; the steps taken by the 
Belgian Government at that time were nothing more than those simple 
precautions which it is the right and duty of every State to adopt in 
such exceptional circumstances. 

It would be as well that you should address a communication to the 
British Government in order to explain the real facts of the case. 

Davignon. 



Enclosure 2 in No. 79. 

Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914. 

I am informed from Antwerp that the Customs have forbidden 
the despatch of vessels containing cargoes of grain for Germany. 

In view of the fact that it is not in this case a question of the 
export of grain, but of grain in transit, the goods in question having 
been merely transshipped at Antwerp, I have the honour to ask your 
good offices in order that the vessels in question may be allowed to 
leave for Germany. 

At the same time I beg your Excellency to inform me if the port 
of Antwerp is closed for the transit of those goods specified in the 
Moniteur of to-day. 

Awaiting your Excellency's reply at your earliest possible con- 
venience, I have, &c. von Below Saleske. 



Enclosure 3 in No. 79. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von 
Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels. 

Sir, Brussels, August 1, 1914. 

In reply to your Excellency's note of the 31st July, I have the 
honour to inform you that the Belgian decree of the 30th July con- 
cerns only the export and not the transit of the products mentioned. 



416 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

I at once communicated your note to the Minister of Finance 
and begged him to issue precise instructions to the Customs officials 
in order that any error in the application of the above-mentioned 
decree might be avoided. 

Davignon. 



Enclosure 4 in No. 79. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von 
Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels. 

Sir, Brussels, August 3, 1914. 

With reference to the note which your Excellency was good enough 
to address to me on the 31st July, I have the honour to inform you 
that the Minister of Finance has instructed the Customs that the 
prohibitions established by the Royal decrees of the 30th July last, 
only apply to actual exports, and do not, therefore, extend to goods 
regularly declared in transit at the time of import. Moreover, when 
duty-free goods are declared to be for actual consumption, although 
they are really intended for export, they are commonly the object of 
special declarations of free entry which are considered as transit 
documents. In short, if it should happen that such goods had been 
declared as for consumption without restriction, as though they were 
to remain in the country, the Customs would still allow them to leave 
the country as soon as it had been duly established by despatch re- 
ceipts, bills of lading, &c, that they were to be exported forthwith 
in transit. 

I would add that the export of grain with which your note deals 
was authorised on the 1st August. 

Davignon. 



THE 
BELGIAN GREY BOOK 

(NO. 2) 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 1 



PART I. 

No. 1. 

The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Paris, February 22, 1913. 

In the course of the interview which I had this morning with M. 
de Margerie, formerly French Minister in China and Assistant to the 
Director-General of Political Affairs, he questioned me on the passing 
of our military law, its importance, its significance, its object, and its 
chances of success in Parliament. 

I gave a suitable reply, remarking, with all necessary reservations, 
that the close relations into which Great Britain had recently entered 
with certain Great Powers did not leave her in the same position to- 
wards us which she had formerly occupied, although the existence of 
a free and independent Belgium continues to be a vital necessity for 
her policy. Our wish is, if possible, to prevent Belgium from again 
becoming the battlefield of Europe, as she has been too often in the 
past. 

I added that it was the intention of Belgium to possess an army 
which should be strong enough to be taken seriously and which would 
allow her to fulfil completely her duty of safeguarding her inde- 
pendence and neutrality. 

"That is excellent," M. de Margerie replied, "but are not your 
new armaments actuated by the fear that your neutrality might be 
violated by France?" "No," I replied, "they are no more directed 
against France than against Germany; they are intended to prevent 
anyone, whoever he may be, from entering the country. M. Poincare 
has assured me that France would never take the initiative in violat- 

1 The Second Belgian Grey Booh. London : Printed under the authority 
of His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1915. No English translation was published 
by the Belgian Government. Title of publication in the original text: Royaume 
de Belgique. Correspondence Diplomatique Relative & la Guerre de 1914-1915, 
II, Paris, Librairie Hachette et Cie, 79, Boulevard Saint-Germain; Londres, 
18, King William Street, Strand, 1915. 

419 



420 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

ing our neutrality, but that if the German armies should enter 
Belgium and we should not be strong enough to drive them back, 
the Government of the Republic would consider themselves justified 
in taking whatever steps they thought expedient to defend French 
territory, either upon their own frontier or, if the General Staff 
thought it more expedient, to advance to meet the Imperial armies. 

"I cannot," I added, " doubt M. Poincare's word. I place every 
trust in his statements, and I am even bound to say that in my hum- 
ble opinion, and I only speak now as a private individual, it seems 
to me that strategically it would be more advantageous to Germany 
to make use of Belgium as a road whereby a blow could be struck at 
the heart of Prance not far from the capital, than it would be for 
the armies of the Republic to go and attack the German frontier in 
the neighbourhood of Aix-la-Chapelle. But, as I have already said, 
we are not relying on any balancing of probabilities; besides what 
may be true to-day may not be so to-morrow, since new circumstances 
may arise, and our sole object is to prevent, so far as our strength 
allows, any violation of our neutrality." 

M. de Margerie showed sustained interest in our conversation as 
to the defence of Belgium. I have no doubt that he will repeat what 
I said to those whom it concerns. 

Baron Guillaume. 



No. 2. 

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Berlin, April 2, 1914. 

The French Ambassador this morning communicated to me in con- 
fidence a conversation which he had had quite recently with Herr von 
Jagow after a private dinner at which he was the guest of the latter. 

During a recent absence of M. Cambon, the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies met the French Charge d 'Affaires at an evening party 
and, a few days afterwards, the Naval Attache, and said to them that 
Germany and France ought to come to an understanding as to the 
construction and linking-up of the railway lines which those coun- 
tries proposed to build in Africa in order that these lines should not 
compete with one another. 

M. Cambon asked the meaning of these overtures. Herr von 



THE BELGIAN GEEY BOOK (NO. 2) 421 

Jagow replied that the question was still under consideration, but 
that he, as well as Herr Solf, thought that an understanding between 
the two countries and also with England would be very useful. "In 
that case," replied the Ambassador, "it would be necessary to invite 
Belgium to confer with us, for that country is building new railway 
lines in the Congo, and in my view it would be preferable that the 
conference should take place at Brussels." 

"Oh no!" replied the Secretary of State, "for it is at the expense 
of Belgium that our agreement would have to be reached." — "How 
would that be?" — "Do you not think that King Leopold has placed 
too heavy a burden on the shoulders of Belgium? Belgium is not 
rich enough to develop this vast domain. It is an enterprise which 
is beyond her financial means and her power of expansion. She will 
be obliged to give it up." 

M. Cambon thought this view altogether exaggerated. 

Herr von Jagow did not consider himself beaten. He developed 
the view that only the Great Powers are in a condition to colonise. 
He disclosed even what was at the bottom of his mind, arguing that 
in the transformation which was going on in Europe to the advantage 
of the strongest nationalities, as a result of the development of eco- 
nomic forces and means of communication, small States could no 
longer lead the independent existence which they had enjoyed up to 
the present. They were destined to disappear or to gravitate into 
the orbit of the Great Powers. 

M. Cambon replied that these views were by no means those of 
France nor, so far as he knew, those of Great Britain ; that he still 
thought that certain agreements were necessary for the proper devel- 
opment of Africa, but that on the conditions set out by Herr von 
Jagow no understanding was possible. 

On receiving this reply Herr von Jagow hastened to say that he 
had only expressed his personal views and that he had only spoken 
in his private capacity and not as Secretary of State addressing the 
French Ambassador. 

M. Cambon, none the less, takes a very serious view of the opin- 
ions which Herr von Jagow did not hesitate to disclose in this con- 
versation. He thought that it was in our interest to know the views 
with which the official who directs the German policy is animated in 
respect to small States and their colonies. 

I thanked the Ambassador for his confidential communication. 
You will certainly appreciate its full gravity. 

Baron Beyens. 



422 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 



No. 3. 

The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Vienna, July 22, 1914. 

I have the honour to lay before you the information which I have 
been able to collect on the question of the relations between the Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Serbia. 

Ten days ago the attitude at the Ballplatz was very warlike. The 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and his principal advisers used very 
aggressive language. They appeared determined to give to the 
demarche about to be made at Belgrade a very energetic character 
and, foreseeing a refusal on the part of the Serbian Government to 
submit to all the conditions which were to be imposed, they showed 
no hesitation in admitting the necessity for armed intervention. Al- 
ready the numbers of the eight army corps to be used for the inva- 
sion of Serbia were mentioned, and people talked of nothing less than 
applying to this kingdom the treatment formerly inflicted upon 
Poland by dividing her territory between the neighbouring states. 
It seemed that Count Berchtold intended at one blow to take his re- 
venge for the successive checks which his policy has suffered during 
recent years. It was the practical application of the theory dear 
to those who have been preaching for long "that the Serbian ques- 
tion must be dealt with once and for all. ' ' 

In the inner circles of the Austrian Government there does not 
appear to have been any protest against such designs, and if the same 
view had been taken at Budapest it would not have been impossible 
that the Emperor, in spite of his leanings to peace, should have 
ranged himself with the unanimous opinion of his advisers. 

It is the Prime Minister of Hungary, who has twice visited 
Vienna, who tried to rein in these warlike ardours. As a prudent 
and far-sighted statesman, Count Tisza pointed out the great danger 
which lay in the Austro-Hungarian Government committing itself 
lightly to such an adventure, and insisted vigorously on the adop- 
tion of a more moderate attitude. 

Indeed, it seems very difficult not to come to the conclusion that 
an armed conflict between the Monarchy and her neighbour would 
contain at least the germ of a European conflagration. It is true that 
the Austro-Hungarian press, which talks every day of war with Ser- 



THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2) 423 

bia as not only possible but probable, affects to prophesy that the 
war would remain localised between these two Powers. "We should 
have the moral support of Germany," they say. "England and 
France will not be interested in the question, and Russia far from 
intervening will on the contrary advise Serbia to give us full satisfac- 
tion." This reasoning is evidently the fruit of a very exaggerated 
optimism. 

I cannot admit for a moment that the Serbian Government and 
the enlightened party in that country have any reason to reproach 
themselves for the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his 
wife, as many people here allege. On the contrary I am convinced 
that this unhappy event must have produced a painful impression in 
Serbia, since people there were in truth very anxious to maintain 
good relations with Austria-Hungary. 

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna, who goes away to-day on 
leave but declares himself ready to return to his post at the least 
alarm, declares that the Czar's Government will invite King Peter's 
counsellors to accept every demand addressed to them in courteous 
terms, and having a direct bearing on the murder. The same course 
would be taken with respect to the dissolution of certain societies 
whose irredentist tendencies are too much accentuated. "But," says 
M. Schebeko, "we should not allow Serbia to be made the subject of 
a general attack intended to discredit her." 

I have every reason to believe that M. Pashitch will follow the 
first part of this advice, but that he will show himself very determined 
if there should be any question of conditions which he could not fulfil 
legally or which would inflict a direct blow upon the national pride. 
In particular, so far as the dissolution of societies is concerned, it is 
worthy of remark that the Serbian constitution, which is very liberal, 
guarantees the right of association and in addition it is not a few so- 
cieties only which take the reconstitution of "Greater Serbia" for 
their political programme, but the whole population of the country 
cherishes this dream. 

What is more, the Prime Minister at Belgrade certainly takes into 
consideration that the whole of the mixture of jougo-Slavs who in- 
habit the south of the Monarchy is composed of Serbians, Bosnians, 
Slovenes, and Croates who are favourable to his cause. The latter, 
in spite of their difference of religion, are greatly dissatisfied with 
the regime to which Hungary subjects them, and the great majority 
of them, in spite of what is alleged here on the subject, extend their 
full sympathies to Serbia. 



424 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR 

Apart from the possible intervention of Russia and the uncertain 
part which might be played by Roumania, there is in this state of 
things a very real danger for Austria-Hungary, and Count Tisza's 
moderating words show it sufficiently. Will his influence prevail to 
the last? Count Berchtold has just gone to Ischl to report to the 
Emperor; it seems that the present uncertain situation cannot con- 
tinue for long, and that an early decision must be taken. 

Comtk Errembault de Dudzeele. 



No. 4. 

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. 

Sir, Berlin, July 24, 1914. 

The publication of the ultimatum addressed yesterday by the 
Cabinet of Vienna to that of Belgrade goes far beyond anything that 
the most pessimistic anticipations of which I informed you in my 
report of the 16th of this month had anticipated. Evidently Count 
Berchtold and Count